Holding

The death was homicidal, and evidence recovered under Section 27 and the accused's undisclosed statements are admissible; the conviction under IPC 302 is upheld.

Summary

The State of Himachal Pradesh appealed the acquittal of Jeet Singh, who had been convicted by a Sessions Court for murdering his wife Sudarshana Devi under IPC 302. The High Court had set aside the conviction, deeming the death a suicide and rejecting incriminating evidence recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act because it was obtained from a place "open and accessible to others" and because the accused's disclosure statements were not witnessed. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence showed homicidal smothering, possibly combined with poisoning, and that the injuries on the victim’s legs corroborated this. It clarified that under Section 27 the admissibility of recovered articles depends on whether the place was ordinarily visible, not merely accessible, and that an accused’s disclosure statements are admissible even if made without witnesses. The Court also observed that motive, while relevant, is not essential for conviction if other evidence establishes guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and restored the conviction and sentence.

Issues considered

The nature of the death: homicidal (smothering/poisoning) versus suicidal.
Whether incriminating articles recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act are admissible when recovered from a place "open and accessible to others".
The admissibility of the accused's disclosure statements made without the presence of witnesses.
The necessity of proving motive for a conviction under IPC 302.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 27, s. 45
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murderuxoricidehomicidesmotheringpoisoningEvidence ActSection 27disclosure statementsmotiveIPC 302appeal

Judgment

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH A
v.
JEET SINGH

MARCH 15, 1999

[K.T. THOMAS AND S.S.M. QUADRI, JJ.] B

Criminal Law :

Evidence Act, 1872 :

Section 45-Death-Suicidal or homicidal-Medical evidence suggested C
cause of death as smothering--Chemical Examiner's report suggested death
due to poisoning also-Injuries on both legs of deceased suggested homicidal
smothering-Held, under these circumstances death is homicidal and not
suicidal.

Section 27-Discovery of f act-lncriminating articles-Recovery D
of-From a place, which was "open and accessible to others"-Admissibility
of-lt is not whether the place is accessible to others or not but whether it was
ordinarily visible to others-/[ it is not, then it is immaterial that the concealed
place is accessible to others-Discovery offact is not the object recovered but
the knowledge of the accused about it. E
Disclosure statement-Not made in the presence or hearing of wit-
nesses-Admissibility of-Held, admissible.

Sections 25 and 27----lnculpatory statement-Admissibility of-Held,
even inculpatory statement given to the police is admissible. F
Penal Code, 1860 :

Section 302-Death-By poisoning or smothering-Held, in the cir-
cumstances of the case, it is more realistic to conclude that death is homicidal
either by poisoning alone or by smothering alone or that both causes worked G
independently and reached the common result.

Criminal Trial :

Motive-Deceased-wife had white patches in her body-Accused-hus-
band mistook it as a kind of leprosy resulting in his dislike for her-Deceased H
1033
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A was smothered after administe1ing poison-Held, in the circumstances of the
case, motive adequately established.

Words and Phrases :

"Discovery of fact" and "whether it amounts to confession or
B 11of'!-Meani11g of-ln the context of S. 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

The respondent-accused was convicted by the trial court under Sec-
tion 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 for committing murder of his wife.
However, the High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the respon-
C dent holding that it was a case of suicide. The High Court held that the
incriminating articles recovered at the instance of the respondent under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 were inadmissible in evidence since
these were recovered from a place which was "open and accessible to
others." The High Court also repelled the circumstances of recovery on the
D ground that the witness who was present when the recovery was made said
that the accused had not made any disclosure statement.

According to the prosecution, respondent's wife suffering from
leucoderma and had white patches on her body. This became the cause of
dislike for her husband towards her as he mistook it to be a kind of
E leprosy. On the fateful night the couple went to bed in the bedroom of their
house but on the next morning the wife was found dead. It was the further
case of the prosecution that the accused administered some kind of
insecticide to the deceased either deceitfully or forcefully and smothered
her.
F
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The High Court has totally overlooked the features of
the victim which are consistent with the consequence of her having been
subjected to smothering. The injuries found on both the legs of the dead
G body are proof positive that it was homicidal smothering. One can place
reliance on the opinions of both sets of doctors that even without seeing
the. Chemical Examiner's report the doctors could say that the death of
the deceased might be due to smothering, and after seeing the Chemical
Examiner's report a doctor could say that poison would also have worked
H fatally in the victim. [1041-D-E]
STATE v. .TEET SINGH 1035

1.2. It is more realistic to conclude that it was a homicide either by A
smothering alone or by poisoning alone or that both causes worked inde-
pendently and reached the common result. It is quite possible that the
killer after administering poison, would have felt that the victim might
expel the poison by vomiting and then he would have smothered her to see
that the venom did not get evacuated and in that endeavour the smothering
became fatal. [1041-F-G]
B

2. Court also cannot ignore the large number of external injuries
particularly those on the legs. When they are counted in association with
the findings regarding the internal organs, they all would cumulatively lead
to the one c.onclusion in favour of the theory of forcible smothering. In view C
of such external injuries, a conclus.ion that the deceased would have
committed suicide is a preposterous inference. [1041-H]

3. It must have been during the interrogation of the accused that he
would have made the disclosures. It is not necessary that other witnesses
should be present when the accused was interrogated by the investigating D
officer. On the contrary, investigating officers used to interrogate the
accused persons without the presence of others. So the mere fact that any
witness to the recovery did not overhear the disclosure statements of the
accused is hardly sufficient to hold that no such disclosures were made by
the accused. [1043-D-E] E
4.1. There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which
renders the statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles
was made from any place which is "open or accessible to other." It is a
fallacious notion that when rcizyvery of any incriminating article was made
from a place, which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the F
evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed
in places, which are open or accessible to others. For example, if the article
is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying
on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain
out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such an article
""· is disinterred its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who G
hid it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other
person. Hence, the crucial 11uestion is not whether the place was accessible
to others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not,
then it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.
[1043-F-H] H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.
A 4.2. It is now well settled that the discovery of the fact referred to in
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact
embraces the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge
of the accused about it. (1044-B]

Pulikwi Kottaya AIR (1947) PC 67; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of
B Mahm-ashtra, (1969] 2 SCC 872; K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra
..-~

Pradesh, AIR (1962) SC 1788; Earabhadrappa @ KJishnappa v. State of
Kamataka, (1983] 2 SCC 330; Shamsliul Kanwar v. State of U.P., (1995] 4
SCC 430 and State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh, (1997] 10 SCC 675, relied
on.
c 4.3. In the present case, the fact discovered by the police with the
help of (1) the disclosure statements and (2) the recovery of incrimination
articles on the strength of such statements is that it was the accused who
concealed those articles at the hidden places. It is immaterial that such
statement of the accused inculpatory because Section 27 of the Evidence
D Act renders even such Inculpatory statements given to a police officer
admissible in evidence by employing the words; ''whether it amounts to
confession or not. (1044-D] -
5.1. No doubt it is a sound principle to rememb~r that every criminal
act was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal offence
E would have been committed if prosecution has failed to prove the precise
motive of the accused to commit it. When the prosecution succeeded in
showing the possibility of some ire for the accused towards the victim the
inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have
swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him to
F commit the offence cannot be construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecu-
tion. It is almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unravel the full .
dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the person
whom he offended. [1045-E-F]

5.2. It may be that during the pre-marital months the deceased had
G only on<! tiny mark of discolouration, which was not considered to be of '"'
any serious notice. But as years passed the leucoderma would have caused
spreading of the discolouration to different parts of her body. If the in-laws
i--
of the deceased had treated such escalating white patches as symptoms of
leprosy there is no doubt that they would have conveyed that opinion to
H the accused also. If the accused was making accusations against her that
,.

STATE v. JEET SINGH [THOMAS, J.] 1037

she was suffering from leprosy it would have rellected his mind towards A
her. It could be that he would have thought of getting rid ofa leper as his
wife once and for all. [1047-A-C]

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC
1622; Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1972) SC 656 and Nathuni
Yadav v. State of Biha1; [1978] 9 SCC 238, relied on. B

R. v. Pa/111e1; (Shorthand Report at p. 308 CCC May 1856), cited.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
263 of 1991.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.7.90 of the Himachal
Pradesh in Cr!. No. 100 of 1988.

Anil Soni and Ms. Meenakshi Arora for the Appellant.

S.N. Mehta, R.A. Mishra and R.L. Vashisht for the Respondent. D

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Death of an Armyman's young wife was depicted as a
case of murder and the Armyman was sent up for trial. Sessions Court
found it a murder and him the murderer. Consequently Jeet Singh, the
E1
respondent was convicted of uxoricide and was sentenced to imprisonment
for life under Section 302 of IPC. But a Division Bench of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh held it to be a case of suicide and exonerated him of
the charges. This appeal is by the State of Himachal Pradesh by special
leave. F

Sudarshana Devi, wife of accused Jeet Singh, was a young fair and
fashionable lass, but "Leucoderma" in its nascent stage had erupted small
white patches on her bosom. This became the cause of dislike for her
husband towards her as he mistook it to be a kind of leprosy. Though their
marriage was solemnised more than three years before her death J eet Singh G
was spending most of his days in the Army field except for short intervals
when he used to go home availing himself of the annual leave. So Sudar-
- shana Devi had to remain in her nuptial home mostly without her husband
nearby, but putting up with the unsavoury epithets intermittently hurled by
her mother-in-law and young sister-in-law at her. H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.
A Jeet Singh went home in April 1987 for his annual leave. He and his
wife Sudarshana Devi left together in his family house at Lahar village
(Hamirpur District), Himachal Pradesh. On the fateful night the couple
went to bed in the "Overy" (Which is said to be a bedroom of the house)
but on the next morning Sudarshana Devi was found dead. The shocking
B news was conveyed to her father who rushed to the house and saw the dead
body of his daughter. As he entertained doubts about some foul play he
decided to report the matter to the police. He did it telephonically and the
police arrived at the scene promptly. They held the inquest on the dead
body and sent it for post-mortem examination. Three doctors of the local
distrid hospital conducted a joint post-mortem examination and it was then
C revealed that death of Sudarashana Devi was by smothering.

Prosecution version is that accused administered some kind of insec-
ticide to the deceased either deceitfully or forcefully and smothered her.
•
D Accused .Teet Singh was arrested on 21.4.1987. On the strength of his
disclosures PW-24 K~shmir Singh (sub Inspector of Police, Nandaun)
recovered a bottle containing green insecticide, a towel, a vest, a steel
Kauli, and steel glass and some ground "misri".

'The trial judge counted a number of circumstances which were
E adverse to the accused, such as the strained relationship between the
spouses, medical evidence suggesting administration of poison, and
smothering of the deceased, recovery of incriminating articles under Sec-
tion 27 of the Evidence Act, the fact that accused and deceased were in
the same room on the fateful night and that she was found dead on the
F early morning and the subsequent conduct of the accused. The Sessior.s
Judge reached the conclusion from the aforesaid circumstances that Sudar-
shana Devi was murdered by the accused. Accordingly, he was convicted
and s'entenced as aforesaid.

The Division Bench of the High Court drastically varied from the
G aforesaid conclusion. Even on the circumstances the Division Bench dif-
fered from the trial court. In the end the High Court held like this:

"In light of the evidence that has come on record of this case, it
• may be said that the deceased died of poison but it is difficult to
H conclude that the death was homicidal. As a matter of fact, it
STATE v. JEET SINGH [THOMAS, J.] 1039

appears that it is a case of suicide for which the accused cannot A
be held to be responsible."

Shri Anil Soni, learned counsel for the State of Himachal Pradesh,
., while criticising the aforesaid conclusion of the High Court submitted that
learned judges have grossly erred in holding that it is a case of suicide. The
<
counsel made a forceful plea that on the medical evidence no court could B
possibly reach a conclusion that it was not a case of homicide .
.... '
Medical evidence in this case has a great significance. Prosecution
examined three doctors who conducted the joint post- mortem examina-
tion. Ext.PB is the Post-Mortem Report signed by all the three doctors.
Among them PW.5 - Dr. P.C.Gupta seems to be the seniormost and he
c
gave details of the autopsy in his evidence. The defence also examined a
doctor (Dr. C. Madhav Rao - Prof. and Head of the Department of
Forensic Medicines, I.G.Medical College, Shimla) to speak to an opinion
on the data contained in Ext.PB Post-Mortem Report.
D
The general features of the dead body as noted by the doctors, have
been described in the Post-Mortem Report as "well plated hair with
Sindoor in the middle partling bindi well placed over forehead (maroon
coloured with white cresent and white dot in it) red coloured lip-stick well
applied over both lip." Then the various ornaments worn by Sudarshana
Devi were described. E

The followjng are the marks noted by the doctors for reaching the
unmistakable conclusion that Sudarashana Devi was subjected to forcible
smothering:

"l. Three bruises 1/4" x 1/4" each (on left upper nasolabial
F
area)

2. Three bruises 1/4" x 1/4" each (on left side just below
the angle of mouth).
G
3. A semi-circular and curved bruise 1.5" x 1/2" obliquely
placed along the face extending between right molac
bone to right angle of mouth .
.... 4. Four bruises 1/4" x 1/4" each on right side just below
and lateral to angle of mouth." H
~ ...-

~

1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
.
I

A Pleurae were congested, mucous membrane of trachea and laryinx were
bright red, covered with bloody froth and congested, right and left lungs
and pericardium of the heart were congested.

The following injuries were found on the lower limbs:

B "5. Multiple linear abrasion (looking like scratch marks)
were present over dorsum of hands and forearms, vary- , •'
ing in size from pin head to 3" in length.

6. Five bruises were present on lateral aspect of right
c thigh, measuring 1/2" x 1/4" each.

7. Two bruises 1/2" x 1/4" were present on the anterior
aspect of the left leg."

When the viscera was sent for chemical analysis Ext. PZ Report was
D forwarded by the Chemical Examiner which showed that it contained
halogenated organic phosphorous compound. In the context of the said
chemical analysis report the following data supplied by the doctors who
conducted the post-mortem can also be referred to: "Linear bluish dis-
colouration on right iliac fossa along the ingunial ligament."
E Without seeing the report of the Chemical Examiner, the doctors
who conducted the autopsy expressed their opinion that the deceased had
died of asphyxia due to suffocation caused by smothering and/or internal
airway obstruction.

F After the receipt of the Chemical Examiner's certificate the following
data collected by the doctors also became important:

"Oesophagus had congested mucous membranes and gave pungent
smell on the dissection. Stomach was distended and full of pungent
smelling greenish white thick liquid about a litre. Mucous
G membranes were congested.... Liver, spleen and kidney were con-
gested. Bladder was empty."

Dr. C Madhav Rao, who was examined as a defence witness, after
looking into Ext.PB - Post-Mortem Report and Ext. PZ - Chemical
...
H Examiner's Report, has expressed his opinion as follows:
STATEv. JEETSINGH [THOMAS,J.] 1041

"In the present case after going through the Chemical Examiner's A
report, I am of the opinion that poison is responsible for death rather
than smothering. It is true that the Chemical Examiner's report has
not mentioned about the strength of poison, but as these substances
are not normally in the body and the finding recorded in the post-
mortem report are consistant with poisoning by these substances, in
my opinion it will be correct to assume death by poison."
B

But at the same time Dr. C. Madhav Rao conceded: "I cannot rule out the
possibility of administration of poison mixed with "Misri" under the disguise
of medicine." During cross-examination he was asked about the possibility
of death by smothering as for the deceased. The following answer was given C
by him: "It is true that one of the important distinctive features of smother-
ing is the injuries around the mouth including the inner surface of the lip
........ It is true that smothering. is sufficient for suffociation. It is correct
that there are symptoms of asphyxia.''

It appears to us that the High Court has totally overlooked the D
features of the victim which are consistent with the consequence of her
having been subjected to smothering. The injuries found on both the legs
of the dead body are proof positive that it was a homicidal smothering. We
can place reliance on the opinions of both sets of doctors that even without
seeing the Chemical Examiner's report the doctors could say that death of E
the deceased might be due to smothering, and after seeing the Chemical
Examiner's report a doctor could say that poison would also have worked
fatally in the vi~tim.

It is more realistic to conclude that it was a homicide either by
_, smothering alone or by poisoning alone or that both causes worked inde- F
pendently and reached the common result. It is quite possible that the killer
after administering poison, would have felt that the victim might expel the
poison by vomitting and then he would have smothered her to see that the
venom did not get evacuated and in that endeavour the smothering became
fatal.
G
The court cannot ignore the large number of external injuries par-
ticularly those on the legs. When they are counted in association with the
... - findings regarding the internal organs, they all would cumulatively lead to
the one conclusion in favour of the theory of forcible smothering. In view
of such external injuries, a conclusion that deceased would have committed H
1042 ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.CR.
A suicide is a preposterous inference. We therefore unhesitatingly dissent
from the finding of the High Court on that score. .,,,.

If Sudarshana Devi was murdered on the night of occurrence the next
point for discussion is whether accused Jeet Singh was her murderer. The
formost circumstance which stares at him is that the couple were closetted
B together in the same "Overy'' (bedroom) during the fateful night. PW-10
Birbal, who is the uncle of accused J eet Singh and who is residing in the
adjoining house, has said in his evidence that J eet Singh and Sudarshana
Devi were together in the same "Overy" on that particular night and that
on the next morning he found Sudarshana's dead body lying on the floor
C of the "Overy". The residence of PW-10 - Birbal and accused Jeet Singh
has only one common courtyard. PW-10 said that he slept on the said
courtyard during that night. Except a feeble suggestion put to PW-10
during cross-examination that he had a property dispute with Jeet Singh's
father (that suggestion was strongly denied by the witness) nothing else is
D shown to doubt the truth of his version.

The conduct of the accused has some relevance in the analysis of the
whole circumstances against him. Pw-3 Santosh Singh, a member of the
Panchayat hailing from the same ward, said in his evidence that he reached
....
Jeet Singh's house at 6.15 A.M. on hearing the news of that tragedy, and
E then accused Jeet Singh to.Id him that Sudarshana complained of pain in
the lever during early morning hours. But when the accused was questioned
by the trial court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminj!l Procedure he
denied having said so to PW-3 and further said, for the first time, that he
and Sudarshana did not sleep in the same room but they slept in two
F different rooms. Such a conduct on the part of accused was taken into
account by the Sessions Court in evaluating the incriminating circumstance
spoken to by PW-10 that they were in the same room on the fateful night.
We too give accord to the aforesaid approach made by the trial court.

The next circumstance against the accused is the disclosure state-
G ments made by the accused to the Investigating Officer which lead to the
recovery of EXT-P.5 - bottle (green insecticide) from tobacco bushes,
Ext.P-6 towel and Ext.P-7 vest from the heap of rubbish situated in the
compound of his residence, and Ext.P-8 steel Kauli from his cow-shed.
PW-24 Kashmir Singh Investigating Officer said in his evidence that when
H accused Jeet Singh was interrogated after arrest he told the investigating
,,
.J'

STATE V. JEETSINGH [THOMAS,J.] 1043

_,_ Officer thus: "! have concealed the bottle containing poison under the A
bushes situate beyond Gohar, I have concealed the towel and vest under
the heap of rubbish and the steel Kauli in the Lakola of the cow- shed ......."

What is significant is that when Ext.P-6 and Ext.P"9 were sent to the
Chemical Examiner he recorded his opinion after analysis that they con-
tained halogenated organic phosphorous compound . B
.~
'
Learned Judges of the High Court repelled the aforesaid circumstan-
ces on two premise. One is that PW-3 Santosh Singh, who was present
when the recovery was effected, said that the accused had not made any
disclosure statement. Second is that as the places from where the
recoveries were made were "open and accessible to others", the recoveries
c
cannot be used as evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Both the aforesaid premise were not of any use to reject the evidence
tendered by PW-24 Investigating Officer. It must have been during the
interrogation of accused that he would have made the disclosures. It is not D
necessary that other ~tnesses should be present· when the accused was
,;· interrogated by the Investigating Officer. On the contrary, investigating
officers used to interrogate accused persons without the presence of others.
So the mere fact that any witness to the recovery did not overhear the
disclosure statements of the accused is hardly sufficient to hold that no E
such disclosures were made by the accused.

There is nothing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act which renders the
statement of the accused inadmissible if recovery of the articles was made
from any place which is "open or accessible to others". It is a fallacious
notion that when recovery of any incriminating article was made from a F
place which is open or accessible to others, it would vitiate the evidence
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Any object can be concealed in
places which are open or accessible to others. For Example, if the article
is buried on the main roadside or if it is concealed beneath dry leaves lying
on public places or kept hidden in a public office, the article would remain G
out of the visibility of others in normal circumstances. Until such article is
disintered its hidden state would remain unhampered. The person who hid
:,.. . it alone knows where it is until he discloses that fact to any other person.
Hence the crucial question is not whether the place was accessible to
others or not but whether it was ordinarily visible to others. If it is not, then H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A it is immaterial that the concealed place is accessible to others.

It is now well settled that the discovery of fact referred to in Section
27 of the Evidence Act is not the object recovered but the fact embraces
the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the
accused as to it. (Pulikuri Kottaya AIR (1947) PC 67). The said ratio has
B received unreserved approval of this Court in successive decisions. Jaffar
Hussain Dastagfr v. State of Maharashtra, (1969] 2 sec 872; K Chinnas- ..
wamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1962) SC 1788; Earabhadrap-
Pfl- @ Krishnappa v. State of Kamataka, (1983] 2 sec 330; Shamshul
Kanwar v. State of U.P., (1995] 4 SCC 430 and State of Rajasthan v. Bhup
C Singh, (1997] 10 sec 675).

In the present case, the fact discovered by the police with the help
of (1) the disclosure statements and (2) the recovery of incriminating
articles on the strength of such statements is that it was the accused who
.D concealed those articles at the hidden places. It is immaterial that such
statement of the accused is inculpatory because Section 27 of the Evidence
Act renders even such inculpatory statements given to a police officer
admissible in evidence by employing the words: "Whether it amounts to ·
confession or not".

E The High Court observed that the accused had no good motive to
liquidate his young wife. This is what the learned Judges of the High Court
have stated on that aspect:

"Although it is not always necessary for the prosecution to prove
F motive in a criminal trial, however, this is one of such cases where
motive is essential in case the prosecution wants to succeed in its
endeavours to prove the case against the accused. B!it, we are not
convinced v.ith this kind of motive. These factors, narrated by the
prosecution, are too trivial to be taken note of to establish it. They
are thoroughly insignificant and do not in any way, indicate that
G they could influence the accused to the extent that he would take
the extreme step of killing his wife."

Having stated the legal principle correctly that it is not the require-
ment of law that unless prosecution establishes a motive of the accused to
H murder the de.ceased prosecution must necessarily fail, learned judges
STATE v. JEET SINGH [THOMAS, J.] 1045

~- proceeded to treat the case on hand as an exception to the aforesaid A
general approach. Why should the present case be an exception to the
aforesaid legal principle?

Learned counsel for the accused invited our attention to the decision
of this Court in Sharad Birdhichcnd Sarda v. State of Maliarashtra, AIR
(1984) SC 1622, in which an earlier decision in Ramgopal v. State of B
~ ,
Maharashtra, AIR (1972) SC 656 was followed with approval a~ laying
• down different tests regarding the mode and manner of proof in cases of
murder by administration of poison. They are: (1) Whether there is a clear
motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased. (2) Whether
the deceased died of poison which is said to have been administered. (3) c
Whether the accused had poison in his possession. (4) Whether he had an
opportunity to administer it to the deceased.

On its basis learned counsel contended that the establishment of a
clear motive is sine qua non for a conviction in cases of murder through
administration of poison. D

No doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act
was done with a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal offence
would have been committed if prosecution has failed to prove the precise
motive of the accused to commit it When the prosecution succeeded in
showing the possibility of some ire for the accused towards the victim the E
inability to further put on record the manner in which such ire would have
swelled up in the mind of the offender to such a degree as to impel him
to commit the offence cannot be construed as a fatal weakness of the
prosecution. It is almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unravel the
full dimension of the mental disposition of an offender towards the person F
whom he offended. In this context we may extract the observations made
by a two Judge Bench of this Court (Dr. A.S. Anand, J - as the learned
Chief Justice then was and Thomas, J) in Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar,
[1978] 9 sec 238 :

"Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area for G

.. prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind of another.
Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act.
Such impelling cause need not necessarily be proportionally grave
to do grave crimes. Many a murders have been committed without
any known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
(1999) 1 S.C.R.

A aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable. Lord
Chief Justice Champbell struck a note of caution in R.V. Palmer
(Shorthand Report at p. 308 CCC May 1856) thus:

"But if there be any motive which can be assigned, I am bound to
tell you that the adequacy of that motive)s of little importance.
B We know, from experience of criminal courts that atrocious crimes·
of this sort have been committed from very slight motives; not
merely from malice and revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary
advantage, and to drive off for a ti111e pressing difficulties.'

c Though, it is a sound proposition that every criminal act is done
with a motive, it is unsound to suggest that no such criminal act
can be presumed unless motive is proved. After all, motive is a
psychological phenomenon. Mere fact that prosecution failed to
translate that mental disposition of the accused into evidence does
not mean that no such mental condition existed in the mind of the
D assailant."

(para 17)

Be the position as it may, this is a case where prosecution succeeded
in showing that the accused had some cause for dislike of his wife. Some
E of the letters which accused had writien during the preceding months were
seized by police and marked as exhibits of the prosecution. Some of those
letters contained the adverse remarks made by him about Sudarshana
Devi's conduct in domestic activities. The High Court did not read much
in those letters as exhibiting any prejudice or ill will towards his wife. Of
F course such an interpretation is plausible. Hence those letters do not afford ,_
any clue for the motive to finish her.

But there was another side of it. PW.12 - Raj Kumari one of the elder
sisters of Sudarshana Devi, has in her evidence, said that Sudarshana had
told her about the accusations which the accused used to make pointing to
G the white patches on her body and describing them as marks of leprosy.
Of course in cross- examination PW.12 admitted that the accused was told
about such white patches even before the solemnisation of the inarriage.
PW.13 c Urmila is another elder sister of the deceased and she too has . -"
stated in her evidence that Sudarshana Devi told her of the remarks which
H her. in-laws used to make that she was having leprosy.
STATE v. JEET SINGH (THOMAS, J.] 1047
..,)_·
It may be that during the pre-marital months Sudarshana Devi had A
only one tiny mark of discolouration which was not considered to be of any
serious notice. But as years passed the leucoderma would have caused
spreading of the discolouration to different parts of her body. In this
context it is useful to refer to what the doctors have recorded in the
post-mortem report regarding that aspect: "Multiple depigmented patches
•• of varying sizes were present over the feet, anterial abdominal wall and
B
·~

sternal area of chest."

If the in-laws of Sudarshana Devi had treated such escalating white
patches as symptoms of leprosy we have no doubt that they would have
conveyed that opinion to the accused also. If the accused was making
accusations against her that she was suffering from leprosy it would have
c
reflected his mind towards her. It could be that he would have thought of
getting rid of a leper as his wife once and for all.

In this case prosecution has succeeded in establishing all the four
tests laid down in Ram Gopal' case (~upra). D
The High Court Committed a grave error in reaching the conclusion
that Sudarshana Devi had committed suicide. Due to gross misappreciation
of·evidence and misreading of the circumstances proved in this case, the
High Court caused a miscarriage of justice by clearing the accused who
committed such a heinous crime by liquidating his hapless female partner. E
We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the
High Court and restore the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions
Court on the«1ccused. We direct the Sessions Judge, Hamirpur (H.P.) to
resort to prompt steps to put the accused back in jail for undergoing the
remaining portion of the. sentence. F
>

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.