STATE OF KARNATAKAversusNARSA REDDY
- Citation
- 1987 INSC 211
- Decided
- 14 August 1987
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
The High Court cannot use its inherent powers to split a trial and the direction to proceed against only some accused was unwarranted.
Summary
The State of Karnataka charged Narsa Reddy and three others with murder and related offences. During the trial, two police officers were added as accused for disposing of the body, but they claimed that prosecution required prior sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The Sessions Judge rejected their claim, leading the officers to file a revision, which the High Court admitted and stayed the entire trial. While the stay was in force, Narsa Reddy applied for bail; his application was denied and the High Court Single Judge, invoking the inherent powers under Section 482, vacated the stay for Reddy and one co‑accused and ordered the trial to proceed against them. The Supreme Court held that this direction was improper because it split the trial, risked miscarriage of justice, and exceeded the scope of the inherent powers. It ordered the High Court to hear and dispose of the pending revision and to keep the trial stayed until that is done. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court's order set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court can, under its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, direct a trial to proceed against some accused while a stay exists for others, thereby splitting the trial.
- Whether such a direction amounts to an abuse of process or causes miscarriage of justice.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 197, s. 319(4), s. 439(1), s. 482
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
A STATE OF KARNATAKA
v.
NARSA REDDY
AUGUST 14, 1987
B [A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-s.482-/nherent Powe.rs of -/"
High Court-Power cannot be exercised so as to split trial of accused (
which is apt to cause miscarriage of justice and serious prejudice to
prosecution.
c While the respondent, alongwith another person, was being tried
under ss. 302 and 201 read withs. 34 I.P.C., etc., for causing the death y
of his wife, the evidence recorded revealed the involvement of two police
officials in the disposal of the dead body, and, they were also charged
under s. 201 read withs. 341.P.C. and the trial was ordered to be held
D de novo against all the four accused. However, the trial could not
proceed as the two police officials whose plea that, being public
servants, it was necessary to obtain a sanction for prosecution under
s. 197 Cr. P.C. for impleading them as accused, was rejected, appro-
ached the High Court in Revision and obtained stay of the trial. The
respondent applied for bail under s. 439(1), Cr. P.C. contending that
E the trial was unduly protracted, and on its rejection, approached the
High Court in Revision. A Single Judge of the High Court rejected the -4
application for bail, vacated the stay granted by the High Court earlier ·
insofar as the respondent and the other person who was originally
accused with him was concerned and directed the Sessions Judge to
proceed with the trial as against them only.
F Allowing the appeal, and, directing continuance of stay of the trial
till the disposal of the Revision filed by the two police officials,
HELD: It is somewhat strange that the learned Single Judge
should have made a direction at all requiring the learned Sessions Judge
to proceed with the trial as against the respondent and the other
G accused merely because there was stay granted by the High Court in the 'y
Revision preferred by the two police officials. If he felt that the stay
would prejudicially affect the respondent and the other accused and
subject them to a protracted trial, the proper course was to have heard
and disposed of the Revision filed by the two police officials rather than
make a direction of this kind which would, result in the splitting up of
H the trial and is apt to cause miscarriage of justice, besides serious pre-
968
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. N. REDDY [SEN, J.] 969
judice to the prosecution. From the nature of the prosecution case, it is A
quite apparent that the evidence to be led by the prosecution would be
more or less common as it relates to the same occurrence. It could not
be said that merely because the proceedings were held up due to stay
gr.anted by the High Court the learned Single Judge could have taken
l recourse to the inherent powers of the High Court under s. 482, Cr.
:r r-r.c., or that it was necessary to do so either to prevent abuse of the
process of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. [97IC-F]
B
r CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 361 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.1986 of the Karnataka
{ High Court in Crl. P.C. No. 69 of 1986. C
P.R. Ramasesh, Adv. for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
SEN, J. The question involved in this appeal by special leave is
whether the High Court of Karnataka was justified in directing the
Sessions Judge, Bidar to proceed with the trial of Sessions Case No. 23
of 1984 insofar as it relates to the respondent Narsa Reddy and one
Vaijinath, accused No. 2, arraigned for having committed alleged
offences punishable under ss. 302 and 201 both n;ad withs. 34 of the
)>.. Indian Penal Code, 1860 and ss. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, E
1961.
While issuing notice, we were not satisfied about the legality and
T pro1:!dety of the order passed by the learned Single Judge which had
the effect of splitting up of the trial although the prosecution case
against the accused arose out of the same incident and the evidence to F
be led by the prosecution against them was more or less common. It
also seemed to us that if the order passed by the learned Single Judge
were to be implemented, the learned Sessions Judge would be
constrained to proceed against the respondent and accused No. 2
Vaijinath and thereby the very object of directing de nova trial would
"fbe frustrated. At the hearing, no one appeared for the respondent and G
therefore we did not have the benefit of hearing his counsel.
The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows. On February 14,
1984, at about 7 p.m., the respondent Narsa Reddy pushed his wife the
deceased Jagdamba into a well situate in his garden to cause her death
and he then with the help of accused No. 2, Vaijinath pulled her out of H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.
~-
A the well and brought her to the house of the respondent where he
assaulted her with a stick and thereafter strangulated her to death.
After the committal, the Sessions case was posted for evidence and
evidence of four witnesses was recorded. The testimony of PW 3
Sangareddy and PW 4 Rangareddy revealed the involvement of Head
Constable Govinda Rao and Police Constable John, who were cited as
B prosecution witnesses, in the disposal of the dead body of the decea:1
sed, that they had also committed the offence under s. 20 l read with '
s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code along with the other two accused. An
application was accordingly filed by the learned Public Prosecutor
under s. 319(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for impleading
Head Constable Govinda Rao and Police Constable John as accused
C Nos. 3 and 4 in the Sessions case. On the said application, the learned
Sessions Judge by his order dated August 22, 1985 ordered that Head y
Constable Govinda Rao and Police Constable John be impleaded as
accused Nos. 3 and 4 for the offence under s. 201 read withs. 34 of the
Indian Penal Code. He also ordered that a de nova trial would be held
against the accused persons after reframing charges. Before the trial
D could proceed further, the newly impleaded accused Nos. 3 and 4 filed
an application before the learned Sessions Judge contending that they )-·
could not be impleaded as accused and that since they were public
servants, sanction under s. 197 of the Code was required for their
prosecution. The application of accused Nos. 3 and 4 was rejected by
the learned Sessions Judge on October 28, 1985. Thereupon, Head
E Constable Govinda Rao and Police Constable John, impleaded as ,,/
accused Nos. 3 and 4, preferred a revision being Criminal Revision
No. 886 of 1985 before the High Court. The High Court has admitted
the revision and granted stay of proceedings in the Sessions case. In
the meanwhile, the respondent Narsa Reddy who had been arrayed as '('
accused No. 1 made an application for bail under s. 439( 1) before the
F learned Sessions Judge contending that in view of the stay order
granted by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 886 of 1985, the
trial of the Sessions case was unduly protracted and hence he should be
released on bail, apart from the ground that no prima facie case has
been made out against him.
G The learned Sessions Judge by his order dated September 25, '°'
1985 rejected the application on the ground that earlier similar appli-
cations for bail were rejected both by him as well as the High Court
and it could not be said that the trial was protracted, merely because of
stay granted by the High Court, observing that the case was likely to be
concluded at an early date. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a
H revision before the High Court. The learned Single Judge by his order
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. N. REDDY [SEN, J.l 971
dated March 28, 1985 rejected the application for bail under s. 439( l) A
of the Code, vacated the stay granted by the High Court in Criminal
Revision No. 886 of 1985 insofar as the trial against the respondent
and the aforesaid Vaijinath, accused No. 2 was concerned and directed
the learned Sessions Judge to proceed with the trial against them as
early as possible. Hence this appeal by special leave.
B
We have no manner of doubt that the direction made by the
learned Single Judge presumably exercising the inherent powers of the
High Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was wholly
unwarranted. It is somewhat strange that the learned Single Judge
should have made a direction at all requiring the learned Sessions
Judge to proceed with the trial as against the respondent and accused C
No. 2, Vaijinath merely because there was stay granted by the High
Court in revision preferred by the co-accused Head Constable Gov-
inda Rao and Police Constable John, accused Nos. 3 and 4 against the
order passed by the learned Sessions Judge dated October 28, 1985
rejecting the objection as to the validity of trial for want of sanction. If
he felt that the grant of stay would prejudicially affect the respondent D
and accused No. 2, Vaijinath and subject them to a protracted trial,
the proper course for the learned Single Judge was tq have heard and
disposed of the Criminal Revision No. 886 of 1985 rather than make a
direction of this kind which would, in fact, result in splitting up of the
trial which is apt to cause miscarriage of justice, besides serious pre-
judice to the prosecution. From the nature of the prosecution case, it is E
quite apparent that the evidence to be led by the prosecution would be
more or less common as it relates to the same occurrence. It could not
be said that merely because the proceedings before the learned Ses-
sions Judge were held up due to stay granted by the High Court in that
revision, the learned Single Judge could have taken recourse to the
inherent powers of the High Court under s. 482 of the Code, or that it F
was necessary to do so either to prevent abuse of the process of Court
or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Any further delay in the trial
could be prevented by taking up the revision for hearing.
In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order
\.if passed by the High Court is set aside and the High Court is directed to G
hear and dispose of Criminal Revision No. 886 of 1985 as early as
possible. In the meanwhile, the proceedings in Sessions Case No. 23 of
1984 before the learned Sessions Judge shall remain stayed till the
disposal of the revision.
H.L.C. Appeal allowed. H
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