Created byFuzzy Cloud

Supreme Court of India

STATE OF GUJARATversusA.C. SHAH AND OTHERS

Citation
1993 INSC 95
Decided
16 March 1993
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for reconsideration, holding that the High Court had not been provided with the necessary facts to assess the legality of the 2:1 quota ratio.

Summary

The State of Gujarat had trifurcated its Electrical Engineering Branch into Junior Engineers and Supervisors and, by a 1975 resolution, introduced a quota rule fixing a 2:1 ratio for promotion to Deputy Engineer posts. The Gujarat High Court struck down this ratio as unjustified and issued a mandamus, prohibiting its enforcement. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had not been furnished with the relevant 1978 Recruitment Rules framed under Article 309 and therefore could not properly assess the fairness of the quota. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by striking down the ratio without considering the necessary facts and legislative framework, and consequently set aside the High Court judgment, remanding the matter for fresh consideration while preserving the status quo under the 1982 substituted rules. The appeal was allowed, and the parties were directed to expedite the High Court proceedings.

Issues considered

  • Whether the Gujarat High Court was justified in striking down the 2:1 promotional quota ratio without being presented with the 1978 Recruitment Rules and other relevant facts.
  • Whether the 2:1 quota ratio violates Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary or discriminatory.
  • Whether the Supreme Court can remand a case under Article 136 when the lower court has not considered all material facts.
  • Whether the Recruitment Rules framed under Article 309 are valid and can support the quota ratio.

Legislation cited

Subjects

promotionquotacivil serviceequalityArticle 14Article 136Article 309public works departmenttrifurcationratiojudicial review

Judgment

                                     STATE OF GUJARAT                                     A
                                                v.
                                  A.C. SHAH AND OTHERS

                                        MARCH 16, 1993

                 [MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.)
                                                                                          B

                  Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 136--Appeal-Relevant facts and
            circumstances not placed before the High Court-Remanding the matter back
            to High Court for reconsideration.
                                                                                          c
                   Civil Service : Gujarat State Public Works Department-Electrical En-
            gineering Branch-Trifurcation of Cadres-Promotion to the posts of Deputy
            Engineers--High Court's direction to provide criterion for promotion-Quota
            mle at ihe ratio of 2: 1--Legality of-Facts and circumstances not placed
            before the High Court-£jf.ct of
                                                                                          D
                  The appellant-State by resolution dated 10.7.1972, trifurcated the
            services.in the Electrical Engineering Branch of the Public Works Depart-
            ment into three cadres, namely, (1) Junior Engineers, (2) Supervisors and
            (3) Over-seers, w.e.f. 1.5.1972. At the relevant time there Wlis only one
                                                                          I
            Overseer and he stood retired. Therefore, in substance it was a bifurcation   E
            between Junior Engineers and Supervisors the former being graduates
            and the latter being diploma holders.



-                 In a writ petition before the High Court exercise of the State was
            challenged.

                  The Hig~ Court directed the State to provide for a criterion for
                                                                                          F

    ,....   promotion from the three independent cadres, for working ont the trirur-
            cation.

                                                   ' High Court, the appellant adopted
                   In compliance of the order of the                                      G
            a Resolution dated 26.9.1975 introducing a quota rule effective from May
            1, 1972 at the ratio of2:1 for Junior Engineers and Supervisors respecthe·
            ly for promotion to the posts of Deputy Engineers.

                  Tiie respondents challenged the trifurcation and also the quota rule
            in a writ petition before the High Court.                                     H
                                                383
    •       384                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1993] 2 S.C.R.

        A         1be High Court struck down the ratio of 2:1 holding it to be unjus·        -.t.    ~




            tified as also tbe disparity in qualifying service from both the channels.

                  Hence th!s appeal by special leave by the State, being aggrieved
            against a mandamus-issued by the High Court not to impose the ratio of
            2:1 while working o'ut the quota rule.
        B
                                                                                             ~
                  As the appellant was unsuccessful in obtaining a stay of operation
            of the High Court's judgment, it had to obey the mandate of the High
            Court and the ratio of 2:1 could not be e11forced.


        c · quota This  Court on 18.12.1980 ordered the Government to fra!lle a fresh
                   rule consistent with the High Court judgment for the purpose of
            making promotions during the pendency of the appeal and under Article
            309 of the Constitution, a Rule was framed. Earlier the appellant had
                                                                                             ~
            framed the Deputy Engineer (Electrical) Recruitment Rules, 1978 under
            Article 309 of the Constitution, which were not brought to the notice of the
        D   High Court nor the Rules, 1978 were challenged.

                   Allowing this .appeal, this Court,

                   HELD: 1.01. The matter in the High Court proceeded on ·the as·
            sumption that an executive action of the State was under challenge. 1be
        E necessary assumptions and presumptions, W!Oll known to law and the                 --),
             placement of onuses went on-noticed. In this background and facing the
          .. situation so arising the State Government issued a Notification on April
             12, 1982 by causing a substitution in the earlier Rules of 1978 by fixing the
             promotional ratio from both sources at 1:1, but subjected them to the
        F result of the instant litigation emerging from this Court. [387D-E]
                                                                                                    -
                1.02. The High Court judgment is silent as to the basis on which it           ~
          was persuaded to strike down the ratio of 2:1 for Junior Engineers and
          Snpervisors respectively. The tenor of the judgment of the High Court
          does however suggest that the executive flexibility, with which the Govern·
        G ment works could not justify the fixation of the ratio of 2:1. The High
          Court could not and did not substitute whai was the right ratio in the
          drcumstances and left it to the Government to devise another ratio. Had
          die factum of the legislation on the subject i.e. the Rules dated 4.7.1978,
                                                                                              -""\
          been brought to its notice, perhaps the High Court's angle of vision would
        H have 1 - difftmlt. [387F·G]
"
                               STATE OF GUJARAT v. AC. SHAH                         385

                   1.03. The State bas no doubt compulsively carried out the mandate A
       ~
             but has done so with reservation so as to meet the eventuality. No such
             measure can ever be permanent that would hold good for all times, to meet
            ·not only the present needs but also future exigencies as well. Hands of the
             State -cannot be so tied down. That would be a step retrograde to the
             growth and working of a democracy. [387H, 388A]
                                                                                            B
                  Ul4. It was on the Writ petltlODf!l"s (•- respoodmfli) to lay data
            before the High Conrt and bear the onus to show that the legislative measuno
            was unfair audarbitrary, violative of Article 14 oftbe Constitution. No such
            data appears to have been placed !>efore the High Court. [388B]

                 1.05. On these circumstances the case is remanded to the High              c
            Court for reconsideration. [388C]
..,    );           Roop Chand Adlakha & Ors.. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors.,
            [1989] Supp 1 SCC 116, referred to. [388D]

                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CiVil Appeal No. 1749 of
                                                                                            D
            1980.

                 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.1980 of the Gujarat High
            Court in Special Civil Application No. 1606 of 1975.

                  D.A. Dave, Vimal Dave, R. Karanjawala, Mrs. Manik Karalijawala,
                                                                                            E
            Jitender Singh and P.K Mullick for the Appellant.



-                 R.R. Goswami, SK Dbolakia, P.H. Parekh, Faza~ H.K Rathod and
            S.C. Patel for the Respondents.



      y._
                    The following Order of the Court was delivered:

                  The State of Gujarat, the appellant herein, is aggrieved against a
            mandamus issued by the High Court of Gujarat on March 26, 1980 iii
                                                                                            F
                                                                                                ....
            Special Civil Application No. 1606n5 whereby its decision to impose a ratio
            while working out a. QUota rule was upset.                                      G
                    The minimum facts are these:-
      .r-         ID the State Public Works Departmeat there was an Electrical En-
            gineerillg Branch. By Resolution dated Jnly 10, 1972, the services in the
            said branch w.c.f. May :t. 1972 \\'ere trifurcated on the same pattern as was   H
    386                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A   done in other branches. The result was that the trifurcation ended into
    three cadres (1) Junior Engineers, (2) Supervisors and (3) Over-seers. The        ~
    compartment of Over-seers is a surplus-age. There was only one Overseer
    at the relevant time and he stood retired. In substance it was a bifurcation
    between Junior Engineers and Supervisors, the former being graduates and
    the latter being diploma holders. This exercise of the State Government
B   was challenged in a writ petition before the High Court in Special Civil
    Application No. 1855/73, which was negatived by the High Court by an
    order dated 2nd April, 1975. The High Court directed that in working out
    the trifurcation the Government must provide criterion for promotion from
    the three independent cadres. In compliance thereof, the State Govern-
C   ment adopted a Resolution dated 26.9.1975 introducing a quota rule effec-
    tive from May 1, 1972 al the ratio of 2:1 for Junior Engineers ·and
    Supervisors respectively for promotion to the posts of Deputy Engineers.
    The nine contesting respondents herein preferred a writ petition being                ,...
    Special Civil Application No. 1606175 before the High Court challenging
D   the trifurcation as also the quota rule. The High Court repelled the
    challenge in so far as it related to the trifurcation and the adoption of quota
    rule but struck down the ratio of 2:1 holding it to be unjustified as also the
    disparity in qualifying service from both the channels. The High Court
    concluded as follows:

E            "We are, therefore, of the opinion that though it was within
             the power of the State Government to bifurcate the unified
             cadre into two distinct cadres of Junior EnJ;ineers and
             Supervisors and though it was within the power of the


F
             State Government to prescribe a quota for both of them
             for the purpose of promotion to the higher posts of a
             Deputy Engineer there was no justification for prescribing
                                                                                          -
             the quota of 2:1 and a longer qualifying service for the
             Supervisors. Therefore, the promotional rule which
             prescribes unequal quota and an unequal length of
             qualifying service for Supervisors for promotion to the
G            posts of a Deputy Engineer is liable to be struck down."

          And accordingly it did by issuing a mandamus.                                       •
         The State Government of Gujarat when appealing to this Court was
H   unsuccessful in obtaining a stay of operation of the impugned judgment.
                                    STATE OF GUJARAT v. AC. SHAH                            387

                   As a consequence it had to obey the mandate of the High Court which was A
      ~            to the effect that the ratio of 2:1 could not be enforced. As a res\llt. the
                   quota rule went out of gear. It was left open all the same to the State
                   Government to make any other rational rule in that behalf. Even this Court
                   on 18.12.1980, at that juncture, ordered, "4t the Government frame a fresh
                   quota rule consistent with the High Court judgment under appeal for the
                                                                                                B
                 · purpose of making promotions during the pendency of the appeal." Pur-
      :4.          suant thereto, it appears that the State Government was constrained to
                   introducing of a Rule under Article 309 of the Constitution. But before we
                   advert to that Rule it would be relevant to mention that earlier in point of
                   time, by Notification dated July 4, 1978, Rules kno\\ln as Deputy Engineer
                   (Electrical) Recruitment Rules, 1978, were framed under Article 309 of the       c
                   Constitution giving a statutory clothing to the Resolutions dated 10.7.72

--,
       .           and 26.9.75. Unfortunately, these statutory provisions were not brought to
                   the notice of the High Court nor were they put to challenge. The matter
                   in the High Court proceeded on the assumption that an executive action
                   of the State was under challenge. The necessary assumptions and presump-
                                                                                                D
                   tions, well known to law and the placement of onuses went un-noticed. In
                  this background and facing the situation so arising the State Government
                  issued a Notification on A.pril 12, 1982 by caysing a substitution in the
                  earlier Rules of 1978 aforementioned by flXing the promotional ratio from
                  both sources at 1:1, but subjected them to the result of the inst1nt litigation
                  emerging from this Court.                                                         E
        -~
                         We stand deprived of the pleadings of the parties before the High
                  Court. The pleadings now introduced do not help us. Significantly, the

 -                High Court judgment is silent as to the basis on which it was persuaded to
                  strike down the ratio of 2:1 for Junior Engineers and Supervisors respec-
                  tively. The tenor of the judgment of the High Court does however suggest
                                                                                                    F

       .,._       that the executive flexibility, with which the Government works could not
                  jnstify the fixation of the ratio of 2:1. The High Court could not and did
                  not substitute what was the right ratio in the circumstances and left it to
                  the Government to devise anothe• ratio. Had the factum of the legislation
                  on the subject the Rules dated 4.7.1978, been bi:ought to its notice, perhaps     G
                  the High Court's angle of vision would have been different. The State has
                  no doubt compulsively carried out the mandate but has done so with
            ~-    reservation so as to meet the eventua1ity. No such measure can ever be
                  permanent that would hold good for all times, to meet not only the present
                  needs but also future exigencies as well. Hands of the State cannot to so H
    388                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [19'13] 2 S.C.R.

A   tied down. That would be a step retrograde to the growth a 1d working of
    a democracy. The State is now left to devise a ratio other th~n the ratio of
    2:1 and cause a variation. It cannot come to that ratio agairL This appears
    to us an· undesirable situation. It must be left to the State to get at. it again.
    Though obeying the mandamus of the High Court the State must be free
    to arrive at the original r~tio of 2:1. On some basis the Governor of the
B   State appears to have legislated. on the subject. It was on the writ
    petitioner's (now respondents) to lay data before the.High Court and bear
    the onus to show that the legislative measure was unfair and arbitrary,
    violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. As said before no such data
    appears to have been placed before the High Court.
c          On these circumstances, we are left with no option but to upset the
    judgment of the High Court and remand the matter back to it for recon-
    sideration. In doing so we may set at rest the controversy regarding
    difference of length of qualifying service, from both sources. The con-
    troversy does not survive in view of Roop Chand Adlakha & Ors. v. Delhi
D   Development Authority & Ors., [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 116. The High Court
    need not advert now to the disparity in length of qualifying service from
    the channels of promotion. In the meantime, however, status quo needs to
    be preserved. The substituted Service Rules of 1982 shall continue to
    operate till the decision of the High Court and the promotions, as before,
E   shall continue, subject to the result of the judgment of the High Court. In
    these terms we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment. The High
    Court may pass appropriate orders afresh, after permitting the parties to
    amend their pleadings, if necessary, and putting the onus on the writ
    petitioners to prove unfairness in the 1978 Rules, or violation of A:rticle 14
    of the Constitution. Since it is an old matter, we request the High Court
F   to dispose it of .as quickly as possible, preferably within six months. No
    Costs.

    V.P.R.                                                          Appeal allowed.




                                                                                         . ·-ii


Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "promotion"Sign in to search

For a digitally signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's own website. Only the court can issue one.