Holding

Section 50 does not require a Gazette notification; "at the instance of" means at the solicitation of the board, thereby authorising the supervisor to lodge the complaint.

Summary

A supervisor of the Karnataka Electricity Board discovered that the respondent had tampered with the electric meter to avoid recording consumption and lodged a complaint with the police. The trial magistrate acquitted the respondent, holding that the supervisor was not authorized under section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 to institute prosecution because the board's authorization was not published in the Official Gazette. The Karnataka High Court affirmed the acquittal on the same ground. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, interpreting "at the instance of" in section 50 to mean at the solicitation of the board and holding that a Gazette notification is not required; the board's internal manual notification sufficed to authorize the supervisor. Consequently, the conviction under section 39 of the Electricity Act read with section 379 IPC was upheld, though no sentence was imposed.

Issues considered

Whether section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 requires a Gazette notification for authorisation to institute prosecution.
Whether a supervisor of the Electricity Board is authorised to lodge a complaint under section 50.
The meaning of the phrase "at the instance of" in section 50.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 248(1)
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908s. 16
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952s. 6(1)
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948s. 12, s. 5
Indian Electricity Act, 1910s. 39, s. 41, s. 43, s. 44, s. 50
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 379

Subjects

electricity theftsection 50at the instance ofauthorizationnotificationofficial gazettecriminal prosecutionstatutory interpretation

Judgment

249
STATE OF KARNATAKA
A
v.

ADIMURTHY ALIAS B. MOORTHY

May 11, 1983
B
[A. P. SEN AND E. s. VENKATA!lAMIAH, JJ.]

Indian Electricity Act, 1910-Section 50-Scope of.

Word~' and phrases-" At the instance of"-Meaning of
c
On a routine inspection a Supervisor of the State Electricity Board· follnd
that by tampering with the electric connectio~. the respondent was using
switches, lights and.fans inside the house without the meter recording any
consumption. On the dirCction of the Assistant Engineer lie lodged a report
again.st the respondent with the police alleging theft of electricity by him.

The trying Magistrate acquitted ·the respondent of the offence with which
D
he was charged on the ground that section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act,
1910 did not authorise the Supervisor to lodge a complaint. The High Court
upheld thr- Magistrate's order holding that the notification issued by the
Electricity Board authorizing,.among others, supervisors to institute prosecu·
tions in terms of section 50 not having been published in the official Gazette,
the Court could not take judicial notice of it and that the prosecution had E
failed to establish that the supervisor was _competent to lodge the complaint.

Allowing the appeal,

HELD : The order of acquittal recorded by the Magistrate as affirmed
by the High Court proceeds on a constru~tiQn of section 50 of the Act which ' F
r is wholly unwarranted and has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice.
Section 50 of the Act nowhere requires that the authorisation· should be by a
notification published in the official Gazette. The prosecution had been
launched •at the instance of' the Electricity Board within the meaning of section
50 of the Act. The meaning of the phrase 'at the instance of' does not imply
the same degree of obligaJion to obey as does 'command'; That is also the.legal
G
~ense in which the phrase has been understood in se~tion 50 of the Act.
(2S2 B-C-D]

Ram Chander Prasad Sharma v. State of Bihar & Anr, [1966) 3 S.C.R.
517 referred to.
-+ H
Vishwanath v. Emperor AIR 1936 All. 742; State (Dehli Administration) v.
/Jharm Pal 1980 Cr!. L.J. 1394; State of karnataka v. Abdul Nab/ 1975 Cd. L.J.
-746 ap~roved.
SUPREME COURT REPORTs ll 9SJJ 3 S.C.R.
The High Court was misled by the use of the wotd 'notili.cation' con-.
A tained in the manual. The notification is· a general .order issued by the Board
· in terms of section 50 authorising certain of its officials to institute prosecutions
or make complaints to the police for instituting prosecutions for offences under
certain sections of.the Act:: Ii was an intern~l matter for the Electricity Board.
It is quite ch~ar upon the terms of section 50 that the Supervisor was authorised
to lodge a complaint with the police: The Board, being a public. authority, it
w.as sufficient for the prosecution to have placed on record a copy of the
B manual containillg tlie relevant notifications: Thai was sufficient proof of the
authorisation requisite under section 50 of the Ac~. (254 F, 255 A·C:J

Even if the requiren1ent of section 50 was that the authorisation should
have been by a notification published in the official Gazette that would have
hardly made a difference. [2S5 C-D] ·
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE' JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 285
of 1983

Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated lhe
D 15th December, 1980 of the Karnataka High Court in Cr!. A. No.
590 of 1979.

M. Veerappa·for tho Appellant;

E Vimal B'obde A.C, and P.R. Ramasish for the Respondent.

The Judgment of'the Cour~ was delivered· by

SEN, J. This appeal by special· leave is directed a1(ainst a
judgment or'the Karnataka High Court dated December 15, 1980
F affirming· the order of acquittal passed by the Munsiff & Judicial
Magistrate First Clas>, Krishnarajanagar dated July 10, 1979 acquitt-
ing the respondent of an offence punishable under· ss. 39 and 44 · of
the Indian Electricity Act; 1910 read· with s. 379 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860:'
G
The prosecution case in ·brief was as follows., On August 25,
1976'at about 12 noon P.W. 1 Syed Ameer, Supervisor, Karnataka
Electrfoity. Board, went to the house of the respondent on a routine
inspection to check the electric meter installed there. He' found the
meter board at the entrance and though the meter was not recording
H consumption· of electriC engrgy, the lights and fans were on. It
appeared. thilt the respondent had tampered with the main. co~nection
by fixing two switches to the wall of the house and by operating the
KARNATAKA v. ADIMUR'fHY (Sen, J.) 2SI
switches the lights and fans inside the house could be used without
the meter recording any consumption. Later in the day, he along A
with the Assistant Engineer attached to the Karnataka Electricity
Board; Krishnarajanagar and the Junior Engineer went to the· house
of the respondent and saw that there was theft of electric energy.
Accordingly, on the direction of the Assistant Engineer, P.W. 1 Syed
Ameer lodged a report with the police Ex. P-1. After an investigation·
into the complaint, the Krishanrajanagar police· filed a challah The
prosecution led evidence of five witnesses including that of P.W. 1
Syed Ameer, Supervisor and P.W. 2 Bheemanna, Junior Engineer to
substantiate the charge. The learned trying Magistrate however
acquitted the respondent of the offence with which he was charged
under s. 248 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the. c
ground that the prosecution had failed to establish that P.W. 1 Syed
,.)
Ameer had been authorized to lodge a complaint. On a reading of ·
s. 50 the Act, he held that a Junior Engineer of the Electricity Board
could lodge a complaint but not the Supervisor, .and the mere
presence of the Junior Enginee~ after detection of the theft, does not
D
imply that the Supervisor had been authorized to lodge a complaint.
The High Court has upheld the order of acquittal passed by the
leam~d trying Magistr.ate on the ground that the notification issued
by the Karnataka Electricity Board authorizing Junior Engineers,
Section Officers and Supervisors to institute prosecutions 'in terms of
s. 50 of the Act not having been published in the official Gazette, the E
Court could not take judicial notice of any such notification· and it
'was for the prosecution to lead evidence in proof thereof to establish
that P.W. I Syed Ameer was. competent to lodge a complaint. It
rejected a prayer of the learned public prosecutor to lead additional
evidence in proof of the notification on the ground that that would
be tantamount to allowing the prosecution to fill up a lacuna in the F
case.

The decision of the appeal must turn on the construction of
s. 50 of the Act which reads as follows :
"50. Institution of prosecutions No prosecution·
shall be instituted against any pers.on for any· offence
against this Act or any rule, licence or order thereunder,
except at the instance of the Government or an Electrical
-+ Inspector., or of a .Person aggrieved by the same."

According to the plain English language, the ordinary meaning
of the phrase "at the instance of" in the collocation- of words "No
SUPREME COURt REPORTs (1983) S s.c.R.
prosecution shall be instituted ......... except at the instance of"
A must, in the context in which it appears, mean 'at the behe!\t of, or,
at the solicitation of'. The word 'in stance' as a verb means "to urge,
entreat urgent!;';" importune". The meaning of the phrase "at the
instance of" as given in Random House Dictionary of the English
Language at p. 690 is : 'at the urging or suggestion of'. 'Instance'
B does not imply the same degree of obligation to obey as does
'command'. That is also the legal sense in which the phrase "at the
)
instance of" ins. 50 of the Act has been understood. It is clear upon
the terms of s. 50 that it nowhere requires 'that the authorization
should be by a notification published in the official Gazette.

c The order of acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate and
as affirmed by the High Court proceeds on a construction of s. 50
of the Act which is wholly unwarranied and has resulted in manifest
miscarriage of justice. There can oe no doubt that the prosecution
had been launched "at the instance of" the Electricity Board within
the meaning of s. 50 of the Act. . The Karnataka Electricity Board
D which is a statutory body had issued a notification No. KEB/A5/
6053/7374/SOL/401/72 dated April 18, 1974 which finds place in the
Karnataka Electricity Board Manual, Vol. I, 2nd edn. at p. 80 which
is to the following effect :

E Section 134 (4) (iv) :

Superintending Engineers, 'Executive Engineers,
Assistant Engineers, Junior Engineers, Section Officers
and Supe.rvisors are authorised to institute prosecutions
or make complaints to the jurisdictional officers in charge
F of Police Stations, for instituting prosecutions when
offences under any of the Sections 39, 41, 43 and 44 of
the Electricity Act or Rule 56 read with Rule 138 of' the
Electricity Rules are committed or are reasonably believed
to have been committed in their respective jurisdictions."
G
The matter is no longer res integra. In Ram Chander Prasad
Sharma v. State of Bihar & Anr.( 1) the Court observed :

"It is true that Bhattacharya was not himself a
H "person aggrieved" and that the "person. aggrieved" was

(I) (1966) 3 S.C.R. 511.
KJ.NATAKA v· ADIMURTHY (Sen, J.) 253

the P.E.S.Co. The P.E.S. Co. however, is .a body cor-
--/ 'porate and must act only through its directors or officers. A
Here we have the evidence of Ramaswami to the effect
that he held a general power of ~ttomey from the P.E,S.
Co., and that he was specifically empowered thereunder
to act on behalf of P.E.S. Co., in all legal proceedings.
The evidence shows that it was at his instance that
Bhattacharya launched the first information report and, B
therefore, it would follow that the law was set in motion
by the "person aggrieved"."

Interpreting the phrase "at the instance" in s. 50 of the Act,
the Allahabad High Court in Vishwanath v.- Emperor(') stated : C
"If it had been the intention of the Legislature that
no case should be instituted in Court except by the
Electric Company itself or the other persons mentioned
in S. 50 of the Act, the Legislature would, we think have
used the ordinary phrase "on the complaint of" and the D
section would have been on the lines that no Magistrate
_should take cognizance of any offence referred to in S. 50
of the Act, except upon the complaint of certain persons.
The phrase "at the instance of" means merely "at the
solicitation of or at the request of"."

In that case the prosecution was in fact launched by the police
at the behest of the e!Cctric supply company and the High Court
held that there could be no doubt that the company desired that the
accused should be prosecuted for the offences. The officers of the
company had discovered the theft and they had, as here, reported the F
matter to the police and asked the police to make an investigation, as
in the instant case. Upon these f~cts, the Allahabad High Court held
that the prosecution had been launched at the instance of the electric
supply company within the meaning of s. 50 .of the Act. That
construction of s. 50 of the Act by the Allahabad High Court in G
Vishwanath's case, supra, bas throughout been followed.

We find that the Delhi High Court in State (Delhi Administra-
tion v. Dharam Pal(') as well as the Karnalaka High _Court in State
H
(!) A:J.R. 1936 All. 742.
(2) [1980] Crl.L.J. 1394.
254 SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1983) 3 s.c.il.

of Karnataka v. Abdul Nabi( 1) have taken tbe same view 11lacing
·emphasis on the circular issued by the General Manager laying down
the procedure to he followed in launching prosecutions of theft 9f
electricity whicl) was in terms similar to the notification issued by the
Karnataka Electricity Board. It is unfortunate tha! the learned
·,Judges of the Karnataka High Court should have disregarded their
earlier judgment in Abdul Nabi's case, (supra) more so, when one of
B them was a member to the earlier Bench. After referring to the
judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Vishwanath's case (supra)
as to the meaning of the phrase "at the instance of", the High Court
had earlier observed in Abdul Nabi's case, (supra) :

c "Where, therefore, a person acting for and on behalf
of the Board lodges a complaint\ with Police in respect
of unlawful extraction of electric energy and the police in·
tum file a charge_sheet, the prosecution must be regarded
as instituted at the instance of the Board."
D •
In the instant case, the High Court refers to the concession of
the learned Government Advocate that 'the notification had not been
published in the Official Gazette' and observes :

"In that view of the matter, it is plain that this Court
E cannot take judicial notice of existence of such notifica-
tion and the facts contained in that notification. The
prosecution ought to have led in evidence on producing
this notification to establish that P.W. I was legally
authorized to prosecute within the meaning of s. 50 of
the Act. It has failed to do so."
F
It appears that the High Court was obviously misled by the use of
the word 'notification' eontained in the Manual. The Knrnataka
Eleciricity Board is constituted under s. 5 of the Electricity (Supply)
l
Act • 1948. Under s. 12 of that Act, the Electricity Board is a body.
. corporate having perpetual suocession and a common seal. The
G
El'ectricity Board therefore is an artificial perrnn and depends on its
officers and servants to carry out its powers, functions and duties.
The aforesaid notification is a general order issued by the Ekctricity
Board in terms of s. 50 of the Act authori•ing the Superintending
H . Engineers, Executive Engineers, Assistant Engineers, Ju,nior Engi,
u~ers, Section Officers and Supervisors to institute prosecutions or

(I)· (1975] Crl.L.J. 746.
~NATAKA V. ADIMURTIIY (Sen, J.) ' 255

make complaints to the police for instituting prosecutions offences
under any of the Sections 39, 41, 43 and 44 9f the Electricity Act or A
Rule 56 read with Rule 138 of the Electricity Rules are committed
or are reasonably believed to have been committed in thei·r respective
jurisdictions. It was an internal matter for the Electricity Board and
it is quite clear .upon the terms of 's. 50 that P.W. I Syed Ameer,
Supervisor was authorized to lodge a complaint with the police. The
Electricity Board being a 'public authority, it was sufficient for the
prosecution to have-placed on record a copy of the Manual contain·
ing the relevant notification. That was sufficient proof of the
11.uthorization requisite under s. 50 of the Indian Electricity Act,
1910.
c
It .may not be out of place to mention that even if the require-
ment of s. 50 of the Act were that the authorization should have
been by a notification published in the Official Gazette, that would
hardly make a difference. The phrase "by notification in the Official
Gazette" occurs in s. 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, D
1952 and it is also occurred in. s.16 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1908 ands. 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908. In
Balkrishan Anant v. Emperor(!), Beaumont C.J. while dealing with
s. 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 which empowered
the local Government by notification in the Official Gazette to declare
an association unlawful on the grounds mentioned therein which are E
in effect that the association constitutes a danger to the public peace,
observed:

"The word used in s. 16 is 'notification' and not
'insertion'. 'Notification' is defined in Webster's Dic-
tionary as "Act of notifying; act of making known; an F
intimation or notice; esp., act of giving official notice or
information by words, by writing, or by other means;" so
that the essence of notification·. is the givfo.g of notice,
and in my opinion, the words "by notification in the
Official Gazette" mean simply "by giving notice in the
Official Gazette."
G

In the context of s. 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908
the Conrt required a stricter proof that all the formaliti~s requisite
to the act of notifying or in other words, publishing the notification
had actually been carried out. That was because the Jaw under H

(1) AIR 1931 Bombay 132.
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983] 3 s.C.R.

which it was issued trenched upon the rights and liberties of the
A citizens.

Finally, a few words on the merits. On a consideration of
the evidence adduced, the. learned Munsiff came to the conclusion
that the prosecution had established_its case against the respondent
B beyond all reasonable doubt, but on a misconstruction of s. 50 of
the Act, acquitted him under s. 248(\) of the Code. In maintaining
·the order of acquittal, the High Court confined its decision on its
interpretation of s. 50 of the Act and has not touched upon the
merits We have gone through the evidence and we are satisfied that
the evidence led by the prosecution is sufficient to raise an inference
c of guilt against the respondent. This is not contested by learned
counsel for the respondent, but he only pleads that a lenient view
should be taken in regard to the punishment.

For these reasons, the appeal succeeds and . is allowed. The
judgment of the High Court of Karnataka upholding the order of
D
acquittal of the respondent is set aside and he is convicted of having
committed an offence punishable under s. 39 of the Indian Electricity
Act, 1910 read with s. 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The
learned standing couhsel made it clear at the time of grant of special
leave that the State Government was only desirous that the law on
E the point should be settled and it was not interested in the imposi-
tion of a punishment on the respondent. In view of this, Wf\ do not
impose any sentence on the respondent, having regard to the period
of time that has elapsed.

We are thankful to Shri V. A. Bobde who ~appeared as amicus ~-

F curiae for the assistance that he has rendered.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

)