Holding

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Summary

The State of Goa challenged an arbitral award granted to Mis. Western Builders. After the award, the State filed a petition under the Arbitration Act, 1940, which was dismissed on the ground that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 governed the matter. The State then sought condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for time spent prosecuting the case in a court lacking jurisdiction, but the district court and High Court rejected the application, holding that Section 14 was inapplicable because Section 34 of the 1996 Act prescribed its own limitation period. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the 1996 Act does not expressly exclude Section 14 of the Limitation Act and, by virtue of Section 43 of the 1996 Act, the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings except to the extent a special period is prescribed. Consequently, Section 14 is applicable and the lower courts erred. The appeals were allowed and the matters remanded to the trial court to consider the condonation application.

Issues considered

Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for condoning delay spent in a forum lacking jurisdiction.
Whether the specific limitation period prescribed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act excludes the operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 30, s. 33
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 34, s. 43
Limitation Act, 1963s. 14, s. 29(2), s. 5

Subjects

ArbitrationLimitation ActSection 14Section 34Condonation of delayJurisdictionSetting aside awardStatutory interpretation

Judgment

A STATE OF GOA
v.
MIS. WESTERN BUILDERS

JULY 5, 2006

B [H.K. SEMA AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-Sections 43 and 34-Limitation
Act, 1963-Sections 14, 5 and 29(2)-Section 14, exclusion of time of
C proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction-Application of. to 1996
Act-Held: 1996 Act does not expressly exclude the applicability ofsection 14
of 1963 Act-Section 43 of 1996 Act applies 1963 Act, as a whole but by
virtue of section 29(2) of 1963 Act its operation is excluded to the extent of
area which is covered by 1996 Act-Section 34 of 1996 Act lays down the
ground for setting aside the award and prescribes limitation period and that
D will govern-To this extent applicability of section ' of 1963 Act is excluded
but there is no provision to exclude operation of section 14 of 1963 Act.

Interpretation of Statutes-General principles-Explained

Di.spute arose between the respondent-builder and the appellant-
E State. Sole arbitrator was appointed who gave an award in favour of the
respondent. Petition was file1:l under sections 30 and 33 of Arbitration Act,
1940. Ci.vii Judge disposed of the petition holding that the Act of 1940 is
not applicable and present proceedings would be governed by the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. State filed a petition under section
34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the award along with the application
F under section 14 read with si~ction 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning
the time spent in the proceedings before the Civil Judge. Application for
condonation of delay was rejected on the ground that there is no provision
for extension of time under the Act of 1996 and section 14 of Limitation
Act, 1963 is not applicable and also the application under section 34 was
G rejected . State filed an appe21I before the High Court which was dismissed
holding that section 14 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable in view
of sub-section 3 of section 34 of the Act, 1996. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeals, the Court
i

:H 288
STATE OF GOA v. WESTERN BUILDERS 289
HELD: l. The view taken by the court below excluding the A
applicability of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in this proceeding
is not correct. Section 14 of the 1963 Act is applicable in the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. Matter is remanded to the trial court to decide
application on section 14 of the Limitation Act. [300-E-G]

2. 1. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 do not expressly B
exclude the applicability of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The
prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. It is true that the Act
of 1996 intended to expedite the commercial issue expeditiously. The same
is clear from the statement of objects and reasons. The statement of objects
and reasons also nowhere indicate that Section 14 of the Limitation Act C
shall be excluded. But on the contrary intendment of legislature is apparent
as section 43 of the Act, 1996 applies to the Limitation Act, 1963 as a whole.
It is only by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act,
if any other period has been prescribed under the special enactment for
moving the application or otherwise then that period of limitation will
govern the proceedings uuder that Act, and not the provisions of the D
Limitation Act. Under the Act of 1996 for setting aside the award on any
of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 34, sub-section (3)
of section 34 prescribes the period of limitation (3 months) for moving
the application then the provisions of Limitation Act shall stand excluded
in Act of 1996 to the extent of area which is covered by the Act of 1996. E
To this extent the applicability of section 5 of Limitation Act will stand
excluded but there is no provision in the Act of 1996 which excludes
operation of section 14 of the Limitation Act. If two Acts can be read
harmoniously without doing violation to the words used therein, then there
is no prohibition in doing so. [299-G-H; 300-A-E]
F
2.2. Whenever two enactments are overlapping each other on same
area then courts should be cautious in interpreting those provisions. It
should not exceed the limit provided by statute. The extent of exclusion is
however, really a question of construction of each particular statute and
general principles applicable are subordinate to the actual words used by
legislature. [297-D-E[ G
2.3. The legislature wherever wanted to give power to the Court that
has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further power should
lie in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the period spent in
prosecuting remedy before other forum. It is true but at the same time H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A there is no prohibition incorporated in statute for curtailing the power of
the court under section 14 of the Limitation Act. Much depends upon the
words used in statute and iDOt general principles applicable. By virtue of
section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings
under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of Limitation Act can only stand
exclud1~d to the extent wher,ever different period has been prescribed under
B the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under section 34, there
is no reason why section 14 of Limitation be read in Act of 1996, which
will advance the cause of juistice. If statute is silent and there is no specific
prohibition then statute should be interpreted which advances the cause
of justice. [297-F-H; 298-A-BI
c Union ofIndia v. Popular Construction Co., [2001) 8 SCC 470; National
Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Pressteel & Fabrication (P) ltd. and Anr., [2004[ I
SCC 5"0 and Nasir:iddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, [2003) 2 SCC 577,
refern:d to.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1457 of2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.9.2006 of the High Court of
Bombay at Goa in A.F.O. No. 50/2002.

WITH
E
CA. Nos. 1458, 1459·1460, 1461, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1465/200:5.

Dhruv Mehta, Harish Vardhan and Yashraj for K.L. Mehta & Co. for
the Appellant.

A. Subhashini in C.A. No. 1458/2004 for the State of Goa.
F
M.S. Ganesh and Nikhil Nayyar for the Respondent in C.A. No. 1463/
2004 & 1465/2004.

Jay Savla, Reena Bagga and M. Naseem for the Respondent in C.A.
G No. 1458/2004 & 1460/2004.
Ranjit Singh, Lakshmi and Raman Singh for the Respondent in C.A.
No. 1459/2004.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
I H A.K. MATHUR, J. All these batch of appeals are disposed of by a
STATE OF GOA v. WESTERN BUILDERS [A.K. MA THUR, J.] 291

common judgment as same question of law involves in these appeals. A
The basic question which involves in these appeals is applicability of
Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 in The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.

However, in order to appreciate the controversy involve in these appeals B
it is necessary to give few facts for that purpose the facts given in the C.A.
No. 1457 of 1004 are taken into consideration.

A dispute arose between Mis. Western Builders Bito's Compound &
The State of Goa, represented by The Executive Engineer, Works Division
XX (PHE), Public Works Department, Fatorda, Margoa, Goa. Mr. P.K. Mohan, C
Ex-Executive Engineer, Goa P.W.D. residing at House No. 1505, Dr. Rego
Bag, P.O. Barbolim Complex, Goa 403202 was appointed as the Sole
Arbitrator. He gave an award on 7th February, 1995 in favour of claimant
and against the State of Goa and directed that the claimant is entitled to a
sum of Rs. 89763/- and he further directed the State to pay simple interest D
on Rs. 75553/- from 4th January, 1993 at the rate of 15% per annum. This
interest was payable till the date of decree of the award and till payment
whichever is earlier.

Aggrieved against this award, a petition was filed before Civil Court,
Civil Judge, Margao under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 E
for making rule of the Court. Objection was raised that since The Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996) has
come into force therefore, Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
proceedings under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Civil Judge, Senior Division
held that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 there is no provision
for making the award as a Rule of the Court. He observed that as per new F
Act of 1996 the award can be executed as decree. The learned Judge held that
in view of the decision of the apex court given in the case of Thyseen
Stahl union SMBH v. Steel Authority of India and in view of the decision of
the Goa Bench in the case of Reshma Construction v. State of Goa the Act
of 1940 is not applicable and present proceedings shall be governed by the G
Act of 1996 and accordingly he disposed of the proceedings.

Thereafter the State -of Goa filed a petition before the District Judge,
South Goa along with the application under Section 14 read with Section 5
of The Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay as the Civil Judge,
Senior Division has held that he had no jurisdiction, therefore, the time whk.h H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A is spent in these proceedings before the Civil Judge, Senior Division may be
condoned and the petitions filed by the State of Goa for setting aside the
award under Section 34 be considered. This application of State of Goa for
condonation of delay under Section 14/5 of Limitation Act, 1963 was rejected
by Ilnd Addi. District Judge, South Goa on the ground that there is no
provision for extension of time under the Act of 1996 & Section 14 of
B Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable by the order dated 7th March, 2002.
Likewise the application under Section 34 was also rejected.

Aggrieved against this order an appeal was preferred by the State of
Goa before the High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench at Goa under Section
C 37(1 b) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This appeal came to
be dismissed by the Lei. Single Judge by order dated 26. 9.2002, in view of
his detail reasons given in the judgment delivered on 26.9.2002. It was held
that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable in view of sub-
section 3 of Section 34 of the Act, 1996. Hence the present appeal.

D In this background a common question of law arises in all these appeals,
whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the Arbitration
Act, 1996 or not.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the
Arbitration proceedings are of civil nature & in view of Section 43 of 1996
E Act Limitation Act 1963 is applicable to the Act of 1996. Learned counsel
for appellant submitted that in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
there is no provision which prohibit the applicability of the Limitation Act
1963 therefore wherever it is not prohibited by Act, 1996 the provisions of
Limitation Act, 1963 may be made applicable mutatus mutandi. As against
this, learned counsel for respondent has submitted that this is special enactment
F & legislature in its wisdom has provided for every eventuality and therefore
the operation of Limitation Act is ousted by virtue of Sub-section (2) of
S1ection 29. In this connection our attention was invited to Section 34 of the
Act which lays down the ground on which award can be set aside & period
within which it can be set aside. Therefore, it is a complete code in itself and
G the operation of Section 14 & Section 5 of Limitation Act stands excluded.
However, in order to appreciate the submission of learned counsel it would
be necessary to reproduce the Section 34 of the Act:-

34. Application for setting aside arbitra/ award. (I) Recourse to a
Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
H for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and
STATEOFGOA v. WESTERN BUILDERS (A.K.MATHUR,J.] 293
sub-section (3). A
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if

(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
B
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law for the time being in force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or C
was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration: D
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the
arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to
arbitration may be set aside; or
E
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreeme:lt of the parties, unless such
agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which
the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with this Part; or
F
(b) the Court finds that -

(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of G
India.

Explanation-Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) it
is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, than an award is
in conflict with the public policy oflndia ifthe making of the award
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of
section 75 or section 81.

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had rec:eived the arbitral award or, if a request had been
B made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been
disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the
said period of three months it may entertain the application within a
C further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (I), the Court
may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn
the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give
the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings
D or to take mch oth1!r action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will
eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award."

We are primarily concerned with sub-section (3) of Section 34 read
with proviso. Reading of sub-section 3 alongwith the proviso of Section 34,
it clearly transpires that the application for setting aside the award on the
E grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 should be made within
3 months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause by
another period of 30 days & not thereafter that means so far as application
for making setting aside the award the period of limitation has been prescribed
in sub-section (3) i.e. 3 months but it can be extended for another period of
p 30 days on sufficient cause be shown to the satisfaction of court. Therefore,
the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded & the
application for condonatiorn of delay upto a period of 30 days can be made
by the court and not beyond that. Therefore, it was submitted that there is no
scope for applicability of Section 14 of Limitation Act in these proceedings
by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act.
G
Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act reads as under-

"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal
or application a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as
H
STATEOFGOA v. WESTERN BUILDERS (A.K.MATHUR,J.] 295

if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the A
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law."
B
That means if special period of limitation has been prescribed for making
application for any con donation of delay -or for any other purpose then that
period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that
extent the provisions of Limitation Act shall stand excluded. To this extent
there is no dispute. But the question is whether there is any provision to cater C
for present controversy or not. The Limitation Act applies to the arbitral
provisions because of Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. Section 43 reads as under:

"43. Limitation.-(!) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall
apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court. D
(2) For the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act, 1963 (36
of 1963) an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the
date referred in section 21.

(3) Where an arbitration agreement to submit future disputes to
arbitration provides that any claim to which the agreement applies E
shall be barred unless some step to commence arbitral proceedings is
taken within a time fixed by the agreement, and a dispute arises to
which the agreement applies, the Court, if it is of opinion that in the
circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused,
and notwithstanding that the time so fixed has expired, may on such F
terms, if any, as the justice of the case may require, extend the time
for such period as it thinks proper."

(4) Where the Court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the
period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of
the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time G
prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of I 963), for the
commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect
to the dispute so submitted."

Therefore, as general proposition Limitation Act, 1963 applies but still question
,., __ .
is as to what extent. Section 14 of Limitation Act which deals with exclusion H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of time spent in prosecuting the remedy before wrong forum bona fide reads
as under:

"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in ccurt without
jurisdiction--( 1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit
the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
·B diligences another civil proceeding, wh~ther in a court of first instance
or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded,
where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction
or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

C (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time
during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence
another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of
appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be
excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a
D court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature,
is unable to entertain it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-
section (I) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission
E granted on thi~ ground that the first suit must fail by reasons of a
defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature."

The question is whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been
excluded by this spedal enactment i.e. Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. Section 43 of the·Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 clearly says
F that The Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitration as it applies to the
proceedings in court.

Therefore, general proposition is by virtue of Section 43 of the Act of
1996. The Limitation Act 1963 applies to the Act of 1996 but by virtue of
sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, if any other period has
G been prescribed under the special enactment for moving the application or
otherwise then that p1~riod of limitation will govern the proceedings under ..
that Act, and not the provisions of the Limitation Act. In the present case
under the Act of 1996 for setting aside the award on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Section 34 the period of limitation has been
H prescribed and that will govern. Likewise, the period of condonation of delay
STATEOFGOA v. WESTERNBUILDERS [A.K.MATHUR,J.] 297
i.e. 30 days in proviso. A
But there is no provision made in The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 that if any party has bona fidely prosecuted its remedy before the other
forum which had no jurisdiction then in that case whether the period spent
in prosecuting the remedy bona fide/y in that Court can be excluded or not.
As per the provision sub-section (3) of Section 34 which prescribes the B
period of limitation (3 months) for moving the application for setting aside
the award before the court then that period of limitation will be applicable
and not the period of limitation prescribed in schedule under section 3 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Thus the provision of moving the application prescribed
in Limitation Act, shall stand excluded by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section C
29 as under this special enactment the period of limitation has already been
prescribed. Likewise the period of condonation of delay i.e. 30 days by virtue
of proviso.

Therefore, by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation
Act what is excluded is the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act D
& under Section 3 read with Schedule which prescribes the period for moving
application.

Whenever two enactments are overlapping each other on same area
then courts should be cautious in interpreting those provisions. It should not
exceed the limit provided by statute. The extent of exclusion is however, E
really a question of construction of each particular statute & general principles
applicable are subordinate to the actual words used by legislature.

There is no provision in whole of the Act which prohibit discretion of
the court. Under section 14 of the Limitation Act if the party has been bona
fidely prosecuting his remedy before the court which has no jurisdiction F
whether the period spent in that proceedings shall be excluded or not. Learned
counsel for the respondent has taken us to the provisions of the Act of 1996;
like section 5, section 8(t), section 9, section 11 sub-section (4), (6), (9) and
sub-section (3) of section 14, section 27, sections 34, 36, 37, 39 (2)(4),
section 41, sub-section (2) section 42 & 43 and tried to emphasis with reference G
to the aforesaid sections that the legislature wherever wanted to give power
to the Court that has been incorporated in the provisions, therefore, no further
power should lie in the hands of the court so as to enable to exclude the
period spent in prosecuting remedy before other forum. It is true but at the
same time there is no prohibition incorporated in statute for curtailing the
power of the court under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Much depends H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A upon the words used in statute & not general principles applicable. By virtue
of section 43 of the Act of 1996, the Limitation Act applies to the proceedings
under the Act of 1996 and the provisions of L:mitation Act can only stand
excluded to the extent wherever different period has been prescribed under
the Act, 1996. Since there is no prohibition provided under Section 34, there
B is no reason why Section 14 of Limitation be read in Act of 1996, which will
advance the cause of justice. If statute is silent and there is no specific
prohibition then statute should be interpreted which advances the cause of
justice. Our attention was invited to various decisions of this Court but we
shall refer to a few of them which has some relevance.

c is a case
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. in (2001] 8 SCC 470. This
with regard to 1the applicability of section 5. His Lordship while
interpreting the provision of sub-section 3 of section 34 has clearly observed
that the words "but not thereafter" clearly indicate prohibition of applicability
of Section 5 of Limitation Act to that extent. His Lordship observed as
follows:
D
"As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned,
the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-
section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express
exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act.
E Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could
entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended
period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter"
wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a
result."
F National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Presstee/ & Fabrication (P) Ltd and
Anr., reported in (2004] I SCC 540. In that case unilateral appointment of the
arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940 was challenged. This Court in the
said appeal after hearing th1~ parties appointed a sole arbitrator. Before the
sole arbitrator both the parties by consent agreed that the proceedings should
G be governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The arbitrator proceeded on that basis and gave a final award. That final
award was challenged. The question arose whether the proceeding shall be
governed by the 1940 Act or of 1996 Act? And which is the appropriate
Court. The dispute prolonged for nearly 16 years. This Court dismissed the
appeal and held that in the present case proceedings should go on under the •
'H
'
STATEOFGOA v. WESTERN BUILDERS (A.K.MATHUR,J.) 299
provisions of the Act, 1996 though the dispute arose prior to coming into A
force of the Act 1996, the appropriate forum for challenging the award under
Section 34 was Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction as contemplated
under Section 2( e) of the Act, 1996.

However, with regard to delay in filing objection before the principal
civil court of original jurisdiction , this Court directed that the petitioner shall B
file objection for setting aside the award before the Court concerned within
30 days from this date, the delay in regard to filing of the petition as
contemplated under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 shall be condoned by the
said Court since the time consumed was bona fide in prosecution of its
remedy. C
The exact observation of this Court is as under:

"This application fails and the same is dismissed with a direction to
the applicant to file its objections to the award before the court
concerned and if the same are filed within 30 days from this date, the D
delay in regard to the filing of the objections as contemplated under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act shall be condoned by the said Court since
the time consumed was in bona fide prosecution of the application in
a wrong forum."

While interpreting the provisions of statute their Lordships in case of E
Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, in [2003] 2 SCC 577 have observed
in this context as follows:

"In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous,
the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only
because of harsh consequences arising therefrom." F
It further observed :

"Rent control statutes are welfare legislation not entirely beneficial
enactments for the tenant but also for the benefit of the landlord.
Therefore balance has to be struck while interpreting the provisions G
of Rent Acts."

Therefore, in the present context also it is very clear to us that there is
no two opinion in the matter that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
do not expressly excluded the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. The prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. It is true that the H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 intended to expedite the commercial
issue expeditiously. It is also clear in the statement of objects and reasons
that in order to recognize economic reforms the settlement of both of domestic
& international commercial disputes should be disposed of quickly so that
country's economic progress be expedited. The statement of objects and
reasons also nowhere indicate that Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall be
B excluded. But on the contrary intendment of legislature is apparent in the
pre:sent case as Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
applies the Limitation Act, 1963 as a whole. It is only by virtue of sub-
section (2) of section 2'9 of the Limitation Act, its operation is excluded to
that extent of the area which is covered under the Arbitration and Conciliation
C Act, 1996. Our attention was also invited to the various decisions of this
Court interpreting sub-section 2 of section 29 of Limitation Act with reference
to other Acts like The Representation of Peoples Act or the provisions of
Criminal Procedure Code where separate period of limitation has been
prescribed. We need not overburden the judgment with reference to those
cases because it is very clear to us by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29
D of the Limitation Act that the provisions of Limitation Act shall stand excluded
in Act of 1996 to the extent area which is covered by the Act of 1996. In the
present case under section 34 by virtue of sub-section 3 only the application
for filing and setting aside the award a period has been prescribed as 3
months and delay can be condoned to the extent of 30 days To this extent
E the applicability of section 5 of Limitation will stand excluded but there is
no provision in tne Act of 1996 which excludes operation of section 14 of
the: Limitation Act. If two Acts can be read harmoniously without doing
violation to the words used therein, then there is no prohibition in doing so.

As the result of the above discussion we are of the opinion that the
F vic:w taken by the comt below excluding the applicability of Section 14 in
this proceeding is not correct. We hold that section 14 of the Limitation Act,
1963 is applicable in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. We set aside
all the judgments/Order and remand all these cases back to the Trial Court/
District Court for deciding the application under Section 14 of Limitation Act
G on merit after hearing both the parties and in case the delay is condoned then
the case should be decided on merits after hearing all the concerned parties.
All the appeals are allowed. No order as to costs.

N.J. Appeals allowed.