STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.versusS.M. KOTRAYYA AND ORS.

A                    STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
                                   v.
                        S.M. KOTRAYYA AND ORS.

                              SEPTEMBER 2, 1996

B              [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

          Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

          S.21-Delay in approaching the Tribunal-Explanation therefor that
C  relief granted in similar cases came to notice late-Tribunal condoning the
   delay-On appeal held, it is not necessary that explanation should be given
   for the delay which occasioned for the peliod melltioned in sub-sections ( 1)
   or (2) of S.21-But explanation should be given for the delay which oc-
   caSioned after the expiry of the peliod-T1ibunal to satisfy itself whether the
   explanation offered was proper explanation-Coming to know of relief granted
D in similar cases is no proper explanation-Hence T1ibunal wholly unjustified
 . in condoning the delay.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 12037-48
    of 1996.

E         From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.89 of the Karnataka Ad-
    ministrative Tribunal at Bangalore in A. Nos. 4134-45 of 1989.

           M. Veerappa for the Appellants.

           D.V. Sehgal (A.C.) for the Respondents.
F
           The following Order of the Court was delivered :

           Delay condoned.

           Leave granted.
G
            At the outset, we express our deep appreciation for the valuable
     assistance rendered by Shri D.V. Sehgal, learned senior counsel who
     appeared as amicus culiae at our request since the respondents did not
     appear either in person or through counsel.

H          These appeals by special leave arise from the common order of the
                                        426
                       STATE v. S.M. KOTRAYYA                         427

Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, dated August 14, 1989 made in Ap- A
plication Nos. 4134-45/89. The admitted facts are that the respondents,
while working as teachers in the Department of Education, availed of
Leave Travel Concession during the year 1981-82. But later it transpired
that they had never utilised the benefit of LTC but drew the amount and
used in. Consequently, recovery came to be made in the year 1984-86. Some B
of the persons filed applications in the Tribunal questioning the power of       o
the Government to recover the same. It would appear that thereafter in
August 1989 the Tribunal allowed similar claims and had held that the
appellant-Government could not recover the same from the respondents.
On coming to know of it, the respondents filed application in August 1989 C
before the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal
has condoned the delay by the impugned order. Thus these appeals by
special leave.

       Shri Veerappa, learned counsel for the appellant, placing reliance on
the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in S.S. Rathore v. State D
of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 at 591, para 21, contended that the
Tribunal has no power to condone the delay if the respondents had not
given any explanation why they could not file the application within six
months and if they came to be filed beyond _six months covered by sub-sec-
tion (2) of section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, E
the "Act"), the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay. We find no
force in the contention.

     Section 21 reads .as under :

        "21. LIMITATION - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an applica-        F
        tion, -

        (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause
        (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 h~s been made in connection
       with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year G
       from the date on which such final order has been made;
                                                                        -
        (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is men-
        tioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made
        and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such H
        428                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

    A           final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry
                of the said period of six months.

                (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
                where -

    B            (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had
0                arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period
                 of three years immediately preceding the date on which the juris-
                 diction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable
                 under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates,
    c            and

                 (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been
                 commenced before the said date before any High Court, the
                 application shall be e11tertained by the Tribunal if it is made withi11
                 the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause
    D            (b), of sub-section (1) or with in a period of six mo11ths from the
                 said date, whichever period expires later.

                 (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-
                 section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one
    E            year specified in clause (a) or cl~use (b) of sub-section (1) or, as
                 the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section
                 (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that they had sufficient
                 cause for not making the application within such period."

                                                                  (emphasis supplied)
    F
               A reading of the said section would indicate that sub-section ( 1) of
         Section 21 provides for limitation for redressal of the grievances in clauses
         (a) and (b) and specifies the period of one year. Sub-section (2) amplifies
         the limitation of one year in respect of grievances covered under clauses
    G    (a) and (b) and an outer limit of six months in respect of grievances
         covered by sub-section (2) is provided. Sub-section (3) postulates that
         notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), if
         the applicants satisfy the Tribunal that they had sufficient cause for not
         making the applications within such period enumerated in sub-sections (1)
    H    and (2) from the date of application, the Tribunal has been given power
                       STATE v. S.M. KOT RAYYA                          429

to condone the delay, on satisfying itself that the applicants have satisfac- A
torily explained the delay in filing the applications for redressal of their
grievances. When sub-section (2) has given power for making applications
within one year of the grievanc~s covered under clauses (a) and (b) of
sub-section (1) and within the outer limit of six months in respect of the
grievances covered under sub-section (2), there is no need for the applicant B
to give any explanation to the delay having occured during that period.
They are entitled , as a matter of right, to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Court for redressal of their grievances. If the applicatiop.s come to be filed
beyond that period, then the need to give satisfactory explanation for the
delay caused till date of filing of the application must be given and then
the question of satisfaction of the Tribunal in that behalf would arise.
                                                                               c
Sub-section (3) starts with a non-obstante clause which rubs out the effect
of sub-section (2) of Section 21 and the need thereby arises to give
satisfactory explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of
the period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof.
                                                                               D
      The decision of the Constitution Bench in S.S. Rathore's case (supra)
has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, this Court was
concerned with the question whether the total period of six months covered
under sub-section (3) had to be excluded in filing the petition in the suit,
when it was transferred to the Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunal      E
Order. In that behalf, the Constitution Bench held that a suit under a civil
court's jurisdiction is governed by Article 58 of Limitation Act, 1963 and
the claims for redressal of the grievances are governed by Article 21 of the
Act. The questian whether the Tribunal has power to condone the delay
after the expiry of the period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of
                                                                               F
Section 21, did not arise for consideration in that case.

       Thus considered, we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents
should give an explanation for the delay with occasioned for the period
mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, but they should give
explanation for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid G
respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal
should be required to satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was
proper explanation. In this case, the explanation offered was that they came
to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they
filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation H
    430                  SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and
    (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their
    grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1)
    or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal is
    wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.
B          The appeals are accordingly allowed. The order of the Tribunal is
    set aside. No order as to costs.

    G.N.                                                     Appeals allowed.