Supreme Court of India
STATE OF BIHARversusBIHAR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 194
- Decided
- 6 February 1996
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B P JEEVAN REDDY
Holding
The Bihar entry tax is a constitutionally valid, compensatory tax within the State’s competence under Entry 52, saved by Article 304(b) and not violative of Article 301.
Summary
The Bihar Legislature enacted the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1993, imposing a tax of up to 5% on scheduled goods entering any local area in the State. The Patna High Court struck down the Act on grounds that it violated Article 301 of the Constitution, was not a compensatory tax, lacked presidential sanction under Article 304(b), and that its provisions on rate‑setting and exemptions were unguided. The Supreme Court held that the tax is compensatory in nature, that the State obtained the required presidential assent, that the levy is a reasonable restriction in public interest, and that the Act is within the State’s legislative competence under Entry 52 of List II. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside, the appeal by the State was allowed, and the other special leave petitions were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The tax imposed by the Bihar Act is compensatory or merely regulatory in nature.
- Whether the levy is saved by Article 304(b) read with Article 255 despite the lack of a recital of presidential assent.
- Whether the Bihar Legislature has competence to enact the tax in view of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957.
- Whether the tax falls within Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and thus is valid despite not expressly earmarking revenue for local authorities.
- The validity of the proviso to Section 3(1) and Section 6 on the ground of excessive delegation and violation of Article 14.
Legislation cited
Subjects
entry taxArticle 301Article 304(b)compensatory taxlegislative competenceList II Entry 52public interestreasonable restrictionstate taxationconstitutional validity
Judgment
A STATE OF BIHAR
v.
BIHAR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
FEBRUARY 6, 1996
B [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY AND SUHAS C. SEN, JJ.]
Bihar (Tax on Ent1y of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use
or sale 171erein) Act, 1993:
C Entire State divided into local areas-Several trading facilities
provided-Existence of some connection between the tax and trading
facilities-Held: Tax coinpensat01y in nature and not violative of Article 301
of the Constitution of India.
Tax was in public interest and imposed reasonable restnctwn on
D freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse-Hence saved by Article 304(b)
read with A1ticle 255 of the Constitution of India.
Section 3(1) proviso 6-Ent1y TQX---'-Different rates--For different com-
modities and different areas-Subject to ceiling of 5 percent-Conditions and
restrictions-As imposed by State-Power conferred on State Govemment to
E specify-Held : not unguided and hence not violative of Anicle u· of the
Constitution.
Constitution of India, 1950: A1ticles 245, 246, 249 to 253 and Schedule
VII List II Entry 52.
F Legislative competence-Tax under State Act Covered by Entry 52 List
II Seventh Schedule-Not in the nature of sales t~Additional duties of i
e.xcise-Under Central Act-Proceeds-State agreeing to take a share '
of-Held: No ground to urge State Legislature lacked legislative competence.
G Article 301-Nature of t~Regulatory or compensatory-Entry of
goods-/..,evy of tax on-State divided into local areas-Existence of some
connection between tax and trading facilities-Held : tax compensatory in
nature.
Altic/es 19, 304(b) and 25~Trade, commerce and intercourse-
H Tax-Imposing restrictions on-Proviso to Article 304(b }-Condition
184
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 185
under-Bill-President's previous sanction-No recital to that effect in A
...,;> Act-Could be established aliunde-Even in absence of recital-Tax imposed
for implementing welfare schemes-Indicated tax was in public inter-
est-Restriction-Rasonableness of-Equally relevant under Article 304(b ).
Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Imp01tance) Act, 1957:
,..___ Provision-Falls under Entry 84 of List I-Dealt with scheduled commodities B
only-Act neither made under Article 252 nor relatable to A1ticles 249 to
253-Constitution of India, Schedule VII List I Entry 84 and Articles 245,
246 and 249 to 253.
The Bihar (Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consump- c
tion. Use or sale Therein) Act, 1993 which provided for levy of tax on entry
of scheduled goods into Local area for consumption, use or sale therein at
a rate not exceeding 5%. The respondents filed writ petition in the High
Court questioning the constitutional validity of the Act. The High Court
allowed the petition and struck down the Act. Aggrieved by the High
D
Court's judgment the appellant preferred the present appeal.
On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the impugned tax
was both compensatory and regulatory; that the money raised under the
Act would be spent for the benefit of the local areas of the State; that the
challenge to the Act could not succeed because it had obtained the assent E
of the President under Article 304(b) read with Article 255 of the Constitu-
tion; that the impugned levy constituted a reasonable restriction imposed
in public interest under Article 301 of the Constitution; and that where a
ceiling was prescribed and the executive was empowered to prescribe the
rate of tax subject to the said ceiling the confernment of power could not F
-- be characterised as unguided, particularly where the power was conferred
upon the Government.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the State was
sharing the revenue under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
Special Importance) Act, 1957 and, therein, the State could not levy any G
--- entry tax under the impugned Act; and that the impugned Act did not
indicate in any manner that the revenues raised thereunder would be
passed on to the local authorities and the tax imposed could not be treated
as a tax contemplated by Entry 52 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R. .
I
I
A Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1. The impugned tax is not a regulatory measure but a taxing
enactment and the tax was levied upon the entry of goods into a local area,
i.e., upon the movement of goods; where the local areas contemplated by
the Bihar (Tax on entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption. Use
B or Sale Therein) Act, 1993 cover the entire State, the distinction between
the State and the local areas practically disappears. The facilities provided
in the State are the facilities provided in the local areas as well. Interests
of the State and the interests of the local authorities are, in essence, no
-
different. It cannot be stipulated that for the purpose of establishing the
C compensatory character of the tax, it is necessary to establish that every
rupee collected on account of the entry tax should be shown to be spent on
providing trading facilities. It is enough if some connection is established
between the tax and the trading facilities provided. The connection can be
direct one or an indirect one. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that
D the State does provide several facilities to the trade including laying and
maintenance of trade roads, water-ways and markets, etc. Since the levy is
by the State, Court also look to the facilities provided by the State for
ascertaining whether the State has established the compensatory character
of the tax. On this basis, it must be held that the State has estal,>lished that
the impugned tax is compensatory in nature. This finding is by itself
E sufficient to negative the attack based on Article 301. (196-A; 197-B-G]
Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Limited v. State of Rajasthan,
(1963] 1 SCR 491, followed.
Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya
F Pradesh, (1995) 96 STC 6541 relied on.
India Cement Limited & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1990) 1
sec 12, referred to.
2. For the exception in Article 304(b) to come to ~he rescue of the
G State, three requirements have to be satisfied, viz., (a) that the Bill was
introduced or moved in the Legislature with the previous sanction of the
President of India or that the Bill has been assented to by the President
(as contemolated by Article 255), (b) that the levy of the impugned tax
-.
constitutes ·a reasonable restriction and (c) that the said reasonable
H restriction is required in public interest. In the instant case, the Bill was
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 187
I
not introduced or moved in the Assembly with the previous sanction of the- A
President as required by Article 304(b) but the contention of the State is
that the Bill has been assented to by the President and hence, the require-
ment is satisfied, thoui;h the impugned Act does not recite the said fact.
Having regard to the material produced on behalf of the State and 'the
absence of any material to the contrary it must be held that the prior B
consent has been satisfied in the case of the impugned Act. [199-A-C; F]
3. As regards the question whether the interference with and the
restriction upon the freedom guaranteed by Article 301 in the form of the
impugned tax is a reasonable one and whether it is required in public
interest it was stated on behalf of the appellant-State that in view of the C
-· sudden loss of revenue from the cess upon minerals, public interest re-
quired the appellant- State to find alternative sources of revenue to keep
its various welfare programmes and other governmental functions going
and that the impugned tax was conceived as one of the alternative sources.
The fact that President has given assent to the Bill also raises a presump-
tion that the President (Central Government) had applied his mind to the D
problem and had come to the conclusion that the proposed tax constitutes
a reasonable restriction and is required to be imposed in public interest. It
is true that these are only presumptions but taken together with other
materials available they do firmly establish the said requirement in Article
304(b). On the material brought to the notice of this Court and for the E
reasons recorded here in above, the requirements of Article 304(b) are
satisfied in this case. The attack upon the validity of the impugned Act on
the ground of violation of Article 301 accordingly fails.
[199-G-H; 200-A-B; 204-D; 205-B]
State of Karnataka v. Mis Hansa Corporation, [1981) 1 SCR 823;
Khyerbari Tea Company Ltd. v. State ofAssam, [1964] 5 SCR 975; Bhagatram F
Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, (1995) 96 STC
654 and Shakti Kumar M. Sancheti v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 96 STC
659, relied on.
India Cement Limited & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1990) 1 G
sec 12, referred to.
4.1. Entry tax is a tax levied at the point of entry of goods into a local
area for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein. It is not a tax on
sale. It is a tax on the en.try of goods into a local area. It is a tax on entry
and not a tax in the nature of a tax on sale. Tax on sale and purchase of H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 2 S.C.R.
A goods are provided by Entry 52 in List II. Neither mere entry of goods is
enough to attract the levy nor the mere sale thereof within the local area.
What attracts the levy under Entry 52 (and under the impugned enactment)
is the entry of goods into a local area for consumption or for use or sale
within that local area for the purpose of consumption or use within that
local area. It is abundantly clear that the Additional Duties of Excise
B
--
(Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 was meant as a substitute for the
taxes on the sale or purchase of scheduled commodities alone and not for
all kinds of taxes, cesses and fees which the States are entitled to impose
by virtue of the entries in List-II or for that matter List-III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. [207-A-H]
c
4.2. The Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance)
Act, 1957 (A.D.E. Act) is enacted by Parliament with reference to Entry 84
in List-I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution whereas the impugned
enactment is made by the State with reference to entry 52 in List-II. The
D power to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods is conferred upon the
States and the purchase of goods is conferred upon the States and the
States alone by Entry 52 in List-II. Parliament cannot make a law either
with reference to Entry 52 or for that matter with reference to Entry 54.
The A.D.E. Act is also not a law made under and with refernece to Article
252 of the Constitution which article empowers the Parliament to make a
E law with respect to any matter mentioned in List-II, if two or more States
pass resolutions requesting the Parliament to make a law in that behalf.
The impugned Act is also not relatable to any of the Articles 249 to 253
which are in the nature of exceptions to the normal rule that Parliament
can make no law with respect to the entries in List- II. If so, it follows that
F the State Legislatures are not denuded or deprived of their power to make
a law with reference to Entry 52 or with reference to Entry 54 in List-II.
That power remains untouched and unaffected. All that the Parliament
has said by enacting the A.D.E. Act ~s that it will levy additional duties of
excise and distribute a part of the proceeds among the States provided the
States do not levy taxes on sale or purchase of the scheduled commodities.
G The Parliament has also provided the consequence that follows if any State
levies tax on sale or purchase of scheduled commoditites; all that happens
is that the State will be deprived of its share in the proceeds of additional
duties of excise for that financial year. Even this is subject to the power of
the Central Government to direct otherwise. Parliament could not, and did
H not, prohibit any State from making any law or levying any tax which a
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 189
State can levy by virtue of the entries in List-II. [209-B-G] A
4.3. The scope of the A.D.E. Act cannot be extended by reference to
anterior reports or correspodence between the Centre and the States, as the
case may be, so long as the language of the enactment is clear and unam-
biguous. Therefore, it cannot be said that by agreeing to take a share in the
- proceeds of the additional duties of excise, the State has deprived itself of
its power to levy entry tax under and by virtue of Entry 52 in List- II in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Indeed, it has not even forsaken its
B
power to levy taxes on sale or purchase of tobacco or any other scheduled
commodity; if it does so, all that would happen is that the consequence
provided in the provision to Rule (2) in the Schedule to the A.D.E. Act does c
not affect the legislative competence of the State Legislature to make a law
with reference to any of the entries in List-II. [210-E; 211-C-E]
Entry Tax Officer, Bangalore v. Chandanmal Champalal, [1994] 4 SCC
463 and State of Kerala v.M/s. Attesee (Agro) Industrial Corporation), [1989]
Supp. 1 SCC 733, relied on. D
Nemichand Parasmal & Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Eve-
ning Bazaar Assessment Circle, Madras, (1984) 55 S.T.C. 47, approved.
A.B. Abdul Quadir & Ors. v. State of Kerala, [1976] 2 SCR 690, E
referred to.
5.1. Entry 52 of List II of the Constitution speaks of "local areas" and
not "local authodties". The tax, by whatever name called, is levied upon the
entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. Entry
52 empowers the State Legislature to levy this tax. The local authorities F
cannot themselves levy this tax. The power is that of the State Legislature
and of none else. So long as the tax is levied upon the entry of goods into a
local area for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, the require-
ment of Entry 52 is satisfied. The charactor of the tax so levied is that of the
entry tax-by whatever name it is called. At the most it can not be said that
the tax is meant for and must be utilised for the purpose of the local areas. G
It cannot further be stipulated that this utilisation should be through or by
- the concerned local authorities. The entire State is divided into local areas.
From the point of view of the entry tax, one may say that the State is a
compendium of local areas. Spending for the purposes of the State is thus
spending for the purposes of local areas. Where the local areas span the· H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A entire State, it cannot be argued that money spent for welfare schemes for
improvement of roads, rivers, and other means of transport and com-
,_
munic~tion is not spent for the purpose of local areas. The purposes and I
needs of local areas are no different from the purposes and needs of the
State-not at any rate to any appreciable degree. [213-F-H; 214-A-D]
B Central India Spining & Weaving & Manufacturing Co. Ltd~ v. The
Municipal Committee, Wardha, [1958) SCR 1102; Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd.
& Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Am:, [1961) 3 SCR 242; Bunna Shell Oil
Storage & Distributing Company Ltd. v. the Belgaum Borough Municipality,
-
[1963) Suppl. 2 SCR 216 and Shakti Kumar M. Sancheti v. State of
C Maharashtra, [1995) 96 STC 659, referred to.
I
-_,,....-
5.2. The proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act empowers the State
Government to specify different rates subject to the ceiling of five percent
specified in Section 3(1). The State Government must be _deemed to be
aware of the needs of the State and interest of its people. It is the State
D Government that prepares the budget for every year. The very provisi~ns
of the Act and its scheme coupled with the above factors provided sufficient
guidance to the Government in the matter of specification of the rates. It
cannot, therefore, be held thatthe proviso confers an unguided power upon
the State Government. [215-E, ·G-H; 216-A]
E
Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton ~pinning & Weaving
Mills, Delhi &Anr., [1968} 3 S.C.R. 251, relied on.
5.3. The power to grant exemption to any cl~ss of persons from the
operation of the Act has been conferred under Section 6 of the Act. In fact,
F such a provision is a common feature in all the taxing enactments and
many other enactments. The High Court was in· error in declaring Section
6 to be void and thus violative of Article 14. [216-A-B]
P.J. Irani v. Stat~ of Madras, [1962] 2 S.CR. 169, relied on.
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2843-
2851 of 1996 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.95 of the Patna High Court
in C.W.J.C. No. 3224, 5420, 5512, 5651, 6515, 8010, 8600, 10084, 10644 of
-
H 1993.
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 191
M. Chandrasekharan, Additional Solicitor General, Pawan Kumar, A
Rameshwar Prasad, B.B. Singh, Kumar Rajesh Singh, V.K. Verma, C.V.
Subba Rao, S. Ganesh, Ravinder Narain, Ashok Sagar, Ms. P. Singh, Ms.
Sonu Bhatnagar, Rajan Narain for JBD & Co., M.P. Jha, N.K. Jha,
Rudreshwar Singh, R.P. Wadliwani and Ajit Kumar Sinha for the appear-
ing parties.
B
- The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted.
The Bihar Legislature enacted the Bihar Tax on entry of Goods into C
- Local Areas for consumption, use or sale therein Act, 1993 providing for
levy of tax on entry of scheduled goods into a local area for consumption,
use or sale therein at a tate, not exceeding five percent, as may be specified
by the State Government. The goods mentioned in the Schedule are (i)
motor vehicles, (ii) tobacco products [excluding beeris], (iii) India- made
foreign liquor, (iv) vegetable and pydrogenated oils, (v) cements and (vi) D
crude oil. The Act replaces Bihar Ordinance No. 19 of 1993. [Indeed, the
said Ordinance was preceded by yet another Ordinance.] The expression
"Local Areas" is defined in clause (t) of Section 2 to mean the areas within
the limits of a (i) Municipal Corporation, (ii) Municipality, (iii) ·Notified
Area Committee, (iv) Cantonment Board, (v) Town Board, (vi) Mines E
Board, (vii) Municipal Board, (viii) Gram Panchayat and (ix) any other
local authority by whatever nomenclature called constituted or continued
under any law for the time being in force.
Section 3 is the charging section. The levy is upon the entry of
scheduled goods into a local area for" consumption, use or sale therein. The F
proviso to sub-section 3 .empowers the Government to specify different
rates of tax for different goods mentioned in the Schedule. Sub-section (2)
of Section 3 says that the tax under the Act shall be paid by every dealer
liable to pay tax under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Sales Tax Act). Section
5 provides for registration of dealers under the Act while Section 6 em-
powers the State Government to exempt from levy of tax any class of G
-
dealers, persons or importers, subject to such conditions and restrictions
as may be imposed in that behalf. Section 7 provides for punishment in
case of contravention of the provisions of the Act. Section 8 says that the
machinery under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 shall be the machinery for
assessment and collection of this tax. Section 9 confers the rule-making H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A power upon the State Government.
·A number of writ petitions were filed by dealers in the Patna High \
\~
Court questioning the constitutional validity of the Ordinance/Act. Several
grounds were urged in support of the said challenge. The High Court has,
however, struck down the Aet on the following grounds : the State has
B failed to place any material before the Court to show that the impugned
tax is either compensatory or r~gulatory in nature; the levy must, therefore, ·.._\
be held to be impeding the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse
guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution; the State cannot also invoke
the protection of clause (b) of Article 304 for the reason that it has not
C established that the said tax constitutes a reasonable restriction imposed in r
public interest within the meaning of the said clause though it is true that
the President has assented to the Bill; the entire Act is void and inoperative
on this score. The High Court has also held that the proviso to Section 3(1)
and Section 6 of the Act are void being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. It has held that both the said provisions confer. an unguided
D and uncanalised power upon the Government. The.High Court declined to
consider the submission made by the petitioners based upon the Additional
Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 [hereinafter
referred to as "A.D .E. Act"] in view of the fact that it had already declared
the Act void for violation of Article 301.
E
The State of Bihar has filed Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 14636-
14644 of 1995 against the said judgment. The l.T.C. Limited, one of the
writ petitioners before the High Court, has filed Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 23172 of 1995 challenging.the correctness of the judgment of the High
Court insofar as it has negatived its contentions concerning the validity of ·
F the Act. Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23303 of 1995 is preferred by VaZir
Sultan Tabacco Industries Limited and another.
Sri M. Chandrasekharan, learned Additional Solicitor General, ap-
pearing for the State of Bihar urged the following contentions :
G 1. The High Court was in error in holding that the impugned tax is
not established either to be compensatory or regulatory. In fact, it is both.
The Act was enacted by the Bihar Legislature to off-set, atleast partly, the
loss of revenue to the State resulting from the decision of this Court in
India Cement Limited & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., [1990] 1 SCC
H 12. The finances of the State will be spent on public welfare and to carry
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 193
out the welfare schemes meant for the people of Bihar. The entire State A
of Bihar is divided into local areas of one or the other category. The money
raised under the Act will naturally be spent for the welfare of the State
which necessarily means for the benefit of the local areas.
2. Even if it is held, for some reason that the levy is not established
to be compensatory or regulatory in nature, even then the challenge to the B
Act cannot succeed because it has obtained the assent of the President as
contemplated by clause (b) of Article 304 read with Article 255 of the
Constitution. The impugned levy constitutes a reasonable restriction upon
the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 301
imposed in public interest. It satisfies all the requirements of clause (b ). c
Every tax imposed must be presumed to be in the interest of the public.
Further, the very fact of grant of assent by the President as contemplated
by Article 304(b) read with Article 255 gives rise to the presumption that
the tax constitutes a reasonable restriction conceived in public interest. The
High Court was in error in holding otherwise.
D
3. The impugned judgment insofar as it invalidates Section 3(1) and·
Section 6 is contrary to several decisions of this Court which have sustained
similar provisions. Where a ceiling is prescribed and the executive is
empowered to prescribe the rate of tax subject to the said ceiling, the
conferment of the power cannot be characterised as unguided, particularly E
where the power is conferred upon the Government. Conferment of power
· of exemption, as is conferred by Section 6, has also been upheld by this
Court on the ground that the Act itself provides the requisite guidance.
Sri S. Ganesh and Sri Pawan Kumar, learned counsel for respon-
dents-writ petitioners, while disputing the correctness of the contentions F
urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General, urged the following
further contentions in support of their challenge to the validity of the
impugned Act :
(a) The A.D.E. Act was enacted by the Parliament to replace the
levy of sales tax and all other taxes by the States on the commodities G
mentioned in the First Schedule to that Act. Tobacco is included in the
First Schedule. The State of Bihar has been provided an appropriate share
in the revenues raised under the AD .E. Act. It1 therefore, follows that so
far as tobacco is concerned, the. State cannot levy any impost thereon
including entry tax. If it does, it will be deprived of its share in the revenues H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A raised under the A.D.E. Act. By sharing the revenues under the A.D.E.
Act, the State of Bihar must be presumed to have agreed not to levy any
type of tax or impost on tobacco. The levy of entry tax under the impugned
Act, therefore, is incompetent and void. The report of the Taxation En-
quiry Commission on the basis of which the said Act was enacted and the
practice and understanding of the various States at the Centre since the
B enactment of the said Act clearly establish that while sharing the revenue
under the A.D.E. Act, the States have agreed not to impose any tax, cess
or fee on tobacco under whatever name. As a matter of fact, entry tax is a
tax similar to the sales tax.
c (b) The impugned Act does not indicate either expressly or by 'l
necessary implication that the· revenues raised thereunder will be utilised ~
for the purposes of local areas. Entry 52 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule >
to the Constitution,has been understood in a particular manner right from
1920. The entry tax is a substitute for octroi. Octroi 'Yas levied by the local
authorities on consumption, use or sale of goods within their areas. The
D revenues so raised were meant for the purpose of such local authorities.
The character of entry tax is no different. Even though levied by the State,
it is levied (a) on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use
or sale therein and (b) for the purposes of such local area. Since the
>.
impugned Act does not indicate in any manner that the revenues raised
E thereunder will be passed on to the local authorities for being used for
their own purposes, the tax imposed cannot be treated as a tax con-
templated by Entry 52. For this reason too, the impugned Act is beyond·
the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature.
Needless to add that the learned Additional Solicitor General dis-
F puted the correctness of the above contentions.
From the contentions urged before us, the following questions arise
.
for consideration :
(1) Whether the impugned tax has been established to be compen-
G
satory in nature or whether it can be called a regulatory measure?
(2) In case the impugned tax is not established to be compensatory
or as a measure of regulation - whether it is saved by virtue of the
provision contained in Article 304(b) read with Article 255 of the Constitu-
--
H tion. In other words, (a) whether the Act has received the assent of the
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 195
President as alleged by the State, (b) whether the levy of the said tax A
constitutes a reasonable restriction and (c) whether the said levy is con-
ceived in public interest?
(3) Whether the Bihar Legislature is deprived of its legislative com-
petence to enact the impugned Act on account of the enactment of AD.E.
Act and/or because the State of B~har is getting a portion of the taxes levied B
and collected under the A.D .E. Act.
(4) Whether the impugned enactment is outside the purview of Entry
52 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and, therefore,
beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature for the reason C
that it does not provide for the revenues raised thereunder to be passed
on to the local authorities for being used for the purposes of the respective
local areas?
(5) Whether the proviso to Section 3(1) and Section 6 are void for
the reasons assigned by the High Court? D
Question No. 1: Whether the impugned tax has been established to be
compensatory or whether it can be treated as a regulatory measure?
Article 301 declares that subject to the other provisions in Part XIII, E
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be
free. Certain exceptions are provided to the said Rule by Part XIII itself,
one of them being clause (b) of Article 304.
This Court has held that tax laws are not outside the purview of
Article 301 and that taxes which directly and immediately restrict trade and F
interfere with the flow of trade and commerce do offend Article 301.
Similarly, non-fiscal measures which have the above effect are equally hit
by Article 301. It has, however, been held by a seven-Judge Constitution
Bench of this Court in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Limited v. State
of Rajasthan, [1963] 1 SCR 491 that "regulatory measures or measures
imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come G
within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such
measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article
304(b) of the Constitution." It is held that regulatory measures do not really
impede the trade, commerce or intercourse but rather facilitate it. Similar-
ly, it is held that compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities are H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A outside the purview of Article 301. Since the impugned Act is not a
regulatory measure but a taxing enactment and the tax is levied upon the
.entry of goods into a local area, i.e., upon the movement of goods, the
question is whether the impugned tax is compensatory in nature for the use
.of trading facilities provided by the State. The High Court has observed
that the State has failed to adduce any material to establish the compen-
B satory nature of the tax. The only averment in the counter-affidavit filed in
the High Court is the following one [counter-affidavit filed by Sri Binoy
Krishan, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Bihar]: "the Entry Tax
Ordinance was thought to be promulgated in view of the loss of revenue
on cess due to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
C case of India Cement Ltd. repo~ted in A.LR. (1990) S.C. 85 as well as
several decisions of the Hon'ble Patna High Court following the decision".
The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, contended that the
following indisputable facts do establish the compensatory nature of the
tax, viz., the entire State of Bihar is divided into local areas of one or the
D other kind and that the Government and the local authorities do provide
several trading facilities to promote trade and commerce with and within
the State in the form of laying and maintenance of roads, establishment
and maintenance of markets, establishment and operation of market yards
for agricultural commodities and a host of other facilities. He submitted
that the impugned tax will naturally help in providing the above ·facilities
E and, therefore, it must be· held to be compensatory. He requested us to
take notice of these undeniable facts and to hold, on that basis, that the
impugned tax is compensatory. The learned Additional Solicitor General
further submitted that when the entire State is divided into local areas -
when no part of the State is left uncovered by a local area - and when the
F impugned tax is levied for the purposes of the State including the welfare
schemes being undertaken by it, the tax cannot but be compensatory in
nature. The impugned tax will help the State in providing and improving
the trading facilities since the interest of the State lies in promoting trade
and ~ommerce in goods and commodities with and within the State of
Bihar. Reliance is placed upon the following observations at Page 549 of
G Automobile Transporl (Rajasthan) Limited, which read:
"Licensing system with. compensatory fees would not be restrictions
but regulatory provisions; for without it, the necessary lines of
communication, such. as roads, water-ways and air-ways cannot
H effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 197
- turn out to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing for
necessary services to enable the free movement of traffic, whether
A
charged or not, cannot also be described as restrictions impeding
the freedom."
It is not possible to deny the force of this submission. Wher.e the local
B
areas contemplated by the Act cover the entire State, the distinction
between the State and the local areas practically disappears. (The situation
would, no doubt, be different if the local areas are confined to a few cities
or towns in the State and the levy is upon the entry of goods into those
local areas alone. This is an important distinction which should be kept in
mind while appreciating this aspect and also while examining the decisions c
of this Court rendered in 'fifties and sixties'.] The facilities provided in the
State are the facilities provided in the local areas as well. Interests of the
State and the interests of the local authorities are, in essence, no different.
It is not and it cannot be stipulated that for the purpose of establishing the
compensatory character of the tax, it is necessary to establish that every D
rupee collected on account of the entry tax should be shown to be spent
on providing the trading facilities. It is enough if some connection is
established between the tax and the trading facilities provided. The con-
nection can be a direct one or an indirect one, as held by this Court in
Bhagatram Rajeev Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh,
(1995) 96 STC 654. "The concept of compensatory nature of tax has been E
widened and if there is substantial or even some link between the tax and
the facilities extended to such dealers, directly or indirectly, the levy cannot
be impugned as invalid". Though not stated in the counter-affidavit, we can
take notice of the fact that the State does provide several facilities to the
trade including laying and maintenance of roads, water-ways and markets,
F
etc. As a matter of fact, since the levy is by the State, we must also look to
the facilities provided by the State for aswtaining whether the State has
established the compensatory character of the tax. On this basis, it must be
held that the State has established that the impugned tax is compensatory
in nature. This finding is by itself sufficient to negative the attack based on
article 301 but even if we assume that the State has not established the said G
fact, even so the result is no different. We proceed to elaborate.
Question No. 2 : In case the impugned tax is not established to be
compensatory - or as a measure of regulation - whether it is saved by virtue
of the provision contained in Article 304(b) read with Article 255 of the H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) 2 S.C.R.
A Constitution. In other words, (a) whether the Act has received the assent
of the President as alleged by the State, (b) whether the levy of the said
tax constitutes a reasonable restriction and (c) whether the said levy .is.
conceived in public inte.rest?
The impugned tax is a tax on entry - on movement of goods into a
B local area. If it is assumed to be neither compensatory, nor regulatory, [as
mentioned above] it may be said to be offending Article 301, unless, of
course, it is saved by virtue of the provision contained in Article 304(b)
read with Article 255 of the Constitution, as contended by the learned
Additional Solicitor General. Article 304 and Article 255 read as follows :
c "304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among
States.-Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303,
the Legislature of a State may by law-
(a) Omitted as unnecessary.
D
(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade,
commerce or intercourse with or within the State as may be
required in the public interest.
Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause
E (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State
without the previous sanction of the President.
255. Requirements as to recommendations and previous sanctions
to be regarded as matters of procedure only.-No Act of Parlia-
ment or of the Legislature of a State and no provision in any such
F Act, shall be invalid by reason only that some recommendation or
previous sanction required by the Constitution was not given, if
·assent to that Act was given -
(a) where the recommendation required was that of the Governor,
G either by the Governor or by the President;
(b) where the recommendation required was that of the-
Rajpramukh, either by the Rajpramukh or by the President;
/
(c) where the recommendation or previous sanction required was
H that of the President, by the President."
STATEv. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 199
For, the exception in Article 304(b) to come to the rescue of the A
State, three requirements have to be satisfied, viz., (a) that the Bill was
introduced or moved in the Legislature with the previous sanction of the
President of India or that the Bill has been assented to by the President
[as contemplated by Article 255], (b) that the levy of the impugned tax
constitutes a reasonable restriction and (c) that the said reasonable restric-
B
tion is required in public interest?
In this case, the Bill was not introduced or moved in the Assembly
with the previous sanction of the President as required by Article 304(b)
but the contention of the State is that the Bill has been assented to by the
President and hence, the requirement is satisfied. The writ petitioners deny C
the same. They point out that the impugned Act does not recite the said
fact. It cannot, however, be said th.at in the absence of such recital, the said
fact cannot be established aliunde. In support of its contention, the State
relies upon Para 11 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed in the High
Court and upon the telegram sent from Sri M.L. Gupta, Director (Home), D
New Delhi bearing No. 17/36/93-JUDL. dated 22.8.1993 addressed to Sri
P.S. Cheema, Commissioner and Secretary to the Governor, Bihar, Raj
Bhawan, Patna. Para 11 of the counter-affidavit reads: "11. That thereafter
the Bill was introduced in the Assembly and it was passed on getting assent
communication on 22nd August, 1993 and same was published in Bihar
Gazette on 22nd August, 1993". The telegram reads thus: "REF. YOUR E
LETTER NO. 1414/GS(I) DATED 18.1.1993(.) PRESIDENT AS-
SENTED TO THE BIHAR TAXES ON ENTRY OF GOODS INTO
LOCAL AREAS CONSUMPTION, USE OR SALE THEREIN BILL,
1993 ON 21.8.1993(.) LETTER WITHOUT COMMENTS FOLLOWS(.)"
In the absence of any material to the contrary, we accept the averment of F
the State and hold that the requirement of prior consent has been satisfied
in the case of the impugned Act.
The next question is whether the impugned tax constitutes a
reasonable restriction and whether it is imposed in public interest? In other
words, the question is whether the interference with and the restriction G
upon the freedom guaranteed by Article 301 in the form of the impugned
tax is a reasonable one and whether it is required in public interest. The
learned Additional Solicitor. General says that both the requirements are
satisfied in this case. He says that in view of the sudden loss of revenue
from the cess upon minerals as a result of the judgment of this Court in H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 2 S.C.R.
A India Cement Limited and other judgments of the Patna High Court .
following it, public interest required the State to find alternative sources of
-
. .,.._
revenue to keep its various welfare programmes and other governmental
functions going and that the impugned tax was conceived as one of the
alternate sources. He relies upon the statement in the counter-affidavit of
Sri Binoy Krishan, filed on behalf of the State, referred to hereinbefore, in
B
support of his submissions. He also relies upon the Objects and Reasons
appended to the Bill, which are to the following effect:
"To collect funds for various public welfare schemes and to imple-
ment various financial recommendation of the State Government,
c taxation according to the existing financial condition is highly
essential.
With a view to fulfil the above object and to make the provisions
of the Bihar Finance Act more workable, it is essential that tax is
levied and collected on certain goods entering the local areas of
D the State for consumption, use or sale; Bihar tax on Entry of Goods
into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale therein Second
Ordinance, 1993 (Bihar Ordinance 19 of 1993) has been promul-
gated incorporating the aforesaid provisions.
The Object of this Bill is to get the essential provisions of the Bihar
E
Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or
Sale therein Ordinance, 1993 substituted by an Act of the Legis-
lature."
On the basis of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the learned
F Additional Solicitor General contends that the levy of impugned tax was
found "essential" to raise funds for various public welfare schemes, to
implement various financial recommendations of the State Government
and to make the Bihar Sales Tax Law more effective. It is suggested that
public interest _demanded that alternate and new sources be found for
G raising the m~ney to meet the needs of the State and that, therefore, the
levy was "required" in the public interest. The learned Additional Solicitor
General relies upon the following holding in State. of Karnataka v. Mis
Hansa Corporation, [1981) 1 SCR 823 at 843):
"......... a levy which appears to be quite reasonable in its impact on
H the movement of goods and is imposed for the purpose of aug-
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.) 201
menting municipal finances which suffered a dent on account of A
abolition of octroi cannot be said to impose an unreasonable
restriction on the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and
intercourse. In this connection, it would be useful to recall the
observations of this Court in Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. case that the
power conferred on this Court to strike down a taxing statute if it
B
contravenes the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 or 301 has to be exercised
with circumspection, bearing in mind that the power of the State
to levy taxes for the purpose of governance and for carrying out
its welfare activities is a necessary attribute of sovereignty and in
that sense it is a power of paramount character. It is, therefore,
idle to contend that the levy imposed an unreasonable restriction C
on the freedom of trade and commerce."
The above observation is relied upon to show not only that the
impugned tax was "required" in the public interest but that it is also
reasonable. To demonstrate the reasonable character of levy, the learned D
Additional Solicitor General relies upon a few more circumstances. He
points out that so far as motor vehicles, India-made foreign liquor,
vegetable and hydrogenated oil and cements [Items 1, 3, 4 and 5 in the
Schedule to the Act] are concerned, the entry tax levied and collected
thereon is given credit towards the sales tax payable on the sale of the said
goods, which means that no additional burden is created on the dealers by E
the impugned levy. It is pointed out that entry tax is levied and collected
mainly from the dealers in the said goods/commodities and that a dealer
brings the said goods into a local area only for the purpose of sale. Such
sale attracts sales tax which is levied at a far higher rate than the entry tax.
Once the entry tax paid in respect of a commodity/goods is given credit F
towards the sales tax, there is in effect no levy of entry tax on these goods.
Thus, no extra burden is cast by the impugned Act insofar as four out of
six commodities mentioned in its Schedule are concerned. These facts are
not disputed by anyone before us. No such credit is, of course, given in
respect of crude oil and tobacco products, which means that, in effect, the G
entry tax is being levied only upon two commodites, viz., tobacco produc-
tions and crude oil. But there is a good reason, says the learned Additional
Solicitor General, for not providing for such credit in the case of the said
two commodities. The reason given for not making a similar provision
[giving credit] in the case of tobacco products is that no sales tax is levied
on tobacco products by the State of Bihar. Since no sales tax is levied on H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 2 S.C.R.
A the sale of tobacco products, the question of giving credit to the entry tax
against the sales tax does not arise, says the Additional Solicitor General.
This, no doubt, means that so far as tobacco products are concerned, there
is an additional levy of three percent by virtue of the impugned Act and to
that extent it may be said to impede the freedom guaranteed by Article
301. The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, submits that the
B levy represents a reasonable restriction because of the negligible additional
burden it creates and also because of the inherent harmful nature of
tobacco products. [It may be remembered that the nature of the activity is
relevant in the matter of judging the reaonableness of the restriction
imposed - a well-settled proposition under Article 19 and which proposi-
C tion is equally relevant under Article 304(b).] We are inclined to agree with
the submission. It is stated by Sri S. Ganesh, learned counsel for the l.T.C.,
who is the main party said to have been affected by this levy, that the
percentage of excise duties on tobacco products [duties of excise levied
under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and the A.D.E .. Act read with
D notifications issued in that behalf] is between 250 to 300 percent of their
value. Can it be said that an addition of three percent to the said level of
taxation is unreasonable when the tax so levied and collected is going to
serve the interest of the public in that State? Can it be reasonably suggested
that this addition of three percent is impeding the trade, commerce or
intercourse in tobacco products directly and immediately or to any appreci-
E able degree? We think not. In this connection, it is not irrelevant to take
into consideration the harmful nature of the tobacco products. Though it
may not have been recognised in 1957 when A.D.E. Act was enacted, it is
now recognised by one and all that tobacco is injurious to health. [A
warning to the above effect is statutorily required to be printed on all
F packets and cartons containing the tobacco products.) The extraordinary
high level of excise duties on tobacco is meant precisely to discourage its
consumption. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to say that the
addition of three percent is either an unreasonable restriction on the
freedom of trade and commerce or that it is not required in public interest.
G In this connection, it is necessary to notice a few decisions brought
to our notice. In Bhagatram Rajeev Kum01; a three-Judge Bench of this
Court has rejected the argument that to be compensatory, the tax must
facilitate the trade. The reason is obvious: if a measur~ facilitates the trade,
it would not be a restriction on trade but an encouragement to it. It was
H observed:
- STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.]
"The submission of Shri Ashok Sen, learned Senior Counsel, that
compensation is that which facilitates the trade only does not
203
A
appear to be sound. The concept of compensatory nature of tax
has been widened and if there is substantial or even some link
between the tax and the facilities extended to such dealers directly
or indirectly the levy cannot be impugned as invalid. The stand of B
the State that the revenue earned is being made over to the local
bodies to compensate them for the loss caused, makes the impost
compensatory in nature,. as augmentation of their finance would
enable them to provide municipal services more efficiently, which
would help or ease free-flow of trade and commerce, because of
which the impost has to be regarded as compensatory in nature, C
in view of what has been stated in the aforesaid decisions, more
particufarly in Hansa Corporation's case [1981] 1 SCR 823=AIR
(1981) SC 463."
[Emphasis supplied] D
In Shakti Kumar M. Sancheti v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 96 STC
659], the very same Bench has opined :
"A very perusal of these objects and reasons would indicate that
this legislation was brought in order to compensate loss of revenue E
by consumers who avoid payment of the sales tax or purchase tax
on the vehicle payable in the State by purchasing it in another State
where the rate was lesser than the State of Maharashtra and then
to bring the vehicle inside the State. The legislature, therefore,
clearly intended to avoid any loss of legitimate sales tax revenue
by the State. But the levy cannot be held to be bad because the F
Legislature intended to avoid any loss of sales tax in the State so
long as it is not found to be invalid because of any constitutional
or statutory violation. It is not the intention or propriety of a
legislation but it is legality or illegality which renders it valid or
invalid." G
Both these decisions deal with entry tax levied by Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra States respectively.
Now, coming to the crude oil (Indian Oil Corporation is also a party
before us),. it is explained by the learned Additional Solicitor General that H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A inasmuch as there is no sale of crude in the State of Bihar, a provision for
giving credit of entry tax against sales tax was thought to be unnecessary.
It is explained that the crude from the oil fields in Assam is pumped to
-
Barauni Oil Refinery, located in Bihar, through a pipeline. The crude is
refined here and petroleum and other products produced therefrom are
sold. It is, therefore, submitted that while an entry tax is levied on the entry
B of crude in a local area, no provision has been made for giving credit/set-off
of such tax against the sales tax payable inasmuch as no crude is ever sold
in Bihar and no tax is levied or collected thereon, as a fact.
Reliance is placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General upon
C the decision of the Constitution Bench in Khyerbwi Tea Company Ltd. v.
State of Assam, [1964] 5 SCR 975 where it has been recognised that a tax
levied by the State must be presumed to be a reasonable restriction
inasmuch as taxes are levied to raise money in order to carry on the
functions of the Government and to sustain the manifold activities under-
D taken by it. This decision also points out that the fact that President has
given assent to the Bill also raises a presumption that the President
(Central Government] had applied his mind to the problem and had come
to the conclusion that the proposed tax constitutes a reasonable restriction
and is required to be imposed in public interest. It is true that these are
only presumptions but taken together with other material, referred to
E above, they do firmly establish the said requirement in Article 304(b). The
learned Additional Solicitor General also relied upon the following holding
in Hansa C01poration:
"The next is whether this levy is in public interest. As has been
F pointed out earlier, the levy was to compensate the loss suffered
by abolition of octroi. These very people were paying octroi without
a demur. After removing the obnoxious features of octroi a very
modest impost is levied on entry of goods in a local area and that
too not for further augmenting finances of the municipalities but
for compensating the loss suffered by the abolition of octroi is
G certainly a lGvy in public interest. As has been repeatedly observed
by this Court, the taxes generally are imposed for raising public
revenue for better governance of the country and for carrying out
welfare activities of our welfare State envisaged in the Constitution
and, therefore, even if a tax to some extent imposes an economic
H impediment to the activity taxed, that by itself is not sufficient
-
STATEv. BIHARCHAMBEROFCOM.[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.) 205
either to stigmatise the levy as unreasonable or not in public A
interest."
Sri Ganesh, learned counsel for the I.T.C., points out that in Khyer-
bali Tea Co. Ltd., this Court did not rest its decision merely upon the
presumptions aforementioned and that as a fact, specific material was
produced before the Court, by the State, that the funds in question were B
being utilised for keeping the roads in order and in maintaining the
water-ways in the State. The statement filed by the State in that case did
establish that the expenditure incurred by it in maintaining the water-ways
was more than the revenue received from the carriage tax. It is because of
- the said material, Sri Ganesh says, that the levy was held to be a reasonable
restriction. It is true that no such specific statement is contained in the
counter-affidavit of the State in the cases before us but this circumstance
is of no consequence herein for the reason that on the material brought to
c
the notice of the Court and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the
requirements of Article 304(b) must be held to have been satisfied in this D
case. The attack upon the validity of the impugned Act on the ground of
violation of Article 301 accordingly fails.
Question No. 3: Whether the Bihar Legislature is deprived of its legislative
competence to enact the impugned Act on account of the enact of A.D.E.
Act and/or because the State of Bihar is getting a portion of the ta)ces levied E
and collected under the A.D.E. Act?
The submission of Sri Ganesh on this count runs thus: the A.D.E.
Act was enacted by Parliament in lieu of levy of sales tax and all other taxes
and imposts by the States on tobacco and other commodities mentioned in
the First Schedule thereto. This Act was enacted by the Parliament based F
on an understanding with the ·States that they will not levy sale or purchase
tax or any other kind of impost upon the scheduled commodities and that
the Union will collect additional duties of excise under the Act and make
over a portion of the same in specified proportion to the several States in
the Country. The Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission [1953-54] is G
the basis of this Act. The Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission
states inter alia that various duties imposed [by certain States] upon tobacco
are casting an unduly heavy burden on tobacco and on tobacco manufac-
~ tures and that there is need "for ensuring proper coordination between the
taxes on tobacco levied by the Central Government, the States and the local
authorities". For this purpose, the report stated: "We consider that such H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 2 S.C.R.
A coordination would be best evolved through the machinery of the inter-
State Taxation Council to which we have already alluded" [Para 23 at Page
136 of the Report). At a meeting of the National Development Council
held in December, 1976, the Centre and all the States agreed unanimously
that "sales tax levied in States on mill-made taxtiles, tobacco including
manufactured tobacco and sugar should be replaced by surcharge on the
B central excise duties on these articles, the income derived therefrom being
distributed among States on the basis of consumption, subject to the then
income derived by States being assured". Pursuant to the said agreement
and the decision to levy additional excise duties on three commodities
-
including tobacco, the Second Finance commission was requested to
c recommend a suitable basis for distribution of the proceeds of the addi-
tional excise duties among the States and the Union Territories. The
Second Finance Commission made a thorough enquiry and submitted its
proposals. On the basis of the N.D.C. resolution and the recommendations
of the Second Finance Commission, the A.D .E. Act was enacted. On the
basis of the above material, Sri Ganesh submits that the A.D.E. Act was
D intended to prevent the levy of all forms of taxes on the goods mentioned
in the Schedule thereto and that this understanding was adhered to,
respected and followed all these years by all the States. Pursuant to the
said understanding, he says, certain States which had levied one or the
other form of impost on tobacco withdrew the same. The decision of this
E Court in A.b. Abdul Qadir & Ors. v. State of Kera/a, [1976) 2 SCR 690, he
says refers to the fact that the State of Kerala has withdrawn the licence
fee on tobacco after the coming into force of the A.D.E. Act. The leraned
counsel places strong reliance upon a letter dated May 4, 1957 from the
then Finance Minister, Sri T.T. Krishnamachary, addressed to the Chief
Ministers of the States stating, inter alia, that "it is proposed to correlate
F the principles of distribution to the existence of a complete exemption from
,
sales tax or purchase tax or any other impost by whatever name called on
these commodities under the respective State laws. In other words, the State
which does not exempt completely all these three commodities from its
sales tax Act or any other similar legislation will not be entitled to partake
---
G in the distribution of the proceeds of the additional excise duty". Learned
counsel points out that Bihar has been receiving its due share from the
additional duties of excise collected by the Centre on the basis of the
recomendations made by the Finance Commissions from time to time.
Indeed, he goes to the extent of submitting that the entry tax contemplated
by Entry 52 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is a tax
H similar to sales tax inasmuch as it is a tax levied upon the entry of goods
STATEv. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. (B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,.T.] 207
into a local area for the purposes of consumption, use or sale therein. A
It is not possible to agree with Sri Ganesh. Entry tax is a tax levied
at the point of entry of goods into a local area for the pu~pose of consump-
tion, use or sale therein. It is not a tax on sale. It is a tax on the entry of B
goods into a local area and it is precisely because of this that the petitioners
- say, Article 301 is attracted. They cannot, at the same time, say that it is
not a tax on entry but a tax in the nature of a tax on sale* apart from the
fact that such a contention is wholly misconceived. Taxes on sale and c
purchase of goods are provided by Entry 52 in List-II. Moreover, Entry 52
has been the subject-matter of several decisions of this Court which say
that the tax is upon the entry of goods into a local area, i.e., upon entry of
goods for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein. Neither mere D
entry of goods is enough to attract the levy nor the mere sale thereof within
the local area. What attracts the levy under Entry 52 [and under the
impugned enactment] is the entry of goods into a local area for consump-
tion or for use or for sale within that local area for the purpose of E
consumption or use within that local area. Indeed, when it was contended
by one of the States, State of Karnataka, that the expression "sale" occurring
in Entry 52 should be given its full and normal meaning and should not be
confined to sale of goods in a local area for consumption or use therein,
F
the contention was rejected by this Court with reference to the earlier
decisions of this Court (See Entry Tax Office1; Bangalore v. Chandanmal
Champa/al, (1994) 4 SCC 463. The said decision refers to and follows the
earlier decisions of this Court on the point. Secondly, it is abundantly clear G
. from the material, which we shall presently refer to, that the A.D.E. Act
was meant as a substitute for the taxes on the sale or purchase of scheduled
commodities alone and not for all kinds of taxes, cesses and fees which the
States are entitled to impose by virtue of the entries in List-II or for that
matter List-III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The statement H
of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill reads thus : ·
"The object of the Bills is to impose additional duties of excise in
replacement of the sales taxes levied by the Union and States on
sugar, tobacco and mill-made textiles and to distribute the net
proceeds attributable to Union Territories, to the States. The
-- distribution of the proceeds of the additional duties broadly follows
the pattern recommended by the Second Finance Commission.
(If it is a tax on sale, Article 301 is not attracted.)-
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 s.c:R.
A Provision has been made that the States which levy a tax 011 the
sale or purchase of these commodities after the 1st April, 1958 do
not participate in the distribution of the net proceeds. Provision is
also being made in the Bill for including these three goods in the
--
category of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-
State trade or commerce so that, following the imposition of
B uniform duties of excise on them, the rates of sales tax if levied by
any State are subject from 1st April, 1958 to the restrictions in
Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956."
--
Section 3 provides for levy and collection of additional duties. Sec-
C tion 4 provides for distribution of additiohal duties among the States. It
says that during each financial year, there shall be paid out of the Con-
1,-
solidated Fund of India to the States, in accordance with the provisions of
the Second Schedule, such sums, representing a part ofthe net proceeds
.of the additional duties levied and collected during that financial year, as
are specified in the Schedule. Section 5 says that any expenditure incurred
D under the Act shall be charged to the Consolidated Fund of India. Section
6 confers the rule-making power upon the Central Government. The
proviso to Rul_e (2) in the Second Schedule to the Act is of crucial
rele~ance to us. Rule (2) along with its proviso reads thus :
E "During each of the financial years commencing on and after the
1st day of April, 1974, there shall be paid to each of the States
speeified in column 1 of the Table below such percentage of the
net proceeds after deducting therefrom a sum equal to 1.41 per
cent of the said proceeds as being attributable to Union Ter-
ritories, as is set out against it in column 2.
F
Provided but if during the financial year there is levied and col-
lected in any State a tax 011 the sale or purchase of sugar, tobacco,
cotton fabrics, woollen fabrics, rayon or artificial silk fabrics or one -
or more of them by or under any law of that State, no sums shall be
payable to that State tinder this paragraph in rspect of that finan-
G
cial year unless the Central Government by special order otherwise
directs."
The proviso states that if during a given financial year, a State levies
and collects a tax on the sale or purchase of scheduled goods or on any ~
H one or more of the scheduled goods by or under a law of that State, no
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.) 209
sums shall be payable to that State under this paragraph in respect of that A
financial year, unless the Central Government by special order directs
otherwise. There is no reference in the Act - or in the Statement of Objects
and Reasons - to any tax other than the tax on sale or purchase of goods.
There is no ambiguity in the language of the proviso. to Rule (2), which is a
part of the statute.
B
--- The A.D.E. Act is enacted by the Parliament with reference to Entry
84 in List-I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution whereas the
impugned enactment is made by the State with reference to Entry 52 in
List-II. The power to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods is conferred
upon the States and the States alone by Entry 52 in List-II. The Parliament c
cannot make a law either with reference to Entry 52 or for that matter with
reference to Entry 54. The A.D.E. Act is also not a law made under and
with reference to Article 252 of the Constitution, which article empowers
the Parliament to make a law with respect to any matter mentioned in
List-II, if two or more States pass resolutions requesting the Parliament to D
make a law in that behalf. The impugned Act is also not relatable to any
of the Articles 249 to 253 which are in the nature of exceptions to the
normal rule that Parliament can make no law with respect to the entries in
List-II. If so, it follows that the State Legislatures are not denuded or
deprived of their power to make a law either with reference to Entry 52 or
E
with reference to Entry 54 in List- II. That power remains untouched and
unaffected. All that the Parliament has said by enacting the AD .E. Act is
that it will levy additiona~ duties of excise and distribute a part of the
proceeds among the States provided the States do not levy taxes on sale or
purchase of the scheduled commodities. The Parliament has also provided
the consequence that follows if any State levies tax on sale or purchase of F
scheduled commodities; all that happens is that the State will be deprived
of its share in the proceeds of additional duties of excise for that financial
year. Even this is subject to the power of the Central Government to direct
otherwise. The Parliament could not, and did not, prohibit any State from
making any law or levying any tax which a State can levy by virtue of the G
entries in List-II. The decision of this Court in State of Kera/av. Mis. Attesee
(Agro Industrial Corporation), [1989] Suppl. 1 SCC 733 does bear out our
understanding. At Page 744, this Court observed :
The 1957 Act also has a bearing on the sales tax levy of various H
210 su:pREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A States. By levying sales tax on an item covered by the schedule to
the 1957 Act, the State will have to forego its share on distribution
of the proceeds of the additional excise duty levied. Whether it
should impose sales tax on an item of declared goods, limited by
the restrictions in Section 15 of the CST Act and at the risk of
losing a share in the additional excise duty levied in respect of
B those very items, is for the State to determine. As pointed out by
Sri Poti, it was open to the Kerala Legislature to decided - and it
did so also - that on some items there should be one or other of
the levies or both of them. and to modity these levies depending
upon its financial exigencies. But these factual or periodical varia-
c tions do not detract from the basic reality that the policy of sales
-tax levy on declared goods has to keep in view, and be influenced
by, the provisions of the CST Act and the 1937 Act."
To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras
D High Court in Nemichand Parasmal & Co. v. Deputy Commercial Tax
Officer, Evening Bazaar Assessment Circle, Madras, (1984) 55 STC 47 where
this aspect has been elaborately dealt with. We agree with their reasoning
on this score.
We are also of the opinion that the scope of the A.D.E. Act cannot
E be extended by reference to anterior reports or correspondence between
the Centre and the States, as the case may be, apart from the fact that the
material referred to is not unambiguous. Para 32 at Page 126 of the
Taxation Enquiry Commissiort [1953-54], the relevant portion whereof we T
have extracted hereinbefore, is more in the nature of a statement of fact
p coupled with a recommendation. All that it says is that the States had
imposed several duties and other imposts upon tobacco which were casting
an unduly. heavy burden upon it and that, therefore, there should be
·coordination between different taxes on tobacco levied by the Central
Government, the States and the local authorities. For that purpose, the
Commission recommended the constitution of an Inter-State Taxation
G Council. Admittedly, no such Council has ever been constituted. Siinilarly,
the letter of the then Finance Minister, Sri T.T. Krishnamachary, relied
upon by Sri Ganesh, which we have set out hereinabove, is also .. not quite
clear. The extract speaks, in the first instance, of "a complete exemption
from sales tax or purchase tax or any other impost by whatever name called
H on these commodities under the respective State laws" but then it immedi-
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 211
ately proceeds to explain, what it means by the said expression, by saying, A
.. "(I)n other words, the State which does not exempt competely all these
three commodities from its sales tax Act or any other similar legislation will
not be entitled to partake in the distribution of the proceeds of the
additional excise duties". Again, the fact that subsequent to the A.D.E. Act,
certain States withdrew certain enactments providing for levy of taxes/fees
B
other than sales tax on the scheduled commodities, in the light of the
enactment of the AD.E. Act - assuming that it was for that reason alone
- is not relevant on the meaning and interpretation of the AD.E. Act or
for that matter, the proviso to Rule (2) in the Second Schedule thereto. So
long as the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it is not
permissible to refer to the kind of material relied upon by Sri Ganesh for c
altering, expanding or modifying the meaning or scope of the provisions of
the Act. We are, therefore, unable to say that by agreeing to take a share
in the proceeds of the additional duties of excise, the State of Bihar has
deprived itself of its power to levy entry tax under and by virtue of Entry
52 in List-II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Indeed, it has not D
even forsaken its power to levy taxes on sale or purchase of tobacco or any
other scheduled commodity; if it does so, all that would happen is that the
consequence provided in the proviso to Rule (2) in the Schedule to the
A.D.E. Act will follow and nothing more. The AD.E. Act does not affect
the legislative competence of the State Legislature to make a law with
reference to any of the entries in List-IL The contention of Sri Ganesh on E
this score is accordingly rejected.
Pausing here, we may mention a particular submission made by Sri
Ganesh on this score. He submitted that this very question [considered by
us under Question No.3] has been referred by a Bench of this Court to the F
Constitution Bench by its Order dated January 2, 1995, a copy of which
has been placed before us. The Order does not support the submission of
the learned counsel. It does not say that the reference to the Constitution
Bench was on this point. Sri Ganesh submitted that this is one of the points
arising in the said matter. However, in the absence of any indication in the G
Order of reference that this particular question was referred to the Con-
stitution Bench, we declined to accede to his request to tag these matters
to Special Leave petition (C) No. 21476 of 1994 for being heard by the
Constitution Bench. It should also be noticed that the main ground upon
which the High Court has invalidated the impugned Bihar Act, or certain
provisions thereof, as the case may be, is in no way relatable to the AD.E. H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
A Act. The High Court has indeed refused to go into this question in view
of its finding on other issues. Even before us, the contention was not that
the Bihar Legislature had no competence to enact the impugneq Bihar Act
but only that it ought not have done so in view of the decision of the
National Development Council to which the State of Bihar was a party and
B which agreement led to the enactment of the Act. Since the question before
us is one of legislative competence and not one of desirability of making
....'
such an enactment, the submission of the learned counsel was unacceptable _,
to us.
Question No. 4: Whether the impugned enactment is outside the purview
C of Entry 52 in List-II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and,
therefore, beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature for
the reason that it does not provide for the revenues raised thereunder to
be passed on to the local authorities for being used for the purposes of
such local authorities?
D The next submission of Sri Ganesh is that inasmuch as the impugned
Bihar Act does not contain any provision or any indication that the taxes
collected under the Act will be passed on to the local authorities, it cannot
be said to be a tax contemplated by Entry 52 in List-II. Counsel submitted,
on the basis of certain decisions of this Court to which we shall presently
E refer, that the said tax is essentially in the nature of octroi which was being
levied by the local authorities prior to the Government of India Act, 1935.
Octroi was levied by the local authorities to raise money for their own
purposes. It was meant to meet the financial needs of the local authorities
and not for supplementing or augmenting the general finances of the State.
The impugned Bihar Act, however, seeks to do precisely that which is not
F contemplated by Entry 52. It has levied the impugned tax for the purpose
of supplementing and augmenting the finances of the State and not the
finances of the local authorities and hence, outside the purview of Entry
52 in List c II, says Sri Ganesh.
Sri Ganesh relied upon the following decisions :
G
In Central India Spinning & Weaving & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., The
Empress Mills,' Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Ward/ta, [1958] SCR
1102, this Court observed : "The legislative history of this tax thus shows
that octroi was leviable o_n the entry of goods in a local area when the goods·
H were for consumption, use or sale therein .... .ln the absence of clear inten-
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.) 213
tion to the contrary, the incidence of the tax leviable under item 8 of A
Schedule II of the Schedule Tax Rules is incapable of having a different
complexion from that which it had before 1920 or that which was clearly
given after 1935."
In Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., B
[1961] 3 SCR 242, this Court referred to the previous legislative history
including the position obtaining under the Government of India Act, 1919,
Notification No. 311/8 dated Decem~er 18, 1920 and Entry 49 of List-II of
the Government of India Act, 1935 and observed : "It was with the ,
knowledge of the previous history of the legislation that the Constitution-
makers set about their task in preparing the lists in the seventh schedule. C
There can be little doubt therefore that in using the words 'tax on the entry
of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein', they wanted
to express by the words 'local area' primarly area in respect of which an
octroi was leviable under item 7 of the schedule tax rules, 1920 - that is,
the area administered by a local authority such as a municipality, a district D
Board, a local Board or a Union Board, a Panchayat or some body
constituted under the law for the governance of the local affairs of any part
of the State .......".
In Bunna Shell Oil Storage Distributing Company India Ltd. v. The E
Belgaum Borough Municipality, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 216, this Court again
traced legislative history of octroi and terminal taxes and held that octroi
was always understood as a tax leviable on the entry of goods into a local
area for consumption, use or sale therein.
We find it difficult to agree with the submission of Sri Ganesh. Entry F
49 of List-II of the Sevent~ Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935
as well as Entry 52 in List-II in our Constitution speak of "local areas" arid
not "local authorities". The tax, by whatever name called, is levied upon the
entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. The
decisions relied upon by Sri Ganesh too use the same words. Entry 52 G
empowers the State Legislature to levy this tax. The local authorities cannot
themselves levy this tax. The power is that of the State Legislature and of
none else. So long as the tax is levied upon the entry of goods into a local.
area for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein, the requirement
of Entry 52 is satisfied. The character of the tax so levied is that of entry H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996} 2 S.C.R.
A tax - by whatever name it is called. The decisions relied upon by Sri Ganesh
do not say that the State must levy the tax and make over the collection
part of it to local authorities nor do they say that after collecting it, the
State must make over the proceeds to tlie local authorities. The highest
that Sri Ganesh can legitimately put his submission is that the tax is meant
B for and must be utilised for the purpose of the local areas. It cannot further
be stipulated that this utilisation should be through or by the concerned
local authorities. In our opinion, the relevant requirement is satisfied in this 1
case. As stated hereinbefore, the entire State of Bihar is divided into local
areas. From the point Of view of the entry tax, one may say that the State
C is a compendium of local areas. Spending for the purposes of the State is
thus spending for the purposes of local areas. Situation may perhaps be
different where the local areas are confined to a few cities or towns in the
State. But where the local areas span the entire State, it cannot be argued
that money spent for welfare schemes for improvement of roads, rivers and
other means of transport and communication is not spent on or for the
D purposes of local areas. The purposes and needs of local areas are no
different from the purposes and needs of the State - not at any rate to any
appreciable degree. In this context, it is relevant to notice that the
Maharashtra Entry Tax Act, considered by this Court in Shakti Kumar was
also meant for augmenting the general revenues of State, to wit, to make
E up the loss of revenue the State was suffering on account of reduction of
sales tax on motor vehicles in the adjoining States. The following observa-
tions in the said decision tend to support our reasoning, though, it is true,
this particular question was not raised therein :
1
F "A very perusal of these objects and reasons would indicate that
this legislation was brought in order to compensate loss of revenues
by consumers who avoid of payment of the sales tax or purchase
tax on the vehicle payable in the State by purchasing it in another
State where the rate was lesser than the State of Maharashtra and
then to bring the vehicle inside the State. The Legislature, there-
G fore, clearly intended to avoid any loss of legiJimate sales tax revenue
by the State. But the levy cannot be held to be bad because the
Legislature intended to avoid any loss of sales in the State so long
it is not found to be invalid either because of any constitutional or
statutory violation. It is not by intention or propriety of a Legisla-
H tion but it is legality or illegality which renders it valid or invalid."
STATE v. BIHAR CHAMBER OF COM. [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 215
"Question No. 5: Whether the proviso to Section 3(1) and Section 6 are ·A
void for the reasons assigned by the High Court?
Lastly, we may deal with the correctness of the judgment under
appeal insofar as it holds that the proviso to Section 3(1) and Section 6 are
violative of Article 14 inasmuch as they confer upon the State Government
an unguided and uncanalised power. The proviso to Section 3(1) and · B
Section 6 read as follows:
"3. Charge of Tax. -(1) There shall be levied and collected a tax
on entry of scheduled goods into a local area for consumption, use
or sale therein at such rate not exceeding five percentum of the
import value of such goods as may be specified by the State
c
Government in a notification published in an official gazette sub-
ject to such conditions as may be prescribed.
Provided different rates for different scheduled goods and
different local areas may be specified by the State Government. D
6. Exemption from Tax. - The State Government may by notifica-
tion and subject to such conditions restriction as it may impose
exempt from tax any class of dealer, persons or importers."
The proviso to Section 3(1) empowers the State Government to E
specify different rates of entry tax for different commodities mentioned in
the Schedule to the Act. This is, ·however, subject to the ceiling of five
percent specified in Section 3(1) itself. In such a situation, it cannot be held
that the power conferred upon the State Government to specify the rate
of tax is unguided. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bir/a Cotton F
Spinning & Weaving Mills, Delhi & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 251, it was held that
where the power is given to a responsible elected body like the municipal
corporation to prescribe the rates of tax subject to a ceiling prescribed and
where the rates fixed have to be submitted to the Government for its
sanction, it cannot be held to be a case of excessive delegation of legislative G
power. In this case, the delegation is to the State Government and a ceiling
is also prescribed. The State Government must be deemed to be aware of
the needs of the State and the interest of its people. It is the State
Government that prepares the budget for every years. The very provisions
of the Act and its scheme coupled with the above factors provide sufficient
guidance to the Government in the matter of specification of the rates. It H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 2 S.C.R.
A cannot, therefore, be held that the proviso confers an unguided power upon
the State Government. Now, coming to Section 6, it confers upon the State
Government the power to grant exemption to any class of persons from the
operation of the Act. Such a power has consistently been upheld by this
Court in a number of decisions commencing from PJ. Irani v. State of
B Madras, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169. In fact, such a provision is a common feature
in all the taxing enactments and many other enactments. It has been held
that the very scheme and the provisions of the Act do provide the necessary
guidance. Accordingly, ~e' ~old that the High Court was in error m
declaring Section 6 to be void for being violative of Article 14.
C. For the above reasons, the appeals arising from Special Leave Peti-
tion (C) Nos. 14636-14644 of 1995 fp'referred by the State of Bihar] are
1 allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeals
arising from Special Leave Petition {C) No. 23172 of 1995 [preferred by
I.T.C. Limited & Ors.] and Special Leave Petition (C) No. 23303 of 1995
[preferred by V.S.T. Industries & Anr.) are dismissed.
D
No order as to costs.
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