Holding

Section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC does not bar prosecution for forgery under Section 467 read with 114 IPC when the forged document is not used as evidence in the civil proceeding, so Hemareddy’s conviction under that provision is valid, while the conviction under Section 193 IPC is barred.

Summary

The State of Karnataka appealed against the Karnataka High Court’s order acquitting Hemareddy alias Vemareddy of offences under Sections 467 read with 114 of the IPC and 193 IPC, and modifying the sentence of Pyatal Bhimakka. The case arose from a dispute over land mortgaged for twenty years, where a forged sale deed dated 10‑11‑70 was used to claim ownership. The prosecution alleged conspiracy, forgery and fabrication of false evidence. The High Court held that, because the forged deed was not produced in the civil suit for redemption of the mortgage, Section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC barred the complaint for the offence under Section 193 IPC, and also held that a private complaint could not sustain the charge of forgery. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 195(1)(b) and held that it applies only when the forged document is actually produced in evidence in the proceeding; therefore the offence of forgery under Section 467 read with 114 IPC is cognizable on a private complaint. Consequently, Hemareddy’s conviction under 467/114 IPC was confirmed, his acquittal under 193 IPC upheld, and the sentence of Pyatal Bhimakka left unchanged.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to offences of forgery (Sec. 467 IPC) and fabrication of false evidence (Sec. 193 IPC) when the forged document is not produced in evidence in the civil suit.
Whether a private individual’s complaint is sufficient to prosecute an offence under Section 467 read with Section 114 IPC without a court’s complaint.
Whether the High Court erred in acquitting Hemareddy of the forgery charge and in holding the 193 IPC conviction barred.
Whether the sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka should be modified.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 195(1)(b), s. 195(1)(c)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 120B, s. 193, s. 420, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

forgeryfabrication of false evidenceSection 195 CrPCSection 467 IPCSection 193 IPCprivate complaintmortgage redemptionconvictionappeal

Judgment

695

STATE OF KARNATAKA A

v.
• HEMAREDDY ALIAS VEMAREDDY AND ANR.
January 27, 1981

[S. MURTAZA fAZAL ALI AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.] B

Code of Crimina: Procedure 1973, S. 195(1)(b)(i) & Indian Penal Code
1860, S.1·. 467, 193 and 114-Suit for reden1p1io11 of 1nortgage-Conspiracy by
accused to deprive con1plai11ant of land-Safe deed forged-Prosecution with-
out lvrittcn con1plaint of Court-Maintainability.

Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 provides c
that no court sha.11 take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of the
sections enumerated therein (one of v...hich is S. 193 J.P.C.) when such offence
is allL'ged to hai·e been conunifled i11, or in relation to, any proceeding in any
court, except upon a written co1nplaint from a Court.

The prosecution alleged that both the respondents along\\'ith two others
conspired to cheat the complainant and to deprive him of certain lands by D
fabricating a sale deed.

The complainants' paternal grand-uncle mortgaged certain lands with
• possession to the father of respondent No. 1 for a period of 20 years with the
condition that possession would be surrendered. to the owner after the expiry of
th~ period. The father of the complainant executed a will bequeathing the
aforesaid lands to hinl. The period of 20 years having expired the complainant E
requested respondent No. 1 to surrender possession. Respondent No. 1 having
failed to deliver possession, the compla.inant filed a suit for redemption of the
mortgage. Subsequent to the institution of the suit the complainant came to
know that respondent No. 1 had purchased the lands in question from respon-
dent No. 2 who had impersonated the real ov..·ner, i.e. wife of the complainJnt's
paternal grand-uncle. On inquiries made in the office of the Sub-Registrar, the
complainant learnt that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-1970. After F
obtaining a registration copy of the sale deed and ascertaining that respondent
No. 2 had no property of her own, the complainant filed a criminal complaint
in the Court. After investigation, the Sub-Inspector of police filed a charge-
sbeet against both the respondents a.nd two others for having commiUed
offences under sections 120B, 193, 465. 468 and 420 read with section 114
I.P.C. The Sessions Court to which only the respondents were committed, con-
victed respondent No. l under section 467 read with section 114 and section G
193 I.P.C. and respondent No. 2 under section 467 I.P.C. and sentenced them
to imprisonment and fine.

In the appeals. against their conviction and sentence. the High Court found
that respondent No. 1 was guilty nnder section 467 read with section 114 and
section 193 J.P.C., but acquitted him on the ground that the complaint in the
crjminal case which ended in the conviction of both the respondents Vi'aS filed
by a private individual i.e. the complainant and not by a Civil Court. As H
regards respondent ~Na. 2 it found her to be guilty under section 467 l.P.C. but
finding that she forged the document independently of respondent No. 1 and
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A being an illiterate \\'Oman who haJ n1ercly put her thumb impression on the
docun1ent to admit its execution hct'ore the Subi-Registrar modified the ,_entcncc
awarded to her,
•
In the appeal to this Court.

HELD:
B
1 (i) The High Court was not right in law in holding that the complaint was
totally not maintainable against respondent No. l in view of the provisions of
S. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and in not only acquit·
ting him of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. but also in finding
that he has comn1itted an offence punisbabJe under section J 93 l.P.C. [7.lOH]

c 1 (ii) The High Court was justified in coming to rhe conclusion on the evi·
dence that respondent No. 1 was guilty under section 467 read with section
114 I.P.C. and that respondent No. ~ was guilty under section 467 l.P.C. [711AJ

l(iii) 'fhe conviction of respondent No. l under section 467 read with section
114 I.P.C. and of respondent No. 2 of 467 I.P.C. are confirmed. [711B]
D 2. S. 195 ( 1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the offence
under s. 193 LP .C. should be alleged to have been committed in or in relation
to, any proceeding in any court. Since the forged sate deed was not pro-
duced in evidence in any stage of the redemption suit, s. 195(l)(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. Therefore, the Magistrate who
committed the accused to the Se'. sions. ccukl not n1ve taken cognizance of any
-
offence under s. 193 I.P,C. so far as respondent No. 1 is concerned. The
E complaint could have been taken on file only for an offence punishable under
s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. so far as that accused is concer,ned. No com-
plaint by the court for prosecuting respondent No. 1 for offence under s. 467
read with s. 114 l.P.C. is therefore required and he could be validly convicted
for that offence on the complaint given by the private individual. [701E-GJ

3. The Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition con-
F
t.'lined ins. 195(1)(c) Cr. P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when com-
mitted by a party .to a proceeding in that court prior to his becoming such
party. [708HJ

4. In cases, v;'here in the course of the same transaction an offence for
which no complaint by a Court is necessary under section 195(1)(b) of the-
G Code of Criminal Procedure, and an offence for which a complaint of a court
is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not rossible to split up·
and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in
s. 195 ( 1) (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld. [702G]
'
Jn the instant case the document forged by Respondent No. 2 was the sale
deed d<lted 10-11-70. The suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the
complainant P.W. 3 on 24-11-70. He filed the complaint before the ·police on
H 24-11-70 and before the court subsequently on 15-12-70. The forged sale deed
dated 10-11~70 was not produced in the suit filed by the complainant for re-
demption of the rnortgage. r703A]
KARNATAKA v. JJEMAREDD\ ( Varadarajan, J.) 697

:S. The offence of abietn1ent of forgery \\as complete when the forged sale ..\
deed dated 10-11-70 was registered. But no offence under s. 195( I )(b) of Cr.
P.C. \Vas committed as the forged sale deed was not at aH put in evidence at
• any stage in the redemption suit filed by the complainant. [7108]
lr1 Re. V V, L. l\,,arasi111/u1111urthy, [1955] A.J.R. Madras 21 approved.

Vasudeo Ra111clu111dra Joshi [1923] A.l.R. Bombay 105 disapproved.
B
In re. J:lian.l:'ruo Yc1hwa11t (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362 & Mahadev
Yadne.shwar Joshi (1912) 14 Bombay Law 'Report 715 distinguished.
(Jirija IVandini Devi v. Bigendra l\'andini Choudry [1967j I S.C.R. 93 &
Patel Laljib/iai Son:abhai v. Thi' State of Gujarat (1971] Supr. S.C.R. 834
1 eferred to.

CRl~!INAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 341 c
(~f 1975.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
19-4-1974 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 324
and 335 of 1973.
D
N. Ncttar, and R. C. Kaushik for the Appellant.
P. R"m Reddy and A. V. V. Nair for Respondent No. I.
• The Judgment of the Court was deli<ered by
V AR·'.IJ.\1:1..IAN, J. This appeal by special leave has been filed by
the State of Karnataka against the judgment of a Division Bencl1 of the E
Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 324 and 335 of
1973 against the acquittal of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-l) in
Cr!. A. No. 324 of 1973 and against the order in Cr!. A. No. 335 of
1973 modifying the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge,
Raichur to Pyatal Bhimakka ( A-2) in Sessions Case No. 25/72. The
learned Sessions Judge convicted Hemareddy ·alias Vernareddy under F
s. 467 read with s. 114 and s. 193 Indian Penal Colic and sentenced
him to undergo R.l. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, and
in default to undergo R. I. for three months under s. 467 read with
s. 114 and to undergo R.I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.
200/- and in default to undergo R.l. for one month for the offence
under s. 193 1.P.C. He convicted Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2), the appel· G
!ant in Cr!. A No. 335 of 1973 before the High Court, under s. 467
I.P.C. and sentenced her to undergo R. I. for six months and to pay
a fine of Rs. 200/- and in default to undergo R.I. fur one month. Both
the accused filed appeals before the High Court against their convic-
tions and sentences awarded to them by the learned Sessions Judge.
H
In Cr!. A. No. 324 of 1973 filed bv Hemareddy alias Vemareddy,
the learned Judges held that on the facts there could be no doubt
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A that he is guilty under s. 467 read withs. 114 ands. 193 1.P.C. In the
appeal filed by Pyatal Bhimakka, Crl. A. No. 335173, also the learned
Judges found that there could be no doubt that she is guilty under s.
467 I.P.C. They confirmed the conviction of Pyatal Bhimakka, obser- •
ving that she forged the document independently of Hemareddy alias
Vemareddy but taking into consideration the fact that Pyatal Bhimakka
B is an illiterate women who had been taken to the Office of the Sub-
Registrar by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and asked to put her thumb
impression to the document and to admit execution of the document,
which she did, for which Hemareddy alias Vemareddy paid her a sum
of Rs. 1001-, the learned Judges felt that the sentence awarded to
Pyatal Bhimakka by the learned Sessions Judge was harsh and that
c the ends of justice would be met by sentencing her to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one day, which she had already undergone before
she was probably released on bail, and to pay a fine of Rs. 200 /- and
in default to suffer RI. for a perrod of one week and thus modified the
sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka accordingly. The State has filed
the appeal by special leave also against this order modifying the sen-
D
tence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka.

The learned Judges of the High Court, however, acquitted
Hemareddy alias Vemarcddy, the appellant in Crl. A. No. 324 of 1973
and set aside the .sentence awarded to him by the learned Sessions
E Judge on the ground that the complaint in the criminal case which
ended in the conviction of both accused in the Sessions Court, was
fll"d by the private individual Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 and not by the
Civil Court. As stated earlier the Criminal Appeal has been filed by
the State against the acquittal of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy by the
F High Court.
.
It is 'necessary to set out briefly the facts of the case. One Narsappa
is the son of one Thimmaiah who had an elder brother Nagappa
J.
Thimmaiah and Nagappa were the sons of one Thayappa. Nagappa's
wife was one Bhimakka alias Bhieamma. Thimaiah and Nagappa
G lived for sometime in Underaldoddi. Nagappa purchased lands bear-
ing Survey Nos. 93, 94 and 96 in Underaldoddi. Those lands were
in the possession and enjoyment of Narsappa's father Thimmaiah. ,
Subsequently, Nagappa and his wife left Underaldoddi and settled
down in Alkur village. While Nagappa was living in Alkur village,
he mortgag~ the aforesaid lands with possession to one Kurbar
H Bhimayya, the father of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, A-1. According
to the terms of the mortgage, Kurbar Bhimayya was to be in possession
of the lands for twenty years and surrender possession thereof to the
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, /,) 699

owner after the expiry of the period. Subsequently, Nagappa and his A
wife as well as Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah came and settled down
at Raichur. Bhimakka alias Bhisamma, the wife of Nagappa, died in
•. or about 1953 and Nagappa died two or three years later. Nagappa's
brother also died leaving behind him his son Narsappa as the only
heir in the family, Meanwhile Kurbar Bhimayya, the mortgagee and
father of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-1) died. Hemareddy alias B
Vemareddy continued in possession of the lands. Narsappa, son ol
Nagappa's brother Thimmaiah executed a will in favour of the comp-
lainant Narsappa Eliger, bequeathing the aforc,1id lands to him.
Narsappa Eliger, the legatee under the will of Thimmaiah's son
Narsappa, approached Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, the son of the
mortgagee Kurbar Bhimayya, who was in possession of the lands and c
requested him to surrender possession of the lands on the ground that
the period of twenty years had expired. Then Hemareddy alias Vema-
reddy informed the complainant Narsappa Eliger that he would consi-
der his request a few days later as it was harvesting time. Finding
that there was no response from Hemareddy alias Vemareddy, Narsappa
D
Eliger wrote a letter, for which, according to the prosecution, Hema-
reddy alias Vemareddy sent the reply, Ex. P-3. Subsequently,
Narsappa Eliger filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage. Subse-
quent tu the institution of the suit, Narsappa Eliger came to know from
Shivareddy (P.W. 12) that Hemareddy alias Vemareddy has purchased
the lands in quest;on from Pyatal Bhimakka (A-2) ana another and E
that A-2 had impersonated the real owner Bhimakka, wife of Nagappa,
who, as stated earlier, had died in or about 1953. Thereupon,
Narsappa Eliger made inquiries in the Office of the concerne<l Sub--
Registrar and learned that the sale deed had been registered on 10-11-
1970. After obtaining a registration copy of the sale deed and after
making inqmries at Alkur Narsappa Eliger learnt that Pyatal Bhimakka
(A-2) had no properties of her own, Narsappa Eliger thereafter
filed a criminal complaint in the Court, which was referred to the
Police. After investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, P.W. 21 filed
a charge-sheet against both the accused and two others alleging that
they had conspired to cheat Narsappa Eliger and to deprive him of
the lands and that in pursuance of that conspiracy they put forward G
Pyatal Bhimakka as Nagappa's wife Bhimakka and got the sale deed
executed by her and they thereby committe<l offences under ss. 120B,
193, 465, 467, 468 and 420 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
Only Hemareddy alias Vemareddy and Pyatal Bhimakka, A-1 and A-2
were ccmmittcd to the Court of Sessions at Raichur, and they were
• found guilty and convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. R
We were taken through the judgment of the learned Judges of the
High Court. We are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198Jj 2 S.C.R.

A in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that Hemarcddy alias
Yemareddy is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 144 J.P.C. and that
Pyatal Bhimakka i• guilty under s. 467 J.P.C. Since we agree with
the learned Judges of the High Court on the question of fact in so far .•
as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards Hcmareddy alias Vcmaredd)
(A-2) in respect of his co'nviction under s. 467 read with s. 114, it is
unnecessary for us to refer to the evidence relied upon by the learned
Judges for coming to the conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vcmarcddy
is guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 1.P.C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka
is guilty under s. 467 l.P.C. This Court has obserwd in Girija Nan-
dini Devi v. Bige1uira Nandini Choudry(') that it is not the duty ot
the appellate court when it ngrees with the view of the trial court 011
the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the
reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with
-4
- J
reasons given by the court the decision of which is under appeal, will
ordinarily suffice. We shall deal with the case of the prosecutiop
against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy under s. 193 J.P.C. separately.
We, therefore, confirm the conviction of Hemareddy alias Yemareddy
D
under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and of Pyatal Bhimakka u'ndcr
s. 467 I.P.C. We are of the opinion that no interference with the
judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court in regard to the
sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka is called for having rcg:Jrd to the
fact that the learned Judges have given sufficient reasons for taking
E a lenient view in regard to that accused on the question of sentence.
We, therefore, dismiss the Criminal Appeal in so far as it relates to
the question of .sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhim"kka.
It is seen from the judgment under appeal that the learned Public
Prosecutor of Karnataka had contended before the learned Judges of
the High Court that the rose against Hemarcddy alias Vemareddy for
F fabricating false evidence may not be maintainable in view of the
provisions of s. 195 (l )(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that
be may be prosecuted for abetting the offence of forgery and that the
conviction of that accused under s. 467 read with s. I J 4 I.P.C. is
justified o•n the facts of this case for while s. 193 I.P.C. is one of the
sections mentioned in s. 195(l)(b) of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, s. 467 J.P.C. is not mentioned in that <ub-clause of s. 195(1).
The learned Judges rejected that submission, relying upon three deci-
sions of the Madras High Court in Perianna Muthirian v. Vengu
Ayyar('), Ramnappa Reddy v. Emperor(') and in re. V.V.l,, Nara-
•
simhamurthy('). In the first of those ca>es the complainant stated
(1) lt967] I SC R 93.
H (2) A.l.R. 1929 Madras 21.
(3) A.LR. 19J2 Madras 253.
(4) A.LR. 1955 Madras 217
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, !.) 70 I

that certain persons conspiTed with others and forged a document
with the object of using it in evidence in certain proceedings pending
in a court and other proceedings which might follow. That document
• was actually used in the proceedings pending before a court, and it
has been held that the offence complained of fell under s. 195(1) (b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, the complaint can-
not be taken cognizance of unless it was in writing and by the court
in which the offence was alleged to have been committed. It has
been observed in that decision that to hold in such a case that although
a private person was barred from prosecuting the accused for fabricat-
ing false evidence, he would still be at liberty to prosecute him for
fraud would result in the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure being evaded and that it is not open to the court c
to try the accused either for fabricating evidence or for fraud because
the specific offence of fabricating false evidence should be given pre-
ference over the more general offence of forgery. In the second case
the complaint was filed by a private person alleging that the accused
had fabricated a promissory note and induced a third party to file a
suit against the complainant so as to obtain a fraudulent decree, and
it has been held that the allegation made in the complaint attracted
the provisions of s. 195(1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procednre
and the Conrt must refuse to take cognizance. In the third case,
Som&<lundaram, J. has observed : ·
"The main point on which Mr. Jayarama Aiyar appear- E
ing for the petitioner seeks to quash this commital is that on
the facts an offence under s. 193 I.P.C. ls disclosed for which
the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the
court as provided under s. 195(1) (b) Criminal P.C. The
first question which arises for consideration is whether on
the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under s. 193 F
I.P.C. is revealed- Section 193 reads as follows :
"Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage
of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for
the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceed-
ing, shall be punished with imprisonment of either descrip-
tion for a term which may extend to 7 years, and shall also G
be liable to fine."
"Fabrication of false evidence" is defined in s. 192. The
relevant part of it is :
"Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending
that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial H
proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person
who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the
12-152SCI/81
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198!] 2 S.C.R.

A evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any
point material to the result of such proceeding is said "to
fabricate false evidence."
The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred
•
by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will
B to come into existence intending that such will m~y cause
the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion
that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor
daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, there-
fore, ill the complaint will undoubtedly fall under s. 192,
l.P.C. It will, therefore, amount to an offonce under s. 193,
c l.P.C., i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being
used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the
facts disclosed wiill also amount to an offence under ss. 467
and 4 71 l.P.C. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence
under ss. 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not
be necessary as under s. 195(1)(c), Criminal P.C. a com-
D plaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to
any proceeding in any court.
Mr. Jayarama Aiyar does not give up his contention that
the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the
minor gir~ is still a party to the proceeding. But it is un-
E necessary to go into the question at the present moment and
I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian
can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be
disposed of on the other point, viz., that when the allegations
amount to an offence under s. 193, I.P.C., a complaint of
court is necessary under s. 195(1)(b), Criminal P.C. and
F this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an
offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.
We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold ~
that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence -~
for which no complaint by a court is necessary under s. 195 (1 )(b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a com-
G plaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it
is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused
for the offences not mentioned in s. 195(J)(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure should be upheld.
However, it is not possible to agree with the learned Judges of the
n High Court that the complaint in this case given by the private indivi-
dual Narsappa Eliger, P.W. 3 against Hemareddy alias Vemareddy for
the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. is not cognizable and
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, !.) 703

that s. 195 ( 1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code is attracted so far A
as Hemareddy alias Vemareddy is concerned. The document forged
by Pyatal Bhimakka, A-2 is a sale deed dated 10-11-70. The suit
for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the complainant Narsappa
Eliger, P.W. 3 on 17-11-70. He filed the complaint before the Police
on 24-11-70 and before the court subsequently on 15-12-70. It is
B
not disputed that the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was not pro-
duced in the suit filed by the complainant for redemption of the mort-
gage. Mr. P. Ram Reddy, learned counsel appearing for A-1, who
assisted the court as Amicus Curiae for Pyatal Bhimakka ,A-2, invited
our attention to the decision in re. Vasudeo Ramchandra Joshi(') and
submitted that the complaint should have been filed by the court in c
which the suit for redemption of the mortgage was filed by the com-
plainant Narsappa Eliger in view of the provisions of s. 195(1) (b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that as the complaint was filed
directly by the private individual, the prosecution of Hemareddy alias
Vemareddy for offences under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. and s.
193 I.P.C. is bad. In that decision reference has been made to the D
decisions of the Bombay High Court in (1912) 14 Bombay Law Re-
porter 362 and 715. In that case there was a proceeding before the
Magistrate at Bhusaval against one Vana Khusal in respect of the
charge under s. 401 I.P.C. An application was made for bail on be-
half of that person by Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, the petitioner be-
fore the High Court, but that application was refused on April 1, 1922. E
The statements of three witnes§.es were recorded under s. 164, Criminal
Procedure Code on April 18, 1922 from which it appeared that on
April 10, 1922 those three witnesses had an interview with the Pleader
Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi and he had instigated them to give false
evidence. On April 15, 1922 another case against Vasudeo Rama-
chandra Joshi in respect of a dacoity was sent up to the Magistrate. F
The case of the prosecution was that in connection with that case of
~ . . dacoity the alleged instigation by the Pleader to give false evidence was
made. Those witnesses were examined before· the Magistrate on June
2, 1922 in the dacoity case, and on June 7, 1922 a complaint was
filed by the Police against Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, charging him
G
with having abetted the giving of false evidence. The learned Judges
of the Bombay High Court who heard the Civil Revision Case have
observed:
"On behalf of the Crown it is urged that no sanction is
necessary because at the date of alleged abetment no pro-
ceeding in relation to which the offence is said to have been H
committed, was pending. It is contended that the offence
(I) A.I.R. 1923 Bombay 105.
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A had no relation to the proceedings pending on April 10 and
that the proceedings to which it related, were sent up to the
Magistrate on April 19 and were not pending at the time.

It is quite clear, however, from the very nature of the
offence alleged against the present petitioner that if the
B offence. was committed, it was committed in relation to the
proceeding in which those three persons were to be examin-
ed as witnesses, and it is difficult to understand how it could
be said that the present proceedings against the petitioner
could go on without the sanction of the Court before which
these proceedings are pending at present, and in relation to
c \Vhich the offence is said to have been committed. I assume,
without deciding that the offence alleged against the peti-
tioner related to the Budhgaon dacoity case and not to the
case under s. 401, Indian Penal Code, then actually pending
even then the offence related to proceedings which were
clearly under contemplation then and which were sent up to
D
the Magistrate on April 15. The expression used in
s. 195 ( 1) (b) is wide enough to cover such a proceeding and
the decisions of this Court in re Khanderao (1912) 14
Bombay L.R. 362 and in re Mahadev Yadneshwar (1912)
14 Bombay L.W. 715, support that conclusion. I am un-
E able to follow the reasoning adopted by the learned Magis-
trate in holding that no sanction is necessary. We, therefore,
quash the present proceedings, without prejudice to any pro-
ceeding that may be taken after obtaining the necessary
sanction.

p I may also point out that the prosecution of a pleader
defending an accused person while that proceeding is pend-
ing, and before the evidence of the witnesses who are said to
have been instigated to give false evidence has been appre-
ciated by the Court, is inadvisable. If such a prosecution is
to be started it ought to be started after the principal pro-
G ceeding, in relation to which the offence is said to have b~en
committed, has terminated."

We are of the opinion that it is not possible to agree with the view •
of the learned Judges expressed in that case that even when the offence
of instigating the witnesses to give false evidence was committed in
H relation to a proceeding which was not actually pending in the court but
was only under contemplation the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted.
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, !.) 705

The decisions in 1912 (14) Bombay Law Report 362 and 715 A
would not apply to the facts of the present case for whereas in those
cases the false evidence hap been actually put in evidence in the pre-
sent case, as already stated, the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was
not at all tendered by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in the redemption
suit filed by the complainant NarsapP'a Eliger on 17-11-70 at any stage
of the proceedings in that suit. In the first of these two decisions-re. B
Khanderao Yeshwant(') the petitioner before the Bombay High Court,
a Policeman, was present in a village Dhanchi on 20-2-1911 in relation
to work about census and on that day a panchnama was filed in that
village in regard to an offence alleged to have been committed by a cer-
~· ... tain Talukdar under the Arms Act. The investigation into the alleged
offence was not made by the petitioner Police constable but by the c
village constable Shamserkhan who sent up the case to the Sub-
Inspector by whom in turn it was committed to a Magistrate. In the
course of trying the alleged offence the Magistrate found that certain
rccitah in the panchnama were false. The Talukdar was discharged
as the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the charge imputed to
him was false. In that view he issued a notice to the village constable D
Shamserkhan as to why sanction for prosecution should not be granted
under s. 195 Cr!. P.C. After hearing Shamserkhari the Magistrate
issued notice against the Police Constable and on 8-9-1911 directed
the prosecution of the Police Constable under s. 211 I.P.C. Thus it
is seen that the panchnama containing false recitals prepared by the
E
Police Constable was actually used in a criminal proceeding against
the Talukdar who had been implicated as a culprit in the panchnama.
In the second case re Mahadev Yadneshwar Joshi('), Mahadev and
five others were being prosecuted for offences under s. 193 read with
s. 109 I.P.C.-in that they were alleged to have abetted the making
of a false statement during the police investigation in a theft case. The F
theft case was subsequently tried by a Magistrate who convicted the
accused. The appeal filed against the conviction by the Magistrate
was unsuccessful. During the trial the accused raised an objection
that before they could be prosecuted, sanction of the competent Court
should have been obtained. Th~ Magistrate over-ruled the objection.
The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held that sanction was G
necessary and that the offences cannot be tried in the absence of a com-
plaint by a. court before which the evidence, which is now said to be
' fabricated. was adduced. In that case also the fabricated evidence had
been actualh used in a criminal proceeding and s. 195 (1) (b) of the
Code of Cri,;,inal Procedure was therefore attracted. But in the present
case. as ~lated ear;ier, the fabricated sale deed dated I 0-11-70 had not H
(I) (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 362
(2) (1912) 14 Bombay Law Report 715
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A been put in evidence at any stage of the suit for redemption filed by
the complainant Narsappa Eliger in the Civil Court on 17-11-1970.

Mr. N. Nettar, appearing for the State, invited our attention to the
decision of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of
Gujarat.(') In that case the appellant before this Court had filed a suit
B for recovery of a certain amount on the basi's of a forged cheque. A
private complaint was filed in the Court of a Judicial Magistrate against
the appellant and another person under ss. 467 and 471 I.P.C. The
Magistrate prima facie found on the evidence that the appellant had
fraudulently used in the Civil Court a forged document and he com-
mitted the appellant to Sessions for trial. The appellant raised an
c objection that under s. 195 (l)'(c) of the Code of Criminal Procednre
no cognizance of the offence could be taken on a private complaint.
The High Court upheld the committal order. But this Court held ou
the scope and effect of s. 195 (1) (c) and its applicability to cases
where a forged document had been produced as evidence in a judicial
proceedings by a party thereto and the prosecution of that party sought
D for offences under ss. 467 and 471 I.P.C. that the words "to have
been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court" according
to s. 195 (!) (c) mean that the offence should be alleged to have been
committed by the party to' the proceeding in his character as such party, •
that is, after having become a party to the proceeding. This Court has
E observed:
"We are directly concerned only with cl. (c) of s.
195(1). What is particularly worth noting in this clause
is (i) the allegation of commission of an offence in respect
of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in a court; and (ii) the commission of such offence by a party
F to such proceeding. The use of the words "in respect of" in
the first ingredient would seem to some extent to enlarge the I
scope of this clause. Judicial opinion, however, differs on the
effect and meaning of the words "to have been committed by
a party to any proceeding in any court". As cl. (b) of s.
•
G 195(1) does not speak of offence, committed by a party to
the proceeding, while considering decisions on that clause
this distinction deserves to be borne i'n mind. Broadly
speaking two divergent views have been expressed in deciaed
cases in this connection. According to one view, to attract
the prohibition contained in cl. ( c) the offence should be
H alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceed- •
ing in his character as such party, which means after having
(I) [1971J Suppl. S.C.R. 834
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, J.) 707

become a party to the proceeding, whereas according to the A
other view the alleged offence may have been committed by
/ the accused even prior to his becoming a party to the proceed-
ing provided that the document in question is produced or
given in evidence in such proceeding. The language used
seems to us to be capable of either meaning without straining
B
it. We have therefore, to see which of the two alternative
constructions is to be preferred as being more in accord with
the legislative intent, keeping in view the statutory scheme
and the purpose and object of enacting the prohibition con-
tained ins. 195(1)(c).
c

The underlying purpose of enacting s. 195 (1 )(b) and ( c)
and s. 476 seems to be to control the temptation on the part
of the private parties considering themselves aggrieved by the
offences mentioned in those sections to start criminal prose- D
cutions on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired
by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents.
These offences h_ave been selected for the court's control
because of their direct impact on the judicial process. It. is
the judicial process, in other words the administration of
public justio~, which is the direct and immediate object or E
victim of these offences and it is only by misleading the
courts and thereby preverting the due course of law and
justice that the ultimate object of harming the private party
is designed to be realised. As the !Purity of the proceedings
of the court is directly sullied by the crime the Court is con-
F
sidered to be the Qnly party entitled to consider the desira-
bility of complaining against the guilty party. The
private party designed ultimately to be injured through the
offence against the administration of public justice is un-
doubtedly entitled to move the court for persuading it to file
the complaint. But such party is deprived of the general G
right recognized by s. 190 Cr. P.C. of the aggrieved parties
directly initiating the criminal proceedings. The offences
about which the court alone, to the exdusion of the aggrieved
private pai:ties, is clothed with the right to complain may,
therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those
offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that cour(, B
the commission of which has a reasqnably close nexus with
the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embark-
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 2 S.C.R.

.A ing upon a completely independent and fresh inquiry, satis-
factorily consider by reference princ\pally to its records the ex-
pediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore,
appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the strict con-
struction of confining the prohibition contained in s. 195 (1)
(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein
were committed by a party to the proceeding in the character
as such party. It may be recalled that the superior court is
equally competent under s. 476A Cr. P.C. to consider the
question of expediency of prosecution and to complain and
there is also a right of appeal conferred by s. 476B on a
person on whose application the Court has refused to make
a complaint under s. 476 ors. 476A or against whom such a
-111 I

complaint has been made. The appellate court is empowered
after hearing the parties to direct the withdrawal of the
complaint or as the case may be, itself to make the com-
plaint. All these sections read together indicate that the
0 legislature could no_t have intended to extend the prohibition
contained in s. 195(1) (c) Cr\. P.C. to the offences men-
tioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding
iri that court prior to his becoming such party. It is no doubt
true that quite often-if not almost invariably-the documents
are forged for being used or produced in evidence in court
before the proceedings are started. But that in our opinion
cannot be the controlling fader, because to adopt that con-
struction, documents forged long before the commencement
of a proceeding in which they may happen to be actually
used or produced in evidence, years later by some other party
wonld also be subject toss. 195 and 476 Cr!. P.C. This in
our opinion would unreasonably restrict the right possessed
by a person and recognized by s. 190 Cr. P.C. without pro-
moting the real purpose and object underlying these two
sections. The Court in such a case may not be in a position
..
I'

to satisfactorily determine the question of expediency or
making a complaint."
G
We are bound by the view expressed in this decision that the
Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition con-
tained ins. 195(1) (c) Cr. P.C. to the offences mentioned therein when
committed by a party to a proceeding in that court prior to his becom-
ing such party. In the decision in Raghunath and Others v. State of
U.P. and Others(') it is observed :
(1) [1973] 1 S .C.C. 564 at 568
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadaraja11, J.) 709

"In this Court the main contention raised on behalf of the A
appellants by their learned counsel was that even prosecution
• for an offence under Section 465 I.P.C. requires complaint by
th() revenue court concerned as such an offence is covered by
Section J 95 (I) (c), Cr.P.C. This contention is diilkJlt to
accept. This Court has recently in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai
v. The State of Gujarat [1971] 2 SCC 376 after considering
B
the conflict of judicial opinion on this point, approved the
view taken in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra). According to
that decision the words "to have been committed by a party
to any proceeding in any court" in Section 195(1)(c) mean
that the offence should be alleged to have been committed c
by tbc party to the proceeding in his character as such party,
that is, after having become a party to the proceeding. The
appellants· learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision
of the Allahab>ad High Court in Kushal Pal Singh case (supra)
by pointing out that in that case lhe offence 4:lf forgery was
alleged to have been committed in 1898, more than 25 years D
before it was produced or given in evidence in court and it was
for this reason that Section 195(1) (c), Cr.P.C. was held to be
inapplicahk. In our view, the duration of time between the
date of forgery and the production or giving in evidence of
the forged document in court is not a governing factor. The
principle laid down in Sombabhai's case (supra) was not E
founded on any such consideration. Reference to such delay
was made in that decision in another context. After taking
notice of the fact that Section 195(1) (c), Cr. P.C. deprives
a private aggrieved party of the general right recognized by
Section 190 Cr.P.C. of directly initiating criminal [proceedings
this Court observed in the case: F
/
"The offences about which the Court alone, to the
exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with
the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately
considered to be only those offences committed by a
party to a proceeding in that comt, the commission of G
which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings
in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a
completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily
consider by reference principally to its records the expe-
diency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, there-
fore, appe'arS to be more appropriate to adopt in strict H
construction of confining the prohibition contained in
Section 195 (1) (c) only to those cases in which the
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.R.

A offences specified therein were committed by a party to
the proceeding in the character as such party".

In the present case, the offence of abetmcnt of forgery was com-
plete when the forged sale deed dated 10-11-70 was fabricated and
registered. But no offence under s. 193 I.P.C. falling within the scope
B of s. 195(1) (b) of Cr.P.C. could be stated to have been committed
by Hemareddy alias Vemareddy as the forged sale deed was not at all
put in evidence at any stage in the redemption suit filed by the com-
plainant on 17-11-70. Section 195 (l)(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure reads :
c "(195) (1) No Court shall take cognizance
(a) ........................... .
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following
sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, sections l 93 to
196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive)
and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed
D
in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or

,,

It could be seen that the section requires that the offence under s.
E 193 I.P.C. should be alleged to have been committed in or in relation
to, any proceeding in any court. Since the forged sale deed was not
produced jn evidence in any stage of the redemption suit, s. 195(1) (b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. Therefore, the
Magistrate who committed the accused to the Sessions, could not have
taken cognizance of any offence under s. 193 I.P.C. so far as Hema-
reddy alias Vemareddy (A-1) is concerned. The complaint could
have been taken on file only for an offence punishable under s. 467 'I
read with s. 114 I.P.C. so far as that accused is concerned. It would
follow that no complaint by the court for prosecuting Hemareddy alias ·
t
Vemareddy for the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114 I.P.C. is
G required, and he could be validly convicted for that offence on the com-
plaint given by the private individual. We are,.therefore, of the opinion
that learned Judges of the. High Court were not right in law in holding
that the complaint in this case was totally not maintainable against I
Hemareddy alias Vemareddy in view of the provisions of s. 195 (1) (b)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, und in not only acquitting Hema-
H reddy alias Vemareddy of the offence under s. 467 read with s. 114
I.P.C. but alw in finding that he has committed an olfence punishable
under s. 193 I.P.C. We accordingly confirm the judgment of the
KARNATAKA v. HEMAREDDY (Varadarajan, J.) 711

High Coutt as regards modification of the sentence awarded to Pyatal A
Dhimakka (A-·2) and the acquittal of Hemaredd; alias Vemareddy
under s 11)3 l.P .C. and dismiss the appeal to that extent but allow the
appeal in part so far as Hemareddy alias Vcmareddy is concerned and
find him guilty under s. 467 read with s. 114 l.P.C. and convict him
and sentence him to undergo RI. for one year and also pay a fine of
Rs. 500/. and in default to undergo R.I. for thice months. B

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

l