STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.versusNORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD.

                   [2015] 10 S.C.R. 697


               STATE OF HARYANA& ORS.                           A
                              v.
     NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD.
              (Civil Appeal No. 8378 of 2015)
                   OCTOBER 07, 2015 .                           B
                         •
   [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
      Land acquisition - Resumption of land - Acquisition of
land in favour of respondent for specified purpose by
appellant-State - Passing of award wherein compensation         C
payable to the landowners computed- Thereafter, execution
of deed of conveyance by appellant-State in favour of
respondent, however, respondent violated the terms and
conditions of deed of conveyance - Respondent sold the          D
land without permission of appellant-State - Resumption
notice to respondent by appellant State - Writ petition by
respondents seeking quashing of resumption notice - High
Court set aside the said Notice and directions to appel/ant-
State to comply with the principles of natural justice - On     E
appeal, held: Conduct of the respondent was not only unfair
but, in fact, it smacks of fraud, malpractice and malfeasance
- Resumption notice' was issued to the respondent because
of its actions, so respondent has forfeited whatsoever rights
it may have enjoyed over the land- Thus, the order passed       F
by the High Court set aside.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 The view of the High Court that the Deed
 of Conveyance is founded on the Act and, therefore, G
 contractual rights would not be the only determinative
 elements in the dispute is concurred with. The High
·Court's opinion that the principles of natural justice are
 an "inalienable part of the· rule of law" is endorsed; H
                             697
698      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2015] 10 S.C.R.


A abidance with these principles is necessary even de hors
  specific stipulation in this regard. There was no
  permission either in law or as per the Deed of
  Conveyance which authorised the respondent to sell the
  land without prior written permission of the appellant-
s State. Had the Executing Court been properly apprised
  of the terms and conditions ofU1e Conveyance Deed and
  the true factual circumstances of the case, its
  conclusions would have been diametrically different.
  The respondent cannot take advantage of its own
C transgressions and legal duplicity and shenanigans. The
  plea of the respondent is that it was saddled with higher
  compensation awarded by the District Court and
  thereafter by the High Court, and that requisite resources
  were not available with it to satisfy the decreed amount
0
  and that consequently it filed in Court, instead with the
  appellant-State, the application for permission for private
  sale. The said higher compensation was computed at a
  mere Rs. 8.8 lacs which stands in stark contrast to the
E quantum of Rs.4 crore which was planned to be invested
  by the respondent in the ma!'lufacture of sheet glass.
  Significantly, the respondent was neither asked nor did
  it proffer details of its other properties against which the
  decree in favour of the original landowners could have
F been satisfied and satiated. The respondent also hid from
  the Executing Court the fact that the burden to pay any
  enhanced compensation lay, in the first place, on the
  appellant-State and not the respondent. [Paras 7, 8, 9,
  1 O] [707-C-D; 708-B-G]
G
       1.2 Respondent failed altogether to perform the
  terms and conditions of the Conveyance, which throws
  serious doubts on its intention to establish a sheet glass
  factory and commence production on the acquired land.
H Respondent failed to establish and commence
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN IND!AN                 699
             GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD.

production in the sheet-glass factory within the time A
frame provided in the Deed of Conveyance; that it used
the subject acquired land for purposes other than those
allowed by the Deed; that it sold the acquired land,
without written permission or any permission worth
mentioning, to third parties. Despite all these B
happenings, the respondent failed to make even a single
representation before the appellant-State. [Paras 13, 14)
[710-F; 711-B-D]

     1.3 The conduct of the Respondent has not only          C
been utterly unfair but, in fact, it smacks of fraud,
malpractice and malfeasance. The respondent in its
affidavit before the High Court stated that 118 Sale Deeds
were executed in favour of various third parties with
several sales being in 2004-05. This. is sought to be        D
vindicated by the respondent on the ground that since
the land was returned to it in 2004 after the quashing of
the acquisition was set aside by this Court, it could have
executed final Sale Deeds in respect of Agreements to
Sell of 1991 post repossession of the land. It is also the   E
case of the respondent that after the land remained in
possession of the original landowners for twelve long
years, it was beyond its control to establish the unit as
was proposed and postulated at the time of acquisition       F
and so in bona fide belief it sold the remaining land as
well. The respondent cannot predicate that after paying
the cost of the land to the appellant-State and the
enhanced compensation to the original landowners, it
had become absolute owner of. the land and                   G
consequently it could use the land in the manner it liked.
[Para 19) [713-H; 714-A-F]

    1.4 In the writ petition, the challenge was predicated
on the perceived failure to adhere to the audi a/terem H
partem rule and not to the correctness of the decision to
700      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015] 10S.C.R.


A resume possession of the land. In any event, there is no
  doubt that the circumstances of the case warrant the
  issuance of the Resumption Notice of the land by the
  appellant-State. The 'Resumption Notice' has been
  issued to the respondent alone which, because of its
B actions, has forfeited whatsoever rights it may have
  enjoyed over the land in question. The respondent would
  be liable to make over to the appellant-State all the profit
  that it has illegally and unjustifiably reaped in its
  misutilization of the lands acquired for it for the purpose
C of setting up an industrial unit for manufacture of sheet
  glass with the accompanying projection of providing
  employment to almost a thousand workmen. The
  appellant-State would avowedly have to proceed in
  accordance with law, especially since it has not
0
  maintained a watchful eye on the manner in which the
  land was dealt with by the respondent.. The impugned
  judgment is set aside. [Paras 21, 22) [715-E-H; 716-A-D]

         Northern India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh
 E       2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 534: (2003) 1 sec 335;
         State of Gujarat v.M.P Shah Charitable Trust
         (1994) 3 SCC 552; State of Chhattisgarh v.
         Dhiroj Kumar Sengar 2009 (7) SCR 1016: ·
         (2009) 13 SCC 600; Nirma Industries v. SEBI
 F
         2013 (3) SCR 662: (2013) 8 SCC 20; Chairman
         Board of Mining Examination and Chief
         Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee 1977 (2) SCR
         904: (1977) 2 SCC 256; Union oflndia v. Jesus
 G       Sales Corporation 1996 (3) SCR 894: (1966) 4
         SCC 69; Patel Engineering Ltd. v. Union of
         India (2012) 11 SCC 257 - referred to.

                      Case Law Reference
 H    2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 534 referred to.         Para 4
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                    701
             GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD.

  (1994) 3   sec 552          referred to.       Para 15        A

  2009 (7) SCR 1016           referred to.       Para 16

  2013 (3) SCR 662            referred to.       Para 17

  1977 (2) SCR 904            referred to.       Para 18        B

  1996 (3) SCR 894            referred to.       Para 18

  (2012) 11   sec 257         referred to.       Para 18

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.               c
8378 of 2015.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2007 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.
3750 of 2005.                                                   D

    Manjit Singh, AAG, Nupur Choudhary, Vivekta Singh, Rao
Ranjit, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Appellants.

    Rakesh Khanna, V. K. Bali, Rajesh Prasad Singh,Anirudh      E
Tanwar, Shefali Jain, Mohd. Fuzail Khan, Sunita Singh, Mohit
N.,Aditya Soni, C. Kumar, Shree Pal Singh, Dr. Vipin Gupta,
Ajayveer Singh Jain, U. R. Bokadia, Diviya Garg, Mohd. lrshad
Hanif, Pankaj Kumar, Siddhartha Chowdhury, Vabhav Kalea,
Madhu Sikri, Sandeep Narain, S. Narain & Co. for the            F
Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                G
     2. The Appellant, State of Haryana, is assailing the
Judgment dated 11.12.2007 passed by the High Court of
Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 3750 of 2005 whereby
the Notice to resume the land of the Respondent has been
set aside. The Appellant State has been directed to comply      H
702       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 10 S.C.R.


A with the principles of natural justice as perceived by the High
  Court, and, in consonance with its tenets, rehear the
  Respondent as well as the subsequent purchasers, and
  thereafter to decide the issue of resumption o~ the subject
  land by the Appellant State.
B
       3 It is unfortunate, and indeed remarkable, that the fate
  of the subject agricultural land, measuring 358 kanals and
  7 marlas, located in village Sankhol ot Tehsil Bahadurgarh
  of District Rohtak, has been in a state of uncertainty since
C the year of its acquisition in 1973. The Respondent had
  approached the Appellant State on 18.5.1971 with a
  proposal to set up an industrial undertaking having 20,000
  tonnes capacity for manufacture of sheet glass, requiring
  an investment plan of [pic]4 crore,. It was projected that this
D industry would provide employment for as many as one
  thousand workmen. Keeping in perspective the palpable
  public purpose of generating employment and spurring
  industrial growth, the Appellant State approved the said
  proposal and issued a Notification and a Declaration under
E Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition Act,
  1894 (referred to as "the Act" hereinafter) in 1973. The
  Award came to be passed in the following year 1974 which
  computed the compensation for the landowners at
F [pic]3,93,688.12. Immediately after the passing of the Award
  on 16.10.1974, the Appellant State executed a Deed of
  Conveyance in favour of the Respondent, the relevant
  clauses of which shall hereafter be adverted to.

      4 Being aggrieved with the quantum of compensation
G the landowners approached the Additional District Judge
  in Reference proceeding under Section 18 of the.Act, who
  enhanced the compensation by [pic]59,349/- vide Order
  dated 29.1.1979. The compensation was thereafter further
H enhanced to [pic]8.10 lakh by the High Court vide Judgment
  dated 2.6.1988, which was not interfered with by this Court
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                       703
    GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

by the ciismissal of the SLP of the Respondent. In the             A
interregnum, on 1.8.1986, some of the landowners filed
Execution proceedings under Order XXI Rule 11 of the CPC
against the Respondent and the Appellant State for recovery
of the enhanced compensation awarded to them. It is these
proceedings which have supplied the bedrock for the                B
dispute portrayed before us. In that execution case, the
Additional District Judge proceeded to attach the acquired
land, vide Orders dated 29.8.1987; and then directed ·its
sale by way of auction vide Order dated 4.3.1989. The
Respondent thereupon presented the Executing Court with            C
an ingenious offer of private sale on the predication that
the barren and water-logged land would not fetch sufficient
funds to satisfy the decreed compensation through court
auction. Suffice to note that the application of the               D
Respondent for private sale seems to have received the
imprimatur of the District Judge on 7.5.1991, and thence
several portions of the subject land had been sold by the
Respondent. Knowledge of these execution proceedings
has been unconvincingly denied by the Appellant State which        E
asserts that it came to know about them only in 1991, when
some of the original landowners successfully challenged the
acquisition proceedings on the ground of non-utilization of
the subject land in CWP No. 14735 of1991. The High Court
quashed the acquisition proceedings in its entirety vide           F
Judgment dated 5.3.1992 and directed that the land be
returned to the original landowners. These Orders were
overturned by this Court on 29.10 2002 in Northern India
Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (2003) 1 SCC 335 inter
alia with the observations that in the event "the land was not     G
used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open
to the Appellant State to take action but that did not confer
any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land.
As already noticed, the Appellant State in this regard has
already initiated proceedings for resumption of the land. In       H
704         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 10 S.C.R.


A     our view, there arises no question of any unjust enrichment
      to the Appellant Company."

        5. The Appellant State thereupon initiated resumption
   proceedings, pursuant to which a Committee was
B constituted by it on 27.5.2004, which visited the subject land
   and submitted its Report dated 16.6.2004. This Report has
   provided the primary plank for the Notice of Resumption
   dated 6.1.2005 issued by the Appellant State to the
   Respondent, which was challenged by the Respondent
C before the High Court in the CWP No. 3750 of 2005. This
   Notice has been annulled by the High Court vide the
   impugned Judgment on the ground of non adherence to the
   audi alteram partem principle, since the Respondent and
   the subsequent purchasers had not been given an
D ·opportunity of hearing. This is the solitary issue which arises
   before us. In the Writ Petition of the Respondent, the
   Appellant State essayed to justify the impugned Notice of
   Resumption on the basis of the terms and conditions set
   out in the Deed of Conveyance. The relevant clauses of the
E Deed, whence the rights and the duties of the parties flow,
   inter alia state:

           "2. The Company hereby covenants with the
           Government that it shall:
 F
           (i) Use the said land exclusively for all or any of the
           purposes of a factory for the manufacture of sheet glass
           and such other products as the Government may
           approve and for no other purpose.
 G
           xxxxxx
           (iv) Not to transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange,
           mortgage or otherwise the said land or the buildings
           constructed thereon or any right, title or interest therein
 H
STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                    705
 GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJITSEN, J.]

 without prior written permission of the Government. A
 However, the Government hereby agrees that the
 company shall have the liberty to mortgage the said
 land together with building erected/to be erected
 thereon in favour of the Industrial Finance Corporation
 of India (IFCI); Industrial Development Bank of India B
 (IDBI); and the Industrial Credit and Investment
 Corporation of India (ICICI).

 xx xx xx
                                                             c
  4(i) In the event of the company being up whether
  compulsorily or voluntarily (save for the purposes of
  amalgamation or reconstruction) and the company,
  through its liquidator, failing to obtain the Government's
  permission to transfer the said land with the buildings D
  constructed thereon in terms of the clause 2(iv) hereof
  or if the company shall fail to observe and perform any
  of the covenants on its part contained in this deed,
· then and in either such case the Government may
  resume the said land by serving a notice on the E
  company by sending it to the registered office of the
  company by registered post (acknowledgment due).
  The notice shall indicate the reasons for resumption
  of the' said land and shall require the company to
  remove and dispose of for its own benefit all buildings F
. and other structures constructed on the said land and
  all machinery and other fittings fixed therein or lying
  thereon within a period of not more than 15 months
  from the date of service of the notice on the company.
                                                             G
  (ii) That from the date of service of the notice referred
  to in sub-clause

 (i) the said land shall subject to the provisions of sub-
 clause                                                      H
706         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 10 S.C.R.


A          (iv) hereinafter appearing stand resumed and .vest in
           the Government.

            6. Even a cursory glance at clause 2(iv) of the Deed
      would manifest that the Respondent was specifically
 B    precluded from selling, gifting or transferring the subject land
      without prior "written permission" of the Appellant State.
      When clause 2(iv) and clause 4(i) of the Deed are read in
      conjunction, it is at once apparent that the Appellant State
      was empowered to resume the land in the event of their
C     violation by the Respondent. Such resumption, the Appellant
      State vehemently argues, could be done merely by serving
      on the Respondent a notice containing the reasons therefor.
      The Appellant State further contends that the Deed bestows
      no right on the Respondent to be heard before resumption
 D    and hence no corresponding duty is cast on the Appellant
      State to comply with the principles of natural justice; that
      the rights and the duties of the parties are strictly
      circumscribed by the contractual rights contained in the
      Deed, which alone should be the determining factor to
 E    resolve disputes arising between the parties. The argument
      of the Appellant State did find favour with the High Court
      which held that the power of the Appellant State to convey
      the land to the Respondent is subject to extant ~ules. It
 F    opined that the Appellant State has exercised its power to
      convey the land by virtue of Chapter VII of the Act, but Clause
      2(iv) is also borrowed from Section 44A of the Act. Section
      41, as provided in the Chapter VII of the Act read with the
      preceding provisions, lays down several general conditions,
 G    such as, cost of acquisition, terms on which the land
      transferred should be held by a company, time period for
      fulfilment of conditions etc. Section 44A thereafter forbids
      the concerned company from disposing of the land
      transferred to it by any mode of conveyance, except with
 H    the previous written sanction of the ccr.cerned Government.
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                 707
    GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

The clause for resumption mentioned in the Deed has not A
been prescribed in the Act, but nevertheless empowers the
State to resume the land in certain situations. Sub-Rule 2
of Rule 5 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963
provides that in case a company breaches any of the terms
of the Agreement, the appropriate Government shall not B
make an order declaring the transfer of the acquired land
as null and void, unless the company has been given an
opportunity of being heard in the matter.

     7. We agree with the High Court that the Deed of C
Conveyance is founded on the Act and, therefore, contractual
rights would not be the only determinative elements in the
dispute. We also endorse the High Court's opinion that the
principles of natural justice are an "inalienable part of the
rule of law"; abidance with these principles is necessary D
even de hors specific stipulation in this regard. We reiterate,
however, that the Deed of Conveyance does not permit the
Respondent to sell the land without prior written permission
of the Appellant State. The Respondent, while admitting that
it never sought permission of the Appellant State, E
endeavours to defend its conduct by asserting that since
the Appellant State was a party to the execution proceedings,
it impliedly consented to the sales.

     8. Vl/e have perused the Orders of the Executing Court F
adduced by the Respondent where the Appellant State
through its Land Acquisition Officer has been shown as a
party in the application filed on 1.8.1986 by the original
landowners under Order XXI Rule 11 of the CPC. As a
matter of fact, the Appellant State has also been mentioned G
as one of the Judgement Debtors along with the Respondent
in the Orders passed by the Executing Court from time to
time. It must be immediately underscored that neither has it
been pleaded that the Appellant State was notified of the H
Execution proceedings nor has any effort been made to
708        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015) 10 S.C.R.


A show that the Appellant State was represented and heard
  by the Executing Court. Mere inclusion of a party in a
  proceeding falls far too short of proving that its views or
  stance had been laid and duly considered. We have no
  hesitation in holding that there was no permission either in
B law or as per the Deed which authorised the Respondent to
  sell the land. We think that had the Executing Court been
  properly apprised of the terms and conditions of the
  Conveyance Deed and the true factual circumstances of the
  case, its conclusions would have been diametrically
C different. The Respondent cannot take advantage of its own
  transgressions and legal duplicity and shenanigans.

        9. The plea of the Respondent is that it was saddled
   with higher compensation awarded by the District Court and
 D thereafter by the High Court, and that requisite resources
   were not available with it to satisfy the decreed amount and
   that consequently it filed in Court, instead with the Appellant
   State, the application for permission for private sale. It must
   immediately be highlighted that the said higher
 E compensatioo was computed at a mere 8.8 lacs which
   stands in stark contrast to the quantum of 4 crore which was
   planned to be invested by the Respondent in the
   manufacture of sheet glass.

 F      10. Significantly, the Respondent was neither asked nor
   did it proffer details of its other properties against which
   the decree in favour of the original landowners could have
   been satisfied and satiated. The Respondent also hid from
   the Executing Court the fact that the burden to pay any
 G enhanced compensation lay, in the first place, on the
   Appellant State and not the Respondent. Class 2(v) is
   relevant on this point, and reads as:

          2(v) pay to the Government any additional amount
 H        which may have to be paid by the Government in
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                     709
    GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

     addition to the sum of Rupees three lacs ninety three A
     thousand five hundred eighty eight and twelve paise
     only on account of assessment or enhancement of
     compensation payable in respect of the acquisition of
     the said land and all costs, charges and other expenses
     whatsoever relating thereto resulting from C!ny B
     reference, appeal or writ petition, etc to any court or
     authority. (emphasis is ours)

     11. The Respondent has also argued that it had
intimated the Appellant State about the enhanced C
compensation, but it failed to elicit any response. Even if
the Appellant State failed to act upon its intimation, it would
have been appropriate for the Respondent to bring the
relevant clause to the notice of the Executing Court or invoke
arbitration in terms of Clause 4(viii) of the Deed. It could D
not arrogate to itself the power to take unilateral action
inconsonant with the contractual clauses.

     12. Clause 2(iv) of the Deed of Conveyance, in pellucid
terms, enables the Respondent to mortgage the subject land       E
along with any structure thereon in favour of the Industrial
Finance Corporation of India (IF~I), the Industrial
Development Bank of India (IDBI), or the Industrial Credit
and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) in order to obtain
loans. Whilst conveyance of the property was forbidden, its      F
mortgage to. the named entities was permitted. There was
neither disposition of power nor any justification for the
Respondent to have sold the acquired land or even a portion
of it. As reflected in the Deed of Conveyance, the
Respondent was required to construct the factory within two      G
years from the date of delivery of possession of the acquired
land or within one year from the date of execution of the
Deed, whichever period expired later. The Deed of
Conveyance was executed on 16.10.1974 whereas the                H
possession was given on 20.06.1974, and it is an admitted
710       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2015) 10 S.C.R.


A fact that 110 factory building has been constructed till date.
  The Appellant State cancelled the allotment of the acquired
  land to the Respondent. However the petition for quashing
  of the acquisition proceedings was allowed on 5.03.1992,
  which was ultimately set aside by this Court on 29.10.2002.
B During the period 5.03.1992 to 29.10.2002, the land was
  returned to the original landowners, so the Respondent could
  have done nothing. Thereafter, resumption took place on
  6.1.2005.
C      13. The Respondent pleads all the said factors, but
  without basis halted its efforts to construct the factory
  building and est~blish the sheet glass industry. What is
  evident from the abovementioned facts is that, at least
  before 05.03.1992, the only excusable factor could be of
D flood, which also did not recur regularly since the date of
  possession, i.e. 20.10.1974 for nearly two decades.
  Enhanced compensation and economical constraint had
  already been discoursed above and even if the factor of
E flood is kept in sight, cannot discharge the Respondent of
  the duty to establish the industry. Significantly, the
  Respondent had not sought extension of time from the
  Appellant State as per the Rules of 1963. The only
  conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the
F Respondent failed altogether to perform the terms and
  conditions of the Conveyance, which throws serious doubts
  on its intention to establish a sheet glass factory and
  commence production on the acquired land.

       14. The Committee constituted by the Appellant State
G had·submitted its Report dated 16.6.2004 which
  categorically stated that no plant, machinery, electric
  connection etc, which may have some semblance of
  industrial activity, was found on the site; instead, only an
H Office engaged in dealership of plots has been set up.
   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v, NORTHERN INDIAN                711
    GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

Indeed, the Committee had reported that the acquired land A
had been divided into different plots, foretelling a
forthcoming unauthorised colony. The Report of the
Committee remains uncontroverted; rather, the endeavour
of the Respondent is focused on explaining the predicament
it was supposedly trapped in. Recapitulating the facts noted B
above, it is clearly evident that the Respondent failed to
establish and commence production in the sheet-glass
factory within the time frame provided in the Deed of
Conveyance; that it used the subject acquired land for
purposes other than those allowed by the Deed; that it sold C
the acquired land, without written permission or any
permission worth mentioning, to third parties. Despite all
these happenings, the Respondent failed to make even a
single representation before the Appellant State.
                                                             D
     15. The question to be answered is whether the
Respondent should have been given an opportunity of being
heard by the Appellant State before the Appellant State could
resume the subject land acquired on its behalf for a
specified purpose. In State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah E
Charitable Trust, (1994) 3 SCC 552 it was contended by
the respondent Trust that taking away the power of the Trust ·
to nominate certain number of students in the concerned
Government Medical College by the Appellant State was F
bad in law inasmuch as the State Government had passed
the impugned resolution without notice to the Trust. This
Court while allowing the appeal of the State has observed
thus:

     "22. We are unable to see any substance in the G
     argument that the termination of arrangement without
     observing the principle of natural justice (audi alteram
     partem) is void. The termination is not a quasi- judicial
     act by any stretch of imagination; hence it was not H
712        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015} 10 S.C.R.


A         necessary to observe the principles of natural justice.
          It is not also an executive or administrative act to
          attract the duty to act fairly. It was - as has been
          repeatedly urged by Shri Ramaswamy - a matter
          governed by a contract/agreement between the
 B        parties. If the matter is governed by a contract, the writ
          petition is not maintainable since it is a public law
          remedy and is not available in private law field, e.g.,
          where the matter is governed by a non-statutory
          contract".
c
          16. In State of Chhattisgarh v. Dhiroj Kumar Sengar,
     (2009) <13 sec 600 a compassionate appointment was
     cancelled because the incumbent had procured it on the
   . prediction of the services of his deceased uncle, but without
 D proving that he had been validly adopted by him. The High
     Court allowed his writ petition challenging the cancellation
     of appointment on the ground that he had adduced an
     Adoption Deed as well as a Succession Certificate. This
     Court found the said documents to be deficient of proving
 E the claim of adoption since the Deed of Adoption was
     unregistered and the Succession Certificate included the
     name of the incumbent as well as his real father. This Court
     noted that the appointment had been obtained by
 F suppression of the facts· including the rejection of the first
     application and therefore, principles of natural justice were
     not required mandatorily to be complied with.

        17. Nirma Industries v. SEBI (2013) 8 SCC 20, involved
   interpretation of Regulation 27 of the Takeover Code. The
 G appellant company therein after making a public
   announcement for proposed open offer up to 20 per cent of
   the shares of the existing shareholders of Shree Ram Multi
   Tech Ltd (SRMTL) under Regulation 10 of the Takeover
 H Code, sought to withdraw that offer in the light of certain
     STATE OF HARYANA& ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                      713
      GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] ·

 Reports in the public domain post the open-offer, unearthing A
 fraudulent transactions and siphoning off of funds by the
 promoters of SRMTL. SEBI declined the request for
 withdrawal inter alia, holding that the appellant company
 should have conducted due diligence before making an
 open public offer. The failure by SEBI to grant any B
 opportunity of being orally heard was held by both the
 Securities Appellate Tribunal and this Court not to vitiate
 the order of SEBI inter alia, because SEBI had all the
 necessary information and materials before it to make a
 fair decision, all of which had been duly considered.        C

       18. In the Chairman Board of Mining Examination and
  Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256,
  Krishna Iyer J, one of the foremost apostles of human rights
  and natural justice, advocated that the Court" .... cannot look D
  at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact.
  Nor can we fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable
  opportunity..... If the authority which takes the final decision
  acts mechanically and without applying its' own mind, the
  order may be bad, but if the decision-making body, after E
  fair and independent consideration, reach'es a conclusion.
  which tallies with the recommendations of the subordinate
  authority which held the preliminary enquiry, there is no error
  in law.... " It would also be useful to recollect the observations F
  of this Court in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation,
  (1996) 4 sec 69 wherein it has been enunciated that the
  dictat of natural justice, viz. affording an opportunity to the
  person concerned to present his case would be met if the
  person concerned had the opportunity to present his case G
  and that all points were taken into consideration. More
  recently, in Patel Engineering Ltd. v. Union of India (2012)
  11 SCC 257, this Court has opined "that there is no
  inviolable rule that a personal hearing of the affected party
· must precede every decision of the State".                         H
714         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 10 S.C.R.


A         . 19. In the instant case, the conduct of the Respondent
      has not only been utterly unfair but, in fact, it smacks of fraud,
      malpractice and malfeasance. It cannot be justified as a
      simple error which may exonerate it of the allegations
      levelled against it by the Appellant State. According to its
 B    own affidavit filed before the High Court, the Respondent
      has executed 118 Sale Deeds in favour of various third
      parties, with several sales being in 2004-05. This is sought
      to be vindicated by the Respondent on the ground that since
      the land was returned to it in 2004 after the quashing of the
C     acquisition was set aside by this Court, it could have
      executed final Sale Deeds in respect of Agreements to Sell
      of 1991 post repossession of the land. Whether it had
      entered into Agreements to Sell with third parties in 1991
 D    or accepted Earnest Money thereagainst is not an enquiry
      to be made here. It is also the case of the Respondent that
      after the land remained in possession of the original
      landowners for twelve long years, it was beyond its control
      to establish the unit as was proposed and postulated at the
 E    time of acquisition and so in bona fide belief it sold the
      remaining land as well. The Respondent cannot predicate
      that after paying the cost of the land to the Appellant State
      and the enhanced compensation to the original landowners,
      it had become absolute owner of the land and consequently
 F    it could use the land in the manner it liked.

       20. Some brief words with regard to persons who have
   purchased plots from the Respondent. If a diligent title-
   search had been conducted by them it would indubitably
 G have disclosed that the sale transaction was contrary to the
   purpose of the acquisition, was not consonant with the
   clauses of the contract executed by the Appellant State and
   the Respondent and was intrinsically inconsistent with the
   terms and the tenor of law. Equities cannot emerge in favour
 H of such purchasers who cannot but be presumed to have
   STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. v. NORTHERN INDIAN                      715
    GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

purposefully transgressed the law. Suchlike persons are not A
justified or entitled to seek impleadment in these
proceedings. The impleadment applications are meritless
and are dismissed.

      21. The prayer in the writ petition was for the issuance     B
of a writ of Certiorari quashing the Resumption Notice dated
6.1.2005 issued by the Appellant State. In the impugned
Judgment the Division Bench has opined that the principles
of natural justice applied irrespective of the nature of the
cause or the gravity thereof and are not mere platitudes. In       C
our analysis of the exposition of law contained hereinabove,
we think that this unjustly sets far too broad and wide a
parameter to the perceptions of natural justice. Quite to the
contrary, Courts should be "pragmatic rather than pedantic,
realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal   D
and practical rather than precedential". We cannot lose
perspective of the fact that protracted litigation had already
taken place between the parties as a consequence of which
the legal position of all affected parties had already become
well-known. It seems to us that in the writ petition, the          E
challenge was predicated on the perceived failure to adhere
to 'the audi alterem partem rule and not to the correctness
of the decision to resume possession of the land. In any
event, we harbour no manner of doubt that the
circumstances of the case warrant the issuance of the              F
Resumption Notice of the land by the Appellant State. We
also note that the 'Resumption Notice' has been issued to
the Respondent alone which, because of its actions, has
forfeited whatsoever rights it may have enjoyed over the land      G
in question. In fact the Respondent may be liable to make
over to the Appellant State all the profit that it has illegally
and unjustifiably reaped in its misutilization of the-lands
acquired for it for the purpose of setting up an industrial unit
for manufacture of sheet glass with the accompanying               H
716          SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2015) 10 S.C.R.


A  projection of providing employment to almost a thousand
   workmen. How this Resumption Notice will be implemented
   against third parties is a matter on which we would t.hink
                                                         ..   it
   prudent not to make any observations. The Appellant State
   may not treat the observations made by us above pertaining
B to third parties who have purchased land from the ,
   Respondent as conclusively circumscribing any relief to.
   them and/or rendering it unnecessary to give any hearing
  ·to them. The Appellant State will avowedly have to proceed
   in accordance with law, especially since it has not
C maintained a watchful eye on the manner in which the land
   was dealt with by the Respondent.

      22. The Appeal is accordingly allowed and the
  Impugned Judgment is set aside. We are mindful of the
D legally reprehensible manner in which the Respondent has
  abused the acquisition of land in their favour. The
  Respondent is therefore liable to pay costs of legal
  proceedings which are quantified by us at 2 lakhs. Costs to
  be paid within two months.
E
      Nidhi Jain                                 Appeal allowed.