Holding

Section 21 of the Act, being pari materia with CPC Section 115, limits the High Court’s revisional power to jurisdictional errors and cannot disturb the Appellate Tribunal’s factual findings; the four transactions were made to avoid the ceiling law and lack compelling necessity, so they are excluded under Section 7(1).

Summary

The respondent, a holder of agricultural land under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, and his wife sold four parcels of land within a 15‑day period between 24‑Jan‑1971 and before the notified date. One sale was to the respondent’s father and three to others, with installment payments and a house constructed only after four years. The Land Reforms Tribunal initially held the transactions genuine, but the Appellate Tribunal reversed, finding they were made to evade the ceiling provisions. The High Court, exercising revision under Section 21 of the Act, again held the transactions genuine, setting aside the Appellate Tribunal. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that Section 21 is pari materia with CPC Section 115, conferring only limited revisional jurisdiction that cannot disturb pure findings of fact of the appellate tribunal. Moreover, the transactions were made in anticipation of and to avoid the Act without any compelling necessity, thus falling within Section 7(1) and must be excluded. Consequently, the High Court erred and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, exercising revision under Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, could interfere with the pure factual findings of the Appellate Tribunal regarding the genuineness and necessity of the four sale transactions.
Whether, assuming the High Court could examine the merits, the finding that the transactions were genuine and not made to evade the Act is sustainable.
Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in this matter.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973s. 21, s. 7(1)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 142, s. 39

Subjects

Land reformsAgricultural ceilingRevision jurisdictionSection 7(1)Section 21Genuine transactionCompelling necessityHigh Court revisionCPC Section 115Article 136Article 142

Judgment

--1·
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH A
v.
VATSAVYI KUMARA VENKATA KRISHNA VERMA

JANUARY 6, 1999
.., [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.] B

Tenancy and Land Laws :

Andhra Pradesh Land Refom1s (Ceiling on AgJicultural Holdings) Act,
1973 : Section 21.
c
Transfer of laiuJ-Made within a sh01t span of only 15 days between
24-1-1971 and before the notified date i.e., 1-1-1975-0ne sale transaction
was in favour of declarant's own father while the other three pertained to
highly valuable rich wet lands-Vendees of some transactions given facility of
·~
payment by instalments spread over years--Declarant constntcted house only D
after four years of the sale transactions-Held, Before any transaction is
upheld under S.7(1) it is to be shown that the transfer is not only genuine but
also had to be effected for some compelling reasons and was backed up by
some sort of necessity--ln the circumstances of the case, trans/ers are effected
in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding and defeating the provisions of E
the Act-High Cowt in revision e1Ted in holding sale transactions to be
genuine and not hit by S. 7( 1).

Section 21-Revision unde,.......//igh Court's power in-Nature of---,4.ppel-
"":- late Tribunal, the final court offacts, found declarant transfelTed lands with
F
a view to defeating the provisions of land ceiling Act-Held, S.21 is in pari
materia with S.115 CPC-Thus jurisdiction of High Court thereunder is not
an appellate jurisdiction-High Co wt, there/ore, ca1111ot inteifere with pure
findings offact-It can inteifere only when the findings of lower court suffer
from jurisdictional e1Tors--l11 the circumstances of the case, High Court e1Ted
in interfering with the pure findings offact while exercising jwisdiction under G
... S.21-Further; R.17(2) of A.P. Land Refom1s Rules cannot extend or curtail
the scope of S.21-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, S.115-A.P. Land Refom1s
(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974, R.17(2).

Constitutio11 of India, 1950: Articles 39, 136 and 142. H
1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A Beneficial Legislation-lnteiference with-By Supreme Court-Held, .,.
Supreme Court cannot countenance attempts to get out of the sweep of ""
legislation like Agricultural land ceili11g Act which is mea11t to subserve the
com111011 good--Decisio11 also co11tra1y to law laid down by Supreme
Court-Supreme Cowt cannot put an imp1imatur on illegal acts by refusing
to inteifere under Art. 136.
B
~
Administrative Law :
t
Subordinate Legislation-Scope and ambit of-Held, Cannot extend r
scope of substa11tive provisio11s of a11 Act. '
c The respondent was holding some agricultural lands which were
governed by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973. The respondent and his wife sold some of the lands
under four registered sale deeds within a short span of 15 days between
24-1-1971 and the notified date i.e. 1.1.1975. One sale transactioQ was in
D. favour of the respondent's own father while the other three. sale transac· ,.._
tions pertained to very highly valued potentially rich wet lands. The
vendees of some transactions were given the facility of payment by instal-
ments spread over years. The respondent constructed a house only after
four years of the sale of lands.

E The Land Reforms Tribunal held that the aforesaid four sale trans·
actions were genuine transactions and they were not made with a view to
circumventing the provisions of the Act. Consequently, excluding them ~:-

from consideration, the ceiling area and the surplus holdings of the
respondent were computed. However, the Land Reforms Appellate
F Tribunal held all that all the four transactions ought not be considered as
they were effected by the respondent and his wife in anticipation of and
~-
.
•
with a view to avoiding the provisions of the Act. But the High Court in
revision under Section 21 of the Act held that all the four transactions were ..
genuine and not hit by Section 7(1) of the Act. Hence this appeal.

G On behalf of the appellant it was contended that Section 21 of the
Act was in pari materia with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 and, therefore, the High Court erred in allowing the revision by
interfering with the pure findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate
Tribunal by exercising jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act; and that r.
H the respondent had no compelling reasons to effect the transfer of lands.
STATEv. VATSAVYIKUMARA VENKATAKRISHNA 3
...{
On behalf of the res11ondent it was contended that the High Court A
_,,, · had powers to interfere with the pure findings of fact by the Appellate
Court under Rule 17(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974 and that this Court in exercise of its
powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of.the constitution should'
refuse- to interfere with the order under appeal.
B
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. It is obvious that before any transaction is upheld under
. Section 7(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural
Holdings) Act, 1973, it is to be shown that the transfer was not only genuine c
· but also had to be effected for some compelling reason and was backed up
""·
by some sort of necessity. In the circumstances of the case, it has to be
held that the four transactions entered into by the respondent and his wife
in a span of only 15 days between 24-1-1971 and the notified date. i.e.,
1.1.1975 were effected in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding and
defeating the provisions of the Ceiling Act. The High Court, therefore, in D
·revision erred in holding that the transactions were genuine and thus not
hit by Section 7(1) of the Act. [13-D; 14-C]

Merla Venkata Rao v. State of AP, [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 245 and State
of AP v. SBPV Chalapathi Rao, [1995] 1 SCC 725, followed.
E
State of AP v. Tikkavarapu Balarami Reddy, (1977) 1 APW'452, held
inapplicable.

Ch. Adisesha Reddy v. State of AP, (1977) 2 APW 65 (SN) and
• Authorised Officer (LR) v. Venkata Narasayya, (1978) 1 ALT, overruled. F
2. Section 21 of the Act is in pari materia with Section 115 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is, therefore, obvious that the revisional juris-
diction under pari materia provision of Section 21 of the Act is not an
appellate jurisdiction and pure finding of fact reached by court of appeal
could not be interfered with. The Court can interfere in revision only when G
... it is satisfied that the findings reached by the court below suffer from any
jurisdictional errors. Further, Rule 17(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974 cannot either
extend or curtail the scope and ambit of Section 21 as enacted by the
Legislature. [10-C] H
4 .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
I-
A Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR (1963) SC 698 and
Managing Dire,ctor, (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway,
[19721 3 sec 195, relied on.

K. Rama Rao v.Authorised Officer, Gudivada, (1978) 2 APW '.7 (SN),
held inapplicable.
B ..
3. In the instant case, the decision of the High Court is contrary to
three-Judge Bench decisions of this Court in. Merla's case and SBPV
Chalapathi Rao's case. It is, therefore, obvious that any attempt to get out
of the sweep of such a legislation like the present one which is meant to
subserve the common good, cannot be countenanced. By refusing to exer-
c cise jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court cannot Jiii:

put an imprimatur on such an illegal act. [17-F·H]

Gpvt. of Union Territory of Pondicheny v. Mohamed Hussain, [1994)
5 sec 121, relied on.
D .,.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 272 of
1983.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.2.78 of the Andhra Pradesh
High <;:ourt in C.R.P. No. 3037 of 1977.
E
..
Anil Kumar Tandale for the Appellant.

P.S.R. Murthy, Ms. Sudha Gupta and B. Kanta Rao for the Respon-
dent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The State of Andhra Pradesh on grant of
special leave to appeal has brought in challenge the judgment and order.
dated 28.2.1978 rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Civil
Revision Petition No. 3037 of 1997.
G
A few facts leading to this appeal deserve to be noted at the out set.
.i·

The respondent was holding some agricultural lands in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. These lands were governed by the Andhra Pradesh Land
Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (Act 1 of 1973)
H (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act'). As per the provisions of the
STATE v. VATSAVY! KUMARA VENKATA KRISHNA [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 5
..j
said Act a person who was holding such lands would be entitled to retain A
possession of lands within the ceiling area permitted by the Act and the
excess lands had to be surrendered to the State. The respondent, therefore,
filed a declaration under Section 8(1) of the Act on behalf of his family
unit consisting of himself, his wife and two minor unmarried daughters. The
Land Reforms Tribunal, Kakinada, by its order dated 12.7.1976 held that
)'.
the holding of the respondent's unit was 1.6798 Standard Holdings, ,.rter
B
excluding certain lands alleged to have been sold by the respondent and
his wife under four registered sale Deeds, namely, Ex.A-1dated14.10.1971,
Ex.A-2 dated 1.10,1971, Ex.A-8 dated 29.9.1971 and Ex.A-14 dated
29.9.1971. As these four transactions prima facie attracted the provisions
of Section 7(1) of the Act, an enquiry had to be held as to whether these c
transactions were required to be disregarded for the purpose of computa-
tion of ceiling area of the respondent as per Section 7(1) of the Act. Section
7(1) of the Act reads as under :

"7. Special provision in respect of certain transfers, etc. already
made :- Where on or after the 24th January, 1971 but before the
D
notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of sale,
gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement, surrender or in
any other matter whatsoever, any land held by him or created a
trust of any land held by him, then the burden of proving that such
transfer or creation of trust has not been effected in anticipation E
of, and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any Jaw
relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings, shall
be on such person, and where he has not so proved, such transfer
or creation of trust, shall be disregarded for the purpose of the
... computation of the ceiling area of such person."
F
A mere look at the said provision shows that if any sale, gift,
usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement or surrender is effected by the
holder of the land between 24.1.1971 and the notified date which is defined
by Clause (m) of Section 3 of the Act as the one notified under sub-section
. (3) of Section 1 being 1.1.1975, then the burden of proving that such G
,;.
transfer or creation of trust had not been effected in anticipation of, and
, with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any ceiling law would
be on the holder of such lands. However, as per the provisions of sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 7, any such transactions effected after 2.5.1972 had to
be treated as null and void. Consequently, the relevant period for which an H
.'
6 SUPREME COURTREPO~TS · {1999] 1 $;C.R.

A enq~tt'~ had to.be made unde~ Section.7(1{ or' the A~ in cdlinection~th
the impugned transactions would be betweeri 24.1:1971 aii:d 2.5.1972. .In
other words,' if .the disputed sale transactions were effected. Withii). th!S.
·-
to
period, a burden ~a:s cast on the deciarant .to show the satisfaction of
the Ceilirtg authority that such. transactions. were not efficteJ in anticipa· .•
ti on of and with a view. to. avoiding or .defeatirig th~ . objects .of. the Act ..
B- relating. to declaration of cejling. area regarding his agricultural holding.
. · Accordingly, the aforesaicl four.tr~risactions ·fell for scrutiny of the Cerling
authority in the first in.stati.ce: The.Land Ref0rmsTribunal, Kakiriada by
its order dated 12.7.1976held that thesetransactions were not effected with.·
a view to avoiding the open1tion of the. Act and therefore, they were not ...
C taken into consideration iri computing the holdiiig.ofthe respondent. Itwas ··
held that these four sale transactions were genuine transactions aridthey
~ere riot made with a view . to. circumvent the provisions of the Act. .
Consequently, excluding them from consideration, the ceiliiig area anclthe
surplus holding of the respondent were computed.

D
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the appel-
1ant-State filed an appeal before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal,
Raja1!mundry. The Appellate Tribunal after hearing the parties, came to a
different conclusion on facts. By its judgment and order dated 19. 8.1977 it
allowed the appellant's appeal holding that Ex.A-8 and Ex.A-14 were true
E transactions and though Ex. A-1 and Ex.A-2 were nominal ones, still all of
them ought not to be considered as they were all effected by the respon-
dent and his wife in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding the
proviSions of the Act This decision of the Land Reforms Tribunal was
carried in revision under Section 21 of the Act by the respondent before
p . the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. A learned Single Judge of the High .
.,.
Court by the impugned judgment in revision disagreeing with the view of
the .~ppellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the two transactions
i.e. Ex. A-1 and Ex. A~2 were genuine and that Ex.A-1 & Ex. A-2 were
not nominal and the learned Judge thus disagreed with the finding of the
Appellant Tribunal.· So far as the other two transactions are concerned,
G agreeing with the view of the Appellate Tribunal that they were genuine it
was held thatall these transactions, even if they might have been entered
into .in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding any provisions of the
Ceiling law, they had to be excluded under section 7(1) of the Act they '
being true transactions. For coming to that conclusion reliance was placed
H by learned Single Judge of the High Court on two earlier decisions of the
STATEv. VATSAVYIKUMARA VENKATAKRISHNA[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 7

said High Court in Ch. Adisesha Reddy -.,. S~t~. ofAndhr~ Pradesh reported A
in (1977) 2 A.P.t.J. 65 (short Notes) and Authorised Officer (L.R.) v.
Ve11kata N~rasayya r~pottedin (1978)I.A.L'r. 112. In other words, accord-
ing to learned Single 'Judge oithe High 'cotirt as the transactions were
genuine, nothing further wa5 required to be done and had to .be treated to
have been entered into not with a view to defeating the provisions of the
B
Ceiling Act'" It is pertinent fo extract the actual reasoning of the learned
Single Judge in this connection.

"It is true that in all Ac.48.52 cents of land in a span of 15 days
in the months of September and October, 1971 was sold by the
petitioner and his wife, may be that they have entered into the C
transactions in anticipation of and with a view to avoid any
provision of any ceiling law that might be enacted in future. But
that does not matter provided the transactions are true transac-
tions."

D
As a result, ti).¢ reviSioh' petition w.as allowed and the Appellate
Tiib1mal's decision wa8 set aside and the decisi9n rendered by the Land
· Reforms Tribtinai, Kilkhiad~ 'was. restored. It is. this decision which has
·.. been broughi on thi;! anvil of scrutiny of tills Coutt by the State of Andhra
.
Pradesh
.
in
.
this a~peal as noted.earlier. . , .
'.. . . ' '

E
J,,ear~e.d c~imsd .for the. appellant. submitted that· c~n~idering the •
nature ofrevision under Secilon zi of the Act it was not for the High Court
to reconsider: the finding of fact <i!rived at by the Appellate Tribunal in
connection witli. the geniiinenes$ of these transactions anil also regarding
the object witl(which they \Vere entered m"to. It was submitte.d that the F
Appellate Tribunal had taken the View that out of the four transactions two
transactions were genuine and the :other two ~ere not genuine but nominal
yet all the four transactions were entered into durihg a period of fortnight
by the dedar;µit and his wife with a view to avoiding the operations of the
Ceiling law. That it was a pure finding of fact based on evidence led by the
declarant before the Land Reforms Tribunal. Tha~ there were no such G
clear recitals in the sale deeds that the transactions were entered int() with
a view to utilise the sale consideration raised from them for constructing a
house at. Kakinada. Hence, subsequent Oral evidence to that effect was not
believed by the final court of facts. That once the appellate court had not
- · --accepted that theory, the High Court could not have <1llowed the revision H
,-I

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A application by upsetting such a pure finding of fact, eirercising jurisdiction ·/>.-
under section 21 of the Act. It was next contended that even on merits, the
decision of the High Court cannot be sustained for the simple reason that
even if the transactions might be sustained as genuine, as held by the High
Court that was not sufficient to avoid the operation of Section 7(1) of the
Act as three Judge Benches of this Court in case of Merla Venkata Rao v.
B State of A.P. & Ors. reported in [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 245 and in the case of
State of A.P. v. S.B.P. V. Chalapathi Rao & Ors. reported in [1995] 1 SCC
725 have taken the view that under Section 7(1) of the Act, a declarant is
not only to show that the transactions were genuine, but that they were
entered into on account of some compelling necessity and that there was
c no such evidence in the present case especially in view of the fact that the
Appellant Tribunal as final Court of facts had held that there was no real
need for the declarant to enter into such transactions. Hence the presump-
tion under the Act, that they were entered into in anticipation of and with
a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of the Ceiling Act remained
unrebutted on record and such a finding reached by the Appellate
D
Tribunal, in any case, could not have been interfered with by the High )-·

Court even on merits.

Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, submitted
that though Section 21 of the Act is pari materia with Section 115 of the
E Code of Civil Procedure the limitation about exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 115, C.P.C. may not strictly be made applicable to the provisions
of Section 21 of the Act as this Section will have to be read with Rule 17(2)
of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings)
Rules, 197£! whereunder the A.P. Appellate Side Rules would apply to such
F revision applications mutatis mutandis. That it has been consistently held
by the High C0urt of Andhra Pradesh that if the decision rendered by the
Appellate Tribunal was patently erroneous, it could be set aside by the
High Court under Section 21 of the Act. It was emphatically submitted that
there was sufficient evidence led by the respondent to show that all these
four transactions were backed up by necessity inasmuch as a house had to
G be constructed at Kakinada by utilising the sale consideration and that the
Appellate Tribunal had itself come to the conclusion that out of the four
transactions two were genuine. He however fairly submitted that though "'
the High Court has not clearly held that there was any compelling necessity
underlying these transactions, the totality of the evidence which was on
H record suggested that such a finding was implicit in the High Court's
~
I

STATE v. VATSAVYI KUMARA VENKATAKRISHNA [S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 9

..I, decision. In the alternative, it was submitted that this Court in exercise of A
powers under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution may

-- not interfere with the order under appeal.

Having given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid rival conten-
tions, the following points arise for our consideration.
B
(i) Whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 21 of the Act was justified in interfering with the finding
of fact reached by the final court of fact namely, Appellate
Tribunal in connection with the genuineness and the necessity for
entering into the four impugned sale transactions ?
c
(ii) Even assuming that it was open to the High Court to
examine the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Tribunal
regarding these transactions, whether the decision rendered by the
High Court can be sustained on merits?
D
-;' (iii) Whether this is a fit case for our interferenc.e under Article
136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India ?

We shall dea1 these points seriatim;

Point No. (i) E
So far as this point is concerned, it will be necessary to note the
nature of the jurisdiction conferred by the Legislature on the High
Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Act
reads as under :
F
"21. Revision :- An application for revision from any party
aggrieved, including the Government, shall lie to the High Court,
within the prescribed period, from any order passed on appeal by
the Appellate Tribunal on any of the following grounds, namely :-
G
(a) that it exercised a jurisdiction not vested in i.t by law, or

(b) that it failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or

( c) that it acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or
with material irregularity." · . · 1 ·~ H
/ .. '

10 /' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A A mere look at the section shows that it is pari :nate1ia with Section
115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is identically worded.

So far as Section 115 is concerned, the scope and ambit of tht?
revision~! jurisdiction under the said Section as conferred on the High ·
. B Court is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court. It is obvious
that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. or for that matter
under pari materia provision of Section 21 of the Act is not an appellate
jurisdiction and pure finding of fact reached by the court of appeal could
not be interfered with. The Court can interfere in revision only when it is
satisfied that the findings reached by the court below suffer from any
C jurisdictional errors. In this connection, we may usefully refer to tWo
decisions of this Court. In the case of Hari Shankar & Ors. v. Rao Girdhari
Lal Chowdhury reported in AIR (1963) SC 698, Hidayatullah, J. speaking
for two other learned Judges distinguished revisional jurisdiction under
Section. 115 C.P.C. with revisional jurisdiction under other Acts which
D conferred wider jurisdiction on the High Court, the following observation
in paragraph 7 of the report deserve to be noted in this connection.

"7. The distinction between an appeal and a revision is ·a real
one. A right of appeal carry with it a right of rehearing on law as
E well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits
the rehearing in some way as,. we find, has been done in. second
· ·appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to
hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may
'satisfy itself that a. particular case has been decided according to
. law. Under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High .Court's
F powers are limited to see whether in a case decided there has been
:an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of
jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or
illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is
confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone."
G
The sanie view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the
case 'of The Managing Director, (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. & Anr. v.
Ajit Prasad Tarway reported in [1972] 3 SCC 195, wherein a three Judge
Bench'cifthis Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High
H Court under Section 115, C.P.C. had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
STAIBv. VATSAVYIKUMARA VENKATAKRISHNA{S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.) 11

order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error A
of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court
that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it
made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may
be in accordance with law· or may not be in accordance with law; but one
thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case B
). that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with
material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked
its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The aforesaid decisions of this Court clearly clinch the issue in favour
of the appellant. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it C
has to be held that while exercising pari materia jurisdiction under Section
21 of the Act, the High Court could not have interfered with pure findings
of fact reached by the Appellate Tribunal. It cannot be said that the
Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to take a contrary view than the
view taken by the Land Reforms Tribunal in connection with the legality D
and genuineness of the said four transactions entered into by the respon-
dent and his wife. The findings of fact reached by the final court of fact
could not have been set aside by the High Court exercising jurisdiction
under section 21 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent contended
that the High Court has acted in a more liberal way and accordingly the
decision rendered by the High Court may not be interfered with: That E
.might have been the earlier approach of the High Court but once the
question is raised. before us we cannot ignore the limited scope and ambit
of Section 21 .of the Act as enacted by the Legislature.

The attempt made by learned counsel for the respondent to enlarge F
)>.
the scope of S.21 of the Act by resorting to rule 17(2) of the AP. Land
·Reforms Rules aiso cannot be of any avail. A mere look at the said tule
shows that it deals with the procedu~e in filing revision applications to the
High Court under Section 21 of the Act. Rule 17 of the Andhra Pradesh
Larid Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974 reads as
under : (}

"17. Revision to High Court :- (1) The period for filing an
... application or revision to the High Court shall be ninety days from·
· the date of communication of the order and every such application
for revision shall bear a court fee of five rupees, if the value of the H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A proceedings to which the order sought to be received relates, does -~

I not exceed Rs. 1000, and of ten rupees if it exceeds Rs. 1000.

(2) The rules issued by the High Court, from time to time for
filing applications for revisions before it shall apply mutatis mutan-
dis to an application for revision under the Act."
B
..
So far as the first part of sub-rule(l) of Rule 17 is concerned, it deals
with the period for filing applications in the High Court and the amount
of court fees to be affixed. So far as sub- rule (2) is concerned, it says that
the rules issued by the High Court from time to time for filing applications
c for revision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the revision under Section 21
of the Act. Therefore, the procedure laid down by the Appellate Side Rules
for filing revision application under Section 115,. C.P.C. or under any other
Act may apply to revision application under Section 21 of the Act. It is
obvious that by such procedural rules, the scope and ambit of Section 21
D as enacted by the Legislature cannot either be extended nor can be
curtailed. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in the case of K. Rama Rao v. The Authorised Officer,
Gudivada, reported in (1978) 2A.P.L.J. 27 (Short Notes) on.which reliance
was placed by learned counsel for the respondent. In that case a learned
Single Judge of the High Court took the view that once a revision petition
E was admitted, the petitioner was entitled to urge all the grounds against
the order appealed against and the scope of the revision petition cannot
be restricted to part of the subject matter or only io certain grounds. In
that connection reference was made to Rule 17 of the Rules above referred
to ..It is difficult to appreciate as to how the said decision can be of any
F help to learned counsel for the respondent in the facts of the present case.
The reasoning adopted in that case by learned Single Judge in overruling
the contention about partial admission of revision application rested on the
Appellate Side Rules which stated that once the appeal is admitted, it is
to be posted for final hearing and that at the stage of admission, it could
not be partially admitted. In the present case, we are not concerned with
G such a situation as the revision application was admitted in accordance with
the jurisdiction conferred under Section 21 of the Act. This is not a case
A •
of partial admission of the revision application and partial rejection.
Hence, the aforesaid decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court cannot
advance the case of the respondent. Even otherwise, it is obvious that
H whatever the above rule might have said, the jurisdiction of the High Court
STATEv._VATSAVYIKUMARA VENKATAKRISHNA[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 13
J under Section 21 of the Act is to be culled out from Section 21 itself and A
the Rules as stated earlier cannot extend that jurisdiction. Consequently,
it must be held ~hat the impugned order passed in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 21 of the Act had travelled beyond the limited scop~ of
revisional jurisdiction while it tried to upset the pure findings of fact
reached by the final court of fact namely the Appellate Tribunal. Point No.
(i) therefore, is answered in favour of the appellant and against the
B
)-
respondent.

Point No. (ii) :

Having held the point No. (i) against the respondent we proceed to
c
examine the decision of the High Court on merits on the assumption that
the High Court was competent to examine the question on merits. That
takes to the consideration of this point. So far as this point is concerned,
it is to be kept in view that all these four sale deeds were entered into by
the respondent and his wife during the relevant period between 24.1.1971 D
and 2.5.1972. On this aspect there is no dispute between the parties. All
these four sale deeds saw the light of the day within a short span of 15
days. Ex. A-1 being registered sale deed dated 14.10.1971 was executed by
the respondent in respect of Ac.6.24 cents of wet lands for a consideration
of Rs. 13,000 in favour of P.W.1 who is none other than the respondent's E
father. Ex.A-2 is dated 1.10.1971. By this sale deed the respondent is said
to have sold Ac.22.83 cents dry land for Rs. 5,000 in favour of respondent
witness No. 2. These two transactions entered into by the respondent have
been followed by two more transactions entered into by his wife in favour
of other vendees. Ex.A-8 is a registered sale deed dated 29.9.1971 in
F
connection with wet lands of Ac.8.57 cents for a sum of Rs. 18,000 executed
by the respondent's wife in favour of witness No.3 and Ex. A-14 is another
' registered sale deed dated 29.9.1971 executed by the respondent's wife in
favour of P.W. 4 in connection with wet lands of Ac.10.88 cents for a
consideration of Rs. 20,000. It is pertinent to note that out of all these four
transactions three pertained to very highly valued potentially rich wet lands G
and one was regarding a large chunk of dry land. They were all effected
in a span of 15 days spread over between 29.9.1971 and 14.10.1971. The
first transaction by the respondent was in favour of his own father. The
recital in this transaction shows that the vendee under Ex. A-1 stated that
four days prior to this sale he sold his land situated in Chinasankarlapudi H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A village and 'as this land is contiguous to his own he purchased that from his
son. All these transactions were scrutinised by the Appellate Tribunal and ,
it came to th~ conclusion that the first two transactions e~tered into by the '.
respondent
. ,~
were
.
nominal in nature and the last two transactions
' -· . '
which
. . '
.
were entere~ into by respondent's wife though were genuine were not
B backed up by any real necessity and therefore, they could be said to have .
been entered into with a view to circumvent the provisions of the Ceiling
Act. In view of the fact that these four transactions were entered into by
the respondent and his wife in a span of only 15 days and that too one of
them was in favour of the respondent's own father and again three of them
pertain to wet lands which are naturally more valuable than dry lands as
C found by the Appellate Tribunal and by the last one large areas of dry land
was tried to 'be shielded off, they were rightly held to be effected by the
declarant and his wife in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding and
defeating the provisions of the Ceiling Act. These factual findings cannot
be said to be in any way uncalled for or not based on ~elevant ·evidence.
D These findings were clearly supported by evidence· on record. The case of
the respondent that out of the sale consideration obtained from t.hese four
transactions a house was constructed at Kakinada was rightly rejected by
the Appellate Tribunal on the giound that· the respondent himself had
given facility to the vendee of some of the transactions to pay up the ·
consideration money by instalments, spread over years. and even the per-
E missiOn to cons•ruct the house was obtained years tl).ereafter in 191:;-14
and the respondent constructed the hous.e oniy in 1975. Therefore, there ·
was no real nexus between the sale deeds and the necessity to. construct
the house.' Hence, the finding reached by the Appellate Tribunal that all
these four ,transactions were effected with a view to defeat the provisions '
F of the Ceiling Act cannot be said to be in any way e;roneous. Consequently .
the High Court was not justified in reversing t)lese findings even on merits.
In this connection, we may usefully refer to the decisions of three Judge .· •
Benches of this Courts in the case of Merla Ve1ikata Rao v. State of A:P. &
Ors. reported in (1995] Supp. 1 SCC 245 and in the case of State of A.P. v..
G S.B.P. V. Chalapathi Rao & Ors. reported in (1995] 1 SCC 725. In the first .
case, it was held by the Bench in connection with the impugned transac-
tions of sale between 24.1.1971 and 2.5.1972 that the High Court had
accepted the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that a large extent of 220
acres of land were alienated by the appellant and his wife within a short ·
H period of eight months between 4.6.1971 and 1.2.1972. lt was not the case ...

')
. · Sl;AIB v: VATSAVYIKlJMARA·VENKATA KRISHNA [S.B.MAJM:UOAR, J,)

. Qf theappellant that there was any pressure on the estate for. the discharge .
· of debts. or ·that the alienations were in fact made for discharge of or · ·
. meeti~1(any binding debts or for meeting the marriage or educatitmal
, expenses ofariy member of the family. On the the basis of this finding the
'. High Court heldthat the transactions in question were made in anticipation ...·
. 'of the Act. It has to be shoWI) that during the relevant period when th~
transactions irtquestions were effected, they were supported by any real ·
necessity or pressure on the estate for the discharge of the debts or that
the alienatfon were in fact made for discharge of or meeting any binding .
debts. Same view was reiterated with approval by a later deeision of this
· . Court. in S.B.f.V. Chalapllthi Rao (Supra). Interpreting Section 7(1) of this
. Att, .tlie following pertinent observations· were made by Kuldip Singh, J c
speaking for the three 'Judge Bench.

·"The provisions of the Act and the U.P. Act are not pari
mate1ia. under the U .P. Act where it is proved to the satisfaction
of the prescribed authority that the transfer of land in a given case
is in good faith, and satisfies other conditions laid down in clause D
(b) of the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 5, the transfer is
valid and cannot be ignored while determining the ceiling area of
the landowner. On the other hand, under the Act the bonafide or
genuine mature of the transfer or the same being made in good
faith has no relevance at all. What is required to be proved under E
the Act by the landowner is that the transfer was not made in
anticipation of and to avoid or defeat the provisions of the Act.
We are of the view that Section 7(1) of the Act not only requires the
transfer to be valid and genuine but also makes it obligatory for the
transferor to prove that there was some compelling reason to sell the
land at that point of time. Some sort of necessity or compulsion to F
sell the land has to be proved."

(Emphasis supplied)

It is therefore, obvious that before any transaction is upheld under
section 7(1) of the Act, it is to be shown that the transfer was not only G
genuine but also had to be effected for some compelling reason and was
backed up by some sort of necessity. In that case, this Court held that the
case of the declarant that the sale had to be affected for establishing a
sugar factory did not reveal any compelling necessity so that such transac-
tions can be saved under section 7(1) of the Act. It is interesting to note H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.
A that in the impugned judgment learned Judge, as already observed, has
taken the view that once the transactions were genuine, they have to be
excluded while computing the ceiling area of the respondent. The said
finding of the High Court obviously falls foul on the touchstone of Section
7(1) as interpreted by this Court in the case of S.B.P. V. Chalapathi Rao
B (supra). Learned counsel for the respondent was right when he contended
that the aforesaid liberal view of the High Court was holding the field
earlier and in this connection he referred to two decisions of the High
Court, in Ch. Adisesha Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1977)
2 A.P.L.J. 65 (Short Notes) aTld in Authorised Officer (L.R.) v. Venkata
Narasayya reported in (1978) I.A.L.T. 112. That may be so, but in the light
C of the aforesaid decisions of this Court the earlier view of the High Court
cannot be said to be well sustained and has to be held as impliedly
overruled.

Learned counsel for the respondent then invited our attention to the
D decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of The State of
Andhra Pradesh v. Tikkavarapu Balarami Reddy & Anr. reported in (1977)
1 A.P.L.J. 452 to demonstrate the legal position which was holding the field
in those days. In that case, Alladi Kuppuswami, J. (as he then was)
speaking for the Division Bench in paragraph 5 of the report observed as
follows:
E
"5. From a perusal of Section 7(1) of the Act which has been
extracted above, it is clear that in the case of alienations effected
between 24th January 1971 and the date of notification the burden
is upon the declarant to satisfy the Tribunal that they were not
F effected in anticipation or with a view to avoid or defeat the objects
of any law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural
holdings. There is in other words an initial presumption that such
alienations were made with a view to avoid or defeat the provisions
of the Act. But the Section itself contemplates that such a presump-
tion is rebutable and the burden is placed on the declarant to rebut
G that presumption. It is open to the declarant by satisfactory
evidence to prove that such alienations were made not with a view
to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling law, but in the
ordinary course. For example, a declarant may, by cogent evidence
satisfy the Tribunal that the alienations were effected by the
H declarant for discharging a debt, or for performing the marriage
SfATE v. VATSAvYI KUMARA VENKATA KRISHNA (S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 17

of his children, or those dependent on him, or for incurring urgent A
medical expenses etc. These examples are not exhaustive and are
intended only to serve as illustrations to show that the mere fact
that the alienations were made after 24.1.1971 does not necessarily
mean they were made with intent to defeat or avoid the provisions
of the Act but may have been made in the usual course ..... "
B
In the aforesaid decision the High Court upheld sale transactions for
setting up of a distillary. In the first part of the passage, so far as the
observations on the scope of Section 7(1) of the Act are concerned, they
do not appear to be inconsistent with the ratio of the decisions of this Court
as aforesaid. But we cannot agree with the manner in which the said ratio C
was applied to the facts in that case, merely because a distillary was being
set up. Such type of sale transactions were not accepted by this Court in
S.B.P. V. Chalapathi Rao's case (Supra) where, in similar circumstances, a
transaction of sale for establishing sugar factory was not held to be backed
up by any compelling necessity. Consequently, even on merits, it is to be D
held that no case was made out by the respondent for interference of the
High Court with the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. Issue No.(ii)
therefore, is also answered in favour of the appellant and against the
respondent. That takes us to the consideration of Point No. (iii).

Point No. (iii) : E

It is true that this Court is called upon to exercise jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. On the facts of the present case,
in our opinion this is not a case where we should refuse to interfere under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India as the decision rendered by the p
·learned Single Judge of the High Court is clearly contrary to two decisions
of three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Merla Venkata Rao &
S.B.P. V. Chalapathi Rao (supra). On facts, we have found that these
transactions in question were entered into in anticipation of and with a
view to avoiding and defeating the provisions of the Act as held by the
Appellate Tribunal. This finding is found by us to be well sustained on the G
basis of evidence on record. Once it is so held, it is obvious that any attempt
to get out of the sweep of such a legislation like the present which is meant
to subserve the common good, cannot be countenanced and by refusing to
exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India we
cannot put imprimatur on such an illegal act. As held by this Court in the H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1999] 1 S.C.R. ·.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.