STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERSversusABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 1101
- Decided
- 26 November 2018
- Disposal
- Leave Granted & Allowed
- Bench
- UDAY UMESH LALIT
Holding
Even after a candidate truthfully discloses a pending criminal case that is later compounded, the employer is entitled to consider the antecedents and suitability and may lawfully reject the candidature; the rejection was not mala‑fide.
Summary
The respondent, Abhijit Singh Pawar, applied for police posts in Madhya Pradesh and disclosed in an affidavit that a criminal case (Sections 323, 325, 506, 34) was pending against him. Within four days the parties compromised and the offences were compounded under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., resulting in his acquittal. Although he cleared the written exam, the police selection authority rejected his candidature after a character‑verification report, citing the need for high moral conduct in the police force. The High Court ordered his appointment, but the State appealed. The Supreme Court held that even after truthful disclosure, an employer may consider the antecedents, severity of the charges and whether the acquittal was honourable, and may lawfully reject a candidate; there was no evidence of mala‑fide. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court’s orders and dismissing the writ petition.
Issues considered
- Whether a candidate who truthfully discloses a pending criminal case that is later compounded can be denied appointment in police recruitment.
- Whether the employer may consider the nature, severity of the offence and the character of the acquittal in assessing suitability.
- Whether the rejection of the candidature amounts to mala‑fide or violates service rules or the right to appointment on merit.
- Whether the High Court erred in directing appointment despite the pending/compounded criminal case.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 320
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 294, s. 323, s. 325, s. 34, s. 506
- Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 13 S.C.R. 1133 1133
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS A
v.
ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR
(Civil Appeal No. 11356 of 2018)
NOVEMBER 26, 2018 B
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND
DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Service law: Appointment – Antecedents and suitability of the
candidate – Consideration of – On facts, the respondent participated
in the selection process for posts of subedars, platoon commanders C
and inspectors of police – Disclosure made in an affidavit that a
criminal case is pending against him – Within four days compromise
entered into between the parties and application for compounding
of the offences allowed – Thereafter, the respondent was selected
in the written examination, however, after considering his character D
verification report, his candidature was rejected – Writ petition
thereagainst allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court – Said
order upheld by the Division Bench – On appeal, held: Even after
the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer would be well
within his rights to consider the antecedents and the suitability of
the candidate – Employer can certainly take into account the job E
profile for which the selection is undertaken, the severity of the
charges levelled against the candidate and whether the acquittal
was an honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit
of doubt or as a result of composition – On facts, nothing on record
to suggest that the decision of rejecting the candidature of F
respondent was actuated by mala fides or suffered on any other
count – Thus, the order passed by the High Court is set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, as on the date when the
respondent had applied, a criminal case was pending against him. G
Compromise was entered into only after an affidavit disclosing
such pendency was filed. Even after the disclosure is made by a
candidate, the employer would be well within his rights to consider
the antecedents and the suitability of the candidate. While so
considering, the employer can certainly take into account the job
H
1133
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A profile for which the selection is undertaken, the severity of the
charges levelled against the candidate and whether the acquittal
in question was an honourable acquittal or was merely on the
ground of benefit of doubt or as a result of composition.
[Para 15][1145-B-D]
B 1.2 There is nothing on record to suggest that the decision
taken by the concerned authorities in rejecting the candidature
of the respondent was in any way actuated by mala fides or suffered
on any other count. The decision on the question of suitability of
the respondent was absolutely correct and did not call for any
interference. The decisions rendered by the Single Judge as well
C as by the Division Bench are set aside. [Para 17][1145-G-H]
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another v.
Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432;
State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Parvez Khan
(2015) 2 SCC 591; Union Territory, Chandigarh
D Administration and others v. Pradeep Kumar and
another (2018) 1 SCC 797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112; Avtar
Singh v. Union of India and others (2016) 8 SCC 471 :
[2016] 7 SCR 445; Mohammed Imran v. State of
Maharashtra and others 2018 (10) JT 15 - referred
E to.
Case Law Reference
[2013] 13 SCR 432 referred to Para 10
(2015) 2 SCC 591 referred to Para 10
[2018] 1 SCR 112 referred to Para 10
F
[2016] 7 SCR 445 referred to Para 10
2018 (10) JT 15 referred to Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11356
of 2018
G From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2015 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal No. 132 of 2015.
Rajesh Srivastava, Adv. for the Appellants.
Siddhartha Dave, (A.C.), Ms. Jantiben AO, Advs. for the
Respondent.
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1135
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. 1. Leave granted. This appeal
challenges correctness of the judgment and order dated 22.09.2015
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Writ Appeal
No.132 of 2015.
2. In 2012, the Professional Examination Board, Madhya Pradesh B
invited applications for filling up the posts of Subedars, Platoon
Commanders and Inspectors of Police. Clause 1.13 of the advertisement
dealt with character verification of the candidates. True translation of
said clause 1.13 along with Note appended thereto was to the following
effect: C
“1.13 Appointment: The character verification shall be carried
out about the selected candidates and the appointment only of the
candidates found in the selection list upon finding them fit in
character. The medical examination of the candidates also shall
be conducted. The candidate to be medically fit for the entitlement D
of the appointment is also required.
Note: To save time and for the convenience, the verification form
is sent earlier to the candidates declared fit to sit in the physical
fitness examination, which the candidates have to submit after
filling up and the character and earlier verification of all the E
candidates to appear in interview is made. The candidate who is
not selected, his form will not used further. The candidates should
fill up full and correct information in the character verification
form. They should not provide any false information, incomplete
information and semi true information. They should not conceal
any information as well. Particularly it is required to fill up the F
correct information in column no.12. Now according to the new
guidelines of Madhya Pradesh Government regarding character
verification, to give the undertaking to this effect is required that
he has not concealed any fact in the details given by him earlier
about the criminal cases.” G
3. The respondent participated in the selection process and as
mandated, tendered an affidavit on 22.12.2012 disclosing following
information:
H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A “I affirm on oath that Case No.592/06 under Sections 323, 325,
506, 34 was registered in Police Station Madhav Nagar against
me the deponent. I the deponent myself had come to the court. I
was never arrested. The aforesaid case is pending in the Court.
In addition no criminal record is registered in any police station
anywhere in India, nor has the deponent convicted by the Court in
B
any criminal case.”
4. According to the disclosure, a case registered in the year 2006
was pending on the date when the affidavit was tendered. However, it
appears that within four days, a compromise was entered into between
the original complainant and the respondent and an application for
C compounding the offences was filed under Section 320 Code of Criminal
Procedure. True translation of relevant portions of the proceedings dated
26.12.2012 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ujjain, M.P. is as
under:
“The case was perused. This case is listed for the presence
D of the accused. The accused was taken in judicial custody. …….
The bond forfeiture amount on behalf of the accused was
deposited in compliance with the order, vide receipt No.85. The
receipt was given to the accused….
E At this very stage, Rajiv Rawat submitted an application for
compromise under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. and expressed that a
compromise has been made between him and the accused persons
so the permission for compounding be granted. Copy of the
application was given to ADPO. The remaining accused persons
with Sashank Advocate are present. I heard the matter regarding
F compromise. The case was perused.
It is clear from perusal that the case being of offences under
Sections 294, 325/34, 323, 506 Part-2, IPC is fit for compromise.
The present complainant is a competent party for the compromise.
Hence, the permission for compounding can be granted.
G
The parties submitted a deed of compromise, jointly signed
having photographs. The parties were identified by their counsel.
Both the parties have stated that the compromise was arrived at
voluntarily without any fear and pressure. Hence, the application
for compounding was allowed after verification. As a result of
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1137
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
the composition, the accused persons are acquitted of the charges A
under Sections 294, 325/34, 323, 506 Part-2 IPC.
The bail bonds of the accused persons are discharged.”
5. The proceedings, thus, indicate that the amount of bond submitted
on the earlier occasion had been forfeited for non-compliance; that the
respondent was taken in judicial custody and that after the compromise B
was entered into between the parties, the application for compounding
of the offences was allowed.
6. The respondent was selected in the written examination and
was called for medical examination. Around the same time, his character
verification was also undertaken. After due consideration of character C
verification report, the candidature of the respondent was however
rejected vide order dated 19.07.2013 passed by the Additional Director
General of Police (Selection/Recruitment), Police Headquarters, Bhopal.
Said order observed as under:-
“3-B The services of the persons seeking uniform service/ D
employment comes under the category different from other
services and candidates. The duty of the candidates selected is
to maintain law and order of the State and to protect the life and
property of the public. The high moral conduct and not to be
involved in the criminal activities is required for the police service. E
3-C According to the principles about the excellent conduct with
the Government in respect of the Government Servants, the
Government Servants should be of high character. Since the
officers of the Police Department are responsible to control the
persons of criminal nature, it is not proper to appoint the persons F
of criminal record in public interest.”
7. The respondent being aggrieved, filed Writ Petition No.9412 of
2013 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore challenging
the aforesaid order dated 19.07.2013. A Single Judge of the High Court
allowed said writ petition and directed as under:
G
“… The petitioner shall be appointed in case his name finds place
in the merit list and is entitled to be appointed as per merit. The
petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits, except
back wages.”
H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A 8. The State challenged the decision of the Single Judge by filing
Writ Appeal No.132 of 2015, which challenge was found to be without
any merit by the Division Bench. The view taken by the Single Judge
was thus affirmed by the Division Bench vide its judgment and order
dated 22.09.2015 which decision is presently under challenge.
B 9. Since the respondent, despite being served in the matter had
chosen not to enter appearance, this Court requested Mr. Siddhartha
Dave, learned Advocate to assist as Amicus Curiae and appear on behalf
of the respondent. We heard Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, learned Advocate
for the State and Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Amicus Curiae for the
respondent.
C
10. It was submitted by Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, learned Advocate
that in terms of Rule 12(3) of M.P. Police Executive (Non-Gazetted)
Services Recruitment Rules, 1996, inclusion of a candidate’s name in
the list would not confer any right to appointment and that a candidate
had to be found suitable in all respects before he could be appointed.
D Relying on the decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Police, New
Delhi and another v. Mehar Singh1, State of Madhya Pradesh and
others v. Parvez Khan 2 and Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and others v. Pradeep Kumar and another 3 he
submitted that the candidature of the respondent was rightly rejected
E and there being no allegation of mala fides, no interference with the
decision in question was called for. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Amicus
Curiae, on the other hand, submitted that by virtue of Section 320(8) of
Cr.P.C. composition of an offence would have the effect of an acquittal.
He further submitted that the respondent had not suppressed any
information and he having been acquitted, the High Court was right in
F accepting his challenge. Mr. Dave further relied upon the decisions of
this Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and others 4 and In
Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and others5.
11. In Mehar Singh (supra) the selection in question was for the
post of Constable (Executive). The offences alleged against Mehar
G Singh were under Sections 341, 323 and 427 of the IPC. He had arrived
1
(2013) 7 SCC 685
2
(2015) 2 SCC 591
3
(2018) 1 SCC 797
4
(2016) 8 SCC 471
5
In Civil Appeal No.10571 of 2018, decided on 12.10.2018.
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1139
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
at a compromise with the complainant and in terms of the compromise, A
Mehar Singh and other co-accused were acquitted of the offences under
Sections 323, 341 and 427 of the IPC on 30.01.2009. In the selection
which was undertaken thereafter, said Mehar Singh had disclosed the
factum regarding his involvement and his acquittal. His candidature
was, however cancelled in terms of the concerned Standing Order. The
B
challenge raised by him was accepted by the Administrative Tribunal
and the Delhi High Court. But this Court reversed said decisions and
the observations in paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 33 to 35 of the decision of this
Court are quite relevant for the present purposes:-
“ 23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the
Screening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involved C
in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even if
they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening
Committee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of a
candidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some serious D
flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of
material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers
of the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether
the acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar
activities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to
the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to E
consider the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening
the law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion,
this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any
interference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure F
that only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.
24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the
respondents’ candidature, the Screening Committee has
overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware
that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a G
departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support
can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in
connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical,
namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work
in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case
H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental
proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal
cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such
acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit
of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit
after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the
B
witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India6 this
Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed
even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than
honourable.
25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by
C this Court in S. Samuthiram7. In that case this Court was
concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against
him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing
Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination
D of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the
criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring
to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal8,
where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s
action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground
that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of
E doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court
held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the
punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court
observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted
of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal
F Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial
pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the
expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that
when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the
prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the
charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that
G the accused was honourably acquitted.
6
AIR 1964 SC 787
7
(2013) 1 SCC 598
8
(1994) 1 SCC 541
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1141
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case A
appears to have been compromised. It was urged that acquittal
recorded pursuant to a compromise should not be treated as a
disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission.
Compromises or settlements have to be encouraged to bring about
B
peaceful and amiable atmosphere in the society by according a
quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce
arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending
litigation. But these considerations cannot be brought in here. In
order to maintain integrity and high standard of police force, the
Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a C
compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening
Committee cannot be faulted for that.
34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact
that in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed
their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact D
improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/
attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is
expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are
inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should
not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this
disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It E
bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person
against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later
on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the
police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the
extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean F
acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the
witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the
prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar
activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken
by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi
Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or G
actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be
questioned.
H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A 35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great
responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the
society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be
worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police
force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have
impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal
B
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or
discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order
will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely
exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to
the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police
C force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of
taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee.
The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police
force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a
wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and
D
are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has
taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the
importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening
Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons
who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force.
E At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the
importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates
with an even hand.”
12. The conclusions in Mehar Singh (supra) have been followed
and the principles reiterated by this Court in later decisions, namely in
F State of M.P. v. Parvez Khan (supra) and in Union Territory,
Chandigarh Administration and others v. Pradeep Kumar and
another (supra).
13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of
India (supra) was required to consider the difference of opinion in
G decisions of this Court on the question of suppression of information or
submission of false information in the verification form on issues pertaining
to involvement in criminal cases and the effect thereof. The law on the
point was settled by this Court in following terms in paragraph No. 38 of
its decision as under:
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1143
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and A
reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:
38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to
conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case,
whether before or after entering into service must be true and B
there should be no suppression or false mention of required
information.
38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation
of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take
notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving C
such information.
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government
orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time
of taking the decision.
38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of D
involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had
already been recorded before filling of the application/verification
form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of
the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:
38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been E
recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty
offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent
unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore
such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the
lapse. F
38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not
trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate
services of the employee.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving
moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical G
ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all
relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate
decision as to the continuance of the employee.
H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully
of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to
consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the
candidate.
38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character
B verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial
nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its
discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such
case.
38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to
C multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume
significance and an employer may pass appropriate order
cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of
a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may
not be proper.
D 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate
at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and
the appointing authority would take decision after considering the
seriousness of the crime.
38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding
E departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order
of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression
or submitting false information in verification form.
38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/
verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such
F information which was required to be specifically mentioned has
to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes
to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an
objective manner while addressing the question of fitness.
However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of
suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which
G was not even asked for.
38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio
falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”
14. In Avtar Singh (supra), though this Court was principally
concerned with the question as to non-disclosure or wrong disclosure of
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. ABHIJIT SINGH PAWAR 1145
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
information, it was observed in paragraph 38.5 that even in cases where A
a truthful disclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer
would still have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate and
could not be compelled to appoint such candidate.
15. In the present case, as on the date when the respondent had
applied, a criminal case was pending against him. Compromise was B
entered into only after an affidavit disclosing such pendency was filed.
On the issue of compounding of offences and the effect of acquittal
under Section 320(8) of Cr.P.C., the law declared by this Court in Mehar
Singh (supra), specially in paragraphs 34 and 35 completely concludes
the issue. Even after the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer
would be well within his rights to consider the antecedents and the C
suitability of the candidate. While so considering, the employer can
certainly take into account the job profile for which the selection is
undertaken, the severity of the charges levelled against the candidate
and whether the acquittal in question was an honourable acquittal or
was merely on the ground of benefit of doubt or as a result of composition. D
16. The reliance placed by Mr. Dave, learned Amicus Curiae on
the decision of this Court in Mohammed Imran (supra) is not quite
correct and said decision cannot be of any assistance to the respondent.
In para 5 of said decision, this Court had found that the only allegation
against the appellant therein was that he was travelling in an auto- E
rickshaw which was following the auto-rickshaw in which the prime
accused, who was charged under Section 376 IPC, was travelling with
the prosecutrix in question and that all the accused were acquitted as
the prosecutrix did not support the allegation. The decision in Mohammed
Imran (supra) thus turned on individual facts and cannot in any way be
said to have departed from the line of decisions rendered by this Court in F
Mehar Singh (supra), Parvez Khan (supra) and Pradeep Kumar
(supra).
17. We must observe at this stage that there is nothing on record
to suggest that the decision taken by the concerned authorities in rejecting
the candidature of the respondent was in any way actuated by mala G
fides or suffered on any other count. The decision on the question of
suitability of the respondent, in our considered view, was absolutely correct
and did not call for any interference. We, therefore, allow this appeal,
set aside the decisions rendered by the Single Judge as well as by the
H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 13 S.C.R.
A Division Bench and dismiss Writ Petition No.9412 of 2013 preferred by
the respondent. No costs.
18. Before we part, we must record our appreciation for the efforts
put in by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned Amicus Curiae and the assistance
rendered by him.
B
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
C
D
E
F
G
H
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