Supreme Court of India
STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHERversusPEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 935
- Decided
- 21 July 2009
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The 1999 Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration of Lands to the Scheduled Tribes Act is constitutionally valid, intra vires, and the 1975 Act remains applicable to non‑agricultural lands.
Summary
The Kerala High Court directed the State to implement the 1975 Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, but the State failed to comply, leading to multiple extensions and a contempt petition. The State subsequently enacted the 1999 Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration of Lands to the Scheduled Tribes Act, which altered the rights conferred by the 1975 Act, particularly restricting restoration to agricultural lands and introducing a two‑hectare limit. The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Sections 5(1), 5(2), 6 and 22 of the 1999 Act, alleging colourable legislation, violation of Articles 14, 21 and 300A, and improper repeal of the 1975 Act. The Supreme Court held that the 1999 Act is intra vires, that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not apply where the legislature has competence, and that the 1975 Act continues to apply to non‑agricultural lands because the State lacks power to repeal that portion. Consequently, the High Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality was set aside and the appeals were partly allowed. The Court also clarified the effect of repeal and saving provisions and the limited scope of mandamus in this context.
Issues considered
- The constitutional validity of the 1999 Act, specifically Sections 5(1), 5(2), 6 and 22.
- Whether the doctrine of colourable legislation applies to the 1999 Act.
- Whether the State had legislative competence to amend/repeal the 1975 Act under the Seventh Schedule entries.
- The necessity of Presidential assent for the 1999 Act.
- The effect of a writ of mandamus issued under the 1975 Act on subsequent legislation.
- The status of vested rights and compensation under Articles 14, 21 and 300A.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 254, s. Article 300A, s. Article 46, s. Ninth Schedule, s. Seventh Schedule Entry 18 List II, s. Seventh Schedule Entry 49 List II, s. Seventh Schedule Entry 6 List III
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 6(1), s. 7(1)
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882
Subjects
Scheduled TribesLand restorationMandamusColourable legislationLegislative competenceArticle 14Article 21Ninth ScheduleRepeal and savingVested rightsAgricultural landNon‑agricultural land
Judgment
[2009] 11 S.C.R. 142
A STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
v.
PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, KERALA
STATE UNIT AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos. 104-105 of 2001)
B
JULY 21, 2009
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]
KERALA SCHEDULED TRIBES (RESTRICTION ON
C TRANSFER OF LANDS AND RESTORATION OF
AL/ENA TED LANDS) ACT, 1975/KERALA SCHEDULED
TRIBES (RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF LANDS AND
RESTORATION OF AL/ENA TED LAND) RULES, 19861
KERALA RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER BY AND
D RESTORATION OF LANDS TO THE SCHEDULED TRIBES
ACT, 1999:
Writ of or in the nature of mandamus issued by a High
Court directing implementation of an enactment vis-a-vis a
E subsequent legislation altering or modifying the right of the
beneficiaries under the former Act - Effect of - The 1999 Act
if given a holistic view is more beneficial to the members of
the Scheduled Tribe than the 1975 Act- Thus the 1999 Act
by no stretch of imagination can be treated to be an arbitrary
and unreasonable one - Having regard to the studies
F conducted by the State Government and as a balance of
interest between tribals and non-tribals which has been sought
to be achieved the provisions of the 1999 Act are intra vires
- However, while enacting the 1999 Act, the State could not
have repealed a portion of the 1975 Act - Such a right
G cCJnferred on the owners of the non-agricultural lands could
not have been taken away without payment· of compensation ·
- To that extent the 1975 Act would continue to be applied -
The State has no legislative competence to repeal that portion
H 142
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION .FOR CIVIL 143
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
of the 1975 Act - Constitution of India,, Articles 14, 21, 46, A
254, 300, 300A, Seventh Schedule - Entry 6, List Ill and Entry
49, List If.
DOCTRINES:
Doctrine of co/ourable legislation - Applicability of - In
B
the instant case, the High Court should have examined the
t question of the constitutionality of Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of
the Kera/a Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration of
Lands to the Scheduled Tribes Act, 1999 and not on the
premise that the said provisions are co/ourable in nature - c
Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 21.
Members of Scheduled Tribes filed applications for
restoration of their lands i,n the year 1988 in terms of the
l<erala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of o,
-\, Lands) Act, 1975 and the Rules of 1986 made under the
Act. Since the Act was not implemented in letter and spirit,
a writ petition was filed and the High Court disposed of
the same calling upon the State to give directions to the
Authorities under the 1975 Act to dispose of the E,
applications pending with them within six months.
Extensions of time were sought for and two years had
elapsed. Another application for time was filed and the
·'I
High Court granted a further period of six months but
issued certain directions for monitoring the progress of
F
the implementation of the Act. The pending applications
were disposed of by directing restoration of lands.
Actually no restoration of land was effected. The writ
petitioner filed another application. On an assurance
given by the State, the High Court issued certain
·directions. On an intra-court appeal, .the matter was G
referred to Full Bench which granted a stay relying on or
on the basis of a statement made before the Court that
amendments to the 1975 Act were proposed to be made.
Later, the stay order came to be vacated as the President
H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A of India· declined to give assent to the Bill passed by the
Legislature of Kerala. Again, the High Court granted time
for six months to carry out the direction without prejudice
to the right of the Government in considering the various
aspects of the matter to bring forward suitable legislation
B with suitable changes. Since the abovesaid orders were
not complied with, an application under Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 was filed and notice was issued thereon.
Again state reques;ted for six months' time, assuring the
Court that a nev/I Bill would be introduced in the
c Legislative Assembly in terms whereof a permanent
solution to the problem of alienation of tribal lands from
1.1.1960 to ,1.1.1986 would be dealt with. Accordingly,
High Court extended the time limit by another three
months. Thereafter, the Kerala State Legislature enacted
the Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration of
D Lands to the Sch~duled Tribes Act, 1999 inter alia dealing
with transfer and alienation of agricultural lands. The
constitutional validity of the 1999 f\ct especially the
proviso appended to Sections 5(1), 5(2), 6 and 22 were
challenged in writ petitions and the High Court upheld the
·E challenge and held the provisions to be arbitrary and
discriminatory and thus violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Hence the appeals.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
F
HELD: 1. The validity of 1975 Act is not in question.
It, having regard to its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of
the Constitution of India by Constitution 40th Amendment
Ac, 1976 read with Article 318 which precludes an attack
G to the provisions of such an enactment on the ground
that it violates any provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution
of India, the validity thereof was upheld by a the Kerala
High Court in Bhavani's case.· [Para 11] [179-F-G]
Fr. Thomas Kubukkat v. Union of India, 1994 (2) KLT 25;
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 145
. LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
,.it..,
Manchegowda and others v. State of Karnataka and others, A
(1984) 3 SCC 301; Lingappa·v. State of Maharashtra, (1985)
1 SCC 479; P. Rama Reddy v. State of A.P. (1988) 3 SCC
433 and Samtha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 8 SCC
191, held inapplicable.
B
Madan 'Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCC
50; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4
t SCC 45; Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kera/a, (1996) 7
SCC 637; State of Tamilnadu v. Arooran Sugars Ltd., (1997)
1 SCC 326; Baba Charan Dass Udhasi v. Mahant Basant
Das Babaji Che/a Baba Laxmandas Udasi Sadhu (2000) 6
c
SCC 1 and Bhavani v. State of Kera/a, 1989 (1)_ KLT 37,
referred to.
2.1. The doctrine of 'Colourable Legislation', has no
application in the instant case. The said doctrine is D
~·
founded on legislative competence of the State. An act
of mala fide on the part of the legislature also is beyond
the province of judicial review. In fact no motive can be
attributed to the Legislature for enacting a particular
statute. The question in regard to the constitutionality of E
the statute must be considered keeping in view only the
provisions of the Constitution. [Para 12] (182-D]
2.2. The doctrine of colourable legislation is strictly
confined to the question of legislative competence of the
State Legislature to enact a statute. Once it was opined
F
by the High Court that having regard to Entry 51, List II
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, the
Legislature of the State of Kerala had the requisite
legislative competence to enact the 1999 Act, that should
have been held to be the end of the matter. The High G
Court could not have, entered into the said question
~ through a side-door so as to hold that the transgression
of the limitations of constitutional power may be
disguised, covert or indirect. The High Court, has
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 11 S.C.R.
A committed a fundamental error in failing to keep a
distinction in mind in regard to the power of a law making
authority which is of a qualified character and the power
granted to a legislative authority which is absolutely
without any limitation and restriction~_ being plenary in
s character. A statute in the event of it being held within the
ambit of the legislative competence of the State, could be
declared ultra vi res only on the premise that it is violative
of the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution of India or
any other provisions but not on the ground of colourable
c exercise of power or mala fide on the part of the
legislature. The object, purpose or design referred to by
the High Court should be taken into consideration for the
purpose of examining its constitutionality on the
touchstone of the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution
of India and not otherwise. [Para 12] [185-C-H; 186-A]
0
2.3. No material was placed before the High Court to
. establish that the 1999 Act was confiscatory in nature.
[Para 12] [186-C]
E 2.4. It is one thing to say that a citizen of India having
been conferred with a right on lands by reason of a
statutory provision, has been deprived therefrom without
payment of any compensation and, thus, the same would
be violative of Article 3·00A of the Constitution of India, but,
F it is another thing to say that on that ground alone the
legislation should be held to be a colourable one. [Para
12] [186-0]
2.5. The legislature had a broad object in mind.
Whether the Act stands the scrutiny of limitations of the
G State's power so as to achieve its object and purpose is
one question, but, it is another question that while doing
so it has adopted a device and a cloak to confiscate the ,.
property of the citizen taxed. [Para 12] [186-E-F]
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 147
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
J 2.6. The High Court furthermore committed a serious A
error insofar as it made an incidental observation that the
tribals who enjoy the protection of Constitution of India
and sought to be protected by the 1975 Act could not
have been denied the benefits under the 1999 Act, which
was not a relevant question. [Para 12] [187-A-B] B
2.7. The provisions of the Constitution in this behalf
are enabling in nature. When a constitutionality of an
enactment comes to be questioned, the superior courts
are required to pose unto themselves the right question.
The question should have been whether the statute is
c
valid having been enacted to achieve the constitutional
goal set out not only in Part Ill of the Constitution of India
but also Part IV and IVA thereof. [Para 12] [187-B-D]
2.8. The rights conferred upon the class of persons D
including the protected class, in terms of 1975 Act, were
statutory in nature. They cannot be categorized as plainly
constitutional rights. It is one thing to say that some rights
are constitutional in nature/origin being part of the
expansive regime of Article 21, but, it would not be E
correct to raise the same to the exalted status of
constitutional rights. A right which primarily flows from a
statute, cannot claim its constitutional pedigree to
become a constitutional threshold, against which
f
constitutionality of a statute can be tested. It is trite that F
a right which may be conferred by a statute can also be
..
~,
taken away by another. It is also a trite law that the State
is entitled to change its legislative policy having regard
to the ground realities and changing societal condition'.
In fact, the legislature is expected to take steps for
G
enacting a new statute or amending the same so as to
keep pace with the changing societal condition as well
as taking into consideration the development of law, both
domestic and international. [Para 12] [187-D-G]
• H
148 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A 2.9. The High Court, furthermore committed a serious -~
error in opining that although the legislature had the
legislative competence to enact Act 12 of 1999, but
nevertheless, proviso to Sections 5(1) and 5(2) thereof
would be held to be colourable. The High Court should ~
B have examined the question of their constitutionality on l
~
the touchstone of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
of India and not on the premise that the said provisions
are colourable in nature. [Para 12] [187-H; 188-A-B] +
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning
c and Weaving Company Ltd. and Others AIR 1954 SC 119
and Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC
1563, held inapplicable.
K. C. Gajapathi Narayan Dea v. The State of Orissa
D (1954) 1 SCR 1; R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat and
Others v. Ajit Mills Limited and Another (1977) 4 SCC 98;
Dharam Dutt and others v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC ~12; '
Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. Union of India, (·200 ) 4
SCC 214; K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kera/a AIR 1961 SC
E 552 and Shankaranarayana v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC
1571, referred to.
3. Only because the 1975 Act could be held to be in
conflict with the provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act, the Presidential Assent was necessary having regard
F to Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India but
once the said statute is repealed and in its place a new ~
Act is brought on the statute book, which comes strictly '1""
within the purview of Entry 49, List II of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India, no Presidential
G Assent would be necessary. Presidential Assent would
be necessary for the purpose of amendment of the Act
and not for enacting a separate statute which came
within the purview of a different entry and a different List.
It is furthermore well-known that Article 254 of the
H
..- STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 149
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
Constitution of India would be attracted only in a case A
where two statutes are enacted under the Concurrent
List, viz., one by the State Legislature and the other by
the Parliament of India, and not in any other case. [Para
13] [188-E-H; 189-A]
B
4.1. A distinction must be made between issuance of
writ of mandamus conferring right upon a person or
class of persons and the one directing implementation of .
the Act. However, in this case while the Single Judge of
the High Court issued a direction that the applications
filed by the members of the Scheduled Tribes should be
c
determined by the Revenue Authorities in terms of the
provisions of the 1975 Act; the same, did not mean that
the High Court itself had issued a writ of mandamus
directing restoration of the lands in question: As in most
of the cases members of the Scheduled Tribes have not D
been paid compensation through their vendees in terms
of the provisions of 1975 Act. They did not attain finality.
If that be so, question of invoking the decision of Madan
Mohan Pathak in the factual matrix involved herein does
not arise. [Para 14] [193-E-H; 194-A] E
4.2. It is one thing to say that a writ of mandamus
shall be obeyed despite passing of a subsequent Act as
it had attained finality or that it had not been brought to
the notice of the Legislature, but it is another thing to say F
that no writ of mandamus was issued conferring rights
upon the parties. Directions to implement the provisions
of the Act by itself did not confer any right upon the
parties. The lis has to be adjudicated upon. It did not
attain finality in that sense of the term. [Para 14] [194-B- G
C]
..
4.3. Where a new Act is enacted removing the very
basis on which the High Court made a preceding Act
invalid; it matters not whether the same is not termed as
a validating statute or not. In this case, however, such a H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R. ._,,
1
A question do(;!s not arise as the 1975 Act was not declared
to be invalid. (Para 14] [196-F]
4.4. The Legislature can not over-rule a judgment but
it can remove the basis on which the judgment has been
rendered. [Para 14] (197-B]
B
4.5. The 1999 Act removes the basis for passing of
t
the judgments so far as the applications for restoration
filed by Members of the Scheduled Tribes in regard to their
lands which was less than 2 hectares is concerned. It
c provides that the term 'land' would mean 'only
agricultural land' and the application for restoration shall
lie only in case where the extent of the land exceed two
hectares. Admittedly, the 1999 Act was made effective
retrospectively from 24th day. of January, 1986. It
D contains a Repeal and Savings clause. In that view of the
matter, it was not necessary to term the statute as a
validating statute containing a non-obstante clause. It is
difficult to conceive, having regard to the orders issued
by the Full Bench, that _the Legislature were not aware of
E the orders passed by the High Court. In any event the Full
Bench of the High Court has stated that the directions
issued by it would be subject to the new enactment. [Para
14] (197-C-G]
P. Venugopal v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 1, held
F inapplicable.
National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation of India ·
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 23; Mylapore Club v.
State of T.N. (2005) 12 SCC 752; Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D.
G Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC 298 and Madan Mohan Pathak vs.
Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 50, referred to.
5.1. In a case involving members of the Scheduled .
Tribe living in Scheduled Area the period of limitation can
H
- STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 151
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
be extended, but it is not permissible in respect of an A
area which has not been declared to be a Scheduled
Area. When a person acquires an indefeasible right, he
can be deprived therefrom only by taking recourse to the
doctrine of Eminent Domain. If a person is sought to be
deprived of an indefeasible right acquired by him, he B
should be paid an amount of compensation. In a case of
this nature, therefore, where an amount of compensation
has not actually been tendered, the vendees of the land
could not be deprived of their right to be dispossessed.
In that view of the matter, a distinction must be made c
between a case where an amount of compensation has
been paid and in a case where it has not been. If a vested
right has not been taken away, the question of
applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
would not arise. [Para 15] [208-8-D]
D
5.2. The High Court, however, proceeded to apply
Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the premise that
the provisions of the 1999 Act clearly seek to destroy the
right conferred on Scheduled Area by Act 31 of 1975. The
approach of the High Court being not correct, the same E
cannot be sustained. [Para 15] [208-E-F]
Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity
Inspector & ETIO (2007) 5 SCC 447; Kusumam Hotels
Private Limited v. Kera/a State Electricity Board and Others F
(2008) 13 SCC 213; State of Punjab and Others v. Bhajan
Kaur and Others (2008) 12 SCC 112; Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel
v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Others (2008) 4 SCC 649;
Union of India & Ors. v. Mis. Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd.
(2009 4 SCALE 34 and P. Rami Reddy and Others v. State
G
of Andhra Pradesh and Others (1988) 3 sec 433, relied on.
Jo. /
K. T. Huchegowda v. Dy. Commissioner (1994) 3 SCC
536 and Papaiah v. State of Kamataka (1996) 10 SCC 533,
referred to.
H
152 SUPREME CbURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
edition, page 4888, referred to. · .1! h ·
'I
6.1. The tribals had been out of possession of their
lands. for decades. It was for the elected representatives
of the people to determine as to whether by reason of the
8
provisions of the 1999 Act the members of the Scheduled
Tribe would face dislocation or that it would impinae on
their culture connected with their lands. The ground
realities are presumed to be known to the State and if
anybody raises a contrary contention, it would be for him
C to bring on record sufficient materials to show so as to
enable the co~rt to arrive at a conclusion that the State's
action was arbitrary. [Para 16) [209-H; 210-A-C]
6.2. It is furthermore a well-settled principle of law
D that the s,uperior court in exercise of their power of judicial
review of legislation would not ordinarily determine the
merit of the legislation by entering into a broad question
as to whether materials placed before the Legislature
were sufficient for bringing out the legislation in question
E or not. Such inquisitorial inquiry on the part of the court
is beyond the province of the court. [Para 16) [210-C-D]
7.1. Broadly speaking the provisions of the 1999 Act
are more beneficial to the members of the Scheduled
Tribe. For determining the said question, one must take
F a holistic view of the matter. However, this Court is not
oblivious of the fact that restoration in respect of non-
agricultural land and to the extent of 2 acres are not
contemplated by the 1999 Act. So also on the basis of the
statistics furnished by the State itself that a large number
G of members of the Scheduled Tribe would be deprived of
the benefit of restoration of their own lands constituted
in forest areas. [Para 17) [214-A-C]
7.2. The State has clearly brought on record the fact
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 153
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
f'
that it had conducted further studies wherefrom it came A
to learn that about 12,000 tribal families in the State did
not possess any land of their own and 30,000 families did
not have any house of their own. It is necessary, to bear
in mind that the law postulates grant of compensation in
a case where the right on a land is sought to be taken B
away. The 1975 Act postulates grant of compensation to
the alienees, the amount wherefor was required to be
, determined by a competent authority. The amount of
compensation so determined was to be paid by the
members of the Scheduled Tribe to their vendees in c
respect whereof he was to take loan from the State. The ·
amount of loan taken was, thus, required to be repaid.
The 1999 Act, however, provides for a grant which need
not be repaid. [Para 17] [215-8-E]
-f
7 .3. The members of the Scheduled Tribe were further D
' to get one acre of land from.the State although they might
have transferred even 5 OJ'-10 cents of land. In the case
. ~
of a transfer made upto--t:Wo acres, he is to be allotted two
acres of land by the State. Whether such land is available
with the State Government or not is a different question. E
The statute also contemplates building of houses for the
members of the Scheduled Tribes. It provides that the
land to the extent of one acre also be provided to the
. landless tribals. It contemplates constitution of a
,
rehabilitation fund. The 1999 Act, therefore, if given a F
holistic view, is more beneficial to the members of the
Scheduled Tribe than the 1975 Act. If the State
contemplated a legislative policy for grant of more
benefits to a. vast section of people, taking care of not
only restoration of land but those who have not G
transferred any land at all or otherwise landless, the
statute by no stretch of imagination can be treated,to be
an arbitrary and_an unreasonable one. [Para 17] [215-:.E-
H; 216-A]
H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A 8.1. The cut-off date in terms of the 1975 Act was
1.01.1960. Any transaction which had taken place
between 1960 and 1975 and thereafter had been declared
invalid. Admittedly, even after the provisions thereof
having been given full effect, the members of the
3 Scheduled Tribe had not been put in possession of their
own land for decades. Furthermore, the members of the
Scheduled Tribe are educated and one can safely
presume that most of them are serving various
institutions i!l the State of Kerala and/ or in other parts
c of India. Indisputably, the question of restoration of land
should be considered having regard to their exploitation
and rendering them homeless from the touchstone of
Article 46 of the Constitution of India. For the
•
aforementioned purpose, however, it may be of some
interest to consider that the insistence of autonomy and
0
the view of a section of people that tribals should be
allowed to remain within· their own habitat --and not be
allowed to mix with the outside world would depend
upon the type of Scheduled Tribe category in question.
E Some of them are still living in jungle and are dependant
on the products thereof. Some of them, on the other
hand, have become a part of the mainstream. The
difference between Scheduled Tribes of North-East and
in some cases the Islands of Andaman and Nicobar, on
the one hand, and of those who are on the highlands and
F plains of the Southern regions must be borne in mind.
[Para 18) [224-D-H; 225-A]
8.2. This Court is satisfied that the legislature of
Kerala kept in view the necessity of protecting the interest
G of the small land holders who were in possession and
enjoyment of property which had belonged to tribal
community and at the same time ensured that the tribals
are not thrown out of their land and rendered homeless.
Having regard to the studies conducted by the State
Government and as a balance of interest between tribals
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 155
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
and non-tribals which has been sought to be achieved, A
the provisions of the 1999 Act are intra vires. [Para 18]
[225-8-C]
Narmada Bachao Ando/an v. Union of India and Others
(2000) 10 SCC 664; Ba/co Employees' Union (Regd.) v.
Union of India and Others (2002) 2 SCC 333 and Samatha B
v. State of A.P. (1997) 8 SCC 191, referred to.
Tribes of Kera/a - Identity Crisis by Rayson K. Alex and
Article 12 of the ILO Convention No. 107, referred to.
9. Keeping in view the promises made by the 1999 C
Act, it is obligatory on the part of thet State to provide the
land meant for the members of the Scheduled Tribe. If they
do not have sufficient land, they may have to take
recourse to the acquisition proceedings but this Court
has no doubt in its mind that the State in all situations o
will fulfill its legislative promise failing which the persons
aggrieved would be entitled to take recourse to such ·
remedies which are available to them in law. It is also
made clear that while allotting land to the members of the
Scheduled Tribe, the State cannot and must not allot E
them hilly or other types of lands which are not at all fit
for agricultural purpose. The lands, which are to be
allotted, must be similar in nature to the land possessed
by the members of Scheduled Tribe. If in the past, such
allotments have been made, as has been contended for F
the respondent, the State must allot them other lands
which are fit for agricultural purposes. Such a process
should be undertaken and completed as expeditiously as
possible and preferably within a period of six months
from date. [Para 19] [225-G-H; 226-A-D]
G
10.1. There exists a distinction between a statutory
rule and a Legislative Act. The Legislature did not want
a vacuum to be created. The 1999 Act was enacted
repealing the 1975 Act only for certain purposes. Section
22(2) of the 1999 Act upheld certain actions taken under H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A the 1975 Act as if they had been taken in terms thereof.
The procedure for determining the rights and obligations
of the parties by the Revenue Officers, under both the
Acts, are more or less the same. [Para 20] [227-H; 228-A-
B]
B 10.2. Repeal of a statute, it is well known, is not a
matter of mere form but one of substance·.:lt, however,·
depends upon the intention of the legisl ature. If by
1
reason of a subsequent statute, the legislature intended
to abrogate or wipe off the former enactment, wholly or
C in part, then it would be a case of total or pro tanto repeal.
If the intention· was merely to modify the former
enactment by engrafting an ·exception or granting an
exemption, or by adding conditions, or by restricting,
intercepting or suspending its operation, such
o modification would not amount to a repeal. In this case, +
however, the repealing clause is clear and unambiguous~·
[Para 20] [231-F-G; 232-B] '
A. T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1963
=
SC.928 [1963] Supp (2) SCR 435; B.N. Tiwari v. Union of
E India and others, [1965] 2 SCR 421; West U.P. Sugar Mills
v. State of U.P., (2002) 2 SCC 645; Mohd. Shaukat Hussain
Khan v. State of A.P., (1974) 2 SCC 376 and Indian Express
Newspapers ·v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, relied on.
F 11. Classification between agricultural and non-
agricultural land is a valid one. It is, however, accepted
that all forest areas comprise of the agricultural land. The
State has admittedly no legislative competence to enact
a legislation in exercise of its power of Entry No. 49, List
II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India in
G relation to non-agricultural land. It exists only in terms of
Entry 6, List Ill of the Seventh Schedule of the ..
Constitution of India. While enacting the 1999 Act, the
State could not have deprived the persons who hold non-
agricultural land, having enacted the 1975 Act and, thus,
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 157
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
could not have repealed a portion thereof. Once they A
have made an enactment, the legislative intent is clear
and unambiguous, viz., such exploitation was possible
also in so far as non-agricultural lands are concerned.
Such a right conferred on the owners of the non-
agricultural land, therefore, could not have been taken 8
away without payment of compensation. Jo that extent
the 1975 Act would continue to be applied. The State has
no legislative competence to repeal that portion of the
1975 Act. [Para 21] [232-C-E; G-H; 233-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
c
(19]8) 2 sec 50 referred to Para 6
(1983) 4 sec 45 referred to Para 8
(1996) 1 sec 637 referred to Para 8 D
(1997) 1 sec 326 referred to Para 8
(2000) 6 sec 1 referred to Para 8
1989 (1) KLT 37 referred to Para 11
E
1994 (2) KLT 25 held inapplicable Para 11
(1984) 3 sec 301 held inapplicable Para 11
i (1985) 1 sec 479 held inapplicable Para 11
F
(1988) 3 sec 433 held inapplicable Para 11
(1997) a sec 191 held inapplicable Para 11
AIR 1954 SC 119 held inapplicable Para 12
AIR 1962 SC 1563 held inapplicable Para 12 G
(1954) 1 SCR 1 referred to Para 12
(1977) 4 sec 98 referred to Para 12
(2004) 1 sec 112 referred to Para 12 H
•
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 1'1· S.C.R.
A (2005) 4 sec 214 referred to Para 12 ....
AIR 1961 SC 552 referred to Para 12
AIR 1966 SC 1571 referred to Para 12
(2008) 5 sec 1 held inapplicable Para 14
B
(2003) 5 sec 23 referred to Para 14
(2005) 12 sec 752 referred to Para 14 ~-
(2003) 5 sec 298 referred to Para 14
c
(2001) 5 sec 447 relied on Para 15
(2008) 13 sec 213 relied on Para 15
(2008) 12 sec 112 relied on Para 15
D (2008) 4 sec 649 relied on Para 15
(2009 4 SCALE 34 relied on Para 15 '
(1988) 3 ,sec 433 relied on Para 15
E (1994) 3 sec 536 referred to Para 15
(1996,) 10 sec 533 referred to Para 15
(2000) 1o sec 664 referred to Para 18
(2002) 2 sec 333 . referred to Para 18
F '
(1997) 8 sec 191 referred to Para 18
AIR 1963 SC 928 =
[19G3] Supp (2) SCR 435 relied on Para 20
G [1965] 2 SCR 421 relied on Para 20
(2602) 2 sec 645 relied on Para 20
l.
(1974) 2 sec 376 relied on Para 20
\ i
H (1985) 1 sec 641 relied on Para 20
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 159
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT
CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. A
104-105 of 2001.
From the Judgment & Order dated 24.08.2000 of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in OP Nos. 26499 & 25332 of
1999.
B
WITH
C.A. Nos. 899 & 7079 of 2001.
T.L.V. Iyer,. T.S. Doabia, Rajinder Sachar, G. Prakash,
Dayan Krishnan, Gautam Narayan, Nikhil Nayyar, Sunita
c
. Sharma. Si1weta Garg, K.R. Sasiprabhu, Sanjay Parikh, Jitin
Sahni, A.N. Singh, Anil Shrivastav, Ax Varghese, Baby
Augustine, Jojo A.V., Caveator-ln-Person, Asha G. Nair and
Ashish Gopal Garg for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J.
ISSUE
E
1. Effect of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus issued
by a High Court directing implementation of an enactment vis-
a-vis a subsequent legislation altering or modifying the right of
the beneficiaries under the former Act, inter alia, is the question
involved in these appeals. F
They arise out of a judgment and order dated 24th August,
2000 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala
at Ernakulam.
BACKGROUND FACTS G
.. 2. The State of Kerala enacted the Kerala Scheduled
Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of
Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 (Act No.31 of 1975) (for short 'the
1975 Act') with the object of providing restriction on transfer of H
----i
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A land by Members of Scheduled Tribes in the State of Kerala _,,
and for restoration o( possession of lands alienated by such
members and for matters connected therewith.
The said Act received the assent of the President of India.
It was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India,
8 being item No.150, by the Constitutional 40th Amendment Act.
It was published ln the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary on 14th
November, 1975. However, only on 24th January, 1986 a /o-·
Notification was issued bringing the said Act into force with
retrospective effect from 1st January, 1982.
c
RULES UNDER THE SAID ACT
3. Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of
.lands and Restoration of Alienated Land) Rules, 1986 (1986
Rules) were framed for effective implementation of the 1975
0
Act and Were published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary on
18th Oct0ber, 1986.
PROCEEDINGS
E 4. Members of the Scheduled Tribes filed applications for
restoration of their lands in the year 1988 in terms of the
:< provisions of the 1975 Act and the 1986 Rules.
-l~~s the said Act was not implemented in letter and spirit,
- c - one Dr. Nallathampy Thera filed a writ petition which was
,.,g -marked as O.P. No.8879of1988 praying inter alia for issuance
of a Writ of Mandamus compelling the State to implement the
provisions of the Act and directing the concerned authorities
to deal with e1ndc·dispose of the applications filed therein.
Before the High Court the learned Additional Advocate General
G appearing for the State submitted that :
"utmost steps would be taken for the disposal of the
applications and that the Act would be enforced in all its " '
rigour."
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 161
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
y
Relying on or on the basis of the said statement, O.P. No. A
8879 of 1988 was disposed of by the High C0urt on 15th
October, 1993, inter alia, calling upon the State to give
directions to the Authorities under the 1975 Act to dispose off
the applications pending before them within 6 months from the
said date. B
The State, however, did not comply with the said directions
--\ within the said time frame. Extensions of time were sought for
complying with the said directi'ons. By the said process, a
period of two years lapsed.
c
Another application for extension of time was filed for
implementation of the Act and the High Court granted six
months' time but issued certain directions inter alia for the
purpose of monitoring the progress of the implementation of
the Act. D
The said conditions are as under:-
"(i) The State shall ensure that all the applications are
disposed of within the extended time.
E
(ii) The State shall immediately communicate copies
of this order to the Revenue Divisional Officers of
all the Districts for compliance.
-i
(iii) The Authorities under the Act, i.e., the Revenue
F
Divisional Officers of the concerned Districts shall
file affidavits before this court once in a month
showing the progress achievedin the disposal of
applications during that month. iThe first of these
affidavit showing the progress-made until
G
31.12.199_5 shall be filec;I. before 15.1.1996. The
next of the affidavits ;showing progress till
.... .. 31.1.1996 shall be filed before 15.2.1996 and so
on.
(iv) The State shall provide the necessary back up and H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S,C.R.
A support to the Revenue Divisional Officers to ""
complete the work within the. extended time now
granted.
(v) The State or any of the Revenue Divisional Officers
shall be at liberty to approach this court in the event
B
of any difficulty being felt in disposing off the
applications.
/>-
(vi) It is seen from the affidavit filed by the Government
that the pendency of applications in the Districts of
c Palakkad, Wayanad, ldukki and Kottayam is
unusually large. The Revenue Divisional Officers of
t~ese Districts are directed in particular to dispose
of all the applications within the extended time."
D Applications for restoration of lands which were pending
were disposed of pursuant to the said directions. Appeals were ·/.
filed in a f~w cases but in most of them the orders directing
restoration of lands became final.
1--
Strangely however, no actual restoration of land was
E effected. Another application was filed by the writ petitioner on
•
1st March, 1996 complaining about non-implementation of the
said order. ""
The learned Additional Advocate General once again gave
F an assurance that the order of the authorities under the 1975
Act would be implemented. On or about 28th March, 1996 the
High Court directed :-
"The learned Additional Advocate General assures the
court that all out efforts will be made to dispose of all the ,
~
G pending applications within the time stipulated by this court I
~
and further that wherever there has been final orders
!>
passed, actual restoration will also be formal orders are
~
necessary today. Post on 31.5. 1996." -1
H (emphasis supplied)"
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 163
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Further affidavits were filed by the Revenue Divisional A
Officers reporting progress in the disposal of the applications
made under the Act.
On or about 13th August, 1996 the High Court issued the
following directions :- B
"(1) The Revenue Divisional Officers are directed to cause
~
, 1elivery of the properties covered by orders for restoration
against which, no appeals are pending and in which no
compensation is payable, forthwith and in any event within
six weeks from today. c
(2) In view of the submission that the officers are meeting
with resistance in restoring possession the State and the
District Superintendents of Police of all Districts are
directed to afford the needed protection to the Revenue D
Divisional Officers to carry out their duty of restoring
possession to the Tribals ..
(3) The State and the Collectors of the various Districts are
directed to make available to the Revenue Divisional
Officers the necessary man power and support to carry out E
the implementation of the orders for restoration passed
under the Act.
(4) The Revenue Divisional Officers will file statements
before this court by 30.9.1996 reporting compliance with F
direction No.1"
\
An intra court appeal was preferred thereagainst. The
matter was referred to a Full Bench. An order of stay was
passed relying on or on the basis of a statement made before
G
the Court that amendments to the 1975 Act were proposed to
, { be made.
However, as the President of India declined to give his
assent to the Bill passed by the Legislature of the State of
Kerala for amendment of the said Act, the order of stay was H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A vacated.
The Full Bench on 21st May, 1998 passed the following
order:-
" Heard learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. T.
B Mohammed Youseff and Mr. AX. Varghese, Advocate.
The above application is filed to extend the order of stay
granted in the Writ Appeal for a further period of six
months from 21.5.1998. This Court granted the interim
order of stay since at the time the Bill passed by the
C Legislative Assembly of the State of Kerala was pending
consideration before the Hon'ble President of India. It is
now stated in the ~ffidavit that the Hon'ble President of
India has declined assent to the Bill passed by the State
Legislative Assembly. In the light of the Hon'ble President
D of India having declined assent to the Kerala Scheduled
Tribe (Restriction oh Transfer of Lands and Restoration of
Alienated Lands)Amendment Act, 1996, there is no
justification for .this court extending the order to stay
granted earlier. The interim stay granted earlier is vacated.
E
2. The learned Single .Judge, while disposing of C.M.P.
No. 28950 of 1995 in O.P, 8879 of 1988, was pleased to
grant time till 30.9.1996 for reporting compliance with
direction No.1 in the order. The time was extended from
time to time for compliance with the directions till the order
F
of stay was granted. Now that the order of stay having
been vacated, we grant six months time to the State for
carrying out the direction contained in the order of the
learned single judge dated 13th August 1996, passed in
C.M.P. No. 28950 of 1995, without prejudice to the right
G of the Government in considering the various aspects of.
the matter to bring forward suitable legislation with suitable
)
_changes, .if they so desire."
(emphasis added)
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 165
.. LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
t On or about 23rd November, 19.98 an application for A
initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
was filed against the State and its officers on the premise that
orders of the High Court had not been complied with. A notice
was issued therein. · · · ·
B
A petition was filed by the State for extension of the period
by six months from 21st November, 1998. However, a statement
was made before the Full Bench that a new Bill would be
introduced before the Legislative Assembly in terms whereof
a permanent solution to the problem of alienation of tribal lands
which had taken place during the period from 1.1.1960 and
c
1.1.1986 shall be dealt with. The Full Bench, by its order dated
6th January, 1999, directed :-
"This petition has been filed by the State to extend the time
(sic) granted already by a period of six months from D
21.11.98. We have perused the affidavit and heard the
arguments of both sides. We have also heard Dr. P. Nalla
Thampy Thera. He opposed the petition for extension of
time tooth and nail. This Court has already granted six
month's time. The State has explained the reasons for its E
inability to introduce the new bill within the time granted
earlier. We are satisfied with the reasons given in the
affidavit. It is now stated in the affidavit that the Legislative
Assembly is expected to commence its next session on
22.1.99 and that the new bill formulated by the Government F
will be introduced in this session. According to the
Government, the new bill is expected to find a permanent
solution to the problem of alienation of tribal lands which
had taken for the period from 1.1.1960 to 1.1.1986.
Therefore, they pray that in the interest of justice the State
G
may be granted extension of time to introduce the Bill in
... {
this session.
2. We have considered the rival submissions and are of
the opinion that in the interest of justice, the time already
granted has to be extended by three months from today. H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
......
A As already noticed, the Assembly session is to commence -1
on 22.1.1999 and the State is proposing to introduce the
Bill in this session.
3. In view of the above, the time already granted by this
Court is hereby extended by three months from today. The
B
State shall introducf3 the Bill in this session of the Assembly
and complete all the other formalities within the time now
granted. We make it clear that there will be no further
extension of time .. The State is directed to pay cost of this
petition to Dr. Nalla Thampy Thera which is fixed at
c Rs.5000/-, by way of demand draft drawn in his name,
within three weeks from today."
(emphasis supplied)
D WRIT PROCEEDINGS
-t--
5. Indisputably the Legislature of the State thereafter
enacted the Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and Restoration
of Lands to the Scheduled Tribes Act, 1999 (for short 'the 1999
Act'), which inter alia deals with transfer and alienation of
E agricultural lands.
Constitutional validity of the 1999 Act, specially the proviso
~ppended to Section 5(1), Section 5(2), Section 6 and Section
22 were challenged by filing two writ petitions; one marked as
F O.P. No.25332 of 1999 filed by Niyamvedi, respondent No.1
in Civil Appeal No.105 of 2001 and another 0.P; No.26499 of
1999 by Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kerala State Unit,
respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.104 of 2001 .
. In the aforesaid writ petitions counter-affidavits were filed
G
on behalf of the Union of India supporting the stand of the
tribes.
>
Malayora Karshaka Federation (appellant before us in -~
C.A. No.899 of 2001) was impleaded as a party therein. By
H reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 24th August,
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
.
-;.
A "In the light of our discussion as above, we declare the
proviso to Section 5(1), Section 5(2), Section 6 and
Section 22 of the Kerala Restriction on Transfer by and
Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1999, Act
12 of 1999 as unconstitutional and void. We strike down
B the proviso to Section 5(1), Section 5(2), Section 6 and
Section 22 of Act 12of1999. We direct the State and the
Authorities under Act 31 of 1975 to implement the orders
for restoration passed ur:ider the Kerala· Scheduled Tribes
.-
(Restriction of Transfer of land and Restoration of
c Alienated Lands) Act, 1975,,..Act 31 of 1975 and restrain
the State and the Authorities under Act 12 of 1999 from
enfprcing the proviso to S!3Ction 5(1 ), Section 5(2), Secti~n
6 and Section 22 of Act 12 of 1999."
THE APPEALS BEFORE US
D
·~
7. Civil Appeal Nos. 104-105 of 2003 have been filed by
the State of Kerala against the common judgment and order
dated 24th August, 2000 passed by a Division Bench of the
Kerala High Court in O.P. Nos. 25332 and 26499 of 1999 filed
E by Niyamavedi and Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Kerala
State Unit striking down the proviso to Section 5(1 ), Section .
5(2), Section 6 and Section 22 of the 1999 Act.
Civil Appeal No.899 of 2001 has been filed by Malayora
Karshaka Federation Kerala Meenangadi (respondent No.7
F before the High Court in O.P. No.25332 of 1999) against the
aforesaid order dated 24th August, 2000.
Civil Appeal No.7079 of 2001 has been filed by M. Mohan
Kumar, Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala against the
G order dated 4th December, 2000 passed by a Division Bench
of the High Court in C.C.C. No. 542of1986 whereby the Court
directed the appellant to appear before it for framing charges >
against him in not complying with the final direction issued by '
~
the Court on 18th December, 1999.
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 169
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.)
CONTENTIONS A
8. Mr. T.L. Viswanath Iyer, learned senior counsel and
Mr.Dayan Kishnan, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the
appellants would submit:-
(i) The High Court committed a manifest error in ,_B
holding that the 1999 Act suffers from the vice of
colourable exercise of power or is otherwise mala
fide despite holding that the Legislature of the State
of Kerala had the requisite legislative competence
~~~ c
(ii) The members of the Scheduled Tribes had no
. fundamental or common law right to obtain
restoration of possession of their lanqs which had
already been alienated. · o
(iii) Such a right having been conferred upon them by
reason of the provisions of 1975 Act, the same
could be taken away and/or modified or altered by
reason of a subsequent Act which comes within
Entry 18 of the List II of Seventh Schedule of the E
Constitution of India.
(iv) Only because non.agricultural lands had been kept·
out of purview of 1999 Act, the same by itself did
not attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution F
of India..
(v) The provisions of the 1999 Act being more
beneficial compared to the provisions of 1975 Act,
only because the tribes would be allotted lands G
outside their original habitants, the same would not
attract Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
particularly when they would be getting 2 hectares
of land as also grant for payment of compensation
to the land holder in stead and place of repayable
amount of loan as provided for in the 1975 Act. H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
i
A (vi) ·Keeping in view the nature of mandamus issued by
the High Court in the earlier round of litigation, it
would not mean that the State was not precluded
from amending or repealing the 1975 Act.
(vii) The decision of this Court in Madan Mohan Pathak
B
(supra) and Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State
of Bihar, [ (1983) 4 SCC 45 ] having been
explained in Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of
Kera/a, [(1996) 7 SCC 637] as also a Constitution
Bench of this Court in State of Tamilnadu v.
c Arooran Sugars Ltd., [ (1997) 1 SCC 326 ], the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
(viii) The tribals in whose favour the orders of restoration
had been passed having not filed any writ petition,
D it must be presumed that they were not aggrieved
lo·
by the provisions of the 1999 Act, particularly in
view of the fact that their association had been
consulted by the Government Officials and in that
view of the matter the writ petitioner - association
E had no locus standi to maintain the public interest
litigation having regard to Baba Charan Dass
Udhasi v. Mahant Basant Das Babaji Che/a Baba
Laxmandas Udasi Sadhu [(2000) 6. SCC 1].
(x) In any event, a declaration by a Superior Court that
F a subsequent statute is ultra vires would not wipe
off the earlier statute automatically.
(xi) The purchasers· of land having acquired the
prope~ies in 1950s must be held to have acquired
G an indefeasible right over the same and thus the
1975 Act even to that extent was not applicable.
,)
·. Mr. Rajinder Sachar, learned senior counsel appearing on I--
behalf of respondents in C.A. Nos. 104-105 of 2001, on the
other hand, would contend:-
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 171
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
(i) The 1999 Act being in the teeth of the mandamus A
issued by the High Court has rightly been held to
be unconstitutional in view of the fact that nothing
has been brought on record to show that the 1999
Act was enacted by the legislature despite
knowledge that the directions issued by the High B
Court had attained finality.
(ii) The 1975 Act having conferred a right of restoration
on the Members of the Scheduled Tribes, both in
respect of agricultural and non-agricultural lands,
the provisions of 1999 Act and in particular Section
c
6 thereof having confined i's operation only to
agricultural land and that to9 with retrospective
effect from 24th January, 1986, must be held to be
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
D
(iii) The Members of the Scheduled Tribes being mostly
residents of forests and the lands restored in their
favour being forest lands, no legal infirmity was
committed by the High Court in holding that the
tribals; the community being weakest of weak, E
should not be deprived therefrom having regard to
their constitutional right of ·1ife as adumbrated in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India .
. (iv) As from the statistics furnished by the State itself it
F
would appear that only about 1O percent of the
applicants had more than 2 hectares of land, the
right of restoration of the marginal farmers could not
have been taken away.
(v) Once a statutory protection is granted to the G
beneficiaries, the same could not have been
withdrawn.
......." " Mr. Verghese, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.899 of 2001 supplementing
H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
A the arguments of Mr. Sachar urged: ~
(i) That the Members of Scheduled Tribes having
come under attack by economically more advanced
and politically more powerful ethnic groups who
infiltrated into tribal regions in search of land and
B
new economic possibilities, keeping in view Article
46 of the Constitution of India, they were entitled to
restoration of land in terms of the judgment of the ,,.
High Court passed ,in O.P. No.8879 of 1988.
c (ii) Provisions of 1975 Act having been found to be
constitutionally valid, the accrued and vested rights
of the tribals could not have been taken away by
reason of 1999 Act or otherwise.
0 (iii) The Writ-Petitioner - association having been
fighting for the cause of the tribals for a long time,
it cannot be said that they had no locus standi to
file the public interest litigation.
(iv) Even the Union of India having supported the case
E of the tribals,· there is no reason as to why this Court
should interfere with the impugned judgment.
(v) The 1999 Act being not a validating statute, the
impugned judgment is unassailable, particularly •
F having regard to ·the objective of 1975 Act vis-a-vis
1999 Act.
(vi) It is incorrect to contend that the State before
enactment of 1999 Act consulted the true
representatives of the tribals.
G
(vii) In any view of the matter as the members of the
tribal community became entitled to restoration of )
their land by reason of the provisions of the 1975
Act, there was no reason as to why the original land
'-
H would not be restored to them.
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 173
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
The 1975 ACT A
9. The 1975 Act was enacted by the State in terms of Entry
6 of List Ill of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
Section 2 contains interpretation clauses defining the terms
specified therein. B
Section 2(b) defines 'immovable property' to include
standing crops and trees but does not include growing grass.
'Scheduled tribe' has been defined in Section 2(e) to C
· mean any of the Scheduled Tribes relating to the State as
specified in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950~
Section 2(g) defines 'transfer' as under :-
" 'transfer' , in relation to immovable property, means an D
act by which immovable property, is conveyed to any
documentary or oral transaction, whether by way of
mortgage with or without possession, lease, sale, gift or
exchange, or in any other manner, not being a
testamentary disposition; and includes a charge, E
'vilapanayam', 'unduruthi', contract relating to immovable
property, mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of crops or
standing trees on payment of consideration or otherwise,
voluntary surrender and abandonment.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause. - F
(i) "vilapanyam" means hypothecation of traps ori
payment of consideration or otherwise;
(ii) "unduruthi" means an assignment of the right to G
collect the usufructs available or anticipated to be
available to any land during specified term for a
specified price."
Section 4 imposes restrictions on transfer by providing a
non obstante clause in terms whereof after the commencement H
174 ·suPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
A of the Act any transfer effected by a member of the Scheduled
Tribe of immovable property posses~ed, enjoyed or owned by
him to a person other than a member of a Scheduled Tribe,
without the previous consent in writing of the competent
authority, would be invalid.
B
Section 5 of the Act invalidated certain transfers made by
tribals to persons other than tribals after the first of January,
1970 and before commencement of the Act:-
"5. Certain transfers to be invalid - Notwithstanding
c anything to the contrary contained in any other law for time
being in force, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in
any judgment, decree or order of any court, any transfer
of immovable property possessed, enjoyed or owned by
a member of a Scheduled Tribe to a person other than a
D mernber of a Scheduled Tribe. effected on or after the 1st
day of January, 1960, and before the commencement of
this Act' shall be deemed to be invalid."
Under SeCtion 6of the 1975 Actrnembers of the Schedule
E Tribes became entitled to restoration of possession of the
properties, transfers which stood invalidated by operation of
Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act. It provided for applications
to be made by the Tribals for restoration of alienated lands to
the Revenue Divisional Officer within the time prescribed
_therefor. The Revenue Divisional Officer was to make enquiries
F and after being satisfied with the application of the Act was to
direct restoration of possession to the applicant.
Section 6 which is material for our purpose, inter alia,
reads as under:-
G
"6. Reconveyance of property - (1) Where by reasons of
a transfer of immovable property which is invalid under
Section 4 or Section 5, a member of a Scheduled Tribe
has ceased or ceases to be in possession or enjoyment
thereof he shall be entitled to the restoration of possession
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 175
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
or enjoyment, as the case may be of such property. A
(2) Any person entitled to be restored to the
possession or enjoyment of any immovable property under
sub-section (1) or any other person on his behalf may make
an application, either orally or in writing to the Revenue 8
Divisional Officer within a period of one year from the date
of commencement of this Act or such further period as may
• be specified by Government by notification in the Gazette
fci) fOf restoration of possession, or enjoyment, as C
the case may be, of such property, if such transfer had
been made; before the date of commencement of this Act.
(b) for restoration of possession
or enjoyment, as the case may be, of such property and o
for the prosecution ofthe person-who has procured such
transfer, if such transfe(was made on or after the date of
commencement of this Act."
Section 11 provides for liability to pay amount.
E
Section 12 provides for advancement of loan by the
Government for payment of the amount ·on such terms and
conditions as has been laid down under sub-sections (2) and
• (3) thereof.
F
The Act also prescribed offences and provided for
penalties etc.
Section 22 contains the rule making power.
1999 ACT G
The 1999 Act was published in the Kerala Gazette
-f · Extraordinary on 20th April, 1999. It was given a retrospective
effect and retroactive operation from 24th January, 1986.
'Land' has been defined in 2(b) to mean any agricultural H
176 SUPREMe COURT REPORTS [2009] .11 S.C.R.
A land. 1
Section 5.of the Act reads as under:-
"5. Certain transfer to be invalid -
B (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
·any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract.
custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of.
any court, any transfer of land possessed, enjoyed or >
c
owned by a member of a Scheduled Tribe to a person
other than a member of a Scheduled Tribe, effected on or
r
after ther 1st day of January, 1960, and before the
commencement of this Acf shall be deemed to be invalid: I
I
,.....
Provided that nothing in this section shall render
invalid any transfer of land possessed, enjoyed or owned
D
by a member of a Scheduled Tribe to a person other than
a member of a Scheduled Tribe effected during the •
aforesaid period and the extent of which does not exceed t
jl
two hectares.
)-:
E (2) Notwithstanding. anything contained in sub-section ( 1)
or in any judgment, decree or ord~r of any Court or other
authority, in cases where the land involved in such transfer
is used for agricultural purposes, the transferee thereof
shall be entitled to retain in his possession the said land ...
F upto an extent of two hectares which shall be demarcated
by the Revenue Divisional Officer by order and in the )-
manner as may be prescribed."
Section 6 providing for allotme_nt of lands reads thus:-
G "6. Allotment of lands.- Notwithstanding anything contained
in section 5 or in any judgment, decree or order of any
Court or other authority, a member of a Scheduled Tribe ).
who had effected any transfer of land, possessed, enjoyed
or owned by him, to a person other than a member of a
H Scheduled Tribe, between the 1st day of January, 1960
·.~
~
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 177
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
and the 24th day of January, 1986 and where an A
application for restoration of right under Section 6 of the
Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction of Transfer of Lands
and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 (31 of
1975) has been filed before publication of this Act in the
Gazette, but the possession or enjoyment thereof, has not B
been restored to him and such transfer has been validated
by the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 5 or the
transferee thereof has been made eligible for the retention
of said land under sub-section (2) of Section 5, shall be
entitled to restoration of equal extent of land by way of c
allotment from the Government:
Provided that where the extent of the land so allotted
in respect of which there is eligibility for restoration of
rights, is less than forty ares, Government shall allofthe rest
of the land required to make the total extent equal to forty D
ares (One acre)."
Section 8 providing for liability to pay amount reads :-
"8. Liability to pay amount.-
E
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force, where the possession
or enjoyment of any land is restored to a member
of a Scheduled Tribe under this Act, an amount
equal to the aggregate of the actual amount of F
consideration received by such member at the time
of the transfer and an amount determined by the
competent authority for improvements, if any, made
after the transfer and before such restoration shall
be paid by him to the person from whom G
possession or enjoyment, as the case may be, was
restored, in accordance with the rules made under
this Act:
Provided that no amount shall be payable if the H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.
i
A transfer was effected on or after the
commencement of this Act.
(2) The amount determined by the competent authority
under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be
called in question in any court.
B
t
(3) The amount payable under sub-section (1)"shall be Ir-
recoverable in such manner as may b'e prescribed. 1
'\
Section 10 provides for assignment of land, which reads:-
c "10. Assignment of land.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 6 or
in the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act,
• 1960 (30of1960) and the rules issued thereunder,
D , the Government shall assign land to the landless ,,
families of the Scheduled Tribes in the State, an
extent not exceeding forty ares of land. in. the district
they reside within a period of two years from the
date of publication of this Act in the Gazette, or
E such further period as may be specified by
Government by notification in the Gazette, and 'in the
manner as may be prescribed.
(2) Where the extent of the land in the pos$ession and
·-·
J
f
enjoyr:nent of any family of the Scheduled Tribe in
F
the State, is less than 40 Ares such family shall be
entitled to get assigned more land which is
·necessary to make the total extent of the land equal
to 40 Ares."
G Section 11 provides for constitutio·n of Scheduled Tribe
Rehabilitation and Welfare Fund and utilization thereof.
Section 21 provides for power to make Rules.
Section 22 is the Repealing and Saving clause
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 179
f LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.S. SINHA, J.]
It reads as under:- A
i•22. Repeal and saving.-
(1) The Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on
Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated
Lands) Act, 1975 (31 of 1975) is hereby repealed. B
(2) Notwithstandii'tg the repeal of the said Act, all orders
issued by the competent authority or the Revenue
Divisional Officer, so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to c
have been made under the corresponding
provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in
force accordingly unless and until superseded by
anything done or any action taken under this Act.
Every proceedings pending before a Court on a D
complaint under Section 14 of the said Act shall be
deemed as a proceeding under the corresponding
provisions of this Act and shall be continued
accordingly."
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF 1999 ACT E
.. LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP
11. The validity of .1975 Act is not in question. It, having
regard to its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution
F
of India by Constitution 40th Amendment Ac, 1976 read with
Article 31 B which precludes an attack to the provisions of such
an enactment on th~ ground that it violates any provisions of
Part Ill of the Constitution of India, the validity thereof was upheld
by a leaned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Bhavani
v. State of Kera/a, [1989 (1) KLT _(Short Note Case No.58) at G
..
-~
37].
We may also notice that Jagannadha Rao, C.J. (as His
Lordship then was) in Fr. Thomas Kubukkat v. Union of India,
( 1994 (2) KLT 25] also upheld the provisions of Section 1(3) H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A of 1975 Act stating the said provision to be conditional
legislation and not a delegated legislation.
The Constitutional validity of statutes enacted for the
benefit of the members of Scheduled Tribe by some other State
although not identical has been uph~ld by this Court in
8
Manchegowda and others v. State of Kamataka and others,
[(1984) 3 SCC 301], Lingappa v. State of Maharashtra, [(1985)
1 SCC 479]; P. Rama Reddy v. State of A.P. [ (1988) 3 SCC
433] and Samtha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [ (1997) 8 SCC
c 191 ].
These decisions have been rendered on statutes which
are not absolutely identical. All of which are not in pari materia
with the other.
D However, we may notice that in Manchegowda (supra) this
Court held:-
"19. We have earlier noticed that the title which is acquired
by a transferee in the granted lands, transferred in
contravention of the prohibition against the transfer,of the
E granted lands, is a voidable title which in law is liable to
be defeated through appropriate action and possession
of such granted lands transferred in breach of the condition
of prohibition could be recovered by the grantor. The right
F
or property which a transferee acquires in the granted
lands, is a defeasible right and the transferee renders
himself liable to lose his right or property at the instance
of the grantor. We have further observed that by the
•
enactment of this Act and particularly Section 4 and
Section 5 thereof, the Legislature is seeking to defeat the
G defeasible right of the transferee in such lands without the
process of a prolonged legal action with a view to speedy
resumption of such granted lands for distribution thereof
to the original grantee or their legal representatives and
in their absence to other members of the Scheduled
H Castes and Scheduled Tribes communities. In our opinion,
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 181
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
this kind of defeasible right of the transferee in the granted A
lands cannot be considered to be property as
contemplated in Articles 31 and 31-A. The nature of the
right of the transferee in the gr~nted lands on transfer of
such lands in breach of the condition of prohibition relating
to such transfer, the object of such grant and the terms B
thereof, also the law governing such grants and the object
~nd the scheme of the present Act enacted for the benefit
of the weaker sections of our community, clearly go to
indicate that there is in this case no deprivation of such
right or property as may attract the provisions of Articles c
31 and 31-A of the Constitution."
We are not concerned with the constitutional validity of
1975 Act. We would at an appropriate stage deal with the
matter in regard to the effect thereof.
ii D
COLOURABLE LEGISLATION
12. We have noticed hereinbefore that the Division Bench
of the High Court has upheld the legislative competence of the
Legislature of the State"of Kerala. We, therefore, really at pains
E
to understand as to how the doctrine of 'Colourable Legislation'
could be invoked by the learned Judge of the High Court.
"- The doctrine of 'Colourable Legislation" is directly
connected with the legislative competence of the State.
Whereas the 1975 Act was enacted in terms of Entry 6 List Ill F
of t~e S~venth Schedule of the Constitution of India providing
for transfer of lands; the 1999 Act was enacted in terms of Entry
18 List II thereof. It reads as under:-
"18. Land, that is to say, right in or over land, land tenures, G
including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the
-+ ~'
collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural
land ; land improvement and agricultural loans;
\
colonization."
=S
The 1999 Act, thus, having confined itself to 'agricultural H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 1t S.C.R.
A land', indisputably the State Legislature only has the requisite
legislative competence therefor.
It is one thing to say that an enactment suffers from vice
of colourable legislation on the premise that it does not have
legislative competence but it is another thing to say that only
8
because the Act was amended purporting to nullify an earlier
Act (in the words of the High Court), the same by itself would
attract the said doctrine.
For invoking the doctrine of 'Colourable Legislation' the
C legislature must have transgressed the limits of its constitutional
power patently, manifestly and directly.
The doctrine of 'Colourable Legislation', in our opinion, has
no application in the instant case. The said doctrine is founded
0 on legislative competence of the State. An act of mala fide on ~
the part of the legislature also is beyond the province of judicial
review. In fact no motive can be attributed to the Legislature
for enacting a particular statute. The question in regard to the
constitutionality of the statute must be considered keeping in
E view only the provisions of the Constitut1on.
In K. C. Gajapathi Narayan Oeo v. The State of Orissa
[(1954) 1 SCR 1), this Court held:
"9. It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of
F colourable legislation does not involve any question of
bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The
whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of
competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular
law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law,
G the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant.
On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the
question of motive does not arise at all. Whether a statute
is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power." ·
In R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat and Others v. Ajit
H Mills Limited and Another [(1977) 4 SCC 98), this Court held
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 183
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
as under: A
"2. A prefatory caveat. When examining a legislation from
the angle of its vires, the Court has to be resilient, not rigid,
forward-looking, not static, liberal, not verbal - in
interpreting the organic law of the nation. We must also B
remember the constitutional proposition enunciated by the
U.S. Supreme Court iri Munn v. lllinois1 viz. "that courts do
0
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies". Moreover, while
trespasses will not be forgiven, a presumption of C
constitutionality must colour judicial construction. These
factors, recognised by our Court, are essential to the
modus vivendi between the judicial and legislative
branches of the State, both working beneath the canopy
of the Constitution.
D
*** *** ***
13. Bearing in mind the quintessential aspects of the rival
contentions, let us stop and take stock. The facts of the
case are plain. The professed object of the law is clear.
E
The motive of the legislature is irrelevant to castigate an
Act as a colourable device. The interdict on public mischief
and the insurance of consumer interests against likely,
albeit, unwitting or "ex abundanti cautela" excesses in the
working of a statute are not merely an ancillary power but
surely a necessary obligation of a social welfare state. One
F
potent prohibitory process for this consummation is to
penalize the trader by casting a no-fault or absolute liability
to "cough up" to the State the total "unjust" takings snapped
up and retained by him "by way of tax" where tax is not so
due from him, apart from other punitive impositions to deter G
and to sober the merchants whose arts of dealing with
customers may include "many a little makes a mickle'. If
these steps in reasoning have the necessary nexus with
the power to tax under Entry 54 List 11, it passes one's
comprehension how the impugned legislation can be H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A denounced as exceeding legislative competence or as a
"colourable device" or as "supplementary; not
complementary'."
[See also Dharam Dutt and others v. Union of India,
[(2004) 1 sec 712]."
8
The principles of determining the constitutionality of statute +
has been stated in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd. v. Union of
India, [(2005) 4 sec 214 ] thus:-
c "28. Having determined the parameters of the two
legislative entries the principles for determining the
constitutionality of a statute come into play. These
principles may briefly be summarised thus:
(a) The substance of the impugned Act must be looked 7·
D at to determine whether it is in pith and substance within
a particular entry whatever its ancillary effect may be
[Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd.,
AIR at p. 65, A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, State of
Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, Katra Educational Society v.
E State of U.P., D.C. Johar & Sons (P) Ltd. v. STO and
Kannan Devan Hills Produce v. State of Kera/a].
(b) Where the encroachment is ostensibly ancillary
but in truth beyond the competence of the enacting
F authority, the statute will be a colourable piece of
legislation and constitutionally invalid (A. S. Krishna v.
State of Madras, A.B. Abdul Kadir v. State of Kera/a, SCC
at p. 232 and Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Assn. of
India v. Union of India, SCC at p. 651). If the statute is
legislatively competent the enquiry into the motive which
G
persuaded Parliament or the State Legislature into
passing the Act is irrelevant (Dharam Dutt v. Union of
India).
(c) Apart from passing the test of legislative
H competency, the Act must be otherwise legally valid and
-- STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 185
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
would also have to pass the test of constitutionality in the A
,,,.....
sense that it cannot be in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution nor can it operate extraterritorially. (See
Poppatla/ Shah v. State of Madras.)"
Has the legislature of the State of Kerala transgressed the B
limitations of its constituti.anal power, as has been held by the
High Court, is the question?
We have pointed out heretobefore that the doctrine of
colourable legislation is strictly confined to the question of
legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact a c
statute. Once it was opined by the High Court that having regard
to Entry 51, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution
of India, the Legislature of the State of Kerala had the requisite
legislative competence to enact the 1999 Act, that should have
been held to be the end of the matter. The High Court could D
not have, in our respectful opinion, entered into the said
question through a side-door so as to hold that the
transgression of the limitations of constitutional power may be
disguised, covert or indirect.
E
The High Court, in our opinion, again with utmost respect,
has committed a fundamental error in failing to keep a
distinction in mind in regard to the power of a law making
authority which is of a qualified character and the power granted
to a legislative authority which is absolutely without any limitation
F
and restriction, being plenary in character.
A statute in view of the decision of this Court in Gujarat
Ambuja Cements Ltd. (supra), in the event of it being held
within the ambit of the legislative competence of the State, could
be declared ultra vires only on the premise that it is violative of G
the provisions of Part Ill of the Constitution of India or any other
-· provisions but not on the ground of colourable exercise of power
or mala fide on the part of the legislature. The object, purpose
or design referred to by the High Court should be taken into
consideration for the purpose of examining its constitutionality H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
A on the touchstone of ~he provisions of Part 111 of the Constitution
of India a!ld not otherwise. In that view of the matter, the High
Court committed a serious error in relying upon Dwarkadas
Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving
Company Ltd. and Others [AIR 1954 SC 119] and Jagannath
B Baksh Singh v. State of UP. [AIR 1962 SC 1563], which did
not deal with the question of legislative competence of the
legislature of a State, as was the question before the High
Court.
C No material was placed before the High Court to establish
that the 1999 Act was confiscatory in nature.
It is one thing to say that a citizen of India having been
conferred with a right on lands by reason of a statutory
provision, has been deprived therefrom without payment of any
D compensation and, thus, the same would be violative of Article
300A of the Constitution of India, but, it is another thing to say
that on that ground alone the legislation should be befd to be a
colourable one.
E We have adverted to the statement of Objects and
Reasons of the 1_999 Act. The legislature had a broad object
in mind. Whether the Act stands the scrutiny of limitations of
the- State's- power so as to achieve its object and purpose is
one question, but, it is another question that while doing so it
has adopted a device and a cloak to confiscate the property
F of the citizen taxed as was the case in K. T. Moopil Nair v. State
of Kera/a [AIR 1961 SC 552].
The High Court in its judgment has referred to
Shankaranarayana v. State of Mysore [AIR 1966 SC 1571]. But,
G in our opinion, and with utmost respect, it again failed to apply
the pr~nciples laid down therein correctly. Therein itself the court ._
had noted that if the legislature is competent to pass a particular
law, the motives which impel it to pass the same become really
irrelevant.
H-
STATE QF, KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 187
I
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
The High Court furthermore committed a serious error A
insofar as it made an incidental observation that the tribals who
enjoy the protection of Constitution of India and sought to be
protected by the 1975 Act could not have been denied the
benefits under the 1999 Act, which in our opinion, was not a
relevant question. B
The provisions of the Constitution in this behalf are
enabling in nature. When a constitutionality of an enactment
comes to be questioned, the superior courts are required to
pose unto themselves the right question.
c
- The question, in our opinion, should have been whether the
statute is valid having been enacted to achieve the
constitutional goal set out not only in Part Ill of the Constitution
of India but also Part IV and IVA thereof.
D
The rights conferred upon the class of persons including
the protected class, in terms of 1975 Act, were statutory in
nature. They cannot be categorized as plainly constitutional
rights. It is one thing to say that some rights are constitutional
in nature/origin being part of the expansive regime of Article
E
21, but, it would not be correct to raise the same to the exalted
status of constitutional rights. A right which primarily flows from
. a statute, cannot claim its constitutional pedigree to become a
constitutional threshold, against which constitutionality of a
statute can be tested. It is trite that a right which may be
conferred by a statute can also be taken away by another.
F
It is also a trite law that the State is entitled to change its
legislative policy having regard to the ground realities and
changing societal condition. In fact, the legislature is expected
to take steps for enacting a new statute or amending the same G
• so as to keep pace with the changing societal condition as well
as taking into consideration the development of law, both
domestic and international.
The High Court, in our opinion, furthermore committed a
H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] (1 S.C.R.
A serious error in opining that although the legislature had the
legislative competence to enact Act 12 of 1999, but
nevertheless, proviso to Sections 5(1) and 5(2) thereof would
be held to be colourable. The High Court should have examined
the question of their constitutionality on the touchstone of
B Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and not on the ·
premise that the said provisions are colourable in nature.
PRESIDENTIAL ASSENT
13. It was held by the High Court that Presidential Assent
C was necessary and the 1999 Act was enacted to by-pass the
mandatory requirement of the President's Assent. In
determining the said issue, it again ought to have posed unto
itself the right question, viz., whether the Presidential Assent
was necessary for enacting a statute which came within the
D purview of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of
India. The answer thereto must be rendered in negative.
The 1975 Act dealt with both agricultural and non-
agricultural lands. Transfer of land comes within the purview of
E. Entry 6, List Ill of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of
India. There exists a Parliamentary Act in that behalf, as for
example, Transfer of Property Act. Only because the 1975 Act
could be held to be in conflict with the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act, the Presidential Assent was necessary having
regard to Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India
F but once the said statute is repealed and in its place a new
Act is brought on the statute book, which comes strictly within
the purview of Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India, no Presidential Assent would be
necessary. Presidential Assent would be necessary for the
G purpose of amendment of the Act and not for enacting a
separate statute which came within the purview of a different
entry and a different List.
It is furthermore well-known that Article 254 of the
H Constitution of India would be attracted only in a case where
.. STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNl.Ot:J FOR CIVIL 189
~ LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
two statutes are enacted under the Concurrent List, viz., one A
"' by the State Legislature and the other by the- Parliament of
India, and not in any other case.
EFFECT OF ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
B •
14. Before adverting to the said question, we may notice:
the background facts leading to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus.
Admittedly the State was not implementing the provisions
of the 1975 Act. Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera filed O.P. No.8879 c
of 1988 for direction upon the State and its officers to
implement the provisions of the 1975 Act. The learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the Stat~ gave an
undertaking to the effect that "utmost steps would be taken for
the disposal of the applications and that the Act would be D
enforced in all its rigour'', on the basis whereof the Original
Petition was allowed on 15th October, 1993 directing the State
to give directions to the Authorities under the Act to dispose
of the applications pending before them within six months of
that date. ., ' E
As the State had taken extension of time by an order
-4
dated 13th August, 1996, a learned Single Judge, inter alia,
directed the Revenue Divisional Officers to cause delivery of
the properties covered by orders for restoration against which
no appeals were pending and in which no compensation was F
payable, forthwith and in any event within six weeks from that
date.
A writ appeal was preferred thereagainst and an interim
order of stay was passed on 11th October, 1996. Th~ matter G
was referred to a Full Bench. We have noticed heretobefore
the order dated 25th November, 1998.
We have also noticed the order of the Full Bench dated
6th January, 1999.
H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R. ...
A The High Court was, thus, aware of fhe impending
legislation. The extension of time was subject to a new
legislation.
The 1975 Act was a conditional legislation. It came into
• foree with eff-ect from 24th January, 1986. Directions were
B
issued only tn regard to implementation of the statutory
'
provisions It was not a case where by reason of issuance of
writ of mandamus, certain benefits were conferred on a person
or a group of persons.
c In Madan MohanPathak (supra), the Calcutta High Court
had issued a writ of mandamus directing the Life Insurance
Corporation to pay annual cash bonus to Class 111 and Class
IV employees for years April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 along
with their salary for the month of April, 1976 as provided by the
D Settlement:The said decision attained finality as Letters Patent
Appeal pryferred thereagainst had been withdrawn by the Life
Insurance Corporation. In the meantime a Parliamentary Act,
known as Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of
Settlement) Act, 1976 came into force.
E
In the said factual backgrounds, it was held :-
"7. But before we proceed further, it would be convenient
I-
at this stage to refer to one other contention of the
petitioner based on the judgment of the, Calcutta High Court
F in Writ Petition 371 of1976. The contentionwas that since
the Calcutta High Court had by its judgment dated May 21,
1976 issued a writ of mandamus directing the Life
Insurance Corporation to pay annual cash bonus to Class
Ill and Class IV employees for the year April 1, 1975 to
G March 31, 1976 along with their salary for the month of
April, 1976 as provided by the Settlement and this )
judgment had become final by reason of withdrawal of the
Letters Patent Appeal preferred against it, the Life
Insurance Corporation was bound to obey the writ of
H mandamus and to pay annual cash bonus for the year April
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 191
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 in accordance with the terms A
of clause 8(!i) of the Settlement. It is, no doubt, true, said
the petitioners, that the impugned Act, if vc.:lid, struck at
clause 8(ii) of the Settlement and rendered it ineffective
and without force with effect from April 1, 1975 but it did
not have the effect of absolving the Life Insurance B
Corporation from its obligation to carry out the writ of
mandamus. There was, according to the petitioners,
nothing in the impugned Act which set at naught the effect
of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court or the binding
character of the writ of mandamus issued against the Life c
lnsuranc? Corporation. This contention of the petitioners
requires_ serious consideration and we are inclined to
accept it.
1. It is significant to note that the~e was no reference
to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the D
Statement of Objects and Reasons, nor any non
obstante clause referring to a judgment of a Court
in Section 3 of the impugned Act. The attention of
Parliament does not appear to have been drawn to
the fact that the Calcutta High Court has already E
issued a writ of mandamus commanding the Life
Insurance Corporation to pay the amount of bonus
for the year April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976. It
appears that unfortunately the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court remained almost unnoticed and F
the impugned Act was passed in ignorance of that
judgment. Section 3 of the impugned Act provided
that the provisions of the Settlement insofar as they
relate to payment of annual cash bonus to Class Ill
and Class IV employees shall not have any force G
or effect and shall not be deemed to have had any
force or effect from April 1, 1975. But the writ of
'
' mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court
directing the Life Insurance Corporation to pay the
amount of bonus for the year April 1, 1975 to March H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
~
A 31, 1976remained untouched by the impugned Act.
So far as the right of Class Ill and Class IV
employees to annual cash bonus for the year April
1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 was concerned, it
became crystallised in the judgment and thereafter
B they became entitled to enforce the writ of
mandamus granted by the judgment and not any
right to annual cash bonus under the Settlement.
This right under the judgment was not sought to be
taken away· by the impugned Act. The judgment ', i
c continued to subsist and the Life Insurance
Corporation was bound to pay annual cash bonus ~
to Class Ill and Class IV employees for the year
April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 in obedience to
the writ of mandamus. The error committed by the
D
Life Insurance Corporation was that it withdrew the .
Letters Patent Appeal and allowed the judgment of
the learned Single Judge to become final. By the
time the Letters Patenf Appeal came up for hearing,
the impugned Act had already come into force and '
I
the Life Insurance Corporation could, therefore, have
I
'
E successfully contended in the Letters Patent '
Appeal that, since the Settlement, insofar as it
provided for payment of annual cash bonus, was
~
annihilated by the impugned Act with effect from
April 1, 1975, Class 111 and Class IV employees
F were not entitled to annual cash bonus for the year ,,.
'
April 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 and hence no writ '
of mandamus could issue directing the Life '
G
Insurance Corporation to make payment of such
bonus. If such contention had been raised, there is
little doubt, subject of course to any constitutional
·-
challenge to the validity of the impugned Act, that i,
the judgment of the learned Single Judge would
have been upturned and the writ petition dismissed. }-
But on account of some inexplicable reason, which
H is difficult to appreciate, the Life Insurance
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 193
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.,
Corporation did not press the Letters Patent A
Appeal and the result was that the judgment of the
learned Single Judge granting writ of mandamus
became final and binding on the parties. It is difficult
to see how in these circumstances the Life
Insurance Corporation could claim to be absolved B
from the obligation imposed by the judgment to
carry out the writ of mandamus by relying on the
impugned Act.".
Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) has been followed in P.
Venugopal v. Union of India, [ (2008) 5 SCC 1 ], wherein it
c
was opined :~
"As in Mohan Pathak case (para 8), as quoted
hereinabove, in the instant case also Parliament does not
seern to have been apprised about the pendency of the D
proceedings before the Delhi High Court and this Court
and declaration made and directions issued by the Delhi
High Court at different stages. In the impugned
amendment, there is no non obstante clause. The
impugned amendment introducing the proviso, therefore, E
cannot be treated to be a validating Act."
A distinction must be made between issuance of writ of
.. mandamus conferring right upon a person or class of persons
and the one directing implementation of the Act. However, in
F
this case while the learned Single Judge of the High Court
issued a direction that the applications filed by the members
of the Scheduled Tribes should be determined by the Revenue
Authorities in terms of the provisions of the 1975 Act; the same,
in our opinion, did not mean that the High Court itself had issued
a writ of mandamus directing restoration of'tfle~_ lands in G
question.
As in most of the cases members of the Scheduled Tribes
have not been paid compensation through their vendees in
terms of the provisions of 1975 Act. They did not a_ttain finality. H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
r
A If that be so, in our opinion question of invoking the decision of
Madan Mohan Pathak (supra) in the factual matrix involved
herein does not· arise.
,.
\-
Further, it is one thing to say that a writ of mandamus shall
B be obeyed despite passing of a subsequent Act as it had
attained finality or that-it had not been brought to the notice of
the Legislature, but it is another thing to say that no writ of
mandamus was issued conferring rights upon the parties.
Directions to implement the provisions of the Act by itself did
not confer any right upon the parties. The lis has to be
c adjudicated upon. It did not attain finality in that sense of the
term.
We may notice that scope of Madan Mohan Pathak
(supra) has been explained in Indian Aluminium Co. (supra),
D stating :-
"49. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, on the
basis of a settlement, bonus became payable by the LIC
to its Class Ill and Class IV employees. In a writ, a Single
E Judge of the Calcutta High Court issued mandamus
directing payment of bonus as provided in the settlement.
During the pendency of letters patent appeal, LIC
(Modification of Settlement) Act, 1976 was-enacted J-
denying bonus payable to the employees. The appeal was •
withd.rawn. The validity of 1976 Act was challenged in this .
F
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. A Bench of •
~
seven Judges had held that Parliament was not aware of
the mandamus issued by the court and it was declared that
the 1976 Act was void and writ of mandamus was issued
to obey the mandamus by implementing or enforcing the
G provisions of that Act and directed payment of bonus in
f
terms of the settleme!lt. It was pointed out that there was 1
'
no reference to the judgment of the High Court in the
·Statement of Objects and Reasons, nor any non obstante
clause referring to the judgment of the Court was made in ;-
H Section 3 of the Act. Attention of Parliament was not drawn
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 195
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.)
to the mandamus issued by the High Court. When the A
mandamus issued by the High Court became final, the
1976 Act was held invalid. Shri R.F. Nariman laid special
emphasis on the observations of learned Chief Justice Beg
who in a separate judgment had pointed out that the basis
of the mandamus issued by the court could not be taken B
away by indirect fashion as obser1ed at p. 743, C to F.
From the observations made by Bhagwati, J. per majority,
it is clear that this Court did not intend to lay down that
Parliament, under no circumstance, has power to amend
the law removing the vice pointed out by the court. Equally, c
the observation of Chief Justice Beg is to be understood
in the context that as long as the effect of mandamus
Issued by the court is not legally and constitutionally made
ineffective, the State is bound to obey the directions. Thus
understood, it is unexceptionable. But it does not mean that
0
the learned Chief Justice intended to lay down the law that
mandamus issued by court cannot at all be made
ineffective by a valid law made by the legislature, removing
the defect pointed out by the court."
Madan Mohan Pathak (supra), thus, stood explained in E
Indian Aluminium Co. v.
State of Kera/a (supra) to be
understood in the context that. as long ·as the effect of
mandamus issued by the court is not legally and constitutionally
made ineffective, the State is boun.d to obey the directions.
F
Yet again, in National Agricultural Coop. Marketing
Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India, [(2003) 5 SCC 23],
explaining Madan Mohan Pathak, it has been held:-
"26. The decision is an authority for the principle that a
judicial decision which has become final inter partes, G
cannot be set at naught by legislative action,· a principle
that is well entrenched. Therefore, if, as has been
contended by the appellant, the High Court in 1981 had in
proceedings between th~ appellant and the Revenue held
that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the deduction H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009} 11 S.C.R.
A under Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) of the Act, and the Revenue f
has not impugned the High Court's decision, that decision
binds the parties for the assessment years in question and
cannot be reopened because of the 1998 Amendment.
This principle, however, does not in any way detract from
B the principle that the legislature may "cure" the statute so
that it more correctly represents its intention. Such curative
legislation does not in fact touch the validity of a judicial
decision which may have attained finality albeit under the
pre-amended law."
c In Mylapore Club v. State of T.N. [ (2005) 12 SCC 752 ),
P.K. Balasubramanyan, J opined-:-
"The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the
legislature and unless those who challenge the legislation
D clearly establish that their fundamental tights under the
Constitution are affected or that the legislature lacked
legislative competence, they would not succeed in their
challenge to the enactment brought forward in the wisdom
of the legislature. Conferment of a right to claim the benefit
E of a statute, being not a vested right, the same could be
withdrawn by the legislature which madg the enactment. It
could not be said that the Amendment Act lacked either
legislative competence or that it is unconstitutional."
Where a new Act is enacted removing the very basis on
F which the High Court made a preceding Act invalid; it matters
not whether the same is not termed as a validating statute or
not. In this case, however, in our opinion, such a question does
not arise as the 1975 Act was not declared to be invalid. ~
G In Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan, [(2003) 5 SCC 298]
this Court held :-
"In order to validate an executive action or any provision
of a statute, it is not sufficient for the legislature to declare
- H that a judicial pronouncement given by a court of law would
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 197
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
not be binding, as the legislature does not possess that A
pgwer. A decision of a court of law has a binding effect
unless the very basis upon which it is given is so altered
that the said decision would not have been given in the
changed circumstances."
B
The reason is not far to seek. The Legislature can not over-
rule a judgment but it can remove the basis on which the
judgment has been rendered.
The Act was implemented both in respect of those who had
two acres of land and those who had more. C
The 1999 Act removes the basis for passing of the
judgments so far as the applications for restoration filed by
Members of the Scheduled Tribes in regard to their lands which
was less than 2 hectares is concerned. o
It provides that the term 'land' would mean 'only agricultural
land' and the application for restoration shall lie only in case
where the extent of the land exceed two hectares. (See Section
2(b) and Section 5 of 1999 Act).
E
Admittedly, the 1999 Act was made effective
retrospectively from 24th day of January, 1986. It contains a
Repeal and Savings clause. In that view of the matter, in our
# opinion, it was not neGessary to term the statute as a validating
statute containing a non-obstante clause. F
It is difficult to conceive, having regard to 'the orders issued
by the Full Bench, that the Legislature were not aware of the
orders passed by the High Court. In any event the Full Bench
of the High Court has stated that the directions issued by it G
would be subject to the new enactment.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that Madan Mohan
Pathak (supra) has no application to the present cases.
H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
'
A YESTED RIGHT VIS-A-VIS ARTICLE 14
15. A vested right has been defined in P. Ramanatha
Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, page 4888, in the
following terms:
8 "Vested rights. Property rights.
The expression 'vested right' means an absolute or
indefeasible right. It is an immediate fixed right in present
or future enjoyment in respect of property. The claim based
c on the vested right or settled expectation to obtain sanction
cannot be set up against statutory provisions. It cannot be
countenanced against public interest and conveniences
which are sought to be served. n
In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.
D Electricity Inspector & ETIO [(2007) 5 SCC 447], this Court
-1
held:
"106. Furthermore, exemption from payment of tax in
favour of the appellants herein would also constitute a right
E or privilege. The expression "privHege" has a wider
meaning than right. A right may be a vested right or an
accrued right or an acquired right. Nature of such a right
would depend upon and also vary from statute to statute.
It has been so held by this Court, while construing Section •
F 6 of the General Clauses Act, in Gurcharan Singh Baldev
Singh v. Yashwant Singh in the following tenns: (SCC
p. 432, para 3)
~
"The. objective of the provision is to ensure protection of
any right or privilege acquired under the repe~led Act. The
G only exception to it is legislative intention to the contrary.
That is, the repealing Act may expressly provide or it may
impliedly provide against continuance of such right,
obligation or liability."
H [See also Kusumam Hotels Private Limited v. Kera/a
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES Ur:-JION FOR CIVIL 199
....... LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.S. SINHA, J.]
~
State Electricity Board and Others (2008) 13 SCC 213 and A
State of Punjab and Others v. Bhajan Kaur and Others (2008)
12 sec 1121
The question as to whether the members of Scheduled
Tribe had a vested right or not, may now be considereEI. The
B
properties were sold by them to persons who were not the
members of the Schedule Tribes long back. Such transactions,
\
when entered into, were valid being not barred by any statute.
The vendees, thus, acquired indefeasible right. They, however,
were invalidated by Section 5 of the 1975 Act. The
consequence of rendition of such transactions as invalid was
c
to restore the lands back to possession of the tribals wherefor
certain procedural requirements were to be complied with. The
1975 Act, however, was only brought into force in 1986, that
too with retrospective effect from 1982. In the meanwhile, many
purchasers again acquired prescriptive rights. It was furthermore D
.,, made effective only when the Rules were framed in 1986.
The right of restoration was of two kinds, one, in respect
of agricultural land and the other in regard to non-agricultural
land. We intend to deal with them separately. Indisputably, E
despite the 1975 Act having been brought in force and the
Rules having been framed for the effective implementation
thereof, the State and the Revenue Officers took no steps for
implementation therefor for a long time. The process started
> only when a writ of mandamus was issued by the High Court. F
For its i_mplementation, the substance of the proceedings has
been noticed by us heretobefore. The 1975 Act and the 1986
Rules provided for several stages. The procedure laid down in
the 1986 Rules consists of filing of application for restoration,
calling for objections, determination of the issues, filing of
G
appeals. Once that stage reached finality, the applicants are
required to pay compensation to the land holder in terms of
Section 9 of the 1975 Act which was a condition precedent
therefor.
The 1975 Act contemplated raising of loan from the H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A government by the members of the Scheduled "Tribe, §YPj~ct
to the conditions laid down in the Rules. The procedure for
grant of loan and consequent payment of compensation to the
owners of land was a pre-condition for actual restoration thereof.
When, thus, loans are raised and amount of compensation
8
is paid to the transferees~ in our opinion, only then the vested
right for getting back possession of the lands gets accrued and
not prior thereto. We say so because the 1975 Act itself
provides for a statute depriving the land holders from a right of
property, which is otherwise protected by reason of Article 300-
c A of the Constitution of India. It is also a human right. [See
Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and
Others (2008) 4 SCC 649 and Union of India & Ors. v. Mis.
Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd. [(2009 4 SCALE 34)
0 The provisions of the 1975 Act, therefore, deserve ~trict
construction. Although we are- not required to consider th(j
validity of the 1975 Act stricto sensu, we may place on record
that even the decisions of this Court have declared similar
provisions to be intra vires.
E
Before, however, we advert thereto, we would like to make
some general observations.
No territory in the State of Kerala has been declared as
Scheduled Area within the meaning of Article 244 read with the 4.
F Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India. A distinction, thus,
must be borne in mind in regard to the enactments which deal
with tribal areas and which do not. If a law (e.g. Scheduled Area
Regulation Act) deals with the tribal areas, the same amends
provisions of the other Acts including the Limitation Act, 1963.
G If a person is in possession of a land, which he had obtained
by reason of a valid transaction as it then was, which was
subsequently sought to be invalidated, he would ordinarily
receive protection by reason of doctrine of prescription provided
for under the Limitation Act, by reason whereof if he has been
H in possession thereof for a period of more than 12 years, he
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 201
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
would have acquired an indefeasible right thereto despite the A
fact that the transaction has been invalidated by a later Act. It
was so held in Manchegowda (supra). Therein, a distinction
was maqe between a defeasible right and an indefeasible right
and this Court was concerned with a transaction which was
voidable in nature. B
It is, however, not a case where a transfer has be~n made
in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation
or rule governing such grant which could be legqlly avoid~d c:>r
possession thereof could be recovered through process of law. C
Therein, this Court clearly held:
"24. Though we have come to the conclusion that the
Act is valid, yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain
aspects clear. Granted lands which had been transferred
after the expiry of the period of prohibition do not come D
within the purview of the Act, and cannot be proceeded
against under the pruvisions of this Act. The provisions of
the Act make this position clear, as Sections 4 and 5
l:>~~gm~ qpplicable only when granted lands are
transferFed fn br~cich of the condition relating to prohibition E
on transfer of such 9rpnt~d lands, Granted lands
transferred before the commencement of the Act and not
in contravention of prohibition on transfer are clearly
beyond the scope and purview of the present Act. Also in
case where granted lands had been transferred before the F
commencement of the Act in violation of the condition
regarding prohibition on such transfer and the transferee
who had initially acquired only a voidable title in such
granted lands had perfected his title in the granted lands
by prescription by long and continuous enjoyment thereof G
in accordance with law before the commencement of the
Act, such granted lands would also not come within the
purview of the present Act, as the title of such transferees
to the granted lands has been perfected before the
commencement of the Act. Since at the date of the
H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200£l] 11 S.C.R.
A commencement of the Act the title of such transferees
had ceased to be voidable· by reason of acq4isJtion of
prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user
for the requisite perioq, the title of such transferees could
not be rendered void by virtue of the provisions of the Act
B without violating the con~titutional guarantee. We must,
~h§refore, reaq dqvvn the provisions of the Act by holding
that th~ A9t will qpply tg transfers of gr~nted lands made
in breach ofthe condition imposing prohibition on transfer
of granted lands only in those cases where the title
c acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date
of the commencement of the Act ·and had not lost its
defeasible character at the date when the Act came into
force. Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and
not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must
be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act.
D
Section 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have
the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which
was not voidable at the date of the commencement of the
Act."
E In Lingappa (supra), this Court held;
"26. The impugned Act in its true nature and character is
a law relating to transfers and alienations of agricultural
lands by members of Scheduled Tribes in the State to
F persons not belonging to Scheduled Tribes. Such a law •
does not fall within Entries 6 and 7 in List Ill but is within
Entry 18 in List 11. We may here set out Entries 6 and 7 in
List Ill:
"6. Transfer of property other than agricultural land;
G registration of deeds and documents.
7. Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of
carriage, and· other special forms of contracts, but not
including contracts relating to agricultural lands."
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 203
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
The words "other than agricyltural land" in Entry 6 and the A
- words "but not including contracts relating to agricultural
Ittner in Entry 7 in List Ill have the effect of delimiting the
legislative p9wer of the Union to make a law with respect
to transf~rs and alienations of agricultural lands or with
respect to eontraets in relation thereto. The power to B
legislate cannot be denied to the State on the ground that
the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 4 which provide for
annulm13nt of transfers by tribals incidentally 'trench upon
the existing law, namely, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
or a law rnade by Parliament viz. the Specific Relief Act, c
1963. The power of the State Legislature to make a law
with respect to transfer and alienation of agricultural land
under Entry 18 in List II carries with it not only a power to
make a law placing restrictions on transfers and alienations
of such lands including a prohibition thereof, but also the
D
power to make a law to reopen such transfers and
alienations. Such a law was clearly within the legislative
competence of the State Legislature being relatable to
Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule."
It was observed: E
'' .. ,That apart, members of Scheduled Tribes i.e. tribals
who gre rnostly aboriginals constitute a distinct class who
~ need a special protection of the State. Further, the question
as to how far and by what stages such laws are to be F
implemented involves a matter of policy and therefore
beyond the domain of the courts. Secondly, the Act no
doubt makes a distinction between a non-tribal transferee
who had oiverted the lands obtained by him under a
transfer from atribal during the period from April 1, 1957
G
to July 6, 1974 (:Ind had put such lands to non-agricultural
purpose, a'nd other non-tribal transferees who got into
possession under transfers effected by tribals during the
same period but continued to use the lands for agricultural
purposes. There is no question of any differential treatment
H
'
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.
A between two classes of persons equally situate. When a
part of the land is diverted to a non-agriq.Jlturar purpose
viz. the construction of a dwelling house or the setting up
of an industry, the State Legislature obviously could not
have made a law for annulment of transfer of such lands
B by tribals under Entry 18 in List II as the lands having beeri
diverted to non-agricultural purposes ceased to be
agricultural lands. In the case of such non-agric1,.1ltural land,
if the Stat(3 Legjslatµre mad~ such a law it would not be
eff~ctive unless it was reserved for the assent of the
c Presid@nt enc:f r~§eiveci sl1oh assent."
Therein, thus, this Court found that Sub-section (1) of
Section 3 of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled
Tribes Act, 1974 made detailed provision to strike a balance
between the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, upon
D making of an order for restoration of such land to the members J
of the Scheduled Tribes.
It was furthermore held that the said Act having been
placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India, the
E validity thereof could not have been challenged for contraventi9n
of Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or Article 31 of the Constitution of lndi~.
Yet again in P. Rami Reddy and Others v. State of
Andhra Pradesh and Others [(1988) 3 SCC 433], there existed ..
a law prohibiting transfer in the agency tract areas, viz., the
F Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act, 1917. Those
areas were notified as Scheduled Areas after coming into force
of the Constitution by reason of the Scheduled Area. (Part 'A'
States) Order, 1950. By reason of the power conferred on the
Governor of the State by Para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule, the
G regulations named as AP. Scheduled Areas Lanc:f Transfer
Regulation, 1959 were made. In the aforementioned backdrop,
it was opined:
"19 ... The community cannot shut its eyes to the fact that
H the competition between the "tribals" and the "non-tribals"
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 205
LIBERTIES 1 KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
partakes of the character of a rar.::e between a handicapped A
one-legged person and an able-bodied two-legged
.. person. True, transfer by "non-tribals" to "non-tribals" would
not diminish the pool. It would maintain status quo. But is
it sufficient or fair enough to freeze the exploitative
deprivation of the "tribals" and thereby legalize and B
perpetuate the past wrong instead of effacing the same?
As a matter of fact it would be unjust, unfair and highly
unreasonable merely to freeze the situation instead of
reversing the injustice and restoring the status quo ante.
The provisions merely command that if a land holder c
voluntarily and on his own volition is desirous of alienating
the land, he may do so only in·favour of a "tribal". It would
be adding insult to injury to impose such a disability only
on the tribals (the victims of oppression and exploitation
themselves) and discriminate against them in. this regard 0
whilst leaving the "non-tribals" to thrive on the fruits of their
exploitation at the cost of "tribals". The "non-tribal"
economic exploiters cannot be installed on the pedestal
of immunity and accorded a privileged treatment by
pefrmitting them to transfer the lands and structures, if any,
E
raised on such lands, to "non-tribals" and make profits at
the cost of the tribals. It would not only tantamount to
perpetuating the exploitation and injustice, it would
tantamount to placing premium on the exploitation and
injustice perpetrated by the non-tribals. Thus it would be
the height of unreasonableness to impose the disability only F
on the tribals whilst leaving out the "non-tribals". It would
also be counterproductive to do so."
However, in K. T. Huchegowda v. Dy. Commissioner
[(1994) 3 SCC 536], this Court held: G
"8. On a plain reading, granted land will mean, any land
granted by the Government to a person, who is a member
of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes which
includes land allotted to such persons. Grant may be of H
206 SUPREMtt COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A different types; it may be by absolute transfer of the interest
of the State Government to the person concerned; it may
be only by transfer of the possession of the land, by way
of allotment, without conveying the title over such land of
the State Government. If by grant, the transferee has
B acquired absolute title to the land in question from the
State Government, then subject to protection provided by
the different provisions of the Act, he will be subject to the
same period of limitation as is prescribed for other citizens
by the provisions of .the Limitation Act,_ in respect of
c extinguishment of title over land by adverse possession.
On the other hand, if the land has been allotted by way of
grant and the title remains With the State Government, then
to extinguish the title that has remained of the State
Government by adverse possession, by a transferee on the
ba~is of an alienation made in his favour by an allottee,
D
the period of limitation shall be 30 years. Incidentally, it may
be mentioned that some of the States in order to protect
the members of the Scheduled Tribes from being
/ dispossessed from the lands which belong to them and of
which they are absolute owners, for purpose of
E . extinguishment of their title by adverse possession, have
prescribed special period of limitation, saying that it shall
be 30 years. In Bihar, vide Regulation No. 1 of 1969, in
Article 65 of the Limitation Act, it has been prescribed that
it would be 3Q years in respect of immovable property
F belonging to a member of the Scheduled Tribes as
specified in Part Ill to the Schedule to the Constitution
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.
9. There is no dispute that so far as the Act with which we
G are concerned, no special period of limitation has been
prescribed, in respect of lands which have been granted
, to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes with absolute ownership by the State Government.
In this background, when this Court in the case of Sunkara
H Rajayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka said that the period
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 207
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.S. SINHA, J.]
of limitation, which has to be taken into account for the A
purpose of determining, whether the title- has been
\..
perfected by prescription, shall be that which runs against
the State Government and therefore it would be 30 years
and not 12 years, has to be read in context with the lands,
the ownership whereof, has not been transferred B
absolutely, to the members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes; the lands having been only allotted to
them, the title remaining with the State Government. The
cases where the transfer by the State Government by way
of grant has been absolute, then unless there is an c
amendment so far the period of limitation is concerned, it
is not possible to apply the special limitation of 30 years,
c;o far such grantees are concerned, when the question to
be determined, is as to whether a transferee in
contravention of the terms of the grant, has perfected his
D
" title by remaining in continuous and adverse possession.
The transferee, who has acquired the land from the
grantee, in contravention of the terms of the grant shall
perfect his title·by adverse possession by completing the
period of 12 years .. When this Court said in its main
E
judgment, in the case of Manchegowda v. State of
Kamataka that in cases where granted lands had been
transferred before the commencement of the Act in
violation of the condition, regarding prohibition on such
" transfer and the transferee who had initially acquired only
a voidable title, in such granted lands had perfected his F
title in the granted lands by prescription by long and
continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance with law
before the commencement of the Act, has to be read, for
purpose of determining the period of limitation in respect
of lands granted with absolute ownership, to mean 12 G
& years and grant by way of allotment without transfer of the
ownership in favour of the grantee, to mean 30 years."
[See also Papaiah v. State of Karnataka (1996) 10. SCC
Ill(
533] H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A The statutory provisions, therefore, must be interpreted ih
the light of-the constitutionai provisions.
The decisions of this Court, therefore, are clear and
unambiguous. In a case involving members of the Scheduled
Tribe living in Scheduled Area the period of limitation can be
8
extended, but it is not permissible in respect of an area which
has not been declared to be a Scheduled Area. When a person
acquires an indefeasible right, he can be deprived therefrom
only by taking recourse to the doctrine of Eminent Domain. If a
person is sought to be deprived of an indefeasible right
C acquired by him, he should be paid an amount of
compensation. In a case of this nature, therefore, where an
amount of compensation has not actually been tendered, the
vendees of the land could not be deprived of their right to be
dispossessed. In that view of the matter, a distinction must be
D made between a case where an amount of compensation has
been paid and in a case where it has not been. If a vested right
has not been taken away, the question of applicability of Article
14 of the Constitution of India would not arise.
E The High Court, however, proceeded to apply Article 14
of the Constitution of India on the premise that the provisions
of the 1999 Act clearly seek to destroy the right conferred on
Scheduled Area by Act 31 of 1975. The approach of the High
Court being not correct, the same cannot be sustained. ..
F REASON FOR AMENDMENT
16. This brings us to the question as to whether the 1999
Act is invalid inter alia because the State was apprehensive
that the assignees may offer organized resistance for
G implementation of the 1975 Act and the State wanted to avert
a conflict between the tribals and the non-tribals. the sltort
answer to the said question is that the State cannot shut its
eyes to the ground realities. The Statement of Objects and
Reaso11s would clearly show that the State did not take an
H action in a half-hearted manner. It consulted the tribal
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 209
,. LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
.f
organizations. It is stated in its Counter Affidavit by the State A
before the High Court as under:
"... Under the above circumstances, urgent steps were
taken to have discussion with the various tribal
organisations did not insist upon getting the very same land 8
that had been alienated but would prefer to obtain an equal
.. extent of land from the Government. Many organisations
did not insist that the Act 31 of 1975 should be
implemented in its original form. The Government also had
serious discussions with various political parties and other
concerned with tribal welfare. Discussions were also held
c
with the present occupants of the alienated tribal lands.
On the basis of the discussions and deliberations the
Government thought it proper to introduce a suitable
legislation which would adequately take care of the D
"' interests of the Tribals and also find a solution to the
problems of landlessness and homelessness of the Tribals.
Accordingly, the Kerala Restriction on transfer by and
Restoration of Land to the Scheduled Tribes Act, 1999 was
introduced in the State Assembly and the same was E
unanimously passed by the Assembly. The Bill became an
Act (Act 12 of 1999) on 20.4.1999."
~ If the contention of the State is correct that most of the tribal
organizations did not insist upon getting the same land that they
F
had been alienated from but would have preferred to have
~ltemate land allotted to them by the government and as many
organizations insisted that the 1975 Act may not be
implemented in its original form, we think that action of the
State cannot be termed to be arbitrary so as to attract the wrath
of the equality clause contained in Article· 14 of the Constitution G
of India.
While doing so, the State had taken into consideration the
change in the situation by reason of passage of time. The tribals
had been out of possession of their lands for decades. It was H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R. ,
•,
~
A for the elected representatives of the people to determine as -
to whether by reason of the provisions of the 1999 Act _the
members of the Scheduled Tribe would face dislocation or that
it would impinge on their culture connected with their lands.
' ' -
The ground realities are presumed to be knoWh to the State
8 ~
and if anybody raises a contrary contention, it would· be for'him
to bring on record sufficient materials to show so as· tci enable ...
· the court to arrive at a conclusion that the State's action was
arbitrary.
'
c
- It is furthermore a well-settled principle of law that the
superior court in exercise of their power of judicial review of
legislation would not ordinarily determine the merit of the
legislation by entering into a broad question as to whether
materials placed before the Legislature were sufficient for
D bringing out the legislation in question or not. .
Such inquisitorial inquiry on the part of the court, in our
opinion, is beyond the province of the court.
BENEFICIENT NATURE OF THE 1999 ACT VIS-A-V-5
E 1975 ACT
17.. The 1999 Act, in our opinion, is more beneficial in
nature so far as the people of the State of Kerala are
~
concerned.
F
The 1975 Act came into f9rce with retrospectiv~ effect from -
1.01.1982. But, as noticed hereinbefore, the 'Rules were framed
-only·on 18;10.1986. Act 12 of 1999, however, came into force
_ on _20.04, 1999 but was gi_ven ? retrospective effect and
retroactive operation -from 24.01.1986. :
G ,'
· We heretobelow may notice a comparative chart of the -
salient provisions of the tWo Acts:
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 211
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Act 31/75 - Came into force Act 12/99 came into force A
on 01.01.1982 Pages 135 on 20.04.1999 Page
- 142 Nos.161 - 169, but
·deemed to have come into
force on 24.01.1986
2(b) "Immovable property" 2(4) Section B
defined as including
"Land" defined means
standing crops and trees.
agricultural land - Act
Act applies to such property
applies to such land.
4. Transfer of any immovable 4. Transfer of any land (i.e. c
property by a tribal to a non Agricultural land) by tribal to
tribal without previous non-tribal after
consent of competent commencement of Act
authority after without previous consent of
commencement of the Act competent authority shall D
shall be void. be void.
5. Transfer of immovable 5. (1) Transfer of land by tribal
property by Tribal. to non to non tribal after
tribal after 01.01.1960 shall 01.01.1960 and before Act
be deemed to be invalid shall be deemed to be E
invalid.
Proviso : But this will not
invalidate transfers where
the extent of land
transferred does not F
exceed two hectares
(2) Notwithstanding (1)
above, where the land
transferred is used for
G
agriculture purpose the
transferor may retain the
treansferred land or 2
Hectres to be demarcated
by the RDO.
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A 6(1) The Tribal whose 6. Styled as allotment of land.
transfer is invalidated under
(1) Tribal who has effected
Sections 4 and 5 shall be
transfer of land between
entitled to restoration of
01.01.1960 and 2.4. 1986
possession of the property.
and
B
Sub Sectton (5) provide for (a) who has filed an
a remedy of appeal to the application for restoration
a,ggrieved persons to the u/s. 6 of Act 31 of 1975
.competent authority.
(b) but whose possession
c has not been restored.
(c) and which transfer has
been validated by the
provisions of Sec.5 above
shall be entitled to
D allotment of equal extent of
land by Government to the
extent of 40 Ares.
7. Govt. may take Suo-moto Proviso:
action for restoration
E Where the extent of land to
be so allotted is less than
40 be· Ares (One Acre)
Government will make
further allotment to make
F the total extent 4o Ares.
11. Where possession is 7. Where a transfer ofland is
restored to tribal under invalidated U/s. 4 and 5 of
Section 6 he shall pay to the the Tribal is entitled to
quantum transferee the restoration of such land.
G consideration received as
also the value of the
improvement effected by the
transferee as determined by
.the competent authority.
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 213
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.S. SINHA, J.]
12. Government may advance Sub-section 2 to 4 A
loans to tribal for; payment of prescribe the procedure for
the amount u/s.11 to be restoration with a right of
repaid in half yearly or annual appeal under sub section 6
instalment and to be (Akin to section 6 of Act 31
recovered as an arrear of of 75) B
land revenue if kept in arrears.
8. 1 Similar to section 11 of
Act 31 of 75
9. Government shall provide C
grant to eligible tribal/
liable to pay the amount
- under Section 8.
10. (1) Government shall
assign land to landless
tribal families not
0
exceeding 40 Ares in
extent in his own district
within two years or
extended time.
E
(2) If any family owns land
below 40 Ares I extent
Govt. to assign such
extent of land as is
necessary to make up 40 F
Ares .
. 11. Schedule Tribe rehabili-
tation and Welfare Fund to
be constituted for GOnstru-
ction of houses for tribal G
families and for other
welfare measures.
12. Provision for legal
assistance 22 Repeal of
Act 31 of 1975 with usual H
saving clause.
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A Broadly, speaking, the provisions of the 1999 Act are more
beneficial to the members of the Scheduled Tribe. For
determining the said question, we must take a holistic view of
.the matter. However, we are not oblivious of the fact that
restoration in respect of non-agricultural land and to the extent
B of 2 acres are not contemplated by the 1999 Act. We are also
not oblivious of the fact that, it would appear, on the basis of
the statistics furnished by the learned Additional Advocate
General before the High Court, to which we have referred to
heretobefore itself that a large number of members of the
c Scheduled Tribe would be deprived of the benefit of restoration
oftheir own lands constituted in forest areas.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the State, it is stated:
"It is submitted that the Government found that Act 31 of
D 1975 would not really serve the purpose of ameliorating
the problems of the scheduled tribes and might instead
lead to law and order situation in various parts of the State.
After a comprehensive study of the matter the Government
passed Act 12 of 1999. The allegation that the intention
E of Act 12 of 1999 is other than protection of the rights of
schedule tribes is incorrect and denied. A reading of all
the provisions of the Act 12 of 1999 would make it clear
that the legislature has kept the over all interests of the
tribals and all the people of the State is general while
F enacting Act 12 of 1999. It is submitted that no right
·conferred by Act 31 of 1975 has been taken away by Act
12 of 1999. The allegation that Act 12 of 1999 is meant
to protect the right of tribals is incorrect and is denied. It
is submitted that the various provisions of Act 12 of 1999
G had already been delineated elsewhere in the counter
affidavit and the reasons for the enactment of Act 12 of
1999 have also been explained."
Out of 4724 applications for restoration filed, 1475
applications involved transfer of less than 50 cents, 898
H applications involved transfer of "extent between 50 cents and
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 215
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
o 1 acre", 904 applications covered cases of "transfer of extent A
between 1 and 2 acres and 1074 applications related to
"transfer of extent between 2 acres and 5 acres and that only
373 applications involved cases of transfer of more than 5 acres
or 2 hectares.
B
The State has clearly brought on record the fact that it had
conducted further studies wherefrom it came to learn that about
12,000 tribal families in the State did not possess any land of
their own and 30,000 families did not have any house of their
own.
c
It is necessary, according to us, to bear in mind that the
law postulates grant of compensation in a case where the right
on a land is sought to be taken away. The 1975 Act postulates
grant of compensation to the alienees, the amount wherefor was
required to be determined by a competent authority. The D
amount of cor,rtpensation so determined was to be paid by the
members of the Scheduled Tribe to their vendees in respect
whereof he was to take loan from the State. The amount of loan
taken was, thus, requlred to be repaid. The 1999 Act, however,
~provides for a grant which need not be repaid. . E
The members of the Scheduled Tribe were further to get
one acre of land from the State although they might have
transferred even 5 or 10 cents of land. In the case of a transfer
made upto two acres, he is to be allotted two acres of land by
the State. Whether such land is avaiilable with the State F
Government or not is a different questio'n, which we intend to
deal with separately. The statute also contemplates building of
houses for the members of the Scheduled Tribes. It provides
that the land to the extent of one acre also be provided to the
landless tribals. It contemplates constitution of a rehabilitation G
fund.
The 1999 Act, therefore, if given a holistic view, is more
beneficial to the members of the Scheduled Tribe than the 1975
- Act. If the State contemplated a legjslative policy for grant of H
216 SUPRF.ME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A more benefits to a vast section of people, taking care of not
only restoration of land but those who have not transferred any
land at all or otherwise landless, the statute by no stretch of
imagination can be treated to be an arbitrary and an
unreasonable one.
B ARTICLE 21 ISSUE
18. Article 21 deals with right to life and liberty. Would it
bring within its umbrage a right of tribals to be rehabilitated in
their own habitat is the question? If the answer is to be rendered
C · in the affirmative, then, for no reason whatsoever even an inch
of land belonging to a member of Scheduled Tribe can ever
be acquired. Furthermore, a distinction must be borne between
a right of rehabilitation required to be provided when the land
of the members of the Scheduled Tribe are acquired vis-a-vis
D a prohibition imposed upon the State from doing so at all. The
question must be considered from another angle. The
Scheduled Tribes are not in an agency area or Scheduled
Area. The literacy rate of the tribals of Kerala is 57% which is
much more than the national average. Most of the tribal children
E have elementary education. In the schools and colleges of
Kerala, Malayalam, Tamil or English is taught. It has been
noticed by various writers that the tribal teachers have not been
interacting with the students in the tribal terms and, thus;
gradually the tribal students have lost respect for their language
F and begun to disregard their language, their culture and, thus,
their own primitive way of life. [See Tribes of Kerala - Identity
Crisis by Rayson K. Alex]
The learned author states:
G "What is the criterion for the government to label a tribe
as a "scheduled" tribe in the constitution? Has the
government conducted a detailed study on the culture,
traditions, their interrelationship with the place they live in,
their socio-economic structures and judiciary before
i
H labeling them as "scheduled" tribes? The reason for this '
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 217
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.S. SINHA, J.]
., categorization can be attributed to their "supposed" A
backwardness and not their distinct identity from the
dominant society of the country. Without taking into
consideration aforementioned aspects of the culture of the
tribes, to create "awareness" and to finally "develop" (in the
narrow sense of the word) them, the tribes were forced to B
merge and condition themselves along the lines of the so-
called "main-stream" Indian society. "When that was
challenged, the ideologues of the aggressing society
presented the theory of "integration" which in reality is the
other side of the same coin. And now has come the final c
blow from the armory of the India state for the indigenous
people of the country in the form of total denial of their
existence in India. "India does not have indigenous
population"! Thus declared the Indian Permanent Mission
in the United Nation in Geneva (Mullick et al 7). 0
This is not an argument made to showcase the tribes
of Kera la as "scheduled tribes." Now a question of serious
importance can be raised: Is there a need to uphold/
preserve this indigenous culture? The outer (can be read
as "other") influences have spread their ·roots so strong E
that their minds have been colonized (can be read as
'altered'). Even though the tribes carry wonderful memories
of their rich past, they do not want to be in the same
situation as they were in days of yore. So, the need for
conservation of the tribal culture is the problem of the non- F
tribes, especially the researchers, scholars and activists
working in this area. Intentionally or unintentionally, changes
are the only constant feature of any culture. It can be
observed that no culture can retain its flavor at different
points of time. But the questions to be addressed to the G
"main-stream" and its government are: Are the tribes given
freedom to accept or deny what ever they want? Are they
given a free space to think, act and establish (as they used
to in days of yore?)"
H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A We may notice that in Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention, 1957 which has been ratified by 27 countries
including India contained following clauses:
"Article 11
8 The right of ownership, collective or individual, of the
members of the populations concernec:I over the lands
which these populations traditionally occupy shall be
recognised.
c Article 12
1. The populations concerned shall not be removed without
their free consent from their habitual territories except in
accordance with national laws and regulations for reasons
relating to national security, or in the interest of national
D
economic development or of the health of the said
populations.
2. When in such cases removal of these populations is
necessary as an exceptional measure, they shall be
E provided with lands of quality at least equal to that of the
lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for
their present needs and future development. In cases
where chances of alternative employment exist and where
the populations concerned prefer to have compensation ~.
F in money or in. kind, they shall be so compensated under
appropriate guarantees.
3. Persons thus removed $hall be fully compensated for
any resulting loss or injury.
G Article 13
1. Procedures for the transmission of rights ofownership
and use of land which are established by the customs of
the populations concerned shall t?e respected, within the
H framework of national laws and regulations, in so far as
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 219
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
they satisfy the needs of these populations and do not A
hinder their economic and social development
2. Arrangements shall be made to prevent persons who
are not members of the populations concerned from taking
advantage of these customs or of lack of understanding
B
of the laws on ihe part of the members of these populations
to secure the ownership or use of the lands belonging to
. such members."
Thus, removal of the population, by way of an exceptional
measure, is not ruled out. It is only subject to the condition that c
lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously
occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs
and future development. We may, however, notice that this
Convention has not been ratified by many cou_i:itries in the
Convention held in 1989. Those who have ratified the 1989 D
Convention are not bound by it.
Furthermore, the United ~ations adopted a declaration on
the rights of indigenous peoples in September, 2007. Articles
3 to 5 thereof read as under:
E
"Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-Oetermination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural F
development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self- G
government in matters relating to their internal and local
,,, • affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions.
Article 5
H
4
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social
and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political,
economic, social and cultural life of the State."
B
It is now accepted that the Panchasheel doctrine which
provided that the tribes could flourish and develop only if the
State interfered minimally and functioned chiefly as a support
system in view of passage of time is no longer valid. Even the
notion of autonomy contained in the 1989 Convention has been
c rejected by India. However, India appears to have softened its
stand against autonomy for tribal people and it has voted in
favour of United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous
people which affirms various rights to autonomy that are
inherent in the tribal peoples of the world. This declaration,
D however, is not binding.
This Court furthermore in Narmada Bachao Ando/an v.
Union of India and Others [(2000) 10 SCC 664] while
considering the validity of acquisition of lands by the State of
E Madhya Pradesh for a project known as Sardar Sarovar Project
(SSP) by constructing a dam on river Narmada as a result
whereof the residence of tribals in various States, viz., Madhya
..
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan were affected,
opined as under:
F "62. The displacement of the tribals and other
persons would not per se result in the violation of their
fundamental or other rights. The effect is to see that on
their rehabilitation at new locations they are better off than
what they were. At the rehabilitation sites they wi.11 have
G more and better amenities than those they enjoyed in their
tribal hamlets. The gradual assimilation in the mainstream
of the society will lead to betterment and progress."
"
For the purpose of going into the question with regard to
H the adjudication of the water dispute regarding the inter-State
~~
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 221
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
...,
River Narmada and the river valley thereof in terms of the A
provisions of the inter-State Water Disputes Act, the award inter
alia provided for relief and rehabilitation stating that no
submergence of an area would take place unless the oustees
are rehabilitated.
B
This Court referred to Article 12 of the ILO Convention No.
..\
107 holding:
'
"58. The said article clearly suggested that when the
removal of the tribal population is necessary as an
exceptional measure, they shall be provided with land of c
quality at least equal to that of the land previously occupied
by them and they shall be fully compensated for any
resultin,g loss or injury. The rehabilitation package
contained in the award of the Tribunal as improved further
by the State of Gujarat and the other States prima facie D
~
shows that the land required to be allotted to the tribals is
likely to be equal, if not better than what they had owned."
Noticing that construction of a dam is of utmost importance
for development of the country as it plays an important role in
E
providing irrigation for food security, domestic and industrial
water supply, hydroelectric power and keeping flood waters
back. It repelled a submission that the execution of SSP without
,. a comprehensive assessment and evaluation of its
. environmental impact and a decision regarding its acceptability
F
would be in violation of the rights of the affected people under
Article 21 of the Constitution of .India stating that requisite
environmental clearance had been taken opining that the same
had been granted on due application of mind. It took into
.consideration the question of relief and rehabilitation,
consequent upon the displacement of people, holding: G
-
'v
\ "151. The displacement of the people due to major
river valley projects has occurred in both developed and
developing countries. In the past, there was no definite
policy for rehabilitation of ciisplaced·persons associated H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A with the river valley projects in India. There were certain
project-specific programmes for implementation on a
'temporary basis. For the land acquired, compensation
· under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
used to be given to the project-affected families. This
B payment in cash did not result in satisfactory resettlement
of the displaced families. Realising the difficulties of
displaced persons·. the requirement of relief and
rehabilitation of PAFs in the case of Sardar Sarovar
Project was considered_ by the Narmada Water Disputes
c Tribunal and the decision and final order of the Tribunal
given in 1979 contains detailed directions in regard to
acquisition of land and properties, provision for land, house
plots and civic amenities for the resettlement and
rehabilitation of the affected families. The resettlement
policy has thus emerged and developed along with the
D
Sardar Sarovar Project."
This Court opined that where two views are permissible,
the court ordinarily would not sit in appeal over a policy decision
adopted by the government. Regarding displacement of people
E on proposed project, it was held:
" ... It is not fair that tribals and the people in undeveloped
villages should continue in the same condition without ever
enjoying the fruits of science and technology for better 1
F health and have a higher quality of lifestyle. _Should they not
be encouraged to seek greener pastures elsewhere, if they
can have access to it, eitherthrough their own efforts due
to information exchange or due to outside compulsions. It
is with this object in view that the H&R plans which are
developed are meant to ensure-that those who move must ·
G
be better off in the new locations at government cost. In
the present case, the R&R packages of the States,
specially of Gujarat, are such that the living conditions of
the oustees Will be much better than what they had in their
tribal_ hamlets."
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 223
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-..
As regards the question of necessity to balance the loss A
of forest because of· activities carried on therein and
construction of a dam, it was held:
"242. The loss of forest because of any activity is
undoubtedly harmful. Without going into the question as to
B
whether the loss of forest due to river valley project
because of submergence is neglig.ible, compared to
"" deforestation due to other reasons like cutting of trees for
fuel, it is true that large dams cause submergence leading
to loss of forest areas. But it cannot be ignored and it is
important to note that these large dams also cause ·
c
conversion of wasteland into agricultural land and make the
area grebner. Large dams can also become instruments
in improving the environment, as has been the case in
western Rajasthan, whicn transformed into a green area
because of Indira Gandhi Canal which draws water from D
Bhakra Nangal Dam. This project not only allows the
farmers to grow crops in deserts but also checks the
spread of Thar Desert in the adjoining areas of Punjab and
Haryana."
E
It is of some significance to note that this Court in Ba/co
Emp.'oyees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Others
[(2002) 2 SCC 333) in regard to the decision of this Court in
... Samatha v. State of A.P. [(1997) 8 SCC 191], by drawing a
necessary distinction between an area which is covered by F I
Fifth Schedule of the ,,Constitution and an area which. is not,
/
opined as under: ·
"71. While we have strong -reservations with regard
to the correctness o.f,;the majority decision in Samatha
case, which has not only interpreted the provisions of the G
aforesaid Section 3(1) of the A.P. Scheduled Areas Land
"' Transfer Regulation, 1959 but has also interpreted the
provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, the
said decision is not applicable in the present case
because the law applicable in Madhya Pradesh is not H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
~
A similar or identical to the aforesaid Regulation of Andhra
Pradesh. Article 145(3) of the Constitution provides that
any substantial question of law as to the interpretation-of
the provisions of the Constitution can only be decided by
a Bench offive Judges. In Samatha case, it is a Bench of
B three Hon'ble Judges who by majority of 2:1, interpreted
the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution. However, what is
important to note here is, as already observed
hereinabove, that the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code, 1959 and Section 165, in particular,
c are not in pari materia with the aforesaid Section 3 of the
Andhra Pradesh Regulation."
Furthermore, the cut-off date in terms of the 1975 Act was
1.01.1960. Any transaction which had taken place between
1960 and 1975 and thereafter had been declared invalid.
D Admittedly, even after the provisions thereof having been given
...
full effect, the members of the Scheduled Tribe had not been
put in possession of their own land for decades.
i=urthermore, we have noticed hereinbefore that the
E members of the Scheduled Tribe are educated and we can
. safely presume that most of them are serving various
institutions in the State of Kerala and/ or in other parts of India.
Indisputably, the question of restoration of land should be ...
considered having regard to their exploitation and rendering
F them homeless from the touchstone of Article 46 of the
Constitution of India. For the aforementioned purpose, however,
it may be of some interest to consider that the insistence of
autonomy and the view of a section of people that tribals should
be allowed to remain within their own habitat and .not be allowed
G to mix with the outside ~arid would depend upon the type of
Scheduled Tribe category in question. Some of them are still ,.
living in jungle and are dependant on the products thereof.
Some ·of them, on the other hand, have become a part of the
mainstream. The difference between Scheduled Tribe~ of
H North-East and in some cases the Islands of Andaman and
STATE OF KERAU\ v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 225
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Nicobar, on the one hand, and of those who are on the A
highlands and plains of the Southern regions must be borne in
~ mind.
We are satisfied that the legislature of Kerala kept in view
the necessity of protecting the interest of the small land holders
B
who were in possession and enjoyment of property which had
belonged to tribal community and at the same time ensured that
~- the tribals are not thrown out of their land and rendered
homeless. Having regard to the studies conducted by the State
Government and as a balance of interest between tribals and
non-tribals- which has been sought to be achieved, the
c
provisions of the 1999 Act are intra vires.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the State, it is stated:
" ... It is no doubt true that Act 31 of 1975 was integrated D
·..\
in the light of the non-tribals depriving tribals of their land
and the tribals being exploited. However, over the years
considering the population of land ratio even the non-tribals
occupying land which was once in possession of the tribals
stood to have their livelihood seriously jeopardise by total
E
implementation of Act 31 of 1975. Ultimately; the
Government had to consider all the aspects of the matter
and the Government found that the optimum solution would
be to bring a new legislation. It is in view of this that Act
12 of 1999 has been passed by the State legislature ... "
F
NON-AVAILABILITY OF THE LAND
19. Mr. Iyer, learned counsel would contend that the State
of Kerala is striving hard for making the lands available to the
_, tribal people. The learned counsel contended that the State has G
approached the Forest Bench of this Court for this purpose. We
are, however, not concerned therewith. Keeping in view the
,.),
promises made by the 1999 Act, it is obligatory on the part of
the State to provide the land meant for the members of the
Scheduled Tribe. ,If they do not have sufficient land, they may
H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
A have to take recourse to the acquisition proceedings but we
are clear in our mind that the State in all situations will fulfill its
legislative promise failing which the persons aggrieved would
be entitled to take recourse to such remedies which are
available to them in law.
B
We must also make it clear that while allotting land to the
members of the Scheduled Tribe, the State cannot and must
not allot them hilly or other types of lands which are not at all fit
for agricultural purpose. The lands, which are to be allotted,
must be similar in nature to the land possessed by the
C members of Scheduled Tribe. If in the past, such· allotments
have been made, as has been· contended before us by the
learned counsel for the respondent, the State must allot them
other lands which are fit for agricultural purposes. Such a
process should be undertaken and completed as expeditiously
D as possible and preferably within a period of six months from
date.
EFFECT OF INVALIDATING THE ACT AND
CONSEQUENTLY REVIVING OF THE OLD ACT
'E
20. Whether striking down clan enactment as
unconstitutional would result in automatic revival of an earlier
Act which has been repealed? The High Court wherefor, as
noticed hereinbefore, has struck down Section 22 of 1999 Act
F providing for repeal of 1975 Act. On the aforesaid premise it
was held that the effect must be given to the right accrued under
the 1975 Act.
Sections 6(1) and 7 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, ·
which are relevant for this purpose, read as under:-
G
"6. Effect of repeal.
Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after
the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment
hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
H different intention appears, the repeal shall not-
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 227
--- LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
"" (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time A
at which the repeal takes effect; or
...
~
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment
so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
B
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment
so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment c
incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy in resp~ct of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment D
as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy
may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the E
repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.
7. Revival of repealed enactments -
(1) In any (Central Act) or Regulations made after the
commencement of this Act, it shall be necessary, for the F
purpose of reviving, either wholly or partially, any
enactment wholly or partially repealed, expressly to state
that purpose.
This section applies also to all (Central Acts) made after G
the third day of January, 1968 and to all Regulations made
,. on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
In our opinion, there exists a distinction between a statutory
rule and a Legislative Act. The Legislature did not want a
H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 ,s.c.R.
A vacuum to be created. The 1999 Act was enacted repealing
the 1975 Act only for certain purposes. Section 22(2) of the
1999 Act upheld certain actions taken under the 1975 Act as
if they had been taken in terms thereof. The procedure for
determining the rights and obligations of the parties by the
B Revenue Officers, under both the Acts, are more or less the
same.
We may notice Sections 19 and 22 of 1999 Act, which are
relevant. They read :-
C "19. Saving of other laws. - The provisions of this Act shall
be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for
the time being in force regulating any of the matters dealt
with in this Act, except to the extent provided in this Act."
0 "22. Repeal and saving.-
(1) The Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on
Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated
Lands) Act, 1975 (31 of 1975) is hereby repealed.
E (2) Notwithstanding t~e repeal of the said Act, all orders
issued by the competent authority or the Revenue
Divisional Officer, so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to
have been made under the corresponding
F provisions of this Act and shall continue to be in
force accordingly unless and until superseded by
.anything done or any action taken under this Act.
Every proceedings pending before a Court on a
complaint under Section 14 of the said Act shall be
deemed as a proceeding under the corresponding
G
provisions of this Act and shall be continued
accordingly."
It is, therefore, evident that only those laws which are in
derogation of the provisions of the 1999 Act would stand
H repealed.
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 229
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
We may in this connection notice certain decisions relied A
upon PY Mr. Krishnan.
A. T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras, [AIR 1963
SC 928 = [1963] Supp (2) SCR 435 ] was a case of substitution
· of an old rule by a new rule. It, therefore, ceased to exist and
8
did not automatically get revived when new rule was held to be
invalid.
We are, however, dealing with a Legislative Act, validity
wh~reof was determined in the light of constitutional, provisions.
c
In B.N. Tiwari v. Union of India and others, [ [1965] 2 SCR
421 ], this Court was again dealing with a statutory rule. It was
held that the old rule did not revive opining :-
"When th~refore this Court struck down the carry forward
rule as modified in 1955 that did not mean that the carry D
forward rule of 1952 which had already ceased to exist,
because the Government of India itself cancelled it and had
substituted a modified rule in 1955 in its place, could
revive."
E
However, the legal position was made clear by a Three
Judge bench of this Court in West U.P. Sugar Mills v. State of
U.P., [ (2002) 2 sec 645 ] whereupon also the learned counsel
had placed reliance, stating:-
F
"18. A perusal of Section 20 shows that several provisions
of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act have been
made applicable in relation to statutory instruments
including the statutory Rules issued under any Uttar
Pradesh Act. However, Section 6-C does not find place G
in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the U.P. General
Clauses Act. In the absence of application of Section 6-C
to the statutory instrument, including the statutory rule, which
is the case before us, the contention of the respondents
deserves to be rejected. Since Section 6-C of the U.P.
General Clauses Act has not been applied to the statutory H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A rule framed by the Government of qttar Pradesh, the
substituted rule after it became inopera,tive, the old Rule
49 would not revive." ·
The aforementioned observations were, thus, made having
regard to the fact that Section 6-C of the U.P. General Clauses
8
Act had not been applied to the statutory Rules, which reads
as under:-
"6-C. Repeal or expiration of law-making textual
amendments in other laws.-( 1) Except as provided by
C sub-section (2), where any Uttar Pradesh Act amends the
text of any Uttar Pradesh Act or Regulation by the express
omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, the
amending enactment is subsequently repealed, the repeal
shall not affect the continuance of. any such amendment
D made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at
the time of such repeal.
(2) Where any such amendment of text is made by
any temporary Uttar Pradesh Act or by an Ordinance or
by any law made in exercise of the power of the State
E
Legislature by the President or other authority referred to
in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 357 of the
Constitution, and such Act, Ordinance or other law ceases
to operate without being re-enacted (with or without ...
modifications} the amendment of text made thereby shall
F
also cease to ·operate."
However, the Bench opined:-
"15. It would have been a different case where a
G subsequent law which modified the earlier law was held
to be void. In such a case, the earlier law shall be deemed
to have never been modified or repealed and, therefore,
continued to be in force. Where it is found that the
legislature lacked competence to enact a law, still amends
the existing law and subsequently it is found that the
H
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 231
,.. LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~
legislature or the authority was denuded of the power to A
amend the existing law, in such a case the old law would
revive and continue. But it is not the case here."
Mohd. Shaukat Hussain Khan v. State of A.P., ((1974) 2
SCC 376] is a case where the statute was modified and a
B
different view was taken.
I
:,. But the principle laid down therein has been held to be
inapplicable in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India,
l (1985) 1 sec 641 1
c
"106. The rule in Mohd. Shaukat Hussain Khan v.
State of A.P. is inapplicable to these cases. In that case
the subsequent law which modified the earlier one and
which was held to be void was one which according to the
Court could not have been passed at all by the State D
Legislature. In such a case the earlier law could be
deemed to have never been modified or repealed and
would, therefore, continue to be in force. It was strictly not
a case of revival of an earlier law which had been repealed
or modified on the striking down of a later law which
E
purported to modify or repeal the earlier one. It was a case
I
where the earlier law had not been either modified or
repealed effectively."
Repeal of a statute, it is well known, is not a matter of mere
form but one of substance. It, however, depends upon the F
intention of the legislature. If by reason of a subsequent statute,
the legislature intended to abrogate or wipe off the former
enactment, wholly or in part, then it would be a case of total or
pro tanto repeal. If the intention was merely to modify the former
enaCtment by engrafting an exception or granting an exemption, G
or by adding conditions, or by restricting, intercepting or
suspending its operation, such modification would not amount
""
to a repeal.
In Southern Petrochemical Industries (supra), the
H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A subsequent Act did not contain the words "unless a different
intention appears". It was heltj that the later Act was not different
from the earlier Act.
This Court is required to assume that the Legislature did
so deliberately.
8
In this case, however, the repealing clause is clear and
unambiguous. We, therefore, cannot accept the submi~sion of
Mr. Dayan Krishnan.
c AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND ·
21. Classification between agricultural and non-agricu!:- '.al
land is a valid one. It is, however, accepted that all forest areas
comprise of the agricultural land. The State has admittedly no
legislative competence to enact a legislation in exercise of its
D power of Entry No. 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the ..
Constitution of India in relation to non-agricultural land. Such a
power has been noticed hereinbefore. It exists only in terms of
Entry 6, -List Ill of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of
India. While enacting the 1999 Act, the State could not have
E deprived the persons who hold non-agricultural land, having
enacted the 1975 Act and, thus, could not have repealed a
portion thereof by raising the following contention:
" ... If in a given situation a tribal possess non-agricultural "'
"""--
F land that only indicates that though the person is a tribal
by birth he has come a long way from the way of
Scheduled Tribe and has acquired the trappings of non
tribals and thereafter has come to own immovable property
other than the agricultural land. The exploitation of the
tribals has studied would indicate (sic) has always taken
G n
place by deprivation of the agricultural land of the tribals ...
.... ......
Once they have made an enactment, the legislative intent
is clear and unambiguous, viz., such exploitation was possible
also in so far as non-agricultural' lands are concerned. Such a
H ....
STATE OF KERALA v. PEOPLES UNION FOR CIVIL 233
LIBERTIES, KERALA STATE UNIT [S.B. SINHA, J.]
right conferred on the owners of the non-agricultural land, A
therefore, could not have taken away without payment of
compensation. We, therefore, are of the opinion that to that
extent the 1975 Act would continue to be .applied. The State
has no legislati~ competence to repeal that portion of the 1975
~ B
For the reasons aforesaid, Civil Appeal Nos. 104-105 of
2001 and 899 of 2001 are allowed in part to the extent
mentioned above.
In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 104-105 of C
2001 and 899 .of 2001, no orders are called for in Civil Appeal
No. 7079 of 2001. No costs
G.N. Appeals partly allowed.
-
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