STATE OF HARYANAversusRAM PAL AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2005 INSC 66
- Decided
- 7 February 2005
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court’s order dismissing the State’s application without reasons is unsustainable; leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC must be granted and the High Court must re‑appreciate the evidence and record reasons.
Summary
The State of Haryana sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the CrPC against the acquittal of several accused in a case involving offences under Sections 148, 302, 452, 506, 323 and 149 of the IPC. The trial court had convicted some accused but acquitted others, holding that Section 149 IPC did not apply because only three persons were proved to have committed the offences. The High Court dismissed the State’s application without giving any reasons. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had failed to appraise the entire evidence and, consequently, the High Court was obligated to re‑appreciate the evidence and must record reasons for its order. The absence of reasons rendered the High Court’s order unsustainable. The Court therefore granted leave to the State to file an appeal and directed the High Court to entertain the appeal and decide it on the merits.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court must re‑appreciate the evidence when the trial court fails to do so, under Section 378(3) CrPC.
- Whether a judgment dismissing an application for leave to appeal must contain reasons.
- Whether Section 149 IPC can be attracted when only three persons are proved to have committed the offences.
- Whether the conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC is appropriate in place of Section 302 IPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378(3)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 304 Part II, s. 323, s. 34, s. 452, s. 506
Subjects
Judgment
A STATE OF HARYANA
V.
RAM PAL AND ORS.
FEBRUARY 7, 2005
B [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H.KAPADIA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 378(3)-Trialfor offences
under /PC-Decision of trial Court-Application uls 378(3)-Summary
C dismissal by High Court-On appeal, held: In the facts of the case trial Court
did not appraise the entire evidence-On account of such lapse High Court
ought to have re-appreciated the entire evidence independently-Absence of
reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable-Penal Code,
1860.
D Judgment-Reasons-Recording-Requirement for-Held: Right to
reason is an indispensable part of sound judicial system-It is requirement of
principle of natural justice-Reasons introduce clarity in an order-Principles
of Natural Justice-Administrative Law.
Respondents-accused were tried for offences punishable u/ss. 148,
E 302, 452, 506, 323 r/w Section 149 IPC. Trial Court held that only some
of the accused persons were responsible for the act. Assault by one accused
was an individual act and he was guilty of offence punishable u/s. 304 Part
II IPC; that the other two accused were liable to be convicted for offences
punishable u/ss. 452 and 323 r/w Section 34 IPC; and that since the total
F number of persons proved to have committed the offences was only three,
provisions of Section 149 were not attracted. Rest of the accused were
acquitted. Application of the State in terms of Section 378 Cr.P.C. was
dismissed by High Court without giving any reasons thereto. Hence the
present appeal by the State inter alia questioning the manner of disposal
of the application by the High Court.
G
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: I. The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the
entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at
lapse in this regard the High Court was obliged to undertake such an
H 1112
STATEOFHARYANAv. RAM PAL 1113
exercise by entertaining the appeal. The trial Court on the facts of this A
case did not perform its duties, as was enjoined on it by law. High Court
ought to have in such circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a first
court of appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the record
independently and returned its findings objectively as regards guilt or
otherwise of the accused. rt has failed to do so. The questions involved B
were not trivial. The question regarding application of Sections 302 and
149 IPC as raised does require consideration, keeping in view the evidence
adduced and conclusions of trial Court. (1115-H; 1116-A-BI
2.1. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration
of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reas<!ns, howsoever C
brief, in its order, indicative of an application of its mi~d; all the more when
its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons
has rendered the High Court order not sustainable. 11116-C-DI
2.2. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the
same it becomes lifeless. Reasons are live links between the mind of the D
decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion
arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis
on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face
of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the
Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial
review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an E
indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient
to indicate an application of mind to the matter before Court. Another
rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone
against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling
out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking out. The p
"inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial
or quasi-judicial performance. 11116-F-H; 1117-A-C(
State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors., (20011 10 SCC 607; State of
Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, AIR (1982) SC 1215; Jawahar
Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors., 1198712SCC222 and Raj Kishore Jha G
v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 7 Supreme 152, relied on.
Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, 119711 1 All E.R. 1148;
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) ltd. v. Crabtres, (1974) ICR 120 (NIRC),
referred to.
H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] I S.C.R.
A 3. State is granted leave to file the appeal. The High Court shall
entertain the appeal and after requisite notice to the respondents hear the
appeal and dispose of it in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any
observation made in the present appeal.
State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh, (2004( I SCC 547, relied on.
B
4. Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court,
cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it
even the highest Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the
Constitution of India, 1950.
C CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 234
of 2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.1.2002 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Cr!. M.No. 493-MA of 2001.
D D.P. Singh, Vinay Kumar Garg and Ms. Avneet Toor for the Appellant.
Manoj Swarup, J.P. Dhanda, Mrs. Raj Rani Dhanda and Vineet Dhanda
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. Leave granted.
The State of Haryana questions legality of the order passed by the
Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing its
application under Section 378(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in
F short the 'Code').
Respondents faced trial for alleged comm1ss1on of the offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302, 452, 506, 323 read with Section 149 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). The accusations against the
accused persons were that they formed an unlawful assembly and being
G members of such unlawful assembly, they trespassed into the house of one
Daiei Singh (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') and inflicted injuries
on him and his son Nafe Singh (PW-5) by deadly weapons which they were
carrying. The date and time of occurrence was stated to be 23.2.1999 at about
6.00 a.m. There were two eyewitnesses to the occurrence namely Parma
H Nand (PW-4), the informant and Nafe Singh, the injured (PW-5). Accused
STATEOFHARYANAv. RAM PAL [PASAYAT, J.) 1115
1 persons took the plea of false implication and attributed assaults on the accus~d A
persons by the deceased and Nefa Singh (PW-5). Three witnesses were
examined to further the defence version of false implication.
The trial Court found the evidence of witnesses to be credible and
cogent and found that some of the accused persons were responsible for the
injuries on the deceased and the injured PW-5. It held that some of the B
accused persons did not inflict any injury and the assault made by accused
Ram Chander was an individual act and the other two accused persons,
• namely, Ram Pal and Palla Ram were to be convicted for offence punishable
under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 !PC. It was held that since
the total number of persons proved to have committed the offences was only C
three, provisions of Section 149 were not attracted. Ultimately, accused Ram
Chander was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 304 Part II
IPC and other two accused persons named above for the offences punishable
under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 !PC. Other accused persons
were acquitted of the charges.
D
The State of Haryana filed an application in terms of Section 378(3} of
the Code taking the stand that for attracting Section 149 IPC it is not necessary
to attribute any particular overt act. Further, merely because the accused Ram
Chander had assaulted by the blunt side of the Gandasa, it cannot mean that
he did not have the requisite intention to commit the offence of murder. The
trial Court having noticed that the blow was given with such great force that E
it caused multiple fractures and laceration of the brain, the alteration of the
conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II was not correct.
The High Court dismissed the application with the following order :
"We find no good ground to interfere with the reasoned judgment F
of the trial Court. Dismissed."
Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the manner of
disposal of the application as done by the High Court is unsustainable.
In response, learned counsel for the accused persons submitted that the G
High Court was justified in not interfering with the elaborate judgment of the
trial Court, by refusing grant of leave.
The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire evidence
and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at lapse in this regard H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] l S.C.R.
A the High Court was obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the
appeal. The trial Court on the facts of this case did not perform its duties, as
was enjoined on it by law. The High Couii ought to have in such circumstances
granted leave and thereafter as a first court of appeal, re-appreciated the
entire evidence on the record independently and returned its findings
objectively as regards guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do so.
B The questions involved were not trivial. The question regarding application
of Sections 302 and 149 JPC as raised does require consideration, keeping in
view the evidence adduced and conclusions of trial Court. The High Court
has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against
acquittal, and seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that by
C such refusal, a close ~crutiny of the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum,
has been lost once and for all. The manner in which appeal against acquittal
has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons
introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High
Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order,
indicative of an application of its mind; all the more when its order is amenable
D to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High
Court order not sustainable. Similar view has been expressed in State of U.P.
v. Battan and Ors., [2001] 10 SCC 607. About two decades back in State of
Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, AIR (1982) SC 1215 the
desirability of a speaking order while dealing with an application for grant
E of leave was highlighted. The requirement of indicating reasons in such cases
has been judicially recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated in
Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 222. Judicial
discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court, cannot be forsaken,
under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it even the highest Court in
a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
F the 'Constitution').
Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it
becomes lifeless. (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2003) 7
Supreme 152).
G Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen
v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [ 1971] 1 All E.R. 1148 observed "The
giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In
Alexander Machinery (Dudley) ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974) !CR 120 NIRC it
was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons
H are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in
STATE OF HARY ANA~ RAM PAL [PASAYAT, J.] 1117
t
question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute A
subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the
decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx'', it can, by its silence,
render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function
or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the
decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; B
reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter
before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the
decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural
justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking
out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a
judicial or quasi-judicial performance. C
The above position was highlighted in State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh,
[2004] 1 sec 547.
In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned judgment of the
High Court is unsustainable and is set aside. We grant leave to the State to D
file the appeal. The High Court shall entertain the appeal and after requisite
notice to the respondents hear the appeal and dispose of it in accordance with
law, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present appeal. The appeal
is allowed to the extent indicated.
K.K.T. Appeal partly allowed. E
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