Holding

A valid sanction by a competent authority is essential for taking cognizance, but if cognizance was taken without such sanction, the court may later examine the sanction and a fresh trial with proper sanction is not barred by Section 300 Cr.P.C.

Summary

The State of Karnataka, represented by the CBI, charged C. Nagarajaswamy under the Prevention of Corruption Act for demanding illegal gratification and later for misappropriation of funds. In both cases the trial courts took cognizance and conducted full trials, but discharged the accused on the ground that the sanction for prosecution was invalid. The State then filed fresh charge sheets after obtaining what it claimed to be proper sanctions, and the accused sought quashing of the fresh proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court held that a valid sanction by a competent authority is a condition precedent for taking cognizance, but if cognizance was taken erroneously the court may later examine the sanction and a fresh trial is not barred by Section 300 Cr.P.C. The Court set aside the High Court orders, allowing the State to proceed with fresh trials, and directed the trial courts to dispose of the matters within six months. The judgment emphasized that the question of sanction may be decided even after trial and that the bar under Section 300 applies only when the earlier court had jurisdiction and recorded a conviction or acquittal.

Issues considered

Whether a trial court can discharge an accused after a full trial on the ground of an invalid sanction and whether fresh proceedings can be initiated after obtaining a proper sanction.
Whether Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars a retrial when the earlier trial was conducted without a valid sanction.
Whether the question of sanction must be decided at the stage of taking cognizance or can be examined later, even after trial.
Whether the High Court erred in holding that a trial court must record a judgment of conviction or acquittal after a full-fledged trial despite an invalid sanction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 300
Constitution of Indias. Article 20(2)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. Section 19

Subjects

sanctioncognizanceSection 300 Cr.P.C.double jeopardyPrevention of Corruption Actcriminal procedurefresh trialjurisdictionspeedy trial

Judgment

STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH CBI A
v.
C. NAGARAJASWAMY

OCTOBER 7, 2005

[S.B. SINHA AND R.V. RA VEENDRAN, JJ.] B

Constitution of India-Article 20(2)-Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973-Section 300-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988-Section 19-State
initiated proceeding~ against persons without proper order of sanction for C
prosecution-Trial Court discharged the persons on ground of invalid sanction
after full fledged trial-Challenge of the initiation of fresh proceedings on
obtaining proper sanction before High Court-High Court allowed the
applications of the persons-Correctness of-Held, grant of proper sanction
is a sine qua non for taking cognisance of the offence-Question of proper
sanction can be dealt with after taking cognisance of the offence or after trial D
or even before an appellate court for the first time--Fresh proceedings initiated
cannot be barred by Section 300 Cr.P.C.

In the first of the two appeals, State initiated proceedings against.
the respondent under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 before trial
court for demanding illegal gratification. The trial court took cognisance E
of the offence, examined witnesses and recorded the statement of the
respondent under section 313 Cr.P.C. The trial court thereafter discharged
the respondent on the ground that the sanction for prosecution accorded
by authority was illegal. The State filed a fresh charge sheet before the
trial court with a proper order of sanction. The respondent challenged F
the filing of the fresh charge sheet before High Court under section 482
Cr.P.C. The High Court allowed the application of the respondent holding
that when a accused faces a full-fledged trial, the trial court must either
record a judgment of conviction or acquittal and the accused cannot be
discharged under section 227 Cr.P.C.
G
In the other appeal, the State initiated criminal proceedings against
the respondent for misappropriation of money before trial court. When
the proceedings were pending, the respondent was dismissed from service.
The respondent faced a full fledged trial and was examined under section
·>

169 H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 313 Cr.P.C. The respondent raised a plea before the trial court that the
sanction for prosecution accorded by the Managing Director was illegal
because only the Board of Directors was competent to accord the sanction.
The trial court accepted the plea of the respondent and held that the
sanction order was invalid. The State filed a second charge sheet against
the respondent before the trial court without obtaining any sanction on
B the ground that the respondent has been dismissed from service. The
respondent filed an application under section 482 Cr.P.C. before High
Court for quashing the criminal proceedings. The High Court quashed
the proceedings on the ground that no fresh trial is permissible in law.

C In appeals to this Court, the appellant State contended that the High
Court failed to consider the provisions of section 300 Cr.P.C.; that the
court cannot take cognisance of the offence without a proper sanction for
prosecution and hence another trial with proper sanction is not barred.

The respondents contended that under Chapter XVIII Cr.P.C., a trial
D court, after conducting a full-fledged trial, cannot pass an order of
discharge or drop the proceedings on the ground of improper sanction
and thereby make liable for another trial with proper sanction for
prosecution.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court
E
HELD: I.I. Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction
has been accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter
which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognisance. But in a case
of this nature where a question is raised as to whether the authority
granting the sanction was competent therefor or not, at the stage of final
F arguments after trial, the !iame may have to be considered having regard
to the terms and conditions of service of the accused for the purpose of
determination as to who could remove him from service. Grant of proper
sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for taking cognisance
of the offence. It is desirable that the question as regard sanction may be
G determined at an early stage. But, even if a cognisance of the offence is
taken erroneously and the same cones to the court's notice at a later stage,
a finding to that affect is permissible. Even such a plea can be taken for
the first time before an appellate court. (174-G, H; 175-A, BJ

1.2. The High Court is not right in holding that the Trial Court was
H bound to record wither a judgment of conviction or acquittal, even after
STATE OF KARNA TAKA THROUGH CBI v C. NAGARAJASW AMY. 171

holding that the sanction was not valid. Even if a judgment of conviction A
or acquittal was recorded, the same would not make any distinction for
the purpose of invoking the provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. as even then,
it would be held to have been rendered illegally and without jurisdiction.
1177-G, H; 178-AI

Ashok Sahu v. Gokul Saikia and Anr., !19901 Supp SCC 41; Birendra B
K. Singh v. State of Bihar, JT (2000) 8 SC 248; B. Saha and Ors. v. MS
Kochar, 11979] 4 SCC 177; K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP, 12005] 4 SCC
512; Bai} Nath Prasad Tripothi v. The State of Bhopal, 11957] SCR 650;
Mohammed Safi v. The Stale of West Bengal, AIR (1966) SC 69 and State of
Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 7 SCALE 659, referred to. C
Basdeo Agarwal/a v. King Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 93 and Yusofalli
Mu/la Noorbhoy v. The King. AIR (1949) PC 264, referred to.

1.3. The interest of justice shall be sub-served if while allowing these
appeals and setting aside the judgments of the High Court, the trial court D
is requested to dispose of the matters at an early date preferably within
six months from the date of communication of this order, subject, of
course, to rendition of all cooperation of the respondents herein. In the
event, the trial is not completed within the aforementioned period, it would
be open to the respondents to approach the High Court again.
[180-E, F] E
State of Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 7 SCALE 659; State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Bhooraji and Ors., JT (2001) 7 SC 55; Mahendra Lal Das v. State
of Bihar and Ors., 120021 I SCC 149 and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (20021 4 SCC 578, referred to.
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1279
of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.1.2002 of the Karnataka High
Court in Crl.P. No. 330 of 2000.
G
WITH
Crl. A. No. 137 of 2003.

A. Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Binu Tamta, Amit Anand
Tiwari and P. Parmeshwaran for the Appellant.
H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Basava Prabhu S.Patil, A.S. Bhasme, B. Subramanya Prasad, Naveen
R. Nath, Ms. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Ms. Hetu Arora and
Dasrath for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Comt was delivered by

B S.B. SINHA, J. Interpretation of Section 300 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short "the Code") is in question in these appeals which arise
out of judgments and orders dated 9.1.2002 and 10.4.2002 in Criminal Petition
Nos. 330 of 2000 and 4007 of 2001 respectively passed by the High Court
of Kamataka at Bangalore.

C We will notice the fact of both the appeals separately.

Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2002

The Respondent herein was working as a Junior Telecom Officer in
Shankarapuram Telecom Exchange. One R. Veera Prathap made a complaint
D that he had demanded an illegal gratification for showing official favour
whereupon a case in Crime No. R.C. 34A/l 994 was registered. A charge
sheet was filed therein and the Special Judge for CBI cases, Bangalore by an
order dated 16.7.1999 took cognizance of an offence under Section 7 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"). In the trial, 12
witnesses were examined. The statement of Respondent under Section 313 of
E the Code was also recorded.
The learned Special Judge formulated two points for his determination:

"I. Whether the prosecution has proved that the sanction accorded
for the prosecution of the accused in this case is a valid sanction?
F
2. Whether the prosecution has further proved beyond any reasonable
doubt that the accused has committed the offences punishable under
S.7 and under S. 13(l)(d) R/w. S 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988?"

G In regard to point No. I, the learned Special Judge was of the opinion
that the sanction for prosecution accorded by PW 11 was illegal and in that
view of the matter, the same was determined in favour of the Respondent. In
view of his findings as regard point No. I, the learned Special Judge did not
record any finding on point No. 2 and directed as under:

H "Accused C. Nagarajaswamy is hereby discharged from the
STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH CBI v. C NAGARAJASWAMY [SINHA,!.] 173
proceedings and his bail bonds stand cancelled." A
A fresh charge sheet was filed after obtaining an order of sanction
which came to be challenged before the High Court by the Respondent in an
application filed under Section 482 of the Code.

Criminal Appeal No. 137 of 2003 B
The Respondent herein was working as a Manager in State Bank of
Mysore, 4th Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore. She had dominion and control
over the management of the accounts of the Bank. She allegedly
misappropriated a sum of Rs. 40,000/- wherefor a chargesheet was filed on
27 .12.1984. While the criminal proceedings were pending, she was dismissed C
from service by an order dated 1.6.1985. She faced a full-fledged trial. She
was examined under Section 313 of the Code and also laid defence evidence.
The question as regard sanction accorded by the Managing Director of the
Bank was raised by the Respondent herein before the learned XXI Addi. City
Civil and Sessions and Special Judge, Bangalore, contending that only the D
Board of Directors was the competent authority therefor. By a judgment and
order dated 14.11.1991, the learned XX! Addi. City Civil and Sessions and
Special Judge while accepting the said plea directed:

"The sanction order (Ex. P28) is invalid. The sanctioning authority
was not competent to issue the said sanction order. Further proceedings E
of the case is stopped and the accused is released. The Bail bond of
the accused is cancelled .... "

A second chargesheet was filed after years on 18.8.1995 on the ground
that as the Respondent has been dismissed from the service, no sanction was
required for her prosecution. Cognizance was taken by an order dated F
31.8.200 I. The Respondent herein filed an application under Section 482 of
the Code for quashing the criminal proceedings as also the said order dated
31.8.200 I.

The High Court allowed the first application under Section 482 of the
Code filed by the Respondent herein on the ground that when an accused G
faces a full-fledged trial, having regard to the provisions of the Code, the
Trial Court must either record a judgment of conviction or acquittal and the
accused cannot be discharged in terms of Section 227 of the Code after a
full-fledged trial. In the second matter, the High Court was of the opinion
that no fresh trial is permissible in law.
H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Mr. A. Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf
of the Appellant would contend that the High Court committed a manifest
error in passing the impugned orders insofar as it failed to take into
consideration the ingredients of the provisions of Section 300 of the Code.

Relying on the decisions of this Court in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi v.
B The State of Bhopal [1957] SCR 650 and Mohammad Safi v. The State of
West Bengal, AIR (I 966) SC 69, Mr. Sharan would submit that in a case
where a proper order of sanction was not passed, the court will have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof and as such a judgment passed therein
shall be illegal and of no effect and in that view of the matter, subsequent
C trial with proper sanction is not barred.

Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would submit that Chapter XVIII of the Code does not envisage '
an order of discharge or dropping of the proceedings after a charge has been
framed, witnesses are examined, the statement of the accused under Section
D 313 of the Code is taken and defence witneS'ieS are examined.

Chapter XIX of the Code provides for trial of warrant-cases by
Magistrates. An ac_cused can be discharged in the cases instituted under Section
17 3 in terms of Section 239 of the Code in the event, the Magistrate considers
the charge against the accused to be groundless wherefor reasons are required
E to be recorded. However, if charge is framed \11hereto the accused pleads not
guilty, the prosecution and defence may lead their respective evidence. Section
248 provides for recording of a jedgment of acquittal or conviction.

The Appellant was proceeded against the Respondents under the Act.
Section 5 of the Act provides for the procedure and powers of the Special
F Judge. Section 19 of the Act mandates that no court shall take cognizance of
offence punishable under the provisions specified therein except with the
previous sanction by the authorities specified therein.

Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been
G accorded for prosecution of the accused persons or not is a matter which
should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance. But in a case of this
nature where a question is raised as to whether the authority granting the
sanction was competent therefor or not, at the stage of final arguments after
trial, the same may have to be considered having regard to the tenns and
conditions of service of the accused for the purpose of determination as to
H who could remove him from service.
STATEOFKARNATAKA THROUGHCB!v.C. NAGARAJASWAMY[SINHA,J.] J 75

Grant of proper sanction by a competent authority is a sine qua non for A
taking cognizance of the offence. It is desirable that the question as regard
sanction may be determined at an early stage. [See Ashok Sahu v. Gokul
Saikia and Anr., [1990] (Supp) SCC 41 and Birendra K. Singh v. State of
Bihar, JT (2000) 8 SC 248]

But, even if a cognizance of the offence is taken erroneously and the B
same comes to the court's notice at a later stage a finding to that effect is
permissible. Even such a plea can be taken for the first time before an appellate
court. [See B. Saha and Ors. v. MS. Kochar, [1979] 4 SCC 177, para 13 and
K. Ka/imuthu v. State by DSP, [2005] 4 SCC 512.]

It is true that in terms of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution C
of India no person can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more
than once. Section 300 of the Code was enacted having regard to the said
provision. Sub-section (I) of Section 300 of the Code reads as under:

"Persons once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence- D
(I) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent
jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence
shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be
liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts
for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made
against him might have been made under sub-section (I) of section E
221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2)
thereof."

The essential conditions for invoking the bar under said provision are:

(i) the court had requisite jurisdiction to take cognizance and tried p
the accused; and

(ii) the court has recorded an order of conviction or acquittal, and
such conviction/ acquittal remains in force.

The question came up for consideration before the Federal Court in
Basdeo Agarwal/av. King Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 93 wherein it was held G
that if a proceeding is initiated without sanction, the same would be null and
void.

In Yusofal/i Mu/la Noorbhoy v. The King, AIR (1949) Privy Council
264, it was held:
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A "16A ...... court cannot be competent to hear and detennine a prosecution
the institution of which is prohibited by law and S. 14 prohibits the
institution of a prosecution in the absence of a proper sanction. The
learned Magistrate was no doubt competent to decide whether he had
jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution and for that purpose to
determine whether a valid sanction had been given, but as soon as he
B decided that no valid sanction had been given the Court became
incompetent to proceed with the matter. Their Lordships agree with
the view expressed by the Federal Court in Agarwal/a 's case: (A.LR.
(32) 1945 F.C. 16: Cr. L.J. 510) that a prosecution launched without
a valid sanction is a nullity."
c The matter came up before this Court in Budha Mal v. The State of
Delhi, [Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 1952] disposed of on 3rd October, 1952
wherein a trial of the Appeliant therein for alleged commission of an offence
under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code resulted in conviction but an
appeal therefrom was accepted on the ground that no sanction for the
D prosecution of the Appellant was accorded therefor. The police prosecuted
the Appellant again after obtaining fresh sanction whereupon a plea of bar
thereto in terms of Section 403 of the Code was raised. Mahajan, J. speaking
for a Division Bench opined:

"We are satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge was right in the
E view he took. Section 403, Ct.P.C. applies to cases where the acquittal
order has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction but it does
not bar a retrial of the accused in cases where such an order has been
made by a court which had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case. It is quite apparent on this record that in the absence of a valid
sanction the trial of the appellant in the first instance was by a
F
magistrate who had no jurisdiction to try him."

The aforementioned cases were noticed by a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi (supra) wherein a similar plea was repelled
stating:
G " ....... The Privy Council decision is directly in point, and it was there
held that the whole basis of Section 403(1) was that the first trial
should have been before a court competent to hear and detennine the
case and to record a verdict of conviction or acquittal; if the court
was not so competent, as for example where the required sanction for
H the prosecution was not obtained, it was irrelevant that it was competent
STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH CBI 1·. C NAGARAJASWAMY [SINHA,].] 177

to try other cases of the same class or indeed the case against the A
particular accused in different circumstances, for example if a sanction
had been obtained."

In Mohammad Safi (supra), this Court held:

"6. It is true that Mr Ganguly could properly take cognizance of the B
offence and, therefore, the proceedings before him were in fact not
vitiated by reason of lack of jurisdiction. But we cannot close our
eyes to the fact that Mr Ganguly was himself of the opinion-and
indeed he had no option in the matter because he was bound by the
decisions of the High Court-that he could not take cognizance of
the offence and consequently was incompetent to try the appellant. C
Where a court comes to such a conclusion, albeit erroneously, it is
difficult to appreciate how that court can absolve the person arraigned
before it completely of the offence alleged against him. Where a
person has done something which is made punishable by law he is
liable to face a trial and this liability cannot come to an end merely D
because the court before which he was placed for trial forms an
opinion that it has no jurisdiction to try him or that it has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the offence alleged against him. \\>'here, therefore,
a court says, though erroneously, that it was not competent to take
cognizance of the offence it has no power to acquit that person of the
offence. An order of acquittal made by it is in fact a nullity. E
Relying upon Yusofalli Mu/la Noorbhoy, (supr~), it was held:

"The principle upon which the decision of the Privy Council is based
must apply equally to a case like the present in which the court which
made the order of acquittal was itself of the opinion that it had no F
jurisdiction to proceed with the case and therefore the accused was
not in jeopardy."

[See also State of Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 7 SCALE 659]

In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements, it is not G
possible to agree with the decision of the High Court that the Trial Court was
bound to record either a judgment of conviction or acquittal, even after
holding that the sanction was .not valid. We have noticed hereinbefore that
even if a judgment of conviction or acquittal was recorded, the same would
not make any distinction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Section H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 300 of the Code as even then, it would be held to have been rendered
illegally and without jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the Respondent next contended that having
regard to the fact that the Respondents herein have faced ordeal of trial for
a long time, it would not be in the interest of justice to put them on trial once
B over. In this behalf he relied on the decision of this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Bhooraji and Ors .. JT (200 I) 7 SC 55 wherein it is observed that
fresh trial should be ordered only in exceptional cases of 'failure of justice'.
In Bhooraji (supra), the specified court being a Sessions Court took cognizance
of the offence under the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act without the
C case being committed to it. It convicted and sentenced the accused. During
pendency of appeal by the accused before High Court, this court took the
view that committal proceedings are necessary for a specified court, to take
cognizance of offences to be tried under the Act. The High Court, therefore,
quashed the entire proceedings and directed trial de novo. In that context this
Court held that ordering de novo trial was not justified and as the trial was
D conducted by a 'competent court', the same cannot be erased merely on
account of a procedural lapse. We may notice that in a case where the trial
was conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction ending in conviction or
acquittal, a retrial may not be directed. Interpreting Section 465 of the Code,
this Court in Bhooraji (supra) held:
E "22. The bar against taking cognizance of certain offences or by
certain courts cannot govern the question whether the court concerned
is "a court of competent jurisdiction", e.g. courts are debarred from
taking cognizance of certain offences without sanction of certain
authorities. If a court took cognizance of such offences, which were
F later found to be without valid sanction, it would not become the test
or standard for deciding whether that court was "a court of competent
jurisdiction". It is now well settled that if the question of sanction
was not raised at the earliest opportunity the proceedings would remain
unaffected on account of want of sanction. This is another example
to show that the condition precedent for taking cognizance is not the
G standard to determine whether the court concerned is "a court of
competent jurisdiction".

However, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents
may be right in his submissions as regards the right of an accused for a
speedy trial having regard to the provisions contained in Article 21 of the
H
STA TE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH CBI 1·. C. NAGARAJASWAMY [SINHA).] J 79

Constitution of India that a person's fate may not be kept hanging for a long A
time.

In Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors., [2002] I SCC 149,
this Court opined: -

"5. It is true that interference by the court at the investigation stage B
is not called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating
agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of
the investigation without any limit of time. This Court in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak while interpreting tl~e scope of Article
21 of the Constitution held that every citizen has a right to speedy
trial of the case pending against him. The speedy trial was considered C
· also in public interest as it serves the social interest also. It is in the
interest of all concerned that guilt or innocence of the accused is
determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. The right to
speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation,
enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. While determining the D
alleged delay, the court has to decide each case on its facts having
regard to all attending circumstances including nature of offence,
number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned,
prevailing local conditions etc. Every delay may not be taken as
causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged delay has to be
considered in the totality of the circumstances and the general E
conspectus of the case. Inordinate long delay can be taken as a
presentive proof of prejudice."

In that case, however, the prosecution had miserably failed to explain
the delay of more than 13 years in granting the sanction for prosecution of F
the Appellant therein of possessing disproportionate wealth of about Rs.
50,600/-. The State was also not satisfied about the merit of the case and the
authorities were convinced that despite granting of sanction the trial would
be a mere formality and an exercise in futility.

Yet again in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, [2002] 4 SCC G
578 this Court while categorically holding that no period of limitation can be
prescribed on which the trial of a criminal case or criminal proceeding cannot
continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or
discharging the accused observed:

"( 4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal
proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the
several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I)
and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn
and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate
trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as
B prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause case (!), Raj
Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed
in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or
.
proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to
apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case
c before them and determine by taking into consideration the several
relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay case and decide whether
the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be
called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will
not by themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further
continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging
D the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused."

Keeping in view of the aforementioned principles and having regard
to the facts and circumstances of this case, however, we are of the opinion
that the interest of justice shall be sub-served if while allowing these appeals
E and setting aside the judgments of the High Court, the trial court is requested
to dispose of the matters at an early date preferably within six months from
the date of communication of this order, subject, of course, to rendition of all
cooperation of the Respondents herein. In the event, the trial is not completed
within the aforementioned period, it would be open to the Respondents to
approach the High Court again. These appeals are disposed of with the
F aforementioned directions. No costs.

B.S. Appeals disposed of.