STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICEversusS. SUBBEGOWDA

                   [2023] 11 S.C.R. 19 : 2023 INSC 669



                             CASE DETAILS

          STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE
                                       v.
                            S. SUBBEGOWDA
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1598 of 2023)
                             AUGUST 03, 2023
       [ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]

                               HEADNOTES

      Issues for consideration:
        (i) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers u/s. 482 of CrPC
could have discharged the respondent-accused from the charges levelled
against him for the offences u/s. 13(1)(e) punishable u/s. 13(2) of the said Act,
despite the fact that the accused had not pressed for his second application
for discharge by submitting the Memo dated 02.12.2014 and despite the
fact that after framing of the charge by the Special Court on 23.12.2014, the
trial had proceeded further and the prosecution had examined 17 witnesses
in support of its case?
       (ii) Whether the High Court in the criminal petition filed u/s. 482
of the CrPC could reverse the findings recorded by the Special Court with
regard to the validity of sanction, ignoring the bar contained in sub-section
(3) read with sub-section (4) of s.19 of the said Act?
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.13(1)(e) and s.13(2)
– Charges framed – Trial Court examined witnesses – High Court
discharged the accused – Propriety of:
       Held : Admittedly, the second application was not pressed for by
the respondent by submitting the Memo on 02.12.2014, wherein it was
stated that the Court may proceed to frame charge against him – Thus, by
the said Memo, the respondent-accused had specifically not pressed for
his contention with regard to the validity of sanction or error in granting
the sanction by the Government, and he specifically requested the Court
to proceed further with the framing of charge – Considering the said
memo, the trial court framed the charge, and the prosecution examined
20           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 11 S.C.R.


as many as 17 witnesses in support of its case – At that stage, the
respondent submitted the third application which was in the nature of
interlocutory application again seeking the discharge u/s. 227 of CrPC on
the ground that there was an error in the sanction order, the Government
being not competent to grant the sanction u/s. 19(1) of the said Act –
The said application having been dismissed by the trial court, the High
Court could not and should not have entertained the petition u/s. 482 of
CrPC, which was in the nature of revision application, and reversed the
findings recorded by the trial court, in view of sub-section (3) read with
sub-section (4) of s.19 of the said Act. [Para 7]
     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s. 19(3) – Special Judge
recorded findings – Findings reversed by the High Court – Propriety
of:
       Held : While dismissing the third application filed by the
respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by
the prosecution, it was specifically held by the Special Judge that the
sanction accorded by the Government which was a superior authority
was proper and valid – Such fi ndings recorded by the Special Judge
could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by
the High Court, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3)
of s.19 and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure
of justice occasioned. [Para 14]
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Interlocutory application
seeking discharge midst of trial – Maintainablity of:
        Held : Such an interlocutory application seeking discharge in the
midst of trial would not be maintainable – Once the cognizance was taken
by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the
trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view
of Section 19(3) of the said Act – In the instant case, though the issue
of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same
was not pressed for – The only stage open to the respondent-accused
in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in the
trial. [Para 15]
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19(1) – Stages of raising
issue with regard to validity of sanction u/s. 19(1):
         STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                                    21
                     S. SUBBEGOWDA

         Held : The stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue
with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes
cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court
or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the
trial – Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or
confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section
(3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. [Para 10]
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.19(3) and (4) – Combined
reading of:
       Held : The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19
makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding,
sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a
Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or
any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1),
unless in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned
thereby. [Para 11]

        LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka (2015) 14 SCC 186 : [2015] 8 SCR
685; State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others (2001) 7 SCC 679 : [2001] 2
Suppl. SCR 128 – relied on.

       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1598 of 2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2018 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 4463 of 2018.
       Appearances:
      Shubhranshu Padhi, Ms. Rajeshwar Shankar, Niroop Sukriti, Jay
Nirupama, Advs. for the Appellant.
       H. N. Shashidhara, Sr. Adv., Devamshu Behl, Balaji Srinivasan, Advs.
for the Respondent.
22            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 11 S.C.R.



        JUDGMENT/ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                                 JUDGMENT
       BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
       1. The appellant – State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police by way of
instant appeal has assailed the judgment and order dated 16.08.2018 passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No. 4463
of 2018 whereby the High Court has allowed the said petition by discharging
the respondent (original petitioner-accused) from the offences charged under
Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), on the ground that the sanction
accorded to prosecute the respondent-accused by the Government was illegal
and without jurisdiction.
        2. The respondent was working as an Executive Engineer in the
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board, Mandya Division,
Mandya during the period 1983 to 2007. On the basis of the Source Report
dated 17.12.2007 submitted by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Bengaluru Rural Division, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru, a case being
Crime No. 22 of 2007 (later numbered as Crime No. 62 of 2008) came to be
registered against the respondent for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) read
with Section 13(2) of the said Act. It was alleged, inter alia, that the respondent-
accused during his tenure in the office as an Executive Engineer had amassed
the wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income. On the completion
of the investigation, the Investigating Officer had sent the papers to the State
Government seeking sanction to prosecute the respondent as required in
Section 19(1) of the said Act. The Government of Karnataka on the basis of
the material placed before it, had accorded the requisite sanction by issuing
the Government order dated 13.09.2010. Thereafter the chargesheet came
to be filed in the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
Rural District at Bengaluru wherein it was alleged that respondent had abused
his position as a public servant, had indulged into corrupt practices and had
amassed wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income. The said
case was registered as Special Case No. 488 of 2011 before the said Court.
      3. The respondent-accused filed an application under Section 227
read with 239 of CrPC on 12.10.2011, seeking his discharge from the
        STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                          23
           S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

case contending, inter alia, that neither the contents of the Source
Report nor the other documents constituted any offence as alleged,
and that the sanction under Section 19(1) of the said Act was issued by
the Government without any application of mind. The said application
came to be dismissed by the trial court by passing a detailed order on
01.02.2013. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred a
Criminal Revision Petition being no. 287 of 2013 before the High Court.
The said petition came to be disposed of by the High Court vide the order
dated 05.07.2013 directing the trial court to consider the documents made
available by the respondent during the investigation and produced by
the prosecution with the chargesheet, while framing the charge without
being influenced by the order dated 01.12.2013.
       4. It appears that in view of the said order passed by the High
Court, the respondent-accused again fi led an application under Sections
227 and 239 of CrPC before the trial court seeking his discharge from
the case by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order passed by the
Government lacked application of mind and was given mechanically and
that the Investigating Officer had suppressed the material produced by
the respondent offering satisfactory explanations to the assets acquired,
income derived and expenditure incurred by the respondent during
period in question. Pertinently, the respondent did not press for the said
application by submitting a memo on 02.12.2014 and stating therein
that the Court may proceed to frame charge against him. The said memo
reads as under-
         “IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
      SESSIONS JUDGE BANGALORE RURAL AT BANGALORE
                            Spl.C.C. No.488 of 11
      BETWEEN:
      State by Lokayktha Police,
      Bangalore Rural.                                ... Complainant
      AND:
      Subbegowda.                                        … Accused
24            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 11 S.C.R.


            MEMO FILED ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
        The above named Accused humbly submits that he will not press the
application filed under Sections 227 and 239 of Cr.P.C., 1973 seeking discharge
in the case. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Court may proceed to frame
charges against the Accused.
       02.12.2014
       Bangalore.                                       Sd/-
                                               Advocate for Accused.”
        5.The trial court thereafter framed the charge against the respondent-
accused on 23.12.2014 for the offence of criminal misconduct under Section
13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of the said Act in Special Case No. 488
of 2011. The prosecution thereafter examined as many as 17 witnesses in support
of its case, and in the midst of the trial the respondent-accused again filed third
application under Section 227 of CrPC seeking his discharge from the case on
the ground that the respondent was an employee of the Karnataka Urban Water
Supply and Drainage Board and could be removed only by the said Board in
view of Rule 10 of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1957. The State Government therefore had no jurisdiction to accord the
sanction to prosecute the respondent under Section 19(1) of the said Act. The trial
court vide the order dated 05.06.2018 dismissed the said application by passing
a detailed order holding, inter alia, that the third successive application filed by
the respondent-accused for the discharge from the case, when the evidence of 17
witnesses had been recorded and when the contention based on the sanction was
already rejected by the Court earlier, was liable to be dismissed. The aggrieved
respondent filed the Criminal Petition being no. 4463 of 2018 under Section 482
of CrPC before the High Court, which came to be allowed by the High Court
vide the impugned order.
       6.In view of the afore-stated undisputed facts the following questions arise
for consideration before this Court:
      (i)   Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482
            of CrPC could have discharged the respondent-accused from the
            charges levelled against him for the offences under Section 13(1)(e)
            punishable under Section 13(2) of the said Act, despite the fact that the
            accused had not pressed for his second application for discharge by
        STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                              25
           S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

           submitting the Memo dated 02.12.2014 and despite the fact that
           after framing of the charge by the Special Court on 23.12.2014,
           the trial had proceeded further and the prosecution had examined
           17 witnesses in support of its case?
     (ii) Whether the High Court in the criminal petition filed under
          Section 482 of the CrPC could reverse the findings recorded by
          the Special Court with regard to the validity of sanction, ignoring
          the bar contained in sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of
          Section 19 of the said Act?
       7. As stated earlier, after having not succeeded in the first application
seeking discharge under Section 227 of CrPC, in which the petitioner had
raised the issue of sanction by contending that the sanction was accorded by
the Government under Section 19(1) of the said Act without any application
of mind, the respondent-accused had filed the second application again
seeking his discharge under Section 227 of CrPC by raising the issue of
sanction by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order was passed
mechanically by the Government and that the Investigating Officer had
suppressed the material produced by the respondent offering satisfactory
explanations to the assets acquired by him. Admittedly, the second
application was not pressed for by the respondent by submitting the Memo
on 02.12.2014, wherein it was stated that the Court may proceed to frame
charge against him. Thus, by submitting the said Memo, the respondent-
accused had specifically not pressed for his contention with regard to the
validity of sanction or error in granting the sanction by the Government,
and he specifically requested the Court to proceed further with the framing
of charge. Considering the said memo, the trial court framed the charge,
and the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses in support of its
case. At that stage, the respondent submitted the third application which
was in the nature of interlocutory application again seeking the discharge
under Section 227 of CrPC on the ground that there was an error in the
sanction order, the Government being not competent to grant the sanction
under Section 19(1) of the said Act. The said application having been
dismissed by the trial court, the High Court could not and should not
have entertained the petition under Section 482 of CrPC, which was in
the nature of revision application, and reversed the findings recorded by
26            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


the trial court, in view of sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section
19 of the said Act.
       8. For the ready reference, the relevant part of sub-section (1), (3) and
(4) of Section 19 are reproduced herein below:
      “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution. —
      (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
          sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a
          public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise
          provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—
            (a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be,
            was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in
            connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from
            his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government,
            of that Government;
            (b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may
            be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed
            in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from
            his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government,
            of that Government;
            (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to
            remove him from his office.
      (2) —————
      (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
          Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —
            (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge
            shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or
            revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission
            or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1),
            unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact
            been occasioned thereby;
            (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the
            ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction
        STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                             27
           S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

            granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,
            omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;
            (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any
            other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision
            in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry,
            trial, appeal or other proceedings.
      (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of,
          or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has
          occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall
          have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should
          have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
            Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—
            (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
            (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to
            any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of
            a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person
            or any requirement of a similar nature.”
       9. Similar provision is contained in Section 465 of CrPC on whether
finding or sentence is reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity.
It reads as under: -
     “465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error,
     omission or irregularity. -
     1. Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding
     sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction
     shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation of
     revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the
     complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or
     other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other
     proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any
     sanction for the prosecution unless in the opinion of that Court, a
     failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
     2. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in
     any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any
28             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 11 S.C.R.


      sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court
      shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have
      been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”
        10. Having regard to the afore-stated provisions contained in Section 19
of the said Act, there remains no shadow of doubt that the statute forbids taking
of cognizance by the Court against a public servant except with the previous
sanction of the Government/authority competent to grant such sanction in terms
of clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). It is also well settled proposition
of law that the question with regard to the validity of such sanction should be
raised at the earliest stage of the proceedings, however could be raised at the
subsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the stages of proceedings at
which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction
would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage
when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is
complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial. Such issue of course,
could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however
the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4)
of Section 19 of the said Act. It is also significant to note that the competence
of the court trying the accused also would be dependent upon the existence of
the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of
validity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot be gainsaid that in case
the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and
relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh
sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law.
         11. The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 makes
it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence
or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in
appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or any error,
omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in
the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
sub-section (4) further postulates that in determining under sub-section (3)
whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has
occasioned, or resulted in failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the
fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage
in the proceedings. The explanation to sub-section (4) further provides that for
         STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                              29
            S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

the purpose of Section 19, error includes “competency of the authority to grant
sanction”. Thus, it is clear from the language employed in sub-section (3) of
Section 19 that the said sub-section has application to the proceedings before
the Court in appeal, confirmation or revision, and not to the proceedings before
the Special Judge. The said sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal,
confirmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special
Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where
the appellate or revisional court finds that the failure of justice had occurred
by such invalidity.
       12. This Court in case of Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka1 has very
aptly dealt with the intricacies of Section 19(1) as also Section 19(3) and
19(4) of the said Act as to at what stage the question of validity of sanction
accorded under Section 19(1) of the said Act could be raised, and what are
the powers of the court in appeal, confirmation or revision under sub-section
(3) of Section 19 of the said Act.
      “22. The legal position regarding the importance of sanction under
      Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus much too clear
      to admit equivocation. The statute forbids taking of cognizance by the
      court against a public servant except with the previous sanction of an
      authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a),
      (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such
      sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The competence
      of the court trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of
      a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be invalid the court
      can discharge the accused relegating the parties to a stage where the
      competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in
      accordance with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity
      attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed to be non
      est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same
      offences, upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution.
      23. Having said that there are two aspects which we must immediately
      advert to. The first relates to the effect of sub-section (3) to Section
      19, which starts with a non obstante clause. Also relevant to the same
      aspect would be Section 465 CrPC which we have extracted earlier.

1   (2015) 14 SCC 186
30           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 11 S.C.R.


     23.1. It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable tenacity
     worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section 19(3), any error,
     omission or irregularity in the order sanctioning prosecution of an
     accused was of no consequence so long as there was no failure of justice
     resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was contended that
     in terms of Explanation to Section 4, “error includes competence of the
     authority to grant sanction”. The argument is on the face of it attractive
     but does not, in our opinion, stand closer scrutiny.
     23.2. A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 would show
     that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of any finding, sentence or
     order passed by a Special Judge, on the ground that the sanction order
     suffers from an error, omission or irregularity, unless of course the court
     before whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in appeal or
     revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice has occurred by reason
     of such error, omission or irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words,
     simply forbids interference with an order passed by the Special Judge
     in appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground that the
     sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the appellate or revisional
     court finds that failure of justice has occurred by such invalidity. What
     is noteworthy is that sub-section (3) has no application to proceedings
     before the Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the
     accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning prosecution
     of the accused had not been produced as required under Section 19(1).
     23.3. Sub-section (3), in our opinion, postulates a prohibition against
     a higher court reversing an order passed by the Special Judge on the
     ground of any defect, omission or irregularity in the order of sanction. It
     does not forbid a Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage
     of the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not maintainable for
     want of a valid order sanctioning the same.
     23.4. The language employed in sub-section (3) is, in our opinion, clear
     and unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, sufficiently evident even
     from the language employed in sub-section (4) according to which the
     appellate or the revisional court shall, while examining whether the error,
     omission or irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of
     justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should
         STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                                31
            S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

      have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to say, that a conjoint reading
      of sub-sections 19(3) and (4) leaves no manner of doubt that the said
      provisions envisage a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction
      or the validity of the proceedings including finding, sentence or order
      passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision before a higher court
      and not before the Special Judge trying the accused.
      23.5. The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that if the
      trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a finding or sentence,
      the same should not be lightly interfered with by the appellate or the
      revisional court simply because there was some omission, error or
      irregularity in the order sanctioning the prosecution under Section 19(1).
      Failure of justice is, what the appellate or revisional court would in such
      cases look for. And while examining whether any such failure had indeed
      taken place, the Court concerned would also keep in mind whether the
      objection touching the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction
      could or should have been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings
      meaning thereby whether the same could and should have been raised
      at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or revision.”
       13. In State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others2, this Court had an
occasion to deal with the various aspects contained in Section 465 of CrPC
more particularly to deal with the expression “A failure of justice has in fact
been occasioned” as contained therein. Since, the provisions contained in
Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and in Section 465(1) of
CrPC are pari materia, the observations made in the said decision would
be relevant.
      “14. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the above
      context. It is extracted below:
            “465. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained,
            no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent
            jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal,
            confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or
            irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation,
            order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in
            any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or
2   (2001) 7 SCC 679
32            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 11 S.C.R.


           irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion
           of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.”
     15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error, omission or
     irregularity in the proceedings held before or during the trial or in any
     enquiry were reckoned by the legislature as possible occurrences in
     criminal courts. Yet the legislature disfavoured axing down the proceedings
     or to direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the
     legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error, omission or
     irregularity has occasioned “a failure of justice” the superior court shall
     not quash the proceedings merely on the ground of such error, omission
     or irregularity.
     16. What is meant by “a failure of justice” occasioned on account of such
     error, omission or irregularity? This Court has observed in Shamnsaheb
     M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577: 2001 SCC (Cri)
     358] thus: (SCC p. 585, para 23)
     “23. We often hear about ‘failure of justice’ and quite often the submission
     in a criminal court is accentuated with the said expression. Perhaps it is
     too pliable or facile an expression which could be fitted in any situation
     of a case. The expression ‘failure of justice’ would appear, sometimes, as
     an etymological chameleon (the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock
     in Town Investments Ltd. v. Deptt. of the Environment [(1977) 1 All ER 813
     : 1978 AC 359 : (1977) 2 WLR 450 (HL)] ). The criminal court, particularly
     the superior court should make a close examination to ascertain whether
     there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.”
        14. In the instant case, the Special Judge proceeded with the trial, on
the second application for discharge filed by the respondent having not been
pressed for by him. The Special Judge, while dismissing the third application
filed by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by
the prosecution, specifically held that the sanction accorded by the government
which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which
the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid. Such findings recorded
by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed
or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent challenging
the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-
section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how
         STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE v.                            33
            S. SUBBEGOWDA [BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.]

a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused
as contemplated in the said sub-section (3). As a matter of fact, neither the
respondent had pleaded nor the High Court opined whether any failure of
justice had occasioned to the respondent, on account of error if any, occurred
in granting the sanction by the authority.
        15. As a matter of fact, such an interlocutory application seeking
discharge in the midst of trial would also not be maintainable. Once the
cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed
against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in
the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act. In the instant case,
though the issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of
time, the same was not pressed for. The only stage open to the respondent-
accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in
the trial in accordance with law.
       16. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the
High Court is set aside. It will be open for the respondent to raise the issue
of validity of sanction if he desires to do so, in accordance with law at the
final stage of arguments in the trial. Special Judge is directed to proceed
with the trial from the stage it had stopped, in accordance with the law and
as expeditiously as possible.
       17. Appeal stands allowed accordingly.

Headnotes prepared by:                                          Appeal allowed.
Ankit Gyan