Holding

A conviction may rest on a dying declaration without corroboration if the court is satisfied of its truthfulness, but the dying declaration here was not reliable, so the appeal was dismissed.

Summary

The State of Assam charged Sub‑Inspector Mafizuddin Ahmed with murder for allegedly pouring kerosene on his wife and setting her on fire. The prosecution relied on the victim's dying declaration recorded by a magistrate, an oral statement to her uncle, and the testimony of her 7‑year‑old son. The trial court convicted, but the Gauhati High Court acquitted, holding the dying declaration and child testimony were unreliable. On appeal, the Supreme Court reiterated that a dying declaration can alone support a conviction if the court is satisfied of its truthfulness, but found the declaration in this case doubtful due to the delay, identity discrepancy, and possible influence, and also deemed the child’s testimony coached. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Issues considered

Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a dying declaration without corroborative evidence?
Whether the dying declaration in this case is trustworthy given the delay and possible influence by the uncle.
Whether the testimony of a child witness, who may have been tutored, can be relied upon as corroboration.
Does the discrepancy in the husband's name in the dying declaration affect its admissibility?
Whether the prosecution evidence meets the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

dying declarationcorroborationchild witnessmurder convictionIndian Evidence ActIPC s.302reliability of testimonyappeal

Judgment

241
A
STATE OF ASSAM

v.
MAFIZUDDIN AHMED
8
January 14, 1983

[D.A. DESAI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ ,)

P•nal Cod•-Sectio~ !!02-Conviction if could be baa.d on dying declara-
tion which la not corroborated. •
c
Evidence Act-/)ying decfaration-Accu1ed, if could be conVicttld on dying
declaration which is not corroborated-Evidence of child witne1s-lf could be
accepted.

The prosecution case against the . respondent was that after marrying for
a second time he startCd ill.treating his first wife, t be deceased, and that on the
day of tho occurrence (10th April, 1983) he poured kerosene oil on her a.nd set D
fire to her body. When the deceased started screaming he gagged her and
wrapped her with a quilt and threw her oa the floor and in the process ho
himself received burn injuries on his hands-. A week later on the 18th April~
1973 when the uncle of the deceased called on her at the hospital and enquired
as to how it happened, 1he told him that her husband poured kerosene oil and
set fire to her body. He· then reported the matt~r to the police. Since her
condition was precarious, a Magistrate recorded her dying declaration. E
The respondent's case on the other hand was that on the day of the
occurrence when bis wife's garments accidentally caught fire when ..his house
caught fire he attempted to extinguish the fire by coveriiig her with a quilt and
in the process he himself had received bum injuries.

Believing the evidence of the son of the deceased, a boy of 7 years, and F
the dying.declarations made to her uncle and the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge
held that the charge under s. 302 I.P.C. was established. But the High Court
did not find it safe to convict him on the ba~is of the dying declarations and
the statement of the child witness and acquitted him of the charge.

In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the State that evon
if there was n~ e\•idence oD. record to corroborate the dying declarations the G
respondent's conviction could be based on the dying declaration.

Dismissing the appeal,

• HELD : It is well settled that, even in the absence of other corroborating
evidence, there can be a conviction on the basis of a dying dec.laration provided
that the Court is satisfied about the truthfulness of the dying dqqlaratlon anq
that it is not vitiated in any 9tb~r manner. ~246 !!·CJ ··
242 slJPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 2 8.C.&.

A Maniappan v. The Statt of Madras, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 869, Khushal Rao v.
State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 552, and Lallubhai Devechand Shah & Ors. v.
State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1776 reforred to.

In the instant case even though the occurrence took place on 10th April
and the deceased was alive till 18th April, she did not disclose either to the
villagers who visited her or to the doctor or the nurse attending on her that her
B husband.sprinkled kerosene oil and se:t her on fire. There was no evidence that
she was not in a position to speak or that she was unconscious between 10th
Apr ii and 18th April. It was only on the 18th April that she made an oral
dying declaration for the first time to her uncle and later to the Magistrate.
And secondJy the name of the husband of the deceased in the dying declaration
was shown as Mohitin Ali aod not the real nan1e Mafijuddin Ahmed. The
doctor, W:i whose presence the dying decJaration was recorded, did not state that
c the declarant was the deceased; he orlly stated that the Magistrate recorded the
statement of a patient of bis unit who bad received the burn injury. Therefore
the probability of her statement being inspired by her uncle cannot be weeded
out. The aforesaid circumstances do cast doubt on the truthfulness of the
dying declaration. [246 D·H, 247 A-CJ

From the tenor of the evidence of the son of the deceased, a boy of about
7 years, it is evident that h~ was vadllati-ng throughou(and that he was not a free
agent but he bad been tutored. H1~ said that he \Vas in the mango grove at the
D time of the occurrence ; that his uncle taught him to tell the police that be was
in the grove at the time of occurrence; that it was the house that caught fire
first; that his father poured kerosene oil on bis mother and set fii"e to her. He
also said that his father poured sented oil on his mother's body and not kerosene
oil. On the application of Alimuddin Ahmed the son of the accused was kept in
·the custody of his wife and thus to a11 intents and purpos<. s the custody of the
boy remained with the uncle of tbe deceased and his wife. [247 E-H, 248 A, D·E]
E
The fact that th~ reswndent covered the deceased with quilt to extinguish
the fire and in the process had himse1f got burn injuries on his hands also lend
support to the defence version. [248 F]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDILTION: Criminal Appeal No. 401
of 1976.

Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 26th September, 1976 of the Gauhati High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 18 of 1975.
G
S.K. Nandy and Krishna Prosad for the Appellant. ·
D. Goburdhan for the Respondent.

The Judgment of lhe Court was delivered by
H
MISRA, J. The pmsent appeal by special leave has been filed
b.Y the State of Assam asain~t .the judgment of the Gauhati High
ASSAM v. MAFIZUI>DIN AHMBt> (Misra, J.) 243

Court dated 25th of September, 1975 whereby it set aside the con- A
viction of the respondent Mafizuddin Ahmed .and acquitted him of
the charge of murder.

The prosecution case as unfolded in the first information report
and the evidence is that the respondent Mafizuddin Ahmed was a
sub-Inspector of Police posted at Gauhati. His wife and children B
lived at his village home at Bholagaon within the Palashbari Police
Station. The respondent had first married Jaygun Bibi and had one ·
son and two daughters from her. Later on he married another lady
Smi. Lal Bari and thereafter he started maltreating Jaygun Bibi. On
10th of April 1973 he went to his viilage home and at about 2 p.m. be
poured kerosene oil on his wife Jaygun Bibi an.cl set fire to her body c
with the help of a match box. When she screamed the accused
gagged her mouth and then wrapped her with a quilt and threw her
on the floor. In so doing the respondent himself received some
bum injuries on bis hands. The village people bearing the cries
came there and they took Jaygun Bibi as well as the respondent· D
accused to the Gaubati Medical College Hospital where they were
admitted for treatment.
Alimuddin Ahmed was the nncle of Jaygun Bibi and lived at a
distance of 6 miles from the house of the respondent. He received a
news that the house of the respondent had burnt and that Mafizuddin
and Jaygun Bibi had sustained burn injuries. A few days thereafter
E
Alimuddin Ahmed's brother developed tetanus. He got him admit!·
ed in the Isolation Hospital at Kalapahar, Gauhati. From there he
went to Gauhati Medical College Hospital on 18th April, 1973 to
see how Jaygun Bibi was faring. He met Jaygun Bibi and asked her
bow if happened and then she told that her husband had poured
kerosene oil on her body and set fire. He, thereupon went to the
Sadar Police Station and made a report (Ex. 3). On receipt of the
report police arranged for recording the dying declaration of Jaygun
Bibi by a Magistrate as her condition was considered precarious.
Shri A.C. Bhuyan (PW 2) recorded the dying declaration of Jaygun
Bibi. Eventually Jaygun Bibi succumb~d to her injuries on that very G
day.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. His plea was one
of denial. He, however, admitted that on 10th of April, 1973 his wife
received serious burn injuries and later died as a result of her in- H
juries at the Ganhati Medical College Hospital. His case was that
on 10th April, 1973 bis house at Bholagaon caught fire and at that
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] 2 s.c.1.

A time bis wife wearing garments also accidently canght fire. Having
seen this he tried to extinguish the fire on her body by covering her
with a quilt and in doing so be himself received some burn injuries.
He flately denied that be poured kerosene oil on her body and then
set fire as alleged.

B The only eye witness in the case is Mantaz Ali the son of the
deceased Jaygun Bibi and the accused-respondent. He was of only
5 years and odd at the time of occurrence and of 7 years
and odd at the time of his deposition. The other material
evidence relied upon by the prosecution are the two dying declara-
tions, one being oral made to Alimuddin Ahmed, the uncle, and the
c other being writtel) dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate
Shri A.C. Bhuyan, PW 2.

The Sessions Judge on a consideration of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution found that the charge under s. 302 IPC was fully
brought home to the accused and accordingly convicted him there-
D under and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High·
Court set aside the order of conviction and acquitted the respondent
of the charge. The State of Assam bas, as stated earlier, filed the
above appeal by obtaining a• special leave.

The contention raised before the High Court on behalf of the
E respondent was that the evidence was too meagre and unreliable to
snsta.in the conviction and the learned Sessions Judge failed to
properly appreciate the same. The evidence which bas been relied
upon by the Sessions Judge for convicting the respondent was the
evidence of the eye witnes•I Mantaz Ali, the child witness, and the
two dying declarations, on': oral and the other written for convicting
F the respondent. The High Court, however, did not find it safe to
convict the respondent on the basis of dying declaration and the '
statement of PW 7.

It has b<en contend1id for the State of Assam that the convic-
tion could be based upon the dying declaration even if there is no
G other corroborating evidence on the record and reference was made
to Tarachand Damu Sutar v. The State of Maharashtra(') and
Maniappari v. The State ~f Madras.(') Mr. Goverdhan, counsel for
the respondent-accused, on the other band contends that the dying

H
lll [ 1962) 2 S.C.R. 775.
(2) [1962] 3 S.C.R 869.
ASSAM v. MAFIZUDDIN AHMED (Misra, J.) 245

declaration alone without corroboration cannot be made the basis A
of convicting the respondent and referred to Madhoprasad v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh(').

This Court has consistently taken the view that conviction can
be based upon the dying declaration alone. In Maniappan's case
_(supra) the dying declaration was a completed statement which was B
- categorical in character and there was nothing to show that the
victim had anythi11g more to say. This Court held that the dying
declaration needed no corroboration and could be relied upon. In
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay(') this Court held :

" ... in our opinion, there is no absolute rule of law, or c
even a rule of prudence which has ripened into a rule of
law, that a dying declaration unless corroborated by other
independent evidence, is not fit to tie acted upon, and
made the basis of a conviction."

The Court referred to the following observation made in Madho I)
Prasad' s case (supra) :

"It is settled law that it is not safe to convict an
accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying
declaration without further corroboration because such a
statement is not made on oath and is not subject to cross· E
examination and because the maker of it might be mentally
and physically in a state of confusion and might well be
drawing upon his imagination while he was making the
declaration. It is in this light that the different dying
declarations made by the deceased and sought to be proved
in the case have to be considered."

and observed that they were in the nature of obiter dicta.

In La/lubhai Devechand Shah & Ors. v. State of Gujarat(')
dealing with a dying declaration this Court laid down :
G
"The law with regard to dying declarations is very
clear. A dying declaration must be closely' scrutinised as
to its truthfulness like any other important piece of

(I) AIR 1953 SC 420. H
(2) (1958] S.C.R. 522.
(3) AIR 1976 S.C. 1776.

-~---<o-
246 SUPRl!Mll', COURT RBPORTS [1983) 2 s.c.R.

A evidence in the light of the surrounding facts and circum-
stances of the case, buaring in mind on the one hand, that
the statement is by a person who has not been examined
in court on oath and, on the other hand, that the dying
man is normally not likely to implicate innocent person
falsely."
B
Thus, the law is now well settled that there can be conviction on the·
basis of dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to have a
corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that the dying decla- ~
ration is a truthful dying declaration and not vitiated in any other
manner.
c
We, therefore, find considerable force in the contention of
the counsel for the State of Assam that there can be a conviction on
the basis of dying declaration even in the absence of other corrobo-
rating evidence but before doing so, the Court has to be satisfied
about the tru,thfulness of the dying declaration.
D
In the instant case, the occurrence took place on the I 0th of
April, 1973. The deceased was alive upto 18th of April 1973.
She did not disclose ~earlier to anyone she met in the hospital
t~at her husband sprinkled kerosene oil and set her on fire.
She met so many people after the occurrence -she met the village
E people who appeared on the scene just after the occurrence and who
took-her to hospital. She did not disclose the story to the doctor
or the nurse attending on her. There is no evidence of the doctor
on the record that she was not in a position to speak or that she
had become unconscious between 10th of April and I 8th of April. It
is only when her uncle met ·her on the 18th of April that she made
F an oral dying declaration to him and later to the Magistrate who
r
recorded her statement. This throws doubt on the dying declaration
made by Jaygun Bibi and this circumstance weighed with the High
Court in discarding the dying declaration of the deceased. The
High Court discarded the dying declaration on yet another ground
that the name of the husband of the deceased given in the dying
G declaration was Mohsin Ali not Mafizuddin Ahmed and, therefore,
the identity of the lady Jaygun Bibi was itself doubtful. Dr.
Ramananda Das, Registrar of the Surgical Unit No. 1 of the
Gaubati Medical College Hospital, PW 6, in whose presence the
statement was recorded, bas no! stated that the declarant was
H Jaygun Bibi. He has simply stated that the Magistrate recorded the
statement of a patient of his unit who received burn illiuries.
•
AsSAM v. MAFIZUDDJN AllMED (Misra, J.) 241

Further, the Magistrate, Shri A.C. Bhuyan, who recorded the dying A
declaration of the Jaygun Bibi stated that the daroga and a consta·
ble were present nearby when the statement was recorded. Coupled
with these in the absence of the thumb impression of the deceased
on the declaration.

The cumulative effect of all the circumstances which weighed B
with the High Court is ·that they cast doubt about the truthfulness
of the dying declaration. It is not outside the realm of probability
that her statement may have been inspired by her uncle and, there-
fore, it will not be safe to base the conviction of respondent on
such a dying declaration.
c
The other direct evidence is the deposition of PW 7, the son
of the deceased; a lad of 7 years. The High Court has observed in
its judgment :

..... the evidence of a child witness is always dangerous
unless it is available immediately after the occurrence and D
before there were any possibility of coaching and tutoring."

A bare perusal of the deposition of PW 7 convinces us that he
was vacillating thwughout and has deposed as he was asked to
depose either by his nana or by his own uncle. It is true that we
cannot expect much consistency in the deposition of this witness E
who was only a lad of 7 years. But from the teno~ of his deposition
it is evident that he was not a free agent and has been tutored at
all stages by someone or the other.

~e had told the police that he was in the mango grove at the
time of occurrence. If this be a fact then he could not be an F
eye witness of the occurrence but when he came to depose before
the Court he said :

"Ahmed is my father's brother. He was not at home
at the time of the occurrence. He came later. He taught G
·me to tell police that I had been in the mango grove at the
time of occurrence. That is why I told police so. Later,
in company with my maternal grand father, Alimuddin I
said what I had seen."
H
Again, the firsHhing that he uttered when the house caught fire is
"Oharat Jui Lagil" (the house has caught fire). This statemeqt j~
•
248 SUPREM:lli COURT REPORTS (1983] 2 s.c.R.

A more in consonance with thfJ defence theory. His mother was more
important for him and if it was a fact that his father .had set fire to
his mother by sprinkling kerosene oil to which he was a witness he
would not have omitted to say so. In the next breath he deposed
· that his father poured sce11ted oil on his mother's body and not
kerosene oil.
B
The fact that he was tutored is fully borne out by his own
statement, as will be clear from the following portion of his
deposition :

" "Nana" accompaµied me when I came to depose in
c the lower court, but stayed outside. I stated in that court
that I had stated what "Nana" asked me to. The day
,
before I came to depose, I had told "Nana" what I would
say."

It is also clear from the materials on the record that on the
D advice of the police Alimuddin Ahmed, the nana of PW 7 applied
for his custody during the enquiry proceedings but the Magistrate
instead of giving custody to the nana gave the custody of PW 7 to
his nani, who was no other than the wife of Alimuddin. So to all
intents and purposes the custody of the boy remained with Alimud-
din Ahmed, the nana. Indeed, he took the boy for giving evidence
I in court. P.W. 7 was in thf, full control of the nana and deposed as
he was asked to depose. In this setting the observation made by
the High Court is fully justi11ied.

There are two other circumstances which also cannot be lost
sight of. Covering the burning body of the Jay gun Bibi with quilt
F will help in extinguishing the. fire. That will stop the passing of
oxygen to the fire and the fire will automatically extinguish. The
further fact that in so doing the husband also got burns on bis
bands goes a long way to support the defence version.
For the reasons given above the appeal must fail. It is acc9r-
G dingly dismissed.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.