Holding

An appellate court may re‑appreciate evidence on an acquittal but must interfere only when the acquittal is clearly unreasonable or material evidence has been unjustifiably ignored; the High Court’s acquittal lacked such infirmity.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed a High Court order acquitting Bacchudas and others, who had been convicted by a trial court for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under IPC Section 304 Part II read with Section 34. The prosecution relied on the testimony of the deceased's widow (PW‑1), his son (PW‑2) and a child witness (PW‑11). The High Court found these witnesses' statements unbelievable and set aside the conviction. The Supreme Court held that while an appellate court may re‑appreciate evidence on an acquittal, interference is permissible only on compelling and substantial reasons; the High Court’s judgment was not infirm. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the acquittal.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court can review the evidence on which an acquittal order is based.
What standard of review applies to appellate interference with a High Court acquittal.
Whether the prosecution witnesses' evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under IPC Sections 304 Part II and 34.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378, s. 386
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304(Part II), s. 34

Subjects

acquittalappellate reviewevidence appraisalcriminal jurisprudencemiscarriage of justiceIPC 304 Part IISection 34presumption of innocencestandard of proof

Judgment

J.

STATE OF MAD HYA PRADESH A
v.
BACCHUDAS@ BALARAM AND ORS.

JANUARY 10,2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 378 and 386-Appeal
against acquittal-Power of appellate court to review evidence-Scope
of-Stated-On facts, on re-appreciation of evidence of witnesses, order of
acquittal passed by High Court suffers from no infirmity to warrant
interference-Penal Code, I 860-Section, 304 rlw 34. c
Criminal law-Two views-Possibility-Effect of-Held: If two views
are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt
of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view favourable to the
accused should be adopted-Criminal jurisprudence. D
According to the prosecution case, on account of enmity between the
parties, respondents-accused killed the deceased. On appreciation of evidence
of PW 1-widow of the deceased, PW 2-son of the deceased and PW 11-child
witness, trial Court convicted and sentenced the respondents for offence
punishable under section 304 Part II IPC read with section 34 IPC. High E
Court held that the guilt of the respondents could not be established since
the evidence of prosecution witnesses was unbelievable and thus, acquitted
the respondents. Hence the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court F
' ....
HELD : 1.1. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the
evidence upon which an acquittal order is based. Generally, the acquittal

.. order shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of
the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that G
if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing
to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which
is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration
of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no H
671
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007J l S.C.R.

A less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible
evidence is ignored, duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate
the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence
or not. [Para 9) [675-E-G]

B Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP, [2003] 3 SCC 21, relied on.

1.2. The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the
appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are
compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment
is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been
c unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reas~n for
interference. [Para 9) [675-G-H, 676-A]

Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, [1973] 2 SCC 793;
Ramesh Babula/ Dashi v. State of Gujarat, [1996) 9 SCC 225; Jaswant
Singh v. State of Haryana, [2000) 4 SCC 484; Raj Kishore Jha v. State of
D Bihar, [2003) 11 SCC 519; State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, [2003) 11
SCC 271; State of Punjab v. Pho/a Singh, [2003) 11 SCC 58; Suchand Pal
v. Phani Pal, [2003) 11 SCC 527 and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of UP,
[2004) 11 sec 410, relied on.

E 2.1 High Court noticed several inconsistencies in the prosecution
version. Though silence of a witness per se may not render prosecution
version suspect, what has been disclosed by PW-2 is not found credible,
particularly when considered in the background of PW-1'.s evidence. It was
at variance with what the mother PW-1 stated. Evidence of PW-1 has been
rightly discarded by the High Court. The version given in the first
F information1· report varies from the evidence given in the Court.
[Paras 7, 8] [675-A-D]

2.2 When the conclusions of the High Court in the b~ckground of the
evidence on record are tested on the touch stone of the principles set out,
the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment does not suffer
G from any infirmity to interference. [Para 10) [676-C]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 39 of ./'

2007.

H From the Final Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2004 of the High Court
STATE v. BACCHUDAS@BALRAM[PASAYAT,J.] 673

of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (Gwalior Bench) in Cr!. A. No. A
245/2003

Vibha Datta Makhija for the Appellant.

K. Sarada Devi, for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. ARIJIT PASAY AT, J. : Leave granted.

1. Challenge in this appeal is by the State of Madhya.Pradesh to the
judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, C
Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior, directing acquittal of the respondents. The trial
court had found the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused')
guilty ofoffence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') read with Section 34 IPC. Each of the accused
persons was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and
to pay a fine of Rs. 2000 with default stipulation.
D

2. The respondents faced trial because of the following accusations:-

3. On 10.08.2002 at about 8 in the night Dropadi Bai (PW-1) lodged
FIR at the Police out-post Bhatnavar. It was mentioned in the FIR that at E
about 7-8 A.M. complainant had gone to the agricultural field. Her husband-
Munshi (hereinafter referred to as "deceased") had gone to work in the
shop of Bacchanlal Bania. When she returned in the evening, she enquired
about her husband from her son Banti (PW-2). Arun Das who informed her
that when deceased was going to the shop at about 10 A.M. after having
his meals, he was caught on way near the house of Dobalia by accused F
Bacchu. Satish, Avdhesh and Hariom and was beaten by them. Banti
(PW-2) was told to run away from the spot, otherwise he will also be beaten.
Out of fear he ran back home, but had not told anyone about the incident.
Then complainant Dropadi went to the house of Bacchudas Bairagi and
Ramsingh Kotwar and narrated the incident. She alongwith Bacchudas and G
Ramsingh went to the old house of Shankar Bairagi and Hariom. The house
was used as cattle shed by Bacchu. It's doors were not locked from inside.
They found the deceased dead and was tied by the rope. On enquiry from
neighbours Subhran told them that Bacchu, Satish, A vdhesh and Hariom
had beaten the deceased and thereafter he was dragged inside the room.
HI
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I S.C.R

A Rope was tied in his neck and neck wad throttled, which resulted in his
death. Thereafter they hanged the dead body and ran away. When
complainant saw the dead body, she found injury below left shoulder and
both toes were bleeding. On account of previous enmity on account of
;
purchase of Rundh of Charnu Kirar, Bacchu claimed that he has paid
Rs.1000/- to Charnu Kirar and he was demanding the same from Dropadi or
B in alternative he was asking Dropadi Bai to live as his wife. On the date of
incident in the morning when she had gone to fetch water at the public tap,
Hariom and Bacchu met her. Both the accused asked her to accompany them
and it was objected by her husband Munshi. At this Hariom and Bacchu
threatened Munshi with dire consequences and went back. It is mentioned
c in the FIR that only on account of this incident Bacchu, Hariom, Avdhesh
and Satish had killed the deceased. After the investigation, challan was filed
in the Court and committal of the case to the Sessions Court, charges under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were framed. On appreciation of
evidence, trial Court convicted the accused persons.

D 4. The evidence of three witnesses, i.e. Dropadi Bai-PWI (widow of the
deceased), Arun Das, PW-2 (son of the deceased) and Vinod (PW-I I),
'-
another child witness, were found to be of consequence by the trial court.
The trial court found that the circumstances highlighted presented a complete
chain and therefore, guilt of the accused persons was established.
Accordingly, they were convicted and sentenced as aforestated. In appeal,
E
the High Court found that the evidence ofVinod (PW-I I), the child witness
was unbelievable. Similar was the evidence of Arun Das (PW-2). It was
noted that the silence of PW-2 for about six hours was unusual. Further
the evidence of Dropadi (PW-I) was at variance with that of PW-2. A
different version of the incident was indicated in the first infonnation report.
F Therefore, the High Court concluded that prosecution has not established
the accusations.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant-State
submitted that the evidence of PW-2 was natural. Merely because he had
not disclosed about having seen the incident for a considerable length of
G time, that is not sufficient to discard the prosecution version. Additionally,
PW-I I, the child witness has given a believable version and his evidence
should not have been discarded.

6. In response, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted
H that the evidence of the witnesses has been rightly discarded.

)
STATE v.BACCHUDAS@BAIRAM[PASAYAT,J.] 675

7. Though silence of a witness per se may not render prosecution A
version suspect, in the present case what has been disclosed by PW-2, the
so called child witness is also not found credible, particularly when considered
in the background of PW-1 's evidence.

8. The High Court has noticed several inconsistencies in the prosecution
version. Apart from the fact that PW-2's conduct was unusual, the version B
he had supposedly stated to his mother is at variance with what the mother
PW-1 states. Evidence of PW-1 has been rightly discarded by the High
Court. It is noted that the version given in the first information report varies
from the evidence given in the Court. Dropadi Bai was the informant. She
has stated in her evidence that her son told her that her husband was
hanged by the accused persons. Arnn Das (PW-2) gives an entirely
c
different version. Dropadi Bai had deposed that she went to the police
station, and lodged the report and then she returned alongwith police and
found dead body of her husband. This is at variance with the evidence of
Kashidas (PW-12) and Ram Singh (PW-13) who had deposed that Dropadi
Bai (PW-1) told them that accused had murdered her husband after seeing D
the dead.body and then they went to the police station to lodge the report
along with Dropadi Bai. Ram Singh (PW-13) had further deposed that when
police returned along with Dropadi her son Banti (PW-2) had shown the
hanged dead body to the police.

9. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence
E
upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal
shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the
accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the F
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration
of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible
evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate
G
the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence
or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of MP, [2003] 3 SCC 21). The principle
to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the
H
676 SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS (2007] I S.C.R.

A judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and
substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly
unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably
eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These
aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State
of Maharashtra, (1973] 2 SCC 793, Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of
B Gujarat, [ 1996] 9 SCC 225, Jaswant Singh v. State ofHaryana, [2000] 4 SCC
484), Raj Kishore Jha v. State ofBihar, (2003] 11 SCC 519, State of Punjab
v. Karnai/ Singh, (2003] 11 SCC 271, State ofPunjab v. Pho/a Singh, (2003]
11 SCC 58, Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal, (2003] 11 SCC 527 and Sachchey Lal
Tiwari v. State of UP., (2004] 11 SCC 410.
c I 0. When the conclusions of the High Court in the background of the
evidence on record are tested on the touch- stone of the principles set out
above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment does not
suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

D The appeal is dismissed.

NJ. Appeal dismissed.

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