Supreme Court of India
STATE OF GUJARATversusMANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH
- Citation
- 2020 INSC 366
- Decided
- 27 April 2020
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- N V RAMANA
Holding
A deemed university is included within the meaning of "university" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act, making its trustees public servants for purposes of the anti‑corruption law.
Summary
The State of Gujarat appealed the discharge of Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, a trustee of Sumandeep Charitable Trust which runs a deemed university, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The charge sheet alleged that Shah demanded Rs 20 lakhs to allow a student to appear for examinations, constituting a corrupt public duty. The key issue was whether a "deemed university" falls within the term "university" in Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act, thereby making its trustees public servants. The Supreme Court held that the PC Act’s purpose is to curb corruption by covering anyone performing a public duty, and that the word "any" in the definition includes deemed universities; technical definitions from the UGC Act cannot be imported to limit the PC Act. Consequently, the High Court’s view that a deemed university is excluded was overturned and the trial court was directed to proceed with the case. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether a deemed university is covered by the term "university" in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Whether a trustee of a deemed university can be classified as a "public servant" under the PC Act.
- Whether Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked to discharge the accused in the present facts.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 10, s. 13(1)(b), s. 13(2), s. 2(b), s. 2(c)(xi), s. 7, s. 8
- University Grants Commission Act, 1956s. 23, s. 2(f), s. 3
Subjects
Prevention of Corruption ActDeemed universityPublic servant definitionSection 2(c)(xi)Section 227 CrPCCorruption in educationStatutory interpretationUniversity Grants Commission Act
Judgment
330 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 330 [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A STATE OF GUJARAT
v.
MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH
(Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2018)
B APRIL 27, 2020
[N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.2(c)(xi) – Deemed
University – Whether Deemed University is not covered under the
C
provisions of PC Act – Held: The object of the PC Act is not only to
prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make
the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be
considered public servants – The purpose under the PC Act is to
shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials,
D to those individuals who perform public duties – Keeping the same
in mind, it cannot be stated that a “Deemed University” and the
officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty,
than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials
therein – Therefore, a “Deemed University” is not excluded from
ambit of term “University” u/s.2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.
E
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.2(c) – Public servant,
definition of – Held: The language of s.2(b) of the PC Act indicates
that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at
large has any interest is called a public duty – The first explanation
to s.2 further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the
F
categories stated under s.2 is a public servant whether or not
appointed by the government – The second explanation further
expands the ambit to include every person who de facto discharges
the functions of a public servant, and that he should not be prevented
from being brought under the ambit of public servant due to any
G legal infirmities or technicalities.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss.7, 8, 10, 13(1)(b) and
13(2) – Charge sheet against respondent, trustee in a Deemed
University specifically disclosing that he allegedly was collecting
certain extra amount over the prescribed fees on the pretext of
H allowing the students to fill up their examination forms – In the
330
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 331
complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded Rs.20 A
Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused, failing which the daughter of
the complainant would not be permitted to appear in the examination
– Held: Plea taken by respondent was that he was a trustee of the
“Sumandeep Charitable Trust” and has no connection with the
“Sumandeep University” – Courts below failed to analyze the
B
connection between the trust and the University, as well as the
relationship of the respondent with the university – Prima facie, a
grave suspicion is made out that the respondent was rendering his
service by dealing with the students and the examination aspect of
the University – But a detailed appreciation of evidence is called
for before one can reach a conclusion as to the exact position of C
the respondent vis-à-vis the University – Jurisdiction of Court with
regards to s.227 is limited and should not be exercised by conducting
roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences – Trial court
directed to proceed with the case expeditiously – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.227.
D
Interpretation of Statutes: Extension of technical definitions
used under one statute to the other statute – Held: Technical
definitions under one statute should not be imported to another
statute which is not in pari materia with the first – The UGC Act and
the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in their
purpose, operation and object – The preamble of the UGC Act states E
that it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-ordination and
determination of standards in Universities, and for that purpose, to
establish a University Grants Commission’ – On the other hand, the
PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruption
in the country – As such, the extension of technical definitions used F
under one Act to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Acts
are not in pari materia with one another – Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 – University Grants Commission Act, 1956.
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 – Per Ajay Rastogi,
J. (Supplementing) – Deemed University – “University” under s.2(f) G
of the UGC Act is established either in the Central Act, a Provincial
Act or a State Act – At the same time, such of the institutions for
higher education other than the University created under the
statutory enactment, after being declared by the Central Government
by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to be
H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A university for the purposes of this Act and all provisions of the
UGC Act shall apply to such institutions as if it were a university
within the meaning of clause (f) of s.2 of the Act – By introduction
of s.2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, any person or member of any
governing body with whatever designation called of any university
has been included in the definition of “public servant” and any
B
university includes all universities regardless of the fact whether it
has been established under the statute or declared deemed to be
university under s.3 of the UGC Act – No distinction could be carved
out between the university and deemed to be university so far it
relates to the term ‘public servant’ as defined under s.2(c) (xi) of
C the Act1988 – In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ in
clause (c) of s.2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt an
approach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature –
The legislature has, intentionally, while extensively defining the term
‘public servant’ in clause (c) of s.2 of the Act and clause (xi) in
particular has specifically intended to explore the word‘any’ which
D
includes all persons who are directly or indirectly actively
participating in managing the affairs of any university in any manner
or the form – In this context, the legislature has taken note of ‘any’
person or member of “any” governing body by whatever designation
called of “any” university to be termed as ‘public servant’ for the
E purposes of invoking the provisions of Act 1988 –The question for
consideration is the term ‘any’ university in the broader spectrum
to curb corruption in the educational institutions as referred to under
s.2(c)(xi) of Act 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referred
to the word “any university” which clearly mandates the university
referred to and controlled by its statutory mechanism referred to
F
under s.2(f) and deemed to be university under s.3 of the UGC Act
– Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c)(xi).
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:
G Per N. V. Ramana, J. (for himself and for
Mohan M. Shantagoudar, J.)
1. The contention of the respondent is that the term
“University” needs to be read in accordance with the UGC Act,
wherein only those Universities covered under the Section 2(f)
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 333
of the UGC Act are covered under the PC Act. Such an A
interpretation, by importing the technical definition under a
different Act may not be feasible herein. It is a settled law that
technical definitions under one statute should not be imported to
another statute which is not in pari materia with the first. The
UGC Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completely
B
distinct in their purpose, operation and object. The preamble of
the UGC Act states that it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-
ordination and determination of standards in Universities, and for
that purpose, to establish a University Grants Commission’. On the
other hand, the PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social
evil of corruption in the country. As such, the extension of C
technical definitions used under one Act to the other might not
be appropriate, as the two Acts are not in pari materia with one
another. The purport of UGC Act cannot be borrowed under the
PC Act, and that an independent meaning needs to be provided
for the term “University” as occurring under the PC Act. [Paras
D
31, 33][346-A-C; 347-G]
Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, ESI
Corporation (2014) 9 SCC 657 : [2014] 8 SCR 1021;
Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar
Patro (2018) 1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 –
referred to. E
2.1 In Section 2(c) of the PC Act, the emphasis is not on
the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty
performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention
was to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are
covered, rather a general definition of ‘public servant’ is provided F
thereunder. The object of the PC Act is not only to prevent the
social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same
applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be
considered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act is to
shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, G
to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same
in mind, it cannot be stated that a “Deemed University” and the
officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty,
than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials
therein. Therefore, the High Court was incorrect in holding that
H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A a “Deemed University” is excluded from the ambit of the term
“University” under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act. [Paras 34, 44,
45][348-B; 351-B-D]
Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur [1952] SCR
1122; CBI v. Ramesh Gelli (2016) 3 SCC 788 : [2016]
B 1 SCR 762; P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE)
(1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2 SCR 870; Manish Trivedi
v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420 : [2013] 12
SCR 205 – referred to.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “University”; Law
C Lexicon; Third Edition of Halsbury’s, Volume 13, page
707; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn. (West
Publishing Company) – referred to.
2.2 Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act
indicates that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or
D community at large has any interest is called a public duty. The
first explanation to Section 2 further clarifies that any person who
falls in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is a public
servant whether or not appointed by the government. The second
explanation further expands the ambit to include every person
who de facto discharges the functions of a public servant, and
E that he should not be prevented from being brought under the
ambit of public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities.
In the present case, on a prima-facie evaluation of the statements
of the Vice-Chancellor), the account officer of Sumandeep
Vidhyapith University and other witnesses, it appears that the
F respondent was the final authority with regard to the grant of
admission, collection of fees and donation amount. [Paras 50,
51][354-A-C]
2.3 The charge sheet specifically discloses that the
respondent allegedly was collecting certain extra amount over
G the prescribed fees on the pretext of allowing the students to fill
up their examination forms. Therefore, paying the respondent
the alleged amount was a condition precedent before filling up
the forms, to appear for the examinations. Specifically, in the
complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded Rs.20
Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused, failing which the daughter of
H the complainant would not have been permitted to appear in the
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 335
examination. The fact that there were a large number of cheques A
which were found during the raid is more than sufficient to
establish a grave suspicion as to the commission of the alleged
offence. The respondent has vehemently stressed upon the fact
that he is admittedly a trustee of the “Sumandeep Charitable
Trust” and has no connection with the “Sumandeep University”.
B
But, it ought to be noted that the courts below have failed to
analyze the connection between the trust and the University, as
well as the relationship of the respondent with the university.
Prima facie, a grave suspicion is made out that the respondent
was rendering his service by dealing with the students and the
examination aspect of the University. But a detailed appreciation C
of evidence is called for before one can reach a conclusion as to
the exact position of the respondent vis-à-vis the University. [Paras
52, 53][354-D-H]
3. At this stage, the jurisdiction of this Court, with regards
to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be excercised D
by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences.
This case is not an appropriate one to have exercised the power
under Section 227 to discharge the accused-respondent, having
regards to the facts and circumstances of the case. The trial court
is directed to proceed with the case expeditiously. [Paras 54,
56][355-A; 356-B] E
Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC
4 : [1979] 2 SCR 229; Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau
of Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368 : [2010] 11 SCR
669; Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State
of Madhya Pradesh. (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR F
579; Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University (2015) 16 SCC
530; K. Veeraswami v. Union Of India, (1991) 3 SCC
655 : [1991] 3 SCR 189 (12); State of Madhya Pradesh
v. M. V. Narasimhan (1975) 2 SCC 377 : [1976] 1 SCR
6 (23); M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala [1963] G
2 Suppl. SCR 724; Commissioner of Customs (Import),
Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company (2018) 9 SCC 1 :
[2018] 7 SCR 1191; Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan
Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64 : [2012] 3 SCR 52 – referred
to.
H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A Per Ajay Rastogi, J. (Supplementing)
1. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was amended in
1964 based on the recommendations of the Santhanam
Committee. Although, there are provisions in Chapter IX of the
Indian Penal Code to deal with public servants and those who
B abet them by way of criminal misconduct, they were found to be
inadequate to deal with the offence of corruption effectively. To
make the anti-corruption laws more effective, the Prevention of
Corruption Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The object and
statement of reasons of the Act, 1988 was intended to make the
existing anti-corruption laws more effective by widening their
C coverage and by strengthening the provisions. The Act 1988
caters to its wide scope by providing for “different paths to liability,
some of which are especially suited to, but by no means confined
to, those who hold public office.” [Paras 4, 5][356-G-H; 357-A-
B]
D 2. The UGC Act was established by an Act of 1956 to make
provisions for the coordination and determination of standards
of education in universities. “University” has been defined under
Section 2(f) of the UGC Act and those who are declared as
‘deemed to be university’, a declaration has to be notified under
Section 3 with restrictions which has been imposed upon the
E deemed to be university as referred to under Section 23 of the
UGC Act. “University” under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act is
established either in the Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State
Act. At the same time, such of the institutions for higher education
other than the University created under the statutory enactment,
F after being declared by the Central Government by notification
in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to be university for the
purposes of this Act and all provisions of the UGC Act shall apply
to such institutions as if it were a university within the meaning
of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act. [Paras 8, 9][357-H; 358-A-B,
G]
G
3. It cannot be lost sight of that the Act, 1988, as its
predecessor that is the repealed Act of 1947 on the same subject,
was brought into force with avowed purpose of effective
prevention of bribery and corruption. The Act of 1988 which
repeals and replaces the Act of 1947 contains a definition of ‘public
H servant’ with wide spectrum in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act,
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 337
1988, so as to purify public administration. The objects and reasons A
contained in the Bill leading to passing of the Act can be taken
assistance of, which gives the background in which the legislation
was enacted. When the legislature has introduced such a
comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the
purpose of punishing and curbing the growing menace of
B
corruption in the society imparting public duty, it would be
apposite not to limit the contents of the definition clause by
construction which would be against the spirit of the statute.
[Para 10][358-H; 359-A-C]
4. By introduction of Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, any
person or member of any governing body with whatever C
designation called of any university has been included in the
definition of “public servant” and any university includes all
universities regardless of the fact whether it has been established
under the statute or declared deemed to be university under
Section 3 of the UGC Act. It is true that the distinction has been D
pointed out by the Parliament under the provisions of the UGC
Act for consideration and determination of standards of education
in universities, no distinction could be carved out between the
university and deemed to be university so far it relates to the
term ‘public servant’ as defined under Section 2(c) (xi) of the Act
1988. [Para 11][359-C-E] E
5. In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ in clause
(c) of Section 2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt an
approach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature.
The legislature has, intentionally, while extensively defining the
term ‘public servant’ in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act and F
clause (xi) in particular has specifically intended to explore the
word ‘any’which includes all persons who are directly or indirectly
actively participating in managing the affairs of any university in
any manner or the form. In this context, the legislature has taken
note of ‘any’ person or member of “any” governing body by G
whatever designation called of “any” university to be termed as
‘public servant’ for the purposes of invoking the provisions of
Act 1988. The question for consideration is the term ‘any’
university in the broader spectrum to curb corruption in the
educational institutions as referred to under Section 2(c)(xi) of
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A Act 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referred to the
word “any university” which clearly mandates the university
referred to and controlled by its statutory mechanism referred to
under Section 2(f) and deemed to be university under Section 3
of the UGC Act. [Paras 12, 14][359-E-G; 360-B-C]
B Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation v. Rabi Sankar (2018)
1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
Per N. V. Ramana, J.
[2016] 3 SCR 579 referred to Para 11
C
(2015) 16 SCC 530 referred to Para 11
[1991] 3 SCR 189 referred to Para 12
[1976] 1 SCR 6 referred to Para 23
[1963] 2 Suppl. SCR 724 referred to Para 23
D
[2018] 7 SCR 1191 referred to Para 24
[2012] 3 SCR 52 referred to Para 26
[2014] 8 SCR 1021 referred to Para 32
[2017] 13 SCR 921 referred to Para 32
E [1952] SCR 1122 referred to Para 35
[2016] 1 SCR 762 referred to Para 46
[1998] 2 SCR 870 referred to Para 47
[2013] 12 SCR 205 referred to Para 48
F [1979] 2 SCR 229 referred to Para 54
[2010] 11 SCR 669 referred to Para 55
Per Ajay Rastogi, J.
[2017] 13 SCR 921 referred to Para 13
G CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
989 of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2018 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application (Against Order
passed by Subordinate Court) No. 1188 of 2017.
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 339
Aman Lekhi, ASG, Mukul Rohatgi, P.S. Narsimha, Huzefa A
Ahmadi, Sr. Advs., Mahesh Agarwal, Mitul Shelat, Anshuman Srivastava,
Nishant Rao, E. C. Agrawala, Aniruddha P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Ujjwal
Sinha, Ms. Mehak H., Sanjeev Kr. Choudhary, Advs., for the appearing
parties.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by B
N. V. RAMANA, J.
1. Corruption is the malignant manifestation of a malady menacing
the morality of men. There is a common perception that corruption in
India has spread to all corners of public life and is currently choking the
constitutional aspirations enshrined in the Preamble. In this context, this C
case revolves around requiring this Court to facilitate making India
corruption free.
2. This Appeal is from the impugned judgment and final order
dated 02.02.2018, passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
Criminal Revision Application (against Order passed by Subordinate D
Court) No. 1188 of 2017.
3. The respondent herein is allegedly aTrustee of a trust called
the Sumandeep Charitable Trust, which established and sponsors
‘Sumandeep Vidyapeeth’, a deemed University, which is the institution
concerned herein. E
4. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the case are that an
FIR, being I-ER No. 3 of 2017, dated 28.02.2017 was filed by one
Dr.Jasminaben, wife of Dilip bhai Devda, before the Vadodara City
A.C.B. Police Station against four accused persons including the present
respondent. Broadly, the allegations were that the complainant’s elder F
daughter was admitted to the MBBS Course in the above-mentioned
Deemed University in the year 2012. Her daughter’s course fee was
completely paid up as per the annual fee slab. In the year 2017, her elder
daughter while filling up her final examination form, was asked to meet
the respondent herein. On meeting, the respondent, in conspiracy with
G
others, had communicated that the complainant’s husband had to further
pay Rupees Twenty Lakhs for allowing the complainant’s daughter to
take the examination. Further, it is alleged that the accused-respondent
had communicated that they can deposit a cheque and the same would
be returned on payment of cash, considering that demonetization had
recently taken place. In lieu of the same, cheques were deposited with H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A the accused-respondent herein. Thereafter, the complainant, who was
unwilling to pay the amount, filed the FIR.
5. After following the necessary procedure, phenolphthalein
powder was applied to the currency notes and were delivered to accused
Vinod alias Bharatbhai Savant (the alleged companion/agent of
B respondent through whom the demand was facilitated). Thereafter,
accused Vinod confirmed the receipt of money to the respondent over
the telephone. The aforesaid incriminating conversation stood intercepted
in an audio video camera set up by the complainant. Further, separate
raids were conducted whereupon several undated cheques drawn in the
name of the institution worth more than Rs. 100 crores and certain fixed
C deposits were recovered.
6. The chargesheet came to be filed on 25.04.2017 against several
accused persons, including the present respondent for various offences
under Sections 7, 8, 10 and 13 (1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as the‘PC Act’] read
D with Section 109 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to
as the‘IPC’],.
7. The respondent herein filed a discharge application under
Section 227 of CrPC before the District and Sessions Court in Special
ACB Case No. 2 of 2017. The District and Sessions Court by an order
E dated 29.11.2017, rejected the application.
8. Aggrieved by the rejection of the aforesaid application, the
respondent herein filed a criminal revision application, being Criminal
Revision Application No. 1188 of 2017, before the High Court of Gujarat,
at Ahmedabad. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order
F dated 02.02.2018, allowed the revision and discharged the accused-
respondent herein.
9. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the State of Gujarat is in
appeal before this Court.
10. The senior counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that
G
the PCAct is a comprehensive statute which was passed to prevent
corruption and therefore, should be construed liberally as the legislature
intended to include the abovementioned acts, which harm the public at
large, within the ambit of the PC Act. The PCAct is a social legislation
intended to curb illegal activities of public servants and is designed to be
H construed so as to advance its objectives. The Courts, while keeping the
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 341
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
public interest in mind,must ensure that technicalities should not defeat A
the object sought to be achieved.
11. The counsel further argued that public function need not be
the exclusive domain of the State; private institutions such as universities
may also perform a public function. The counsel placed reliance upon
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya B
Pradesh.,(2016) 7 SCC 353 and Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University.,
(2015) 16 SCC 530 to state that imparting education to the public is a
welfare activity and hence can be called as an activity done forpublic
good. Considering the UGC guidelines, the counsel submitted that
Deemed Universities effectively discharge the public function of imparting
education to the public. C
12. Moreover, the counsel placed reliance upon the case of
K. Veeraswami v. Union Of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 to submit that
there is no requirement of having a master-servant relationship between
the competent authority and the public servant. The PC Act does not
define public servant, rather,it provides categories of the same. The D
counsel further stated that the lack of any authority to grant the sanction
cannot result in non-prosecution. In such situations, there is no necessity
for obtaining sanction. In any case, the sanction was obtained from the
Charity Commissioner out of abundant caution.
13. Lastly, the counsel submitted that the respondent was E
discharging a public duty. In the present facts, it was a pre-condition to
pay the respondent before obtaining an examination pass, although he
was never formally assigned this task or role. The counsel therefore
concluded that there need not be a requirement of positive command
under the law to discharge his public duty. In fact, there may not be any F
formal requirement of providing remuneration or payment in lieu of the
service rendered.
14. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of the respondent
submitted that it is a settled principle of law that a criminal statute has to
be construed strictly. In cases where two interpretations are possible, G
the Courts must lean towards the construction which exempts the subject
from penalty rather than the one which imposes the same.
15. The counsel further vehemently argued that the respondent,
being a trustee, cannot be termed as a Public Servant. There is no
allegation in the charge sheet that the respondent was holding any position
H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A or post in the institution which was Deemed to be University or that he
was engaged by the institution for rendering any service. In light of the
above fact, the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent as
he does not qualify within the ambit of Section 2 (c)(xi) of the PC Act.
16. Moreover, the counsel argued that the High Court has correctly
B held that the relevant provision as laid down under Section 2 (c)(xi) is
inapplicable in the present case as the said Institution was a “deemed to
be university”. Finally, the counsel argued that no valid or proper sanction
was obtained for prosecuting the respondent. The sanction obtained from
the Charity Commissioner is not valid as he cannot be considered as a
Competent Authority, since he does not have the power to remove or
C appoint a Trustee.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the questions
to be answered herein are-
i. Whether the respondent-trustee is a ‘public servant’ covered
D under Section 2(c) of the PC Act?
ii. Whether the accused-respondent can be discharged under
Section 227 of CrPC?
18. The first question before us, that is, whether the respondent-
who is allegedly a trustee in the Sumandeep Charitable Trust which
E established and sponsors the said University (‘Deemed to be University’)
is a ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of the PC Act, can be
broken up into two parts: first, whether the ‘Deemed University’ is
covered under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,
and secondly, whether the ‘respondent-trustee’ can be termed as ‘public
F servant’ under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act?
19. Before we proceed further, we need to observe the relevant
provisions under the PC Act:
2(c.). “public servant” means-
…
G
(xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or member of any
governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher
or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University
and any person whose services have been availed of by a
University or any other public authority in connection with holding
H or conducting examinations;
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 343
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
20. Simply speaking, any person, who is a Vice-Chancellor, any A
member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer, any other
teacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University,is
said to be a public servant. Further, the definition inter alia, covers any
person whose services have been availed of by a University, or any
other public authority in connection with holding or conducting
B
examinations.
21. However, the interpretative necessity arises in this case due
to the fact that the ambit of the term ‘University’, as occurring under
Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act, has not been clearly defined and the
question arises as to whether the same covers ‘deemed to be University’
as well. In this regard, we need to observe certain ground rules on C
interpretation, concerning the PC Act.
22. There is no gainsaying that nations are built upon trust. It is
inevitable that in a democracy one needs to rely on those with power
and influence and to trust them of being transparent and fair. There is no
doubt that any action which is driven by the self-interest of these powerful D
individuals, rather than the public interest, destroys that trust. Where this
becomes the norm, democracy, the economy and the rule of law, all take
a beating, ultimately putting the whole nation at risk. Corrupt societies
often spring from the examples set at the highest levels of government,
but small-scale corruption can be equally insidious. In this regard, the E
PC Act was formulated to bring about transparency and honesty in public
life, as indicated by its objects and reasons. We need to keep the aforesaid
legislative intention in mind while interpreting the provisions of the PC
Act.
23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-State, vehemently F
contended that the PC Act, being a welfare legislation, cannot be narrowly
interpreted, and rather, that a broad interpretation needs to be provided
for the same [refer State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan,
(1975) 2 SCC 377; M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, (1963)
Supp. (2) SCR 724].
G
24. The golden rule of interpretation for any penal legislation is to
interpret the same strictly, unless any constitutional considerations are
involved, and in cases of ambiguity, the benefit of the same should enure
in favour of the accused. Having said so, we need to clarify that strict
interpretation does not necessarily mean literal interpretation in all cases,
rather the interpretation should have regards to the genuine import of H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A the words, taken in their usual sense [refer Commissioner of Customs
(Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1].
25. However, we are concerned herein with interpreting the
provisions of the PC Act. There is no dispute that corruption in India is
pervasive. Its impact on the nation is more pronounced, due to the fact
B that India is still a developing economy. Presently, it can be stated that
corruption in India has become an issue which affects all walks of life.
In this context, we must state that although anti-corruption laws are
fairly stringent in India, the percolation and enforcement of the same are
sometimes criticized as being ineffective. Due to this, the constitutional
aspirations of economic and social justice are sacrificed on a daily basis.
C It is in the above context that we need to resolve the issues concerned
herein.
26. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC
64, this Court observed:
D “68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger
to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the
very foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The
magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the
concept of a socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot be
disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption
E devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines
justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our
preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court is that
any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked
out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against
F corruption. That is to say in a situation where two
constructions are eminently reasonable, the Court has to
accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the
one which seeks to perpetuate it.”
(emphasis supplied)
G 27. We shall accordingly have due regard to the aforesaid principles
while interpreting the provisions herein. The point of contention relates
to whether a deemed University would be included within the ambit of
the PC Act, particularly under Section 2(c)(xi) of the same, where the
word used is “University”. The learned senior counsel for the appellant-
State submits that the word “University” as used in Section 2(c)(xi) of
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 345
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
the Act, must be purposively interpreted. An institution which is “deemed A
to be a University” under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956
[UGC Act] plays the same role in society as a “University”. These
institutions have the common public duty of granting degrees, which are
ultimately qualifications recognized in society. As such, an institution
which is “deemed to be University”, such as the institution in the present
B
case, is included within the ambit of the term “University” used under
the Act.
28. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the
respondent, supporting the decision of the High Court in the impugned
judgment, submits that the term “University” as used in Section 2(c)(xi)
of the PC Act, does not include an institution which is “deemed to be a C
University”. The learned senior counsel submitted that the inclusive
definition of a “University” under the UGC Actis only for the limited
purpose of funding, and an institution which is “deemed to be a University”
is not a University for any other purpose. The learned senior counsel
submitted that the same is abundantly clear from the provisions of the D
UGC Act, which makes a distinction between a “University”, and an
institution “other than a University” which is “deemed to be a University”.
29. At this juncture, it would be apposite to look to the holding of
the High Court in the impugned judgment on this point:
“27.…However, the fact remains that either as a trustee or in E
any other capacity, even if applicant is connected with Sumandeep
Vidyapith, which is not a regular University getting Government
grant in any manner whatsoever and thereby, when there is no
dispute that it is only a Deemed University, the submissions
recorded herein above on behalf of the applicant makes it clear F
that such Deemed University cannot considered as a regular
University and thereby, applicant cannot be termed as a
public servant and therefore, irrespective of such change
report after the complaint, it is clear and obvious that
applicant cannot be termed as a public servant.”
G
(emphasis supplied)
30. The counsel for the respondent has contended that the term
“University” needs to be read in accordance with the Section 2(f), 3 and
23 of the UGC Act, wherein a “deemed University” is different from
a”University”,stricto sensu. However, we do not subscribe to such
H
contention for the reasons provided below.
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A 31. The contention of the respondent is that the term “University”
needs to be read in accordance with the UGC Act, wherein only those
Universities covered under the Section 2(f) of the UGC Act are covered
under the PC Act. Such an interpretation, by importing the technical
definition under a different Act may not be feasible herein. It is a settled
law that technical definitions under one statute should not be imported to
B
another statute which is not in pari materia with the first. The UGC
Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in
their purpose, operation and object. The preamble of the UGC Act states
that it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-ordination and
determination of standards in Universities, and for that purpose, to
C establish a University Grants Commission’. On the other hand, the
PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruption in the
country. As such, the extension of technical definitions used under one
Act to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Acts are not in
pari materia with one another.
D 32. The above principle of law was recently applied by a 3-Judge
Bench of this Court in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director,
ESI Corporation, (2014) 9 SCC 657, where an argument was advanced
by counsel that the interpretation of the term ‘shop’ under the ESI Act
should be determined in light of the definition of the same under the
relevant Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. Negativing this
E contention of the counsel, the Court went on to hold that:
“52. An argument raised by the appellants herein is the issue
relating to the “doctrine of pari materia”. It is contended that
since the ESI Act does not define the term “shop”, the said
definition may be ascertained in the light of the definitions under
F the relevant Shops and Commercial Establishments Act as enacted
by the respective State Legislatures, since the purpose and object
of both the enactments are one and the same.
53. For the above purpose, it would be necessary to look into the
concept of “doctrine of pari materia” and further ascertain
G whether the given statutes are in fact pari materia with the ESI
Act. It is settled law that two statutes are said to be in pari materia
with each other when they deal with the same subject-matter.
The rationale behind this rule is based on the interpretative
assumption that words employed in legislations are used in an
H identical sense. However, this assumption is rebuttable by the
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 347
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
context of the statutes. According to Sutherland in Statutes and A
Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edn.:
“Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertain to the
same subject-matter when they relate to the same person or
things, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the
same purpose or object.” B
…
58. It can be concluded that though the ESI Act, the 1948
Act and the 1961 Act deal with labour and workmen, in
essence and spirit they have a different scope and
application. The Acts do not appear to have any overlap in C
their fields of operation and have mutually exclusive
schemes. Therefore, the argument that the Acts are parimateria
with each other, must fail.
59. This Court must also address the issue that arose in
the course of the arguments that the word “shop” has been D
used in the impugned notifications as well as the 1948 Act
and the 1961 Act and therefore assistance may be taken
from the latter statutes to interpret the notification. This
argument, in light of the above discussion, does not appeal
to us…” E
(emphasis supplied)
It is for the same reasoning that we are of the opinion that the
High Court’s reliance on the judgment of this Court in Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro, (2018) 1 SCC 468
was not appropriate, as the same was with reference to enactments F
relating to administration/regulation of universities, and is unconnected
with the objects of the PC Act.
33. This brings us to the conclusion that purport of UGC Act
cannot be borrowed under the PC Act, and that an independent meaning
needs to be provided for the term “University” as occurring under the G
PC Act. In India, there are 12,206 Universities under Section 2(f) and
12B of the UGC Act, as of 31.07.2019. While there are about 124 deemed
universities across India, as of 23.06.2008. The education sector in India
has seen a general rise. There is no dispute that the education sector,
which is a very important service sector in the country, has seen various
H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A scandals. In this context, we need to understand whether a deemed
university would be covered within the ambit of the Section 2(c)(xi) of
the PC Act.
34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe
that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather,it is
B on the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative
intention was to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are
covered, rather a general definition of ‘public servant’ is provided
thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to the
definition of the term”University”.
C 35. The use of ‘any’ is critical in our understanding as to the term
University. We are aware of the line of authorities, wherein this Court
has reduced the impact of term ‘any’ to not mean ‘every’ [See Hira
Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, (1952) S.C.R. 1122]. However,
we cannot accept such a view as the context in which the present dispute
emanates, differs from the above.
D
36. Our attention was also drawn to the notes on clauses of
Prevention of Corruption Bill dated 20.02.1987. Clause 2 of the Notes
on Clauses in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 2,
clarifies the legislative intent, wherein it was commented as under:
E “2. This clause defines the expressions used in the Bill. Clause
2(c) defines ‘public servant’. In the existing definition the
emphasis is on the authority employing and the authority
remunerating. In the proposed definition the emphasis is
on public duty. The definition of ‘election’ is based on the
definition of this expression in the Penal Code, 1860.”
F
(emphasis supplied)
37. Additionally our attention is drawn to the legislative debates
which took place prior to the enactment of the PC Act. It was uniform
across the party line that the purpose of preventing corruption in
educational institutions was emphasised.
G
38. Coming to external aids of interpretation, the
word ”University” is etymologically derived from the Latin, universitas
magistrorum et scholarium, which roughly means “community of
teachers and scholars”. Black’s Law dictionary defines “University”
as:
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 349
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
“An institution of higher learning, consisting of an assemblage of A
colleges united under one corporate organization and government,
affording instruction in the arts and sciences and the learned
professions. and conferring degrees. See Com. v. Banks, 198 Pa.
397. 48 Atl. 277.”
39. Law Lexicon, defines the same as: B
“A corporation of teachers or assemblage of learned men or
colleges for teaching the higher branches of learning: ;and
having power to confer degrees.
University. A place where all kinds of literature are universally
taught. (Tomlin’s Law Dic.) See also Act VIII of 1904, S.2, C
Cl. (2)(c).
A University, of normal type, may be described in popular
language as an organization of teachers and learners, settled
in a fixed locality, for the purpose of nature study, in which the
body of teachers has authority to attest the proficiency of the D
learners, by bestowing upon them titles, signifying that they
also possess the qualifications and are admitted to the rank of
those that are learned in the particular branch of knowledge in
which they are taught.
The term ‘University’ is usually understood to mean a body E
incorporated for the purpose of learning, with various
endowments and privileges. Such bodies were anciently founded
by papal bull or charter, later by royal charter or act of
Parliament. University is a corporation aggregate-Aggregation
of corporations-The corporations are usually colleges or F
schools.”
40. Third Edition of Halsbury’s, Volume 13, page 707, at para
1441 deals with the term “Universities”. According to the same:
“The word “university is not a word of art and, although the
institutions to which it refers are readily identifiable, precise G
definition is difficult. The essential features of a university seems
to be that it was incorporated as such by the sovereign power.
Other attributes of a university appear to be the admission of
students from all parts of the world, a plurality of masters, the
teaching of one at least of the higher faculties, namely theology, H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A law or philosophy, which in some definitions are regarded as
identical, and medicine, provision for residence, and the right to
confer degrees, but possession of these attributes will not make
an institution a university in the absence of any express intention
of the sovereign power to make it one.
B Incorporation was anciently affected by papal bull or charter later
by royal charter or Act of Parliament.”
41. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn. (West Publishing
Company), the word “Universities” is defined as follows:
“Universities:
C
Bodies politic and corporate have “been known to exist as Far
back at last as the time of Cicero, and Gaius traces them even to
the laws of Solon of Athens, who lived some 500 years before….
And from time immemorial, as at the present day, this privilege of
being a corporation or artificial body of individuals, with power of
D holding their property, rights, and immunities in common as a legally
organized body and of transmitting the same in such body by an
artificial succession different from the natural succession of the
property of individuals has been considered a franchise which
could not be lawfully assumed by any associated body without a
E special authority for that purpose from the government or
sovereign power.”
42. Under the UGC Act, University is defined and recognized
under Section 2(f) in the following manner:
“University” means a University established or incorporated by
F or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes
any such institution as may, in consultation with the University
concerned, be recoginsed by the Commission in accordance with
the regulations made in this behalf under this Act.
43. A ‘deemed to be University’ is recognized under Section 3 of
G the UGC Act, in the following manner:
Application of Act to institutions for higher studies other
than Universities
3. The Central Government may, on the advice of the Commission,
declare by notification in the Official Gazette, that any institution
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 351
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
for higher education, other than a University, shall be deemed to A
be a University for the purposes of this Act, and on such a
declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to
such institution as if it were a University within the meaning of
clause (f) of section 2.
44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only to B
prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the
same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered
public servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from
those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals
who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted
by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-State, it cannot be stated C
that a “Deemed University” and the officials therein, perform any less
or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University
simpliciter, and the officials therein.
45. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are of the opinion
that the High Court was incorrect in holding that a “Deemed University” D
is excluded from the ambit of the term “University” under Section 2(c)(xi)
of the PC Act.
46. Having come to the above conclusion, in the present case, the
pivotal question is whether the appellant-trustee in the Board of ‘Deemed
to be University’ is a ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of the E
PC Act. Recently, this Court in the case of CBI v. Ramesh Gelli, (2016)
3 SCC 788, dealt with the question as to whether Chairman, Directors
and officers of a private bank before its amalgamation with a public
sector bank, can be classified as public servants for prosecution under
the PC Act. While dealing with the aforesaid proposition of law, the F
Court analysed the purpose and scope of the PC Act and made the
following observations:
“15. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the PC Bill it
is clear that the Act was intended to make the anti-corruption law
more effective by widening its coverage. It is also clear that G
the Bill was introduced to widen the scope of the definition
of “public servant”. Before the PC Act, 1988, it was the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Sections 161 to 165-A in
Chapter IX IPC which were governing the field of law relating to
prevention of corruption. Parliament repealed the Prevention of
H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A Corruption Act, 1947 and also omitted Sections 161 to 165-A IPC
as provided under Sections 30 and 31 of the PC Act, 1988. Since
a new definition of “public servant” is given under the PC Act,
1988, it is not necessary here to reproduce the definition of “public
servant” given in Section 21 IPC.
B …
17. The above definition shows that under sub-clause (viii)
contained in Section 2(c) of the PC Act, 1988, a person who
holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required
to perform any public duty, is a public servant. Now, for the
C purposes of the present case this Court is required to examine as
to whether the Chairman/Managing Director or Executive Director
of a private bank operating under licence issued by RBI under the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, held/holds an office and performed/
performs public duty so as to attract the definition of “public
servant” quoted above.”
D
(emphasis supplied)
47. This Court in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/
SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626, has clarified the word “office” in the following
manner:
E “61. … The word ‘office’ is normally understood to mean ‘a
position to which certain duties are attached, especially a place of
trust, authority or service under constituted authority’. (See Oxford
Shorter English Dictionary, 3rd Edn., p. 1362.)
In McMillan v. Guest, (1942) 1 All ER 606 (HL), Lord Wright
F has said:
‘…The word “office” is of indefinite content. Its various
meanings cover four columns of the New English Dictionary,
but I take as the most relevant for purposes of this case the
following:
G “A position or place to which certain duties are attached,
especially one of a more or less public character.”’
In the same case Lord Atkin gave the following meaning:
‘…”an office or employment which was subsisting, permanent,
substantive position, which had an existence independent of
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 353
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
the person who filled it, which went on and was filled in A
succession by successive holders.”’
In Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb, AIR 1968 SC1495
and Mahadeo v. Shantibhai, (1969) 2 SCR 422 this Court has
adopted the meaning given by Lord Wright when it said:
‘An office means no more than a position to which certain B
duties are attached.’”
48. This Court in the case of Manish Trivedi v. State of
Rajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420 further elucidated upon the ambit of the
phrase “public servant” by stressing upon the relevance of “office”,
wherein the emphasis was upon the duties performed. The Court noted C
therein:
“19. The present Act (the 1988 Act) envisages widening of the
scope of the definition of the expression “public servant”. It was
brought in force to purify public administration. The legislature
has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve D
the purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public
servants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents of
the definition clause by a construction which would be against the
spirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this principle, when we consider
the case of the appellant, we have no doubt that he is a public E
servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. Clause
(viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act makes any person,
who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or
required to perform any public duty, to be a public servant.
The word “office” is of indefinite connotation and, in the
present context, it would mean a position or place to which F
certain duties are attached and has an existence which is
independent of the persons who fill it.”
(emphasis supplied)
49. In order to appreciate the amplitude of the word “public
G
servant”,the relevance of the term “public duty” cannot be disregarded.
“Public duty” is defined under Section 2(b) of the PC Act, which is
reproduced below:
2(b) ‘public duty’ means a duty in the discharge of which the
State, the public or the community at large has an interest.
H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A 50. Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act indicates
that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at large
has any interest is called a public duty. The first explanation to Section 2
further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the categories stated
under Section 2 is a public servant whether or not appointed by the
government. The second explanation further expands the ambit to include
B
every person who de facto discharges the functions of a public servant,
and that he should not be prevented from being broughtunder the ambit
of public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities.
51. In the present case, on aprima-facie evaluation of the
statements of the Gaurav D. Mehta (the Vice-Chancellor); Mr. Pragnesh
C kumar Ramesh bhai Trivedi (account officer of Sumandeep Vidhyapith
University) and other witnesses it appears that the present respondent
was the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collection
of fees and donation amount.
52. The charge sheet specifically discloses that the respondent
D allegedly was collecting certain extra amount over the prescribed fees
on the pretext of allowing the students to fill up their examination forms.
Therefore, paying the respondent the alleged amount was a condition
precedent before filling up the forms, to appear for the examinations.
Specifically, in the complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had
E demanded an amount of RupeesTwenty Lakhs to be paid to the co-
accused Bharat Savant, failing which the daughter of the complainant
would not have been permitted to appear in the examination. In our
opinion, the fact that there were a large number of cheques which were
found during the raid is more than sufficient to establish a grave suspicion
as to the commission of the alleged offence.
F
53. The respondent has vehemently stressed upon the fact that
he is admittedly a trustee of the “Sumandeep Charitable Trust” and has
no connection with the “Sumandeep University”. But, it ought to be
noted that the courts below have failed to analyze the connection between
the trust and the University,as well as the relationship of the respondent
G with the university. Prima facie, a grave suspicion is made out that the
respondent was rendering his service by dealing with the students and
the examination aspect of the University. But a detailed appreciation of
evidence is called for before one can reach a conclusion as to the exact
position of the respondent vis-à-vis the University.
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 355
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]
54. At this stage, we may note that the jurisdiction of this Court, A
with regards to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be
excercised by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual
inferences. This Court, in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal,
1979 (3) SCC 4, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 227
CrPC and it held as under:-
B
“7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:
“If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,
the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground C
for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing.”
The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to
frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to D
exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court
to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing
and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his
function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the E
Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether
or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of
the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced
before the court which ex facie disclose that there are F
suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a
charge against him.”
55. Further, in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation,
2010 (9) SCC 368, this Court, inter alia, observed :-
“21.On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections G
227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
…
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial…”
56. Therefore, in line with the aforesaid proposition, this case is
not an appropriate one to have exercised the power under Section 227
to discharge the accused-respondent herein, having regards to the facts
B and circumstances of the case. However, it should be noted that this
judgment is rendered for a limited purpose, and we have not expressed
any opinion on the merits of the case. The trial court is directed to proceed
with the case expeditiously.
57. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
C aside. Appeal is allowed.
AJAY RASTOGI, J.
1. I have had the advantage of going through the draft judgment
proposed by my esteemed Brother Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana. I entirely
agree with the conclusions which my erudite Brother has drawn, based
D on the remarkable process of reasoning. I would all the same like to add
some of my views, not because the judgment requires any further
elaboration but looking for the question of law that emerged of
considerable importance.
2. The question that emerged for consideration in the present appeal
E is whether the respondent-trustee in the board of ‘deemed to be university’
is a ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c ) (xi) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter being referred to as “Act 1988”).
3. Zero tolerance towards corruption should be the top-notch
priority for ensuring system based and policy driven, transparent and
F responsive governance. Corruption cannot be annihilated but strategically
be dwindled by reducing monopoly and enabling transparency in decision
making. However, fortification of social and moral fabric must be an
integral component of long-term policy for nation building to accomplish
corruption free society.
G 4. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was amended in 1964
based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee. Although,
there are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code to deal with
public servants and those who abet them by way of criminal misconduct,
they were found to be inadequate to deal with the offence of corruption
effectively.
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 357
[AJAY RASTOGI, J.]
5. To make the anti-corruption laws more effective, the Prevention A
of Corruption Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The object and
statement of reasons of the Act, 1988 was intended to make the existing
anti-corruption laws more effective by widening their coverage and by
strengthening the provisions. The Act 1988 caters to its wide scope by
providing for “different paths to liability, some of which are especially
B
suited to, but by no means confined to, those who hold public office.”
6. There are number of judicial precedents dealing with the
definition and meaning of corruption. The simplest definition of corruption
is, any act or omission by a public servant for securing pecuniary or
other material advantage directly or indirectly for himself, his family or
friends. It will be apposite to refer the provisions of the Act, 1988 relevant C
for the purpose ad infra:-
(c) “public servant” means—
(i)-(x)…..
(xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or member of any D
governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any their teacher
or employee, by whatever designation called, of any
University and any person whose services have been availed of
by a University or any other public authority in connection with
holding or conducting examinations; E
(xii)…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. It will be relevant to note that prior to the Act, 1988, employees
of the university, professors, readers, etc. were not covered within the
F
definition of ‘public servant’ as it was contained in Section 21 of the
Indian Penal Code. Thrust of submission of the learned counsel for the
respondent is that respondent herein who is a trustee of deemed to be
university which cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to be
a public servant and would not fall within the ambit of Section 2(c ) (xi)
of the Act, 1988. The High Court although has accepted the contention G
of the learned counsel for the respondent on the said premise but it
needs to be examined in the context in which the term “University” has
been referred to under Section 2(c )(xi) of the Act, 1988.
8. The UGC Act was established by an Act of 1956 to make
provisions for the coordination and determination of standards of H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A education in universities. “University” has been defined under Section
2(f) of the UGC Act and those who are declared as ‘deemed to be
university’, a declaration has to be notified under Section 3 with
restrictions which has been imposed upon the deemed to be university
as referred to under Section 23 of the UGC Act. The relevant Sections
of the UGC Act are as infra:-
B
“Section 2(f) – “University” means a University established or
incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a
State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation
with the University concerned, be recognized by the Commission
in accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under this
C Act.
Section 3 - The Central Government may, on the advice of the
Commission, declare by notification in the Official Gazette, that
any institution for higher education, other than a University, shall
be deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act, and on
D such a declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall
apply to such institution as if it were a University within the meaning
of clause (f) of Section 2.
Section 23 – No institution, whether a corporate body or not,
other than a University established or incorporated by or under a
E Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act shall be entitled to
have the word “University” associated with its name in any manner
whatsoever. Provided that nothing in this Section shall, for a period
of two years from the commencement of this Act, apply to an
institution which, immediately before such commencement, had
F the word “University” associated with its name.”
9. “University” under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act is established
either in the Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act. At the same
time, such of the institutions for higher education other than the University
created under the statutory enactment, after being declared by the Central
G Government by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to
be university for the purposes of this Act and all provisions of the UGC
Act shall apply to such institutions as if it were a university within the
meaning of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act.
10. It cannot be lost sight of that the Act, 1988, as its predecessor
that is the repealed Act of 1947 on the same subject, was brought into
H
STATE OF GUJARAT v. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH 359
[AJAY RASTOGI, J.]
force with avowed purpose of effective prevention of bribery and A
corruption. The Act of 1988 which repeals and replaces the Act of 1947
contains a definition of ‘public servant’ with vide spectrum in clause (c )
of Section 2 of the Act, 1988, so as to purify public administration. The
objects and reasons contained in the Bill leading to passing of the Act
can be taken assistance of, which gives the background in which the
B
legislation was enacted. When the legislature has introduced such a
comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of
punishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption in the society
imparting public duty, it would be apposite not to limit the contents of the
definition clause by construction which would be against the spirit of the
statute. C
11. By introduction of Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, any person
or member of any governing body with whatever designation called of
any university has been included in the definition of “public servant” and
any university includes all universities regardless of the fact whether it
has been established under the statute or declared deemed to be university D
under Section 3 of the UGC Act. It is true that the distinction has been
pointed out by the Parliament under the provisions of the UGC Act for
consideration and determination of standards of education in universities,
but in my view, no distinction could be carved out between the university
and deemed to be university so far it relates to the term ‘public servant’
as defined under Section 2(c ) (xi) of the Act 1988. E
12. In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ in clause (c ) of
Section 2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt an approach as
would give effect to the intention of the legislature. The legislature has,
intentionally, while extensively defining the term ‘public servant’ in clause
(c ) of Section 2 of the Act and clause (xi) in particular has specifically F
intended to explore the word ‘any’ which includes all persons who are
directly or indirectly actively participating in managing the affairs of any
university in any manner or the form. In this context, the legislature has
taken note of ‘any’ person or member of “any” governing body by
whatever designation called of “any” university to be termed as ‘public G
servant’ for the purposes of invoking the provisions of Act 1988.
13. Heavy reliance was placed on the judgment in Orissa Lift
Irrigation Corporation Vs. Rabi Sankar1 wherein, the scope and
1
2018 (1) SCC 468 H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.
A parameters were examined by this Court under which the deemed to be
university would regulate its educational fora under the regulations framed
by the UGC for the purpose of imparting education by the deemed to be
university.
14. But so far as the present case is concerned, the question for
B consideration is the term ‘any’ university in the broader spectrum to
curb corruption in the educational institutions as referred to under Section
2(c )(xi) of Act 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referred to the
word “any university” which clearly mandates the university referred to
and controlled by its statutory mechanism referred to under Section 2(f)
and deemed to be university under Section 3 of the UGC Act.
C
15. In my considered opinion, the view expressed by the High
Court is unsustainable in law and all the questions raised on merits are
left open to the respondent to urge during the course of the trial. The
appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court of Gujarat
dated 2nd February 2018 is hereby set aside. No costs.
D
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
E
F
G
H
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