STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.versusDEVANDER SAGAR & ORS.

                    [2015) 13 S.C.R. 1057


                STATE OF HARYANA&ANR.                                A
                                v.
                DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS.
              (Civil Appeal Ne. 318 of2011 etc.)
                                                                     B
                    SEPTEMBER 07, 2015
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,JJ.)

     . Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, 6, SA, 11 A and 17 -
s.4 notification dated 18.01.2001 - Invoking urgency                 c
provision u/s.17(1) and 17(4)-Declaration u/s. 6 issued the
next ciay - The notification and the declaration challenged
in the court by land-owners - Court passed interim order on
07.02.2002 - The State on 08.02.2002 passed award,
oblivious to the interim orders and took possession of certain       o
parts of Schedule iand - The High Court by order dated
12.1.2004 further quashed the declaration on the grounds
that the State failed to adhere to mandatory requirement of
payment of 80% compensation; and that it did not qualify as
a case of urgency as the State failed to pass the award within       E
one year from the date of the declaration- However, the High
Court permitted the land-owners to file objections u/s. SA
within· 30 days and also permitted the State to issue fresh
declaration u/s. 6, if it found substance in those objections -
Objections filed on 11.02.2004 were dismissed - Fresh                F
declaration u/s. 6 was issued on 30.12.2004 - The land-
owners again challenged the s.4 notifjcation dated
18.01.2002 as well as declaration dated 30.12.2004-High
Court quashed the acquisition proceedings holding that
declaration dated 30.12.2004 was issued beyond the                   G
statutory period from the date of s. 4 notification and that award
was also not passed within two years, thus falling foul of s.
11A- On appeal, held: The entire exercise of/and acquisition
proceedings has to be completed within three years - There           H
                              1057
1058        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015) 13 S.C.R.

     ...-
 A are lapses on the part of the State in the manner in which it
   conducted the acquisition - No compensation was paid at
   the time of invocation of urgency provision - Once the State
   invoked s. 17, it was necessary for it to tend the payment of
   80% of the compensation- Section 17(3A) and 17(38) cannot
 B be rendered nugatory- The Declaration dated 30.12.2004
   cannot be upheld and the same cannot be considered as
   continuation of initial Declaration - the order dated 12. 1. 2004
   was erroneous and prejudicial to the landowners and hence
   the State cannot be permitted to rely on that- No party should
 C suffer for the mistake of the Court - Order of High Court
   upheld.

         s. 17 - Invocation of- By State - Without paying 80%
   of the compensation - Held: The State cannot be permitted
 D to invoke one part of s. 17 while discarding another - If the
   manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under a statute,
   the act must be done in that manner or not at all.

         ss. 4 and 6 - Land acquisition - Payment of
 E compensation to land-owners- Possession of the land taken
   by the beneficiary - Thereafter acquisition proceedings
   challenged - Held: As per s. 24 of 2013 Act, the requirements
   for an acquisition to attain finality are passing of award,
   payment of compensation and taking of possession - In the
 F present case, since the land-owners allowed the acquisition
   to become final, they cannot challenge it thereafter- In the
   facts of the case, challenge to acquisition proceedings was
   also belated - Hence, acquisition proceedings upheld -
   Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
 G Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 -
   s.24.

         Interpretation of Statutes - Expropriatory legislation -
   Interpretation of - Held: Expropriatory legislation such as
 H Land Acquisition Act, must be construed strictly- Legislation.
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1059


      Decree - Challenge to- When - Held: A decree without         A
jurisdiction is a nullity - Its invalidity could be a subject at
any stage in any proceedings, even at the stage of execution.

     Dismissing C.A.Nos. 318 of 2011 and 459-460 of
2011 and allowing C.A. Nos. 461-462, the Court      8
     HELD:
      C.A. Nos. 318 of2011and495-460 of2011:
       1. The entire exercise in the land acquisition
P(Oceedings has to be completed within three years.                C
This time prescription is intended to ensure that the
landowners whose lands have been expropriated on the
State's continuing powers of eminent domain, receive
the market price for their property in close proximity of
_the time of acquisition. These persons would thus be in           D
a position to purchase alternate property, which
indubitably would not be possible if the compensation
award is implemented after delay. ·courts must be ever
vigilant and _resolute in protecting these persons from            E
unfair treatment by the State. Parliament was alive to
the injury that would inexorably visit the landowners if
acquisition proceedings were not circumscribed by time,
as compensi)tion is pegged to the date of the
Notification. Parliament has, in terms of the Right to Fair        F
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, provided
amelioration against Governmental apathy. [Para 3]
[1068-C-E]
     Greater Naida Industrial Development Authority                G
     vs. Devendra Kumar (2011) 12 SCC 375; Kiran
     Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117;
     Dr. Jogmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir. Health Services,
     Haryana 2013 (8) SCR 77: (2013) 10 SCC 136
     - relied on.                                                  H
1060      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A       Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu
         2002.(2) SCR 383: (2002) 3 SCC 533-referred to.
         2. Even though the holding of property is no longer
   a fundamental right guaranteed under Part Ill of the
   Constitution of India, it has been given constitutional
 8
   protection under Article 300A. The Constitution now
   guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his
   property save by authority of law. That authority, inter
   alia, is the necessity to tend the payment of 80 per cent
 c of the compensation estimated by the Collector in the
   event that Section 17 is to be pressed into service, with
   the objective of denying the landowners remonstration
   rights by filing Objections in consonance with Section
   5A of the L.A. Act. Expropriatory legislation, such as the
 D L.A. Act, must compulsorily be construed strictly. The
   appellant State cannot be permitted to invoke one part
   of Section 17 while discarding another. Sections 17(3A)
   and 17(38), cannot be.rendered nugatory. "It is the basic
   principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a
 E particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act
   must be done in that manner or not at all." [Para 6] [1071-
   G; 1072-A-D, E]

         3. There are lapses on the part of the Appellant State
 F in the manner in which it conducted the acquisition. No
   compensation whatsoever, leave alone the 80 per cent
   postulated by the Statute under Section 17(3), was given
   at the time that the urgency provisions were invoked.
   This exercise ought to have been carried out by passing
 G a provisional or ad hoc Award containing the Collector's
   estimation of the compensation to be paid to the
   landowners. [Para 5] [1070-B-C]
         Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a (1999) 3
         SCC 422: 1999 (1) SCR 1121; Nazir Ahmad v.
 H
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1061


     King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253; Rao Shiv               A
     Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR
     1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1038; State of U.P. v.
     Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358; Hussein
     Ghadial/y v. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425 -
     relied on.                                           B
     Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 - referred to.
      4. Prima facie, time for filing of s. 5A Objections
would have to be computed to have commenced on the
date of the Order, i.e. 12.1.2004, and further there seems c
to be no alternative but to deem the issuance of the
Section 4 Notification forthe same date. The High Court
in the previous litigation ought to have simply quashed
the Section 4 Notification in personam, or if
circumstances so commanded, in rem. By enjoining the D
petitioners to file Objections, the High Court has causad
a piquant position to come into place .. But, no party can
be made to suffer any disadvantage due to an act of the
Court. [Para 7] [1072-G; 1073-A·B]
                                                           E
      5. According to Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the
award has to be made within two years of the date of the
Declaration, which requirement was met in this case.
There was no basis on which to calculate this period
from the date of the previous Order, as the Division Bench F
has done. [Para 8] [1073-G-H]

    6.1 The Division Bench Order dated 12.1.2004,
which allowed for filing of a fresh Section 6 Declaration,
ought to have be.en assailed by the State since its G
conclusions were contrary to the ratio of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in *Padma Sundara Rao c~se. The
landowners could equally have challenged this Order.
However, given the resources available virtually at the
beck and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its H ·
1062         SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     neglect or jural folly and must be held responsible for its
       failures. This is especially so since the concerned
       citizens face the draconian consequences of
       expropriation of their land with its attendant loss of
       income. (Para 10] (1074-F-H; 1075-A-B]
 B
         6.2 The Division Bench has predicated its decision
   to set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration
   which ironically the previous Division Bench had failed
   to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench in
 C *Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section
   6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period
   cannot be stretched as this would not be in keeping with
   the legislative intent. The contention of the appellant
   State that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 is a
 D continuation of the initial Declaration is thus clearly
   erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face of the
   strict interpretation of time prescribed by *Padma
   Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section
   6. Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a
 E continuation, it would have done so by specifically
   providing for it, as it has done for periods covered by
   orders of stay and injunction. Furthermore, the appellant
   State cannot place reliance on an erroneous Order which
 F caused grave prejudice to the rights of the Respondents.
   No party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. (Para
   11] (1077-E-H; 4178-A]

        6.3 Since compensation is calculated based on the
   value of the land on the date of Section 4 Notification,
 G the Order of the Division Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted
   in the landowners getting compensation at 2001·- rates
   even thqugh the Award was finally passed in 2006 and
   the compensation is yet to be paid to the Respondents.
 H Had the Division Bench Order struck down only the
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1063


Declaration, which. in turn would have resulted in the A
entire acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have
had to reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the
Respondents receiving compensation at the market
rates current at the time of the fresh Notification.
Therefore, the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 cannot be B
upheld merely by virtue of the previous Division Bench's
erroneous and prejudicial Order. [Para 11] [1078-A-D]
     *Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu
     2002 (2) SCR 383 : (2002) 3 SCC 533 - relied          C
     on.
      7. The quashing of the entire acquisition
proceeding has to be explicitly expressed. Quashing of
acquisition proceedings at the instance of one or two
                                                        0
landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the
entire acquisition. Landowners who are aggrieved by the
acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge
to them at least before an Award is pronounced and
possession of the land is taken over by the Government. E
However, generally speaking, Courts come to the
succour of those, who approach it. In some instances
equities are equalized by allowing subsequentslothful
petitioners, belatedly and conveniently jumping on the
bandwagons, to receive, at the highest, compensation F
granted to others sans interest. [Para 9] [1074-B-F]
     Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4
     sec 255 : 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533; Abhey
     Ram, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban
                                                           G
     (1999) 7 sec 44 : 1999 (1) Suppl. scR 650;
     Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000)
     7 sec 296 : 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496; The
     Chairman and M.D., TNHB v. S. Saraswathy2015
     AIR2315;A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation·
                                                           H


                                                               •
1064      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A       Limited v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao (2012)
         12 sec 797 - relied on.
         C.A. Nos. 461-462 of2011:

        8.1 In the appeals compensation has been paid to
 B the contesting respondents, whose land is now in the
   possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority.
   Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
   Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
 C Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three
   requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the
   passing of an award, payment of compensation and
   taking of possession, all of which are met here. [Para
   13] [1078-G-H; 1079-A]
 D       8.2 The Contesting Respondents in these Appeals
   also had not been parties before the Division Bench in
   its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not
   explicitly state that it would apply to all the landowners
 E affected by the impugned acquisition process, it was
   limited in scope to the parties before it. The Contesting
   Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions
   challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated
   12.3.2008 was passed. Till the date of the 12.3.2008
 F Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to the
   acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and
   therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing
   reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.
   [Para 13] [1079-B-D]
 G
        8.3 A number of Proforma Respondents were
   impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated
   12.4.2013, who first challenged the acquisition by filing
   a writ petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated
 H 12.3.2008~ It is thus clear that these Respondents, too,
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1065


initially consented to the acquisition process and only A
challenged it belatedly by seeking to rely upon a
favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain to
them. [Para 14) [1079-F]

                    Case Law Reference                       B
2002 (2) SCR 383                referred to       Para4
c2011) 12 sec 375               relied on         Para4
(1955) 1 SCR 117                relied on         Para4
                                                             c
2013 (8) SCR 77                 relied on         Para 4 ·
1999 (1) SCR 1121               relied on         Para6
(1875) 1 Ch D 426                   referred to   Para 6
AIR 1936 PC 253                 relied on         Para 6     D
1954 SCR 1038                   relied on         Para 6
1964 SC 358                         relied on     Para 6
(2014) 8 sec 425                    relied on     Para 6 ·
                                                             E
· 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533           relied on     Para9
 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 650            relied on     Para 9
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496             relied on     Para 9
2015AIR 2315                        relied on     Para 9     F
(2012) 12sec191                     relied on     Para 9
     CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
318 of2011.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2008 of G
 Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
 Chandigarh in CWP No. 1123 of 2006.
                             WITH
 C;A. No. 459-462 of 2011.                                   H
1066 •     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A        Amrender Sharan, Sr. Adv, Ajay Bansal, AAG, Govind
                                                       '
     Goel, SanjaY. Kumar, Yadav, Ankit Goel, Dr. Kailash Chand,
     C.D. Singh, GauravYadava, Sachin Jain, Ms. Kumud Lata Das,
     Sanjai Kumar Pathak, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, S.N. Gupta,
     Surya Kant, Advs., for the appearing parties.
 B
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

          Civil Appeal No. 318 OF 2011
 c
            1. This Appeal questions the correctness of the Judgment
     dated 12.3.2008 delivered by the Division Bench of the High
     Court of Punjab and Haryana in C.W.P. No. 1123 of 2006, on
     the basis of which the High Court had also allowed C. W. P. No.
 D   1465 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007, C.W.P. No. 7066 of
     2008 and C.W.P. No~ 7353 of 2008. Civil Appeal No. 318 of
     2011 and Civil Appeal Nos. 459-462 of 2011 respectively
     assail these Judgments. It merits to mention that the connected
     Civil Appeal No. 535 of2011 was, on the unrefuted submission
 E   made by the learned counsel for the Respondents/Landowners.
     in that Appeal, dismissed as infructuous by an Order dated
     11.3.2015 of this Court; the submission was that the Public
     Notice dated 8.4.2010 had released the subject land from
     acquisition.
 F
         2. The State of Haryana had issued a Notification under
   Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 ('L.A. Act' for
   brevity) on 18.1.2001 to acquire 12.18 acres of land falling in
   Village Khera Markanda and 11.64 acres of land falling in
 G Village Ratgal as mentioned in the Schedule thereto for the
   construction of a fell-storm sewer, a sewage-treatment plant
   and a crematorium (Shamshan Ghat) at Kurukshetra.                   /'
   Simultaneous with the issuance of this Notification, the
   Appellant State had also invoked the urgency provisions
 H
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1067
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

contained in Sections 17(1) and 17(4 ), thereby denying to the        A
landowners (some of whom are the Respondents before us)
the opportunity to file Objections under Section SA of the L.A.
Act. A Declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued
the very next day, i.e. 19.1.2001. It was at this juncture that the
Respondents/Landowners filed C.W.P. No. 2503 of 2002 and              B
C.W.P. No. 8696 of 2002, (along with a third party namely
Neelam Ram, the petitioner in C.W.P. Ne. 4887 of 2002)
challenging the Section 4 Notification dated 18.1.2001 and
the Section 6 Declaration dated 19.1.2001.
                                                                      c
      3. It will be pertinent to point out that by the time interim
orders came to be passed in the Writ Petitions by the Division
Bench on 7.2.2002, the one year period prescribed in the
statute to advance from Notification to Declaration stage had
already elapsed. It is also relevant to record that D
notwithstanding the interim order dated 7 .2.2002, the Appellant
State passed an Award on the next day, namely 8.2.2002,
obviously oblivious of those interim orders. It also took
possession of certain parts of the Scheduled lands. The one
year prescription having been transgressed, the subject E
acquisition would have met its statutory death but for the feature
that the urgency provisions had been invoked by the State in
the event without legal propriety. The time table established
under the L.A. Act requires to be recalled. Upon the publication
of a Notification, affected landowners are required to file F
Objections within thirty days. Although no period has been
prescribed for disposal of Objections by the Collector, this
exercise must reach its culmination within one year of the
Notification's issuance. If these actions are SD done, the G
Government must direct the Collector to "take order for the
acquisition of the land" which·is a statutory provision which
smacks superficiality. The Collector must also mark and
measure the land in question, cause public notice to be given
of the Government's intention to take possession of the land H


                                                                          '
1068         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     and invite claims for compensation etc. After deciding any
       objection or representation received from the interested
       parties, an Award has to be made within two years of the
       Declaration, failing which the entire acquisition proceedings
       would lapse. Of course the period covered by stay orders
 B     granted by a Court would be excluded. Parliament was, as is
       manifestly evident, alive to the injury that would inexorably visit
       the landowners if acquisition proceedings were not
       circumscribed by time, as compensation is pegged to the date
       of the Notification. The entire exercise has to be completed
 C     within three years. This time prescription is thus obviously
       intended to ensure that the landowners whose lands have been
       expropriated on the State's continuing powers of eminent
       domain receive the market price for their property in close
 D     proximity of the time of acquisition. These persons would thus
       be in a position to purchase alternate property, which
       indubitably would not be possible if the compensation award
       is implemented after delay. Courts must be ever vigilant and
       resolute in protecting these persons from unfair treatment by
 E     the State. Thankfully, Parliament has, in terms of the Right to
       Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
       Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013, provided
       amelioration against Governmental apathy.

 F       4. By a brief Order delivered on 12.1.2004, that is in the
   era of Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3
   SCC533, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
   Court, noting the contentions that the Appellant State had not
   adhered to the mandatory ·requirement of payment of 80 per
 G cent comper;isation to the landowners and that it did not qualify
   as a case of urgency since the Appellant State passed had
   failed to publish an Award within one year after the Section 6
   Declaration, quashed the latter. However, for reasons
   recondite, the Division Bench simultaneously permitted the
 H petitioners before it to file Section SA Objections within thirty
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1069
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

days and permitted the Appellant State to issue a fresh Section A
6 Declaration in the event that it found no substance in those
Objections. The directions could not have been given by the
Division Bench. Instead, the Division Bench should have simply
quashed the Section 6 Declaration, at which point the Section
4 Notification would have lapsed, due to the fact that the one B
year period for filing a Declaration had already elapsed. In
Greater Naida Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendra
Kumar (2011) 12 SCC 375 it has been clarified that it is
impermissible for the Government to proceed with the
acquisition from the stage of Section 4. Applying the ratio of C
Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117 which
has been followed in Dr. Jogmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir. Health
Services, Haryana (2013) 10 SCC 136 to the effect that a
decree without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be D
a subject at any stage in any proceedings and even at the
stage of execution, the said Order of the Division Bench can
be ignored. We think it appropriate to reproduce the operative
part of this Order for reasons that will become apparent later:-

       "l n the facts and circumstances of the case, as E
       mentioned above, in our view, interest of justice would .
       be served, if we quash declaration under Section 6 of
       the Act dated 19.1.2001, and all subsequent
       proceedings that might have been taken thereafter with F
       liberty to the petitioners to file objections under
       Section 5-A of the Act within 30 days from the date of
       receipt of a certified copy of the order, which, naturally
       shall be heard by the State or the authority constituted
       by the State for that purpose, in accordance with law G
       and after giving an appropriate hearing to the petitioners
       if the objections are rejected, naturally, the Government
       will be in its power to issue declaration under Section 6
       of the Act.
                                                                    H
                       I

1070        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A             Petition is disposed of accordingly. However, parties
            are left to bear their own costs." (emphasis supplied)

         5. We must highlight the lapses by the Appellant State
   in the manner in which it conducted the acquisition.
 B Significantly, no compensation whatsoever, leave alone the 80
   per cent postulated by the Statute under Section 17(3), was
   given at the time that the urgency provisions were invoked.
   This exercise ought to have been carried out by passing a
   provisional or ad hoc Award containing the Collector's
 C estimation of the compensation to be paid to the landowners.
   The State seems to be oblivious of the law and impervious to
   the plight of the landowners whose livelihood is virtually
   deracinated. Section 6 requires particular perusal and we are
   extracting its relevant portions for convenience. Also, for facility
 D of reference, Sections 17(3A) is reproduced in order to
   emphasize that those provisions could be correctly and
   properly resorted to only if the State Government, through its
   Collector, had tendered 80 per cent of the compensation
   estimated by him.
 E
             Section 6 - Declaration that land is required for
           a public purpose - (1) Subject to the provisions of
           Part VII of th is Act, when the appropriate Government is
           satisfied, after considering the report, it any, made under
 F         section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is
           needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a
           declaration shall be made to that effect under the
           signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some
           officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different
 G         declarations may be made from time to time in respect
           of different parcels of any land covered by the same
           notification under section 4, sub-section (1) irrespective
           of whether one report or different reports has or have
           been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-
 H         section (2):
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1071
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

         Provided that no declaration in respect of any                A
       particular land covered by a notification under section
       4, sub-!ection (1 ),_

       (i) xxx         xxx         ,• xxx
                                                                       B
       (ii) Published after the commencement of the Land
            Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made
             after the expiry of one year from the date of the
             publication of the notification:

        17. Special powers in cases of urgency -                       c
           xxx         xxx            xxx
         (3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-
       section ( 1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without   o
       prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), -

       (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the
           compensation for such land as estimated by him
           to the persons interested entitled thereto, and
                                                                       E
       (b·) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or
            more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31,
            sub-section (2),

       and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions         F
       of section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second
       provision thereto), shall apply as they apply to the
       payment of compensation under that section.

      6. Even though the holding of property is no longer a            G
fundamental right guaranteed under Part Ill of the Constitution
of India, it has been given constitutional protection under Artiele
300A which came to be inserted into the Constitution by the
Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)Act, 1978 which omitted
Article 19(1)(f), viz., "to acquire, hold and dispose of propertY'.    H
1072        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [201S] 13 S.C.R.


 A The Constitution now guarantees that no person shall be
   deprived of his property save by authority of law. We have
   mentioned this for the reason that if the UnioA or the State
   Government is desirous of depriving any person of his property
   it can only do so by authority of law. That authority, as is facially
 B evident, inter alia, is the necessity to tend the payment of 80
   per cent of the compensation estimated by the Collector in the
   event that Section 17 is to be pressed into service, with the
   objective of denying the landowners remonstration rights by
   filing Objections in consonance with Section SA of the L.A.
 C Act. Expropriatory legislation, such as the L.A. Act, must
   compulsorily be construed strictly. The Appellant.State cannot
   be permitted to invoke one part of Section 17 while discarding
   another. Sections 17(3A) and 17(3B), which were inserted by
   the Act 68 of 1964 with effect from 24.9.1994, cannot be
 0
   rendere~ nugatory. In this regard, we are reminded of the
   Judgment of this Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of
   Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422 which held that: "It is the basic
   principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a
 E particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be
   done in that manner or not at all.• The origin of this rule is
   traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor (187S) 1 Ch D 426
   which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King
   Emperor AIR 1936 PC 2S3, and has been upheld in Rao Shiv
 F Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322,
   State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 3S8 and Hussein
   Ghadiallyv. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425.

         7. Prima facie, time for filing of SA Objections would
 G have to be computed to have commenced on the date of the
   Order, i.e. 12.1.2004, and further there seems to be no
   alternative but to deem the issuance of the Section 4
   Notification for the same date. Hence the Section 6 Declaration
   would have to be made at the latest by 11.1.200S. However,
 H we reiterate that the High Court ought to have simply quashed
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1073
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

the Section 4 Declaration in personam, or if circumstances so A
commanded, in rem. By permitting nay enjoining the petitioners
to file Objections, the High Court has caused a piquant position ·
to come into place. But, as is trite, no party can be made to
suffer any disadvantage due to an act of the Court. The
Respondents filed Objections on 11.2 .2004 which were B
dismissed in September 2004 paving the way for the passing
of a fresh Section 6 Declaration on 30.12.2004. The
Respondents thereupon challenged the Section 4 Notification
dated 18.1.2002 and the Section 6 Declaration dated
30.12.2004 in terms of C.W.P. No.1123 of2006, C.W.P. No. C
1465 of 2006 and C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007.

      8. In the second salvo of writ petitions, the Division
Bench has found in the impugned Judgment dated 12.3.2008
that the second Section 6 Declaration had been made after D
the passing of the period prescribed in the L.A. Act, as the
Section 4 Notification was issued on 18.1.2001. It noted that
this Court had held in Padma Sundara Rao that the subject
statutory period has to be imparted a strict construction; the
period could be increased only in the circumstances postulated E
and provided for in the Act itself. The Division Bench also
observed that even if the second Section 6 Declaration were
to be accepted as valid by construing the one year period from
the date of the Order of the previous Division Bench dated
12.1.2004, the Appellant State had failed to pass an Award F
within two years, thus falling foul of Section 11 A of the L.A. Act.
The Section 4 Notification, the Section 6 Declaration and all
proceedings pursuant thereto were therefore quashed. We find
it apposite to note the error in the latter observation. According G
to Section 11 A of the L.A. Act, the award hbs to be made within
two years of the date of the Declaration, which requirement
was met in this case. There was no basis on which to calculate
this period from the date of the previous Order, as the Division
Bench has done.                                                      H
1074       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A       9. It would be pertinentto clarify thatthe quashing of the
   entire acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed.
   This Court has in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar
   (1993) 4 SCC 255, Abhey Ram, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip
   Singh Uban (1999) 7 SCC44, Delhi Administration v. Gurdip
 B Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296 and The Chairman and M.D.,
   TNHB v. S. Saraswathy (Judgment delivered on 11.5.2015 in
   Civil Appeal Nos. 736-737 of 2008) reiterated and restated
   the established and consistent view that quashing of acquisition
   proceedings at the instance of one or two landowners does
 C not have the effect of nullifying the entire acquisition. In A.P.
   Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited v. Chinthamaneni
   Narasimha Rao (2012) 12 SCC 797, this Court has reiterated
   the established proposition that landowners who are aggrieved
 D by the acquisition proceedings would have to lay a challenge
   to them at least before an Award is pronounced and
   possession of the land is taken over by the Government.
   Numerous decisions of this Court have been discussed
   obviating the need to analyze all of them once again. However,
 E generally speaking, Courts come to the succour of those who
   approach it. In some instances equities are equalized by
   allowing subsequent slothful petitioners, belatedly and
   conveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to receive, at the
   highest, compensation granted to others sans interest.
 F
          10. The Appellant State has filed thisAppeal contending
   that the parties are bound by the Division Bench Order dated
   12.1.2004, which allowed for filing of a fresh Section 6
   Declaration. This is a specious submission because the State
 G ought to have assailed that Order since its conclusions were
   contrary to the ratio of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
   Padma Sundara Rao. It may be contended that the
   landowners could equally have challenged this Order.
   However, given the resources available virtually at the beck
 H and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its neglect or
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1075
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

jural folly and must be held responsible for its failures. This is A
especially so since the concerned citizens face the draconian
consequences of expropriation of their land with its attendant
loss of income. The Appellant State further contended that the
initial Section 6 Declaration was within the statutory time period
and upon the curing of technical defects, the original Section B
6 Declaration continued. The Appellant State also argued that
the possession of certain lands has already been taken by the
Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and therefore
those matters have acquired finality in accordance with the
ratio of Padma Sundara Rao, which is available in these C
extracted paragraphs:

      11. It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding
      the urgency in terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no
      role to play when the period of limitation under Section     D
      6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of
      limitation seems-to be the avoidance of inconvenience
      to a person whose land is sought to be acquired.
      Compensation gets pegged from the date of notification
      under Section 4( 1). Section 11 provides that the            E
      valuation of the land has to be done on the date of
      publication of notification under Section 4(1 ). Section
      23 deals with matters to be considered in determining
      the compensation. It provides that the market value of       F
      the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of
      publication of the notification under Section 4( 1) of the
      Act. The prescription of time-limit in that background is,
      therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chandv. Union
      of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 it was held by this Court that      G
      though no period was prescribed, action within a
      reasonable time was warranted. The said case related
      to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific
      periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same
      became non est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded        H
1076   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no
       bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due
       procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh
       notification is to be issued, the market value has to be
       determined on the basis of the fresh notification under
 B     Section 4( 1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for
       the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose
       land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of.
       He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If
       the acquisition soughtto be made is done in an illogical,
 c     illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer
       on that count.

       ******

 D     14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets
       the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is
       misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law,
       it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if
       deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd.
 E     v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd.) The legislative casus
       omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative
       process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and
       unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something
       into it, as was done in Narsimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah
 F     case the period was further stretched to have the time
       period run from date of service of the High Court's order.
       Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of
       Section 6( 1). If the view is accepted it would mean that
       a case can be covered by not only clause (1) and/or
 G     clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1 ), but also by a
       non-prescribed period. Same can never be the
       legislative intent.

       *****
 H
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS. 1077
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

       16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis A
       principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K.
      .Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu
      AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was
      rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the
      amendment by the 1984Act. lfthe legislature intended B
      to give a new lease of life in those cases where the
      declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no
      reason why it could not have done so by specifically
      providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically
      provided for periods covered by orders of stay or C
      injunction clearly shows that no other period was
      intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for
      providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus
      curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench
                                                                   0
      of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact
      situation of this case.

       11. The Division Bench has predicated its decision to
set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration on P...dma
Sundara Rao, which ironically the previous Division Bench            E
had failed to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench
in Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section
6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period cannot be
stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative
intent. The contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration   F
dated 30.12.2004 is a continuation of the initial Declaration is
thus clearly erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face
of the strict interpretation of time prescribed by Padma
Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 6.               G
Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a continuation,
it would have done so by specifically providing for it, as it has
done for periods covered by orders of stay and injunction.
Furthermore, the Appellant State cannot place reliance on an
erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice to the rights of        H
1078         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 13 S.C.R.


 A     the Respondents. It would be apt to mention the legal principle
       that no party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. Since
       compensation is calculated based on the value of the land on
       the date of the Section 4 Notification, the Order of the Division
       Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted in the landowners getting
 B     compensation at 2001 rates even though the Award was finally
       passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be paid to the
       Respondents. Had the Division Bench Order struck down only
       the Declaration, which in turn would have resulted in the entire
       acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have had to
 C     reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the Respondents
       receiving compensation at the market rates current at the time
       of the fresh Notification. We therefore find that the Declaration
       dated 30.12.2004 cannot be upheld merely by virtue of the
 D     previous Division Bench's erroneous and prejudicial Order.
       We are in agreement with the decision of the High Court in the
       impugned Judgment and consequently dismiss the Appeal.

            C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 2011
 E            12. We are of the opinion thatthe substance of the issues
       in question in this batch of petitions are analogous to those in
       Civil Writ Petition No. 1123 of 2006 which has been assailed
       in Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, save for the difference that it
       is the Haryana Urban Development Authority which has filed
 F     the Appeal. In that light, the findings made in the preceding
       Appeal apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and
       are decided in the same terms.
            C.A. Nos. 461-462 of2011
 G       13. The factual scenario in these Appeals is different
   from Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, in that compensation has
   been paid to the Contesting Respondents, whose land is now
   in the possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority.
   Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
 H Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
STATE OF HARYANA &ANR. v. DEVAN DER SAGAR & ORS. 1079
               [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.)

Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three                    A
requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the passing
of an award, payment of compensation and taking of
possession, all of which are met here. Furthermore, the
Contesting Respondents in these Appeals had not been
parties before the Division Bench in its Judgment dated                 B
12.3.2008. As that Judgment di<;I not explicitly state that it would
apply to all the landowners affected by the impugned
acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties
before it, for reasons that we have already discussed herein.
It would also be pertinent to note that the Contesting                  C
Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions
challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated
12.3.2008 was passed. We find that till the date of the
12.3.2008 Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to
                                                                        0
the acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and therefore
they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance .,;n a
Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.

     14. A number of Proforma Respondent& were
impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, E
and we are not aware of whether the acquisitions with regard
to their land has become final. However, these Proforma
Respondents first challenged the acquisition by filing a writ
petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008. It
is thus clear that these Respondents, too, initially consented F
to the acquisition process and only challenged it belatedly by
seeking to rely upon a favourable Judgment that did not relate
or pertain to them. The impugned Orders dated 12.5.2008 in
C.W.P. No 7066 of 2008 and 13.5.2008 in C.W.P. No. 7353 of G
2008 as well as Order dated 19.1.2010 in C.W.P. No. 163 of
2010 are therefore set aside, and these Appeals are
accordingly allowed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy                              Appeals disposed of.
                                                                        H