Holding

A preliminary inquiry is not a mandatory pre‑condition for FIR registration when the source information report prima facie discloses a cognizable offence, and a Superintendent of Police may validly issue a composite order under Section 17 directing both FIR registration and investigation.

Summary

The State of Karnataka appealed against the Karnataka High Court’s order quashing FIR No. 56 of 2023, which had been registered against public servant T.N. Sudhakar Reddy for alleged disproportionate assets under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The High Court had held that a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before registering the FIR and that the Superintendent of Police could not issue a composite order under Section 17 of the PC Act directing both registration of the FIR and investigation. The Supreme Court examined whether a preliminary inquiry is a statutory prerequisite and whether a Superintendent can simultaneously direct FIR registration and investigation. Relying on Lalita Kumari, Managipet, and other precedents, the Court held that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory where the source information report itself discloses a cognizable offence, and that a Superintendent of Police is empowered to issue a composite order under Section 17. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the FIR was restored. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registering an FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Whether a composite order under Section 17 of the PC Act directing registration of an FIR and investigation is legally valid.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 173, s. 30
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 36, s. 3622
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 12, s. 13(1)(b), s. 13(2), s. 17

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether High Court was justified in quashing the FIR registered against the Respondent in the absence of a preliminary enquiry before registration of FIR under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; whether a composite order can be passed under Section Act, 1988 directing registration of FIR and conducting investigation in the case. Headnotes† Requirement of preliminary inquiry before directing registration of an FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act: Held: Conducting a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua non for registering a

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption ActQuashingPreliminary enquiryComposite orderSection 17FIR registration

Judgment

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1241 : 2025 INSC 229

State of Karnataka
v.
T.N. Sudhakar Reddy
(Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024)
17 February 2025
[Dipankar Datta and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether High Court was justified in quashing the FIR registered
against the Respondent in the absence of a preliminary enquiry
before registration of FIR under the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988; whether a composite order can be passed
under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 directing
registration of FIR and conducting investigation in the case.

Headnotes†
Requirement of preliminary inquiry before directing registration
of an FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act:
Held: Conducting a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua non for
registering a case against a public servant who is accused of
corruption – While preliminary inquiry is desirable in certain
categories of cases including those under the PC Act, it is neither
a vested right of the accused, nor a mandatory pre-requisite for
registration of a criminal case – The purpose of a preliminary
inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the information received,
but merely to ascertain whether the said information reveals the
commission of a cognizable offence – Whether a preliminary
inquiry is necessary or not will vary according to the facts and
circumstances of each case – In the present case, the source
information report submitted by the Police Inspector of Karnataka
Lokayukta Police Station comprehensively documents the financial
irregularities committed by the respondent and disclosed a prima
facie case of commission of a cognizable offence involving
acquisition of disproportionate assets, punishable under the PC
Act. [Paras 24, 25, 26, 27, 51]

* Author
1242 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Validity of a composite order under Section 17 of the PC Act
directing registration of FIR and conducting investigation:
Held: While interpreting procedural laws like the PC Act, it
must be borne in mind that the interpretation should facilitate
and not frustrate the investigation of potential criminal activities,
particularly in cases involving serious allegations of corruption –
The Superintendent of Police is conferred with the responsibility of
evaluating source information report(s) and to determine whether
the same prima facie warrants further investigation – A conjoint
reading of Section 36 with Section 154 of CrPC (corresponding
with Sections 30 and 173 of BNSS respectively) would make it
clear that if the officer in charge of a police station can direct the
registration of an FIR under Section 154, as a natural corollary
by virtue of Section 36 CrPC, superior officers, which in the case
at hand is the Superintendent of Police, are equally competent to
issue such directions for registration of the FIR – High Court erred
in holding that the Superintendent of Police must first direct the
registration of an FIR and only after it is registered, he would be
competent to issue an order for investigation under Section 17 of
the PC Act – Since the subordinate police officers are obligated to
comply with the orders of the Superintendent of Police, it cannot
be argued that he lacked the authority to issue directions under
Section 17 of the PC Act simultaneously with the direction to register
the FIR – The former interpretation is against the true intent of the
PC Act and is liable to be discarded – Hence, the composite order
dated 4th December 2023 issued by the Superintendent of Police
under Section 17 of the PC Act, directing the registration of the
FIR and authorizing investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police is valid and compliant with law. (Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas (2008) 8 SCC 580 relied on)
[Paras 40-45, 49, 51]

Case Law Cited
P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [1970] 3 SCR 931 : (1970) 1
SCC 595; Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1; CBI and Another v.
Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi and Another [2021] 13 SCR
364 : (2021) 18 SCC 135; State of Telangana v. Managipet Alias
Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy [2019] 14 SCR 716 : (2019) 19
SCC 87; State of M.P. and Ors. v. Ram Singh [2000] 1 SCR 579 :
(2000) 5 SCC 88; Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1243

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

[2023] 6 SCR 135 : (2023) 14 SCC 1; Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas [2008] 12 SCR 165 : (2008)
8 SCC 580 – relied on.
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1990] Supp. 3 SCR
259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 – distinguished.

List of Acts
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

List of Keywords
Prevention of corruption Act; Quashing; Preliminary enquiry; Order
directing enquiry; Composite order; Section 17 of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5001 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.03.2024 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 13460 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Nishanth Patil, Ayush P Shah, Arijit Dey, Vignesh Adithiya S, Mehul
Kumar Garg.
Advs. for the Respondent:
S Nagamuthu, Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Advs., Varun Gowda,
Ms. Akhila Wali, Mrs. Samina S., Abhishekh Singh, M/s. Nuli & Nuli.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
2. The present appeal by special leave is preferred by the appellant-
State, challenging the judgment and final order dated 4th March, 2024
1244 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru,1 whereby the
High Court allowed the Criminal Petition No. 13460 of 2023, filed
by respondent-accused2 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973,3 and quashed the FIR being Crime No. 56 of 2023
registered by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bangalore
against the respondent for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988.4

Brief facts:
3. The respondent is a public servant who joined the Karnataka Power
Transmission Corporation Limited5 on 3rd August, 2007 as an Assistant
Executive Engineer (Electrical). In 2021, he was promoted to the
post of Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive Engineer
(Electrical) at BESCOM, Bengaluru, Vigilance Squad, Bangalore
and was discharging his duties in the said capacity.
4. The Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, submitted
a source information report dated 10 th November, 2023 to the
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore6 alleging
inter alia that during his service tenure in various government
department units, the respondent had acquired assets amounting to
Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were disproportionate and almost 90.72%
more than his known sources of income.
5. Based on the said source information report, the Superintendent
of Police issued an order dated 4th December, 2023, directing the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore7
to register a case against the respondent for offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b), and Section 12 read with Section 13(2)
of the PC Act, and further authorized the said officer to conduct
the investigation of the case. The order dated 4th December, 2023

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent.’
3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’.
4 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act.’
5 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘KPTCL.’
6 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Superintendent of Police’.
7 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Deputy Superintendent of Police.’
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1245

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

around which the controversy revolves is reproduced herein below
for ready reference: -
“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
No KLA/B’City(SP-2)/Source/02/2023
Office of the Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru,
Dated 04.12.2023

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA BENGALURU
CITY-2
Sub Possession of properties disproportionate to known
source of income by Sri. T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE)
Ele, BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore.
Ref Source Report submitted by Sri Balaji Babu H N,
Police Inspector-8, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City
P S, Dated 10.11.2023
I have gone through the source report submitted by Sri
Balaji Babu H N, Police Inspector-8, Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City P S, relating to his receipt of credible
information that Shri T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE) Ele,
BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore has acquired properties
disproportionate to his known source of income to the extent
of Rs 3,81,40,246/- and thereby committed an offence
under section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) and 12 of Prevention of
Corruption Act 1988.
From the material placed before me and with application of
my mind I am satisfied that a prima-facie case is made out
against Sri T N Sudhakar Reddy, D6M (EE), Ele, BESCOM
Vigilance, Bangalore Warranting a statutory investigation
for an offence under section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) & 12 of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
ORDER NO. KLA/INV/BCD/SP-2/02/2023, DATED.
04.12.2023.
1246 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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Therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me under
provisions of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act 1988, I, Dr. K Vamsikrishna, IPS, Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru
order that Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City Police Station,
Bengaluru to register a case under Section 13(1)(b) r/w
13(2) & 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 against Sri.
T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM(EE), Ele, BESCOM Vigilance,
Bangalore and to investigate the said case. I know Sri.
Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent of Police and he is
having the knowledge of investigation of the cases registered
under P.C. Act and also he is having previous experience
of investigation of disproportionate of asset cases.
Further, I authorize Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru
City Police Station, Bengaluru under the provisions of the
section 18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to
inspect the bankers books in so far as it relates to the
accounts of the persons suspected to be holding money
on behalf of the said Sri. T N Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE)
Ele, BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore and to take or cause to
be taken certified copies of the relevant entries there from
and the bankers concerned shall be bound to assist the
police officer Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City Police
Station, Bengaluru in the exercise of the powers under
the said section of law.
(Dr. K Vamsirishna., IPS)
Superintendent of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bengaluru City-2,
Bengaluru.

To :
Sri. Tippeswamy H J,
Dy.S.P-4,
Karnataka Lokayukta
Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru.”
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1247

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

6. On the same day, i.e., 4th December 2023, an FIR8 came to be
registered against the respondent at the Karnataka Lokayukta
Police Station, Bangalore City, for the offences punishable under
Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
7. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a Criminal Petition9 under Section
482 of the CrPC before the High Court, seeking quashing of the
aforesaid FIR. The High Court, vide order dated 4th March, 2024,
allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR along with all the
consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom. The said order
of the High Court is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal
by special leave.

Submissions on behalf of Appellant:
8. Learned counsel for the appellant-State vehemently and fervently
argued that the High Court grossly erred in allowing the quashing
petition preferred by the respondent. In this regard, he has advanced
the following submissions: -
(i) That it is not mandatory to hold a preliminary inquiry when the
secret information itself discloses the commission of offences
under the PC Act. The scope of the preliminary inquiry is
not to ascertain the veracity of the information, but only to
check whether the information reveals the commission of a
cognizable offence or not. Therefore, the necessity to conduct
a preliminary inquiry is dependent upon the factual matrix of
each case. Learned counsel in this regard has put reliance upon
the decisions of this Court in the cases of CBI and Another v.
Thommandru Hannah Vijaylakshmi and Another 10 and
National Confederation of Officers Association of Central
and Public Sector Enterprises & Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors.11.
(ii) That the Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the source
information report from the Police Inspector, Karnataka
Lokayukta, Bangalore, thoroughly examined the same and

8 FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2003.
9 Criminal Petition No. 13460 of 2023.
10 (2021) 18 SCC 135.
11 (2022) 4 SCC 764.
1248 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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came to a conclusion that the information provided in the said
report disclosed a prima facie case against the respondent for
the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thereupon, he directed
the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register a case for these
offences against the respondent and to conduct investigation.
Since there is no legislative prescription as to the format of
the preliminary inquiry, the source information report submitted
by the Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore,
which was critically evaluated by the Superintendent of Police,
itself served the purpose of a preliminary inquiry. The source
information report not only delineates the assets amassed by
the respondent but also lays out the expenditure made by him,
which is disproportionate to his known sources of income. He
thus urged that the source information report must itself be
considered as a preliminary inquiry report. Hence, it would be
incorrect to conclude that no preliminary inquiry was undertaken
before the registration of the FIR. Learned counsel in this
regard has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in
the case of State of Telangana v. Managipet Alias Mangipet
Sarveshwar Reddy.12
(iii) That once the Superintendent of Police, upon receiving the
source information report, was satisfied that the said report
disclosed the commission of offences under the PC Act, he was
competent under Section 17 of the PC Act to direct the Deputy
Superintendent of Police to register an FIR in respect of the
offences disclosed in the source information report. Further, it
was submitted that the Superintendent of Police was well within
his jurisdiction while directing the Deputy Superintendent of
Police to conduct the investigation of the case. Learned counsel
in this regard has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra).
(iv) That the order dated 4 th December, 2023 issued by the
Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Superintendent of Police
was passed after due application of mind to the facts of the
case and upon being satisfied that tangible material exists which

12 (2019) 19 SCC 87.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1249

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

merits registration of the FIR. It is a reasoned order which sets
out the name of the accused, the foundational facts pertaining
to acquisition of properties disproportionate to his gross income,
the information about all the expenditures incurred by him,
the nature of the offence, the relevant provisions of the PC
Act, and most importantly, the power of the Superintendent of
Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register
an FIR and investigate the case. Thus, the High Court was
not justified in concluding that the Superintendent of Police
did not apply his mind while issuing the order of registration
of FIR and the consequent authorization for investigation into
the offences thereunder. Reliance placed by the High Court
on the judgment in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v.
Bhajan Lal & Ors13 is misplaced because the present case
does not fall within any of the categories enumerated therein,
justifying the decision to allow the quashing petition filed by
the respondent.
On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State
implored this Court to accept the appeal, set aside the impugned
judgment and restore the FIR, registered against the respondent.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent:
9. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent
vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellant-State. He advanced the following pertinent
submissions, imploring this Court to dismiss the present appeal:-
(i) That the High Court was fully justified in quashing the FIR
in Crime No. 56 of 2023 considering that the order dated 4th
December, 2023, issued by the Superintendent of Police, was
passed without conducting any preliminary inquiry. It is a well-
established principle of law that before an FIR is registered
against a public servant for the offences punishable under
the PC Act, a preliminary inquiry must be undertaken by the
competent authority, considering the gravity of accusations
involved in such cases which have a direct bearing on the
accused/public servant’s reputation and the reputation of the

13 (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335.
1250 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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entire department. Thus, a preliminary inquiry before registration
of an FIR is mandatory so as to avoid abuse of the process
of law considering that the primary objective of conducting the
preliminary inquiry is to ensure that the criminal investigation
is not initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint. Learned
senior counsel in this regard placed reliance upon the decisions
of this Court in P Sirajuddin v. State of Madras;14 Lalitha
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.;15 and
Charansingh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.16
(ii) That any order issued under Section 17 of the PC Act, directing
investigation in the FIR, must be passed with judicious discretion,
based upon due application of mind and supported by substantive
reasons. The second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act, which
is an additional safeguard for public servants, stipulates that
any offence that is punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the PC
Act shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer
who is below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, the
Superintendent of Police was under an obligation to record
reasons before directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
register the FIR and conduct investigation thereupon. However,
in the present case, the Superintendent of Police passed the
order for registration of FIR casually and mechanically, without
assigning any reasons. That a bare perusal of the order dated
4th December, 2023 reflects that the Superintendent of Police
mentioned having assessed the materials i.e., the source
information report dated 10th November, 2023, and applied
his mind thereto. However, the order fails to provide any clear
reflection of a comprehensive and substantive examination
of the said source information report, which makes it evident
that the approach of the Superintendent of Police was totally
mechanical and laconic, vitiating the criminal proceedings from
the very inception i.e., the registration of the FIR.
(iii) That the permission accorded by the Superintendent of
Police to register the FIR was based entirely upon the source

14 (1970) 1 SCC 595.
15 (2014) 2 SCC 1.
16 (2021) 5 SCC 469.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1251

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

information report and no verification whatsoever was sought
in order to adjudge the veracity of the allegations made therein.
Upon receiving the source information report, an independent
preliminary inquiry should have been conducted, before
directing registration of the FIR. However, the Superintendent
of Police, influenced by the source information report, straight
away directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register
an FIR and simultaneously authorised him to commence
the investigation of the case. Learned senior counsel for the
respondent further contended that the entire procedure followed
by the Superintendent of Police is flawed and in teeth of the
law laid down by this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra), wherein
it was held that preliminary inquiry by the police is sine qua
non in offences related to corruption even if the police are in
possession of information that discloses the commission of an
offence. Hence, the very initiation of the criminal process is
vitiated as it was biased and flawed from the beginning and
thus, the High Court has rightly allowed the quashing petition
preferred by the respondent.
On these grounds, the learned senior counsel for the respondent
urged that the present appeal against the judgment of the High
Court is liable to be dismissed, and the High Court’s decision to
quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom,
should be upheld.

Discussion: -
10. We have given our consideration to the submissions advanced at
the bar and have gone through the impugned judgment. With the
assistance of learned counsels for the parties, we have perused the
material placed on record.
11. There is no dispute that the respondent is a public servant who
started serving in KPTCL in 2007. He was duly promoted to the
post of Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive Engineer
(Electrical), at BESCOM, Bengaluru, and has been discharging his
duties in the said capacity.
12. The primary allegation set out against the respondent is that during
his tenure of service in various departmental units, the respondent
had acquired assets to the tune of Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were
1252 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his known sources
of income. A detailed source information report to this effect was
submitted to the Superintendent of Police who took cognizance of
this report and issued a composite Order (supra) dated 4th December,
2023, directing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an
FIR against the respondent for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and
to investigate the same.
13. The core questions which arise for our consideration in the present
case are as follows: -
A. Whether a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before
directing registration of an FIR under the PC Act in the
facts of the case at hand or whether the source information
report could be treated to be a substitute for the preliminary
inquiry?
B. Whether the Order dated 4th November, 2023, passed by
the Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the PC
Act, is sustainable in the eyes of law?

Issue A: Whether a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before
directing registration of an FIR under the PC Act in the facts
of the case at hand or whether the source information report
could be treated to be a substitute for the preliminary inquiry?
14. It is the case of the appellant-State that preliminary inquiry is not
mandatory before registration of an FIR. Without prejudice to the
above, it is contended that the source information report submitted
by the Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station to
the Superintendent of Police, detailing acquisition of assets by the
respondent disproportionate to his known sources of income, itself
serves as a preliminary inquiry report as it was elaborate enough to
disclose a prima facie case for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would urge
that the Superintendent of Police acted in gross violation of law while
issuing an order to the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register
an FIR as preliminary inquiry in ‘corruption cases’ is a condition
precedent for registration of the FIR. Further, preliminary inquiry can
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1253

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

only be conducted by a police officer, who is competent to investigate
the offence, and thus, a source information report, however detailed,
cannot be taken to be a substitute for a preliminary inquiry.
16. In addressing this issue, we must first consider the legal framework
established by this Court in a catena of decisions, particularly in P.
Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita Kumari (supra), Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra), and Managipet (supra). This Court in P.
Sirajuddin (supra) has held that before any public servant is charged
with any acts of dishonesty, a preliminary inquiry ‘must’ be conducted
in order to obviate incalculable harm to the reputation of that person.
The relevant para from P. Sirajuddin is extracted herein below:-
“17. Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is
publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount
to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type
alleged in this case and a first information is lodged
against him, there ‘must’ be some suitable preliminary
inquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer.
The lodging of such a report against a person, specially
one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a
department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm
not only to the officer in particular but to the department
he belonged to, in general...”
(emphasis supplied)

17. However, the authoritative pronouncement of law in respect of
registration of the FIR emerges from the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra) wherein, the issue before the Court
was whether a police officer is obligated to register an FIR upon
receiving information regarding the commission of a cognizable
offence under Section 154 of the CrPC (corresponding Section 173
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023)17 or whether it is
essential to conduct a preliminary inquiry to verify the information
before registration of the FIR. This Court held that under Section
154 of the CrPC, a police officer is required to register an FIR
when the information received by him discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence, without undertaking a preliminary inquiry.

17 For short ‘BNSS’.
1254 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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However, the Court was also cognizant of the possible misuse of the
criminal law resulting in the registration of frivolous FIRs. To address
this concern, it outlined specific ‘exceptions’ to the general rule,
which mandates the immediate registration of FIR upon receiving
information about a cognizable offence. The Constitution Bench in
Lalita Kumari (supra) held: -
“119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims
regarding registration or non-registration, what is
necessary is only that the information given to the
police must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR
is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is
made out in the information given, then the FIR need
not be registered immediately and perhaps the police
can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry
for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether
a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the
information given clearly mentions the commission
of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but
to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are
not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such
as, whether the information is falsely given, whether
the information is genuine, whether the information
is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be
verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage
of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely
whether the information given ex facie discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after
investigation, the information given is found to be false,
there is always an option to prosecute the complainant
for filing a false FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)

18. The following guidelines were laid down by the Constitution Bench
governing the issues:-
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1255

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to
ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In
cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the
complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must
be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not
later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief
for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of
registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed.
Action must be taken against erring officers who do
not register the FIR if information received by him
discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify
the veracity or otherwise of the information received but
only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches
in initiating criminal prosecution, for example,
over 3 months’ delay in reporting the matter
without satisfactorily explaining the reasons
for delay.
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The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)

19. It was held that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory if the information
received by the police officer/Investigating Agency discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. However, if the preliminary
inquiry is conducted, its scope is limited to determine whether the
information prima facie reveals commission of a cognizable offence
and does not extend to verifying its truthfulness. The necessity of a
preliminary inquiry depends on the specific facts and circumstances
of each case. For instance, corruption cases fall into a category
where a preliminary inquiry ‘may be made’.
20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted in Lalita Kumari (supra)
underscores that conducting such an inquiry is discretionary in nature
and not a mandatory obligation.
21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari (supra), this Court in
Managipet (supra) held that while the decision in Lalita Kumari
(supra) noted that a preliminary inquiry was desirable in cases of
alleged corruption, this does not vest a right in the accused to demand
a preliminary inquiry. Whether the preliminary inquiry is required to be
conducted or not will depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances
of each case, and it cannot be said to be a mandatory requirement,
in the absence of which, an FIR cannot be registered against the
accused in corruption-related matters.
22. The relevant paragraphs from Managipet (supra) are extracted
herein below: -
“33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that the
information collected is in respect of disproportionate assets
of the accused officer. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry
is to screen wholly frivolous and motivated complaints,
in furtherance of acting fairly and objectively. Herein,
relevant information was available with the informant in
respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a cognizable
offence. Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR
is satisfied with such disclosure, he can proceed
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1257

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

against the accused even without conducting any
inquiry or by any other manner on the basis of the
credible information received by him. It cannot be said
that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the reason that
the preliminary inquiry was not conducted. The same can
only be done if upon a reading of the entirety of an FIR,
no offence is disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made
to a judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court held inter
alia that where the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused and
also where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary inquiry
warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required
to be mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases. It has
been reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the
type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. There are no
fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be said
to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and informal
collection of information disclosing a cognizable
offence to the satisfaction of the person recording
the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)

23. A three-judge bench of this Court in Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra) extensively discussed the judicial precedents
and legal principles governing the requirement of conducting a
preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR. The Court affirmed the
view taken by the two-judge Bench in Managipet (supra), holding that
a preliminary inquiry may not be necessary if the officer recording the
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FIR possesses relevant information which discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence. The relevant extracts from Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra) are reproduced herein below: -
“32. [..]... we hold that since the institution of a
Preliminary inquiry in cases of corruption is not made
mandatory before the registration of an FIR under the
CrPC, PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this Court
to issue a direction to that affect will be tantamount
to stepping into the legislative domain.
39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions
of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a
preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in all cases which
involve allegations of corruption. The decision of the
Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State
of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that
if the information received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary inquiry would
be required. It also clarified that the scope of a preliminary
inquiry is not to check the veracity of the information
received, but only to scrutinise whether it discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of
the CBI Manual notes that a preliminary inquiry is required
only if the information (whether verified or unverified) does
not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. Even
when a preliminary inquiry is initiated, it has to stop
as soon as the officer ascertains that enough material
has been collected which discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence. A similar conclusion has been
reached by a two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of
Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3
SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition that a
preliminary inquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary to
law, for it is not only contrary to the decision of the
Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
but would also tear apart the framework created by the
CBI Manual.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1259

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

24. Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is perspicuous that
conducting a preliminary inquiry is not sine qua non for registering
a case against a public servant who is accused of corruption. While
preliminary inquiry is desirable in certain categories of cases including
those under the PC Act, it is neither a vested right of the accused,
nor a mandatory pre-requisite for registration of a criminal case.
The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity of
the information received, but merely to ascertain whether the said
information reveals the commission of a cognizable offence. The
scope of such inquiry is naturally narrow and limited to prevent
unnecessary harassment while simultaneously ensuring that genuine
allegations of a cognizable offence are not stifled arbitrarily. Thus,
the determination, whether a preliminary inquiry is necessary or not
will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case.
25. In the present case, the Police Inspector of the Karnataka Lokayukta
submitted a comprehensive source information report dated 10th
November, 2023 to the Superintendent of Police, which included
meticulous documentation and evaluation of the assets acquired by the
respondent, which were grossly disproportionate to his known sources
of income. The respondent, during his tenure of service in various
departmental units, had acquired assets worth Rs.3,81,40,246/-,
which were disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his known
sources of income. Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police took
cognizance of the source information report and concluded that the
allegations made against the respondent did constitute prima facie
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
26. It is clearly discernible that the source information report dated 10th
November, 2023, was in the nature of a preliminary inquiry in itself
and nothing else. The comprehensive nature of the said report took
it beyond a simple complaint, as it provided a meticulous breakdown
of the respondent’s monetary acquisitions. Further, the report makes
cross-referencing of official income records with actual property
acquisitions, bank deposits, and other financial assets. In substance,
the source information report prime facie reflects a systematic pattern
of financial irregularities, wherein the discrepancy in acquisition of
assets was found to be 90.72% more than the known sources of
income of the respondent.
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27. Thus, in our view the source information report dated 10th November,
2023, served as a critical piece of information which not only
documented the financial discrepancies but also presented a clear,
prima facie picture of disproportionate assets accumulated by the
respondent but also demanded immediate and thorough investigative
action. As we have noted above, the scope of preliminary inquiries
is not to verify the absolute truthfulness of information, and it is
only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not
therefrom. The source information report in the case at hand clearly
satisfies this criterion by comprehensively documenting the financial
irregularities committed by the respondent and disclosed a prima
facie case of commission of a cognizable offence involving acquisition
of disproportionate assets, punishable under the PC Act. Thus, we
are of the opinion that the High Court erred in concluding that the
FIR was liable to be quashed on account of omission to conduct a
preliminary inquiry.

Issue B: Whether the order dated 4th November 2023, passed by
the Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, is
sustainable in the eyes of the law?
28. It is the case of the appellant-State that since the preliminary
inquiry is not mandatory, the Superintendent of Police, who took
cognizance of the source information report, has rightly exercised
his powers to issue an order directing the Deputy Superintendent of
Police to register an FIR against the respondent and to commence
the investigation.
29. Learned senior counsel for the respondent urged that the
Superintendent of Police, grossly erred in issuing the order dated
14th December 2023 under Section 17 of the PC Act merely on the
basis of the source information report dated 10th November 2023.
Vide this order, he directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police
to register a case against the respondent for offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of
the PC Act and to investigate the case. It was contended that the
Superintendent of Police failed to apply his mind while appointing the
investigating officer under Section 17 of the PC Act, as in the absence
of a formally registered FIR, the permission of the Superintendent of
Police could not have been sought as required under second proviso
to Section 17 of the PC Act.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1261

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

30. For the purpose of deciding this issue, it is essential to make a
reference to Section 17 of the PC Act.
“Section 17: Persons authorised to investigate.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below
the rank,—
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment,
of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras
and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified
as such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant
Commissioner of Police;
(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police
or a police officer of equivalent rank, shall investigate
any offence punishable under this Act without the
order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of
the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest
therefor without a warrant:
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an
Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government
in this behalf by general or special order, he may also
investigate any such offence without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,
as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a
warrant:
Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (b)
of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall not be investigated
without the order of a police officer not below the rank
of a Superintendent of Police.”
(emphasis supplied)

31. Section 17 of the PC Act prescribes that no police officer below
the rank of an Inspector in the case of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan
areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and any other
1262 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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metropolitan area notified as such, and in any other case, the Deputy
Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank shall
investigate an offence punishable under the Act without prior order
of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the 1st Class, as
the case may be, or make any arrest without a warrant. According to
the first proviso to Section 17, if a police officer not below the rank
of an Inspector of Police as is authorised in this behalf by a general
or special order issued by the Government, he can also investigate
such offences without the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Magistrate of the 1st Class, as the case may be, or make arrest
thereunder without a warrant. Further, the second proviso provides
that where an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of
Section 13 is sought to be investigated, such an investigation shall
not be conducted without obtaining the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
32. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on the
decision of a Coordinate Bench in the case Balakrishna H.N. v. State
of Karnataka and Ors.18 and concluded that the failure to conduct
a preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR, and the issuance of
the order by the Superintendent of Police under second proviso to
Section 17 of the PC Act, tantamounted to a clear violation of the
legal mandate. The High Court in the case Balakrishna (supra)
held that:-
“11. The Apex Court considers entire spectrum of law
and at sub-para 15.1 of paragraph 23 holds that an
inquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to be permissible; not
only permissible but desirable, more particularly in cases
where the allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice
acquiring assets/properties disproportionate to his known
sources of income. This cannot be demanded as a
matter or right is what is held, apart from holding
that there cannot be a hearing given to the accused
prior to drawing up of a source report or registration
of a crime. The Apex Court nevertheless holds that
the preliminary inquiry is not only desirable but
necessary in such cases. At paragraph 33 the Apex

18 Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 15886 of 2022 (GM-RES).
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1263

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

Court holds that the superior officer thus has to verify
whether the developed source information prima facie
would result in the registration of a case; if yes, they then
will have to direct verification of such information. Though
the entire verification was governed by the CBI manual
which the Apex Court had already held that it should be
strictly and scrupulously followed, the Apex Court holds
that preliminary inquiry would not be a matter of right or
necessary in every case.
12. If the reasons rendered by Apex Court are noticed,
two factors would emerge – one, that the prosecution
is required to draw up source report after conducting
some sort of a preliminary inquiry to know the assets
of the Government servant and two, after the source
information report is placed before the Superior
Officer – Superintendent of Police, he has to verify as
to whether a crime should be registered or otherwise.
If these principles that would emerge from the judgment
of the Apex Court are considered qua the facts obtaining
in the case at hand, the registration of the crime would
fall foul of the principles laid down by the Apex Court and
that of this Court in the afore-quoted judgment.”
(emphasis supplied)

33. Therefore, according to the High Court, the Superintendent of Police
is not competent to pass an order under Section 17 of the PC Act
until a formally registered FIR came into existence. In other words,
registration of the FIR is sine qua non for issuance of an order to
investigate the case. The High Court framed a four-step procedure:
first, the police must verify the facts upon receiving the source
information report; second, a preliminary inquiry is to be conducted
by the police; third, the FIR is registered; fourth, the FIR, along with
the source information report and the preliminary inquiry report,
is to be forwarded to the Superintendent of Police. Thus, it was
concluded that it is only at the 4th stage that the Superintendent of
Police becomes competent to issue an order directing investigation
under Section 17 of the PC Act.
34. From the discussion and conclusions drawn by us on the first issue, it
is clear that conducting a preliminary inquiry is not an absolute mandate
1264 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

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of law in cases concerning offences under the PC Act. Hence, the
four-step procedure formulated by the High Court to quash the FIR
against the respondent is not compliant with any prescription in law
and is also contrary to the law laid down by this Court. What invites
our consideration, therefore, is whether the Superintendent of Police is
competent to pass a composite order for registration of an FIR as well
as directing investigation under Section 17 of the PC Act, authorising
the Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct investigation.
35. It is an established principle that the special law overrides the general
law. However, when a general law and a special law address the same
subject matter, the rule of harmonious construction is to be applied.
36. In State of M.P. and Ors. v. Ram Singh,19 this Court discussed the
legislative intent of the PC Act and held:-
“10. The Act was intended to make effective provisions for
the prevention of bribery and corruption rampant amongst
the public servants. It is a social legislation intended to curb
illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to
be liberally construed so as to advance its object.”
37. Chapter 3 of the PC Act deals with provisions concerning offences,
and the following chapter, i.e., Chapter 4 of the Act articulates
procedural aspects with regard to the investigation of the offences
set out in Chapter 3. With respect to other procedural aspects inter
alia registration of the FIR, the PC Act relies on the CrPC. Since
the PC Act only outlines the procedure for investigation of offences,
therefore, as a necessary corollary, Sections 154 (corresponding
Section 173 of the BNSS) will be applicable for the registration of
FIR in relation to offences punishable under the PC Act.
38. The initiation of criminal proceedings requires information that details
the commission of an offence, whether cognizable or not. It is trite
that if the information reveals the commission of a cognizable offence,
the police officials are duty-bound to register an FIR, except in cases
where individual reputation and relations are at stake, wherein it is
advisable to conduct a preliminary inquiry. In this regard, reference
may be made to Paras 120.3 and 120.4. of Lalita Kumari (supra).20

19 (2000) 5 SCC 88.
20 Refer to Para 18 of this judgment.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1265

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

39. In the case of Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri,21
this Court held as follows: -
“29. Drawing on several earlier judgments and the language
of Section 154 of the Code, it was held that the Police is
bound to proceed to conduct investigation, even without
receiving information about commission of a cognizable
offence if the officer in-charge otherwise suspects the
commission of such an offence. The legislative intent
is to ensure that no information of commission of a
cognizable offence is ignored and not acted upon,
which would otherwise result in unjustified protection
of the alleged offender/accused. Every cognizable
offence must be promptly investigated in accordance
with the law. This being the legal position, there is no
reason that there should be any discretion or option
left with the Police to register or not to register an
FIR when information is given about commission
of a cognizable offence. This interpretation in a way
keeps a check on the power of the Police, which is
required to protect the liberty of individuals and society
rights inherent in a democracy. It is the first step which
provides access for justice to a victim and upholds the rule
of law, facilitates swift investigation and sometimes even
prevents commission of crime and checks manipulation
in criminal cases.”
(emphasis supplied)

40. In the present case, the Superintendent of Police, after forming an
opinion that the source information report dated 10th November,
2023 prima facie disclosed the necessary ingredients of the offences
punishable under the PC Act, directed the Deputy Superintendent of
Police to register an FIR against the respondent and subsequently
in the same order, authorised him to investigate the case. We find
nothing wrong in this composite order which could justify the quashing
thereof. However, the High Court, taking exception to the aforesaid
order, found that the Superintendent of Police had acted de hors

21 (2023) 14 SCC 1.
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the legal mandate and went on to quash the FIR on the rationale
that the act of issuing the order under Section 17 of the PC Act
while simultaneously directing the registration of the FIR violated
the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra).
41. We are of the opinion that the High Court gravely erred while imposing
unwarranted fetters on the investigation agency in corruption cases
by carving out a framework of administrative hurdles which may
have the potential of incapacitating law enforcement agencies. By
mandating elaborate pre-investigation procedures and creating
unwarranted procedural check dams, the High Court’s approach
has the potential to render the effectiveness of law enforcement
nugatory. These additional procedural requirements which virtually
tantamount to framing a policy could not only disrupt the smooth
functioning of investigation agencies, but also risk shielding corrupt
public servants from proper scrutiny, which would be in contravention
of the objective of the PC Act.
42. The legislative intent behind the PC Act is to provide a robust
mechanism for investigating corruption-related offences, and to
avoid the creation of meandering procedural hurdles that shield
corrupt officials. While interpreting such procedural laws, it must
be borne in mind that the interpretation should facilitate and not
frustrate the investigation of potential criminal activities, particularly
in cases involving serious allegations of corruption. The correct
approach in such cases is to bolster the system created to ensure
accountability and prevent arbitrary investigations, and not as a
means to create insurmountable procedural barriers at the very
inception. The purpose of fair investigation is to ensure that the
accused is afforded all the rights guaranteed to him under the law.
As a corollary, an investigation which should be expected to be fair,
must focus on collecting evidence that leads to the right conclusion
and nothing else. A fair investigation cannot be interpreted to cater to
the accused only, rather it must be such that the entire investigation
process has a backing of the law, and the due procedure established
therein. Thus, the ambit of fair investigation tethers the procedural
safeguards in order to remain immune from arbitrary actions of
individual investigators.
43. The critical issue which requires clarity is what would be the
appropriate procedural mechanism when a detailed source information
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1267

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

report reaches the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent
of Police is entrusted with the administrative authority to direct his
subordinates to register an FIR upon receiving a factual report
which prima facie discloses the commission of offences punishable
under the PC Act. The Superintendent of Police is conferred with
the responsibility of evaluating source information report(s) and to
determine whether the same prima facie warrants further investigation.
This administrative command is not contingent upon a pre-existing,
formally registered FIR or an exhaustive preliminary inquiry report,
as we have held while answering Issue A.
44. Under Section 3622 of CrPC (corresponding Section 30 of the BNSS),
police officers superior in rank to the officer in charge of a police
station are vested with the same powers that the officer in charge
may exercise within their station. Section 154 of CrPC (corresponding
Section 173 of the BNSS) empowers the officer in charge to reduce
every piece of information, disclosing a cognizable offence, into
writing either personally or under his direction. A conjoint reading of
Section 36 with Section 154 would make it clear that if the officer in
charge of a police station can direct the registration of an FIR under
Section 154, as a natural corollary by virtue of Section 36 CrPC,
superior officers, which in the case at hand is the Superintendent of
Police, are equally competent to issue such directions for registration
of the FIR.
45. As a consequence of the above discussion, we are convinced that
the High Court erred in holding that the Superintendent of Police must
first direct the registration of an FIR and only after it is registered, he
would be competent to issue an order for investigation under Section
17 of the PC Act. This interpretation could be permissible only if the
subordinates of the Superintendent of Police had a discretion to
either comply with or disregard the latter’s directive to register the
FIR. Under the scheme of the CrPC, the automatic consequence
of registration of an FIR is commencement of investigation. The
only deviation which Section 17 of the PC Act creates is that the
Superintendent of Police must authorize a competent subordinate
officer to commence investigation. Since the subordinate police

22 36. Powers of superior officers of police.—Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a
police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as
may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.
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officers are obligated to comply with the orders of the Superintendent
of Police, it cannot be argued that he lacked the authority to issue
directions under Section 17 of the PC Act simultaneously with the
direction to register the FIR. The former interpretation is against the
true intent of the PC Act and is liable to be discarded.
Hence, the composite order dated 4th December 2023 issued by the
Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, directing
the registration of the FIR and authorizing investigation by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police is valid and compliant with law.
46. Furthermore, it is the case of the respondent that the Superintendent
of Police passed the order mechanically in typed proforma and did
not provide clear, comprehensive evidence of examining the source
information report, which suggests a perfunctory approach that
improperly set the criminal law into motion. The High Court in the
impugned judgment also made a reference to Bhajan Lal (supra) to
conclude that the Superintendent of Police did not properly apply his
mind to the source information report and the statutory requirements
before directing the registration of FIR.
47. In the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court adjudicated an issue
wherein the Superintendent of Police had issued the order in a
mechanical and very casual manner. The Superintendent of Police,
while authorising the Station House Officer to investigate a case,
had only made an endorsement to the effect ‘Please register the
case and investigate’. The Court, while quashing the investigation as
well as the entire proceedings, held that the Station House Officer is
not clothed with the valid legal authority to take up the investigation
and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5-A(1) of
the PC Act. The relevant paragraphs from Bhajan Lal (supra) are
extracted below:-
“129. In the present case, there is absolutely no reason,
given by the SP in directing the SHO to investigate and
as such the order of the SP is directly in violation of
the dictum laid down by this Court in several decisions
which we have referred to above. Resultantly, we hold
that appellant 3, SHO is not clothed with the requisite
legal authority within the meaning of the second proviso of
Section 5-A(1) of the Act to investigate the offence under
clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1269

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

[..]
[..]
131. From the above discussion, we hold that (1) as
the salutary legal requirement of disclosing the reasons
for according the permission is not complied with; (2)
as the prosecution is not satisfactorily explaining the
circumstances which impelled the SP to pass the order
directing the SHO to investigate the case; (3) as the
said direction manifestly seems to have been granted
mechanically and in a very casual manner, regardless of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court, probably
due to blissful ignorance of the legal mandate and (4) as,
above all, the SHO has got neither any order from the
Magistrate to investigate the offences under Sections 161
and 165 IPC nor any order from the SP for investigation
of the offence under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act in the manner known to law, we have
no other option, save to quash that order of direction,
reading “investigate” which direction suffers from legal
infirmity and also the investigation, if any, so far carried
out. Nevertheless, our order of quashing the direction of
the SP and the investigation thereupon will not in any
way deter appellant 1, the State of Haryana to pursue
the matter and direct an investigation afresh in pursuance
of the FIR, the quashing of which we have set aside, if
the State so desires, through a competent police officer,
clothed with the legal authority in strict compliance with
Section 5-A(1) of the Act.
(emphasis supplied)

48. The apparent distinction in Bhajan Lal (supra) and the case at
hand, is that the Superintendent of Police in the instant case has
demonstrably applied his mind and passed a well-reasoned and a
speaking order directing registration of the FIR and authorised the
Deputy Superintendent of Police to begin with the investigation.
The Superintendent of Police received the report on 10th November,
2023, and issued the subject order on 4th December, 2023, i.e. after
a gap of 24 days. The said order not only provided details of the
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respondent, but it also makes a reference to the quantification of
the disproportionate assets, nature of the offence along with the
provisions concerned. In addition, it also referred to the provisions
that empowered the Superintendent of Police to authorise his junior
officer to investigate the case. The Superintendent of Police assigned
a palpable reason as to why the particular Deputy Superintendent of
Police was directed to investigate the case. Reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment in Ram Singh (supra), wherein this
Court held as follows:-
“15. We are not satisfied with the finding of the
High Court that merely because the order of the
Superintendent of Police was in typed pro forma,
that showed the non-application of mind or could be
held to have been passed in a mechanical and casual
manner. As noticed earlier the order clearly indicates
the name of the accused, the number of the FIR, the
nature of the offence and power of the Superintendent
of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer
to investigate. The time between the registration of the
FIR and authorisation in terms of the second proviso to
Section 17 shows further the application of mind and the
circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of
Police to direct authorisation to order the investigation.
(emphasis supplied)

49. Moreover, this Court in the case of Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas,23 adjudicated on a similar
factual scenario wherein the Superintendent of Police issued a
verbatim, similar order as in the present case. The Court opined
that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police is elaborate
and the reasons are clearly discernible therefrom.
50. Therefore, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of
the opinion that the order dated 4th December, 2023, issued by the
Superintendent of Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, is fully
compliant with the law. The High Court erred in imposing unwarranted
administrative frameworks that could potentially incapacitate the

23 (2008) 8 SCC 580.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 1271

State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy

law enforcement agencies. Thus, the Superintendent of Police’s
authority to issue a composite order directing registration of the FIR
and authorizing the officer to conduct an investigation is valid in the
eyes of law. The said order was issued without undue haste and with
due application of mind. The reasons assigned in the order dated
4th December, 2023 for entrusting the investigation to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police are manifest and obvious.

Conclusion
51. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:-
a. The High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the order
dated 4th December, 2023, passed by the Superintendent of
Police, was directly passed under Section 17 of the PC Act,
thereby violating the mandatory provisions of the PC Act.
b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every case under the
PC Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a source information
report which is both detailed and well-reasoned and such
that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima
facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the
preliminary inquiry may be avoided.
c. Section 17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the investigation
process, and not the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it
relies on the provisions of the CrPC. Hence, it places limitations
on only the investigation; it does not impede the fundamental
duty of the law enforcement agency to record and register an
FIR for cognizable offences.
d. On a harmonious reading of the provisions of the PC Act and
the CrPC, it is manifest that the Superintendent of Police is
competent to direct the registration of an FIR if he has information
about the commission of a cognizable offence, punishable under
the PC Act. The former is also competent to simultaneously
direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR
for the offences under the PC Act, with the understanding that
the subsequent investigation will be subject to the restrictions
outlined in Section 17 of the PC Act. A composite order to
register the FIR and conduct investigation aligns with the
statutory framework of the CrPC and the PC Act.
1272 [2025] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

52. For the above reasons, we quash and set aside the judgment and
order dated 4th March, 2024 passed by the High Court of Karnataka
in Criminal Writ Petition No. 13460 of 2023 and restore the FIR in
Crime No. 56 of 2003, pending before the 23rd Additional City Civil
and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City.
53. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
54. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)