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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESHversusDR. KRISHNA CHANDRA SAKSENA

Citation
1996 INSC 1185
Decided
11 October 1996
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The High Court erred in quashing the prosecution; the sanction was prima facie valid and the criminal proceedings must continue.

Summary

Dr. K.C. Saksena, a medical officer, was caught in a trap for allegedly demanding a bribe. After investigation, the State Government granted sanction for prosecution under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Before a challan could be filed, Saksena invoked Section 482 of the CrPC and obtained a stay; the High Court subsequently quashed the proceedings. The State appealed, arguing that the High Court had no power to quash at the challan stage when a valid sanction existed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred, emphasizing that Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, and that the sanction was not prima facie illegal despite the respondent not being heard. The Court also rejected the relevance of the complainant’s traceability and the respondent’s promotion or retirement. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court order set aside, and the criminal prosecution may proceed.

Issues considered

  • Whether a High Court can quash criminal proceedings at the challan stage under Section 482 CrPC when a sanction for prosecution has been granted.
  • Whether the sanction order is invalid for not hearing the accused or for not considering certain affidavits.
  • Whether the non‑traceability of the complainant justifies quashing of the case.
  • Scope and limits of the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCquashing of criminal proceedingssanction for prosecutiontrap casePrevention of Corruption ActHigh Court jurisdictioninherent powersbribery

Judgment

                          STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH                                   A
                                            v.
                        DR. KRISHNA CHANDRA SAKSENA,

                                  OCTOBER 11, 1996

                   [DR. A.S. ANAND AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]                          B

              Code of Criminal Procedure 1973-Section 482-Quashing of Criminal
        Proceedings-Challan stage-Sanction for prosecution granted-Be[ore filing
        of Challan High Court quashing the proceedings-Held interference under
        Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing criminal proceedings should be done very   c
        spa1ingly and in exceptional cases.

              The respondent was a medical officer in the services of appellant
        State. On a complaint against him for demand of bribe, trap was laid and
        respondent was arrested. After completion for investigation sanction for D
        prosecution of the respondent was granted by the State Government.
        Before the challan could be filed the respondent got stay order from the
        High Court in a Writ Petition. Subsequently the High Court allowed the
        Writ Petition and quashed the prosecution. Hence the State has preferred
~...    present appeal.
                                                                                    E
             Allowing the appeal, this Court

               HELD : 1. The Single Judge of the High Court had ex- facie erred in
        interfering with the criminal proceedings at the stage of filing a challan
        after investigation which was backed up by relevant sanction. Interference
        under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing a criminal proceedings should be F
        done very sparingly and in exceptional cases. The extraordinary or in-
        herent powers do not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to
        act according to its whim or caprice. The Court will not be justified in
  •'"   embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or other-
        wise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. [507-C-E]        G

             State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1992] Supp.
 -..    1 sec 335, relied on.

              2. It could not prima f acie be said that the sanction order was
        patently illegal. If ultimately at the state of trial it is found that the H
                                            503
    504                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A sanction was liable to fail on any relevant ground, then the respondent may
    be entitled to acquittal. But at the stage of quashing of criminal proceed-
    ings where even challan had not been filed the order of sanction could not       .,._
    have been treated by the High Court as ex-[acie illegal or invalid. It is well
    settled that at the stage of granting of sanction the accused need not be
B   heard, it is too premature at the present stage to hold that all necessary
    and relevant evidence must not have been considered by the sanction:lng
    authority. These aspects would be better examined at the stage of trial for
    invalidating the sanction. (510-A-C)

          3. This Court fails to appreciate the relevancy at this stage of rthe
C   observation made by the Single Judge that the complainant is not trace-
    able. Investigating agency has recorded the statement of the complainant
    and it had been considered by the sanctioning authority. It could not be
    urged that complainant was not available at the stage of investigation a.nd
    filing of Challan against the accused. The proceedings could not be
    quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by not permitting the trial to proceed
D   when there is sufficient material collected during investigation including
    the version of the complainant to implicate the accused and to call upon
    him to face the trial. [511-H, 512-A·C]

          4. It is clarified that whatever observation made in this judgment are
E confined to the limited question as to whether the respondent should be
    prosecuted or not and these observations shall not be given any weightage
    while deciding the culpability of the respondent at the stage of tl'ial a.nd
    such decision would be strictly confined to the evidence led by the prosem-
    tion at the stage of trial and the defence evidence, if any, le~ by the
    respondent. (511-F-G]
F
          State of Maharashtra v. /shwar Rirafi Kalpatri and Others., (1995) 6
    Scale 674 and Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary and
    Others, AIR (1996) SC 186, relied on.

G        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    1800 of 1996.

         From the Judgment and ·Order dated 17.11.95 of the Madhya
    Pradesh High Court in Misc. Crl. Case No. 946 of 1989.

H         K.N. Shukla, B.S. Banthia and Uma Nath Singh for the Appellant.
_,




                    STAIB v. KC. SAKSENA[S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.)                 505
          R.K. Jain, Sushil Kumar Jain, A.P. Dhamija and K.K. Gogna for the        A
     Respondent.

           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. Leave granted.
                                                                                   B
           We have heard learned advocates of parties on merits with their
     consent. This appeal is, therefore, being finally disposed of by this judg-
     ment. The appellant is the State of Madhya Pradesh. Respondent was
     sough to be prosecuted under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption
     Act on the basis of a trap case. A learned Single Judge of the High Court     C
     AS. Tripathi, J. by the impugned judgment quashed the criminal proceed-
     ings against the respondent in a petition filed under Section 482 of Code
     of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.PC') and that is how the State is in
     appeal against the said judgment.

            A few relevant facts may be noted at the outset. Respondent was a D
     Medical Officer in the service of the appellant-State. He was posted at the
     relevant time as District Project Officer, Danida in Madhya Pradesh. One
     Sunil Jain, a representative of Kankur Laboratories, Ahmedabad made a
     complaint against him of demand of bribe on 1st January 1987 to the
     Vigilance Branch of Lok Aayukt. On his Complaint a trap was laid on 2nd
     January 1987 and the respondent was trapped and arrested. After comple- E
     tion of investigation sanction for prosecution of the respondent was granted
     by the State Government on 27th July 1989. Before the challan could be
     filed on the basis of the aforesaid case registered as Crime Case No. 4 of
     1987 at Vigilance Branch of Lok Aayukt, Gwalior, respondent preferred a
     petition under Section 482, Cr.PC at the Gwalior Bench of the High Court F
     of Madhya Pradesh challenging this sanction order on three grounds - (i)
     the grant of sanction by the Department of Law was without the authority
     of law; (ii) the prosecution sanction was given against principles of natural
     justice having been granted without hearing the respondent; and (iii) the
     grant of sanction amounted to abuse of the process of the court. Because G
     of the stay order granted by the High Court on 4th August 1989 in those
     proceedings the challan could not be filed before the competent court. In
     the meantime the record of the case was lost in the High Court. Proceed-
     ings dragged on for a couple of years on the file of the High Court. During
     this period the respondent got promoted to the post of Chief Medical
     Officer and was further promoted as Joint Director of Gwalior and Raipur H
    506                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
A and then he retired on attaining superannuation in June 1993.
          In the criminal proceedings pending in the High Court the record
    was reconstructed by an order of the Chief Justice dated 13th July 1993.

          After the record was reconstructed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.
B   948 of 1989 was heard by the learned Single Judge of the High Court who
    allowed the petition filed by the respondent by his impugned order dated
    17th November, 1995 and quashed the prosecution. As noted earlier the
    said order of the learned Single Judge is on the anvil of scrutiny in the
    present proceedings.
c         Shri Shukla, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-
    State submitted that the learned Single Judge ought not to have quashed
    the criminal proceedings when after investigation the case was ready for
    being filed in the court in the light of the sanction granted by the competent
    authority. That the High Court had patently erred in bypassing the trap
D case wherein the respondent was found to have been caught red-handed
    while accepting bribe of Rs. 2,500 from the complainant. That such
    proceedings could not be nipped in the bud. That if ultimately the respon-
  . dent was found not to have accepted the bribe he would be acquitted but
    in the light of the evidence on record at the stage of investigation the
E prosecution agency had clearly made out a case for prosecuting the respon-
    dent who was required to face the trial. It was further contended that the
    High Court did .::ommit a patent error in taking the view that the sanction
    was invalid as all relevant aspects were not considered by the sanctioning
    authority. That even assuming that some aspects were not considered by
    the sanctioning authority while granting the sanction, like the affidavits filed
F by staff members of the hospital who were admittedly supporting the
    respondent, it could not be said that the sanction was invalid. That respon-
    dent was not required to be heard while granting the sanction and that
    ultimately if on evidence it was held that the sanction was invalid the
    proceedings could result in favour of the respondent and he would get
G acquitted but there was no reason why criminal proceedings should be
    quashed under Section 482 Cr.PC af this stage.

        Learned senior counsel Shri Jain for the respondent on the other
  hand submitted that the High Court has noted all relevant aspects and that
  even though he did not support the reasoning of the High Court that
H sanction would be bad because the respondent was· nut heard before
               STATEv. KC.SAKSENA(S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.)                       507

granting the sanction, it would still remain bad as all relevant material was   A
not placed before the sanctioning authority. That the respondent was
promoted by the Government as it was convinced about the falsity of the
trap and he has retired since three years and more justified the quashing
of prosecution. Under these circumstances it could not be said that .the
High Court had erred in quashing the proceedings. This order did not call
for any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
                                                                                B

       On a careful consideration of the rival contentions it is found that
the learned Single Judge had ex f acie erred in interfering with the criminal
proceedings at the stage of filing a challan after investigation which was
backed up by relevant sanction. It is now well settled that interference        C
under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing a criminal proceeding should be
done very sparingly and in exceptional cases. In the case of State of
Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 it has been
laid down by a two member Bench of this Court speaking through S.
Ratnavel Pandian, J., that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding          D
should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in
the rarest of rare cases. The extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Courts to act according to its
whim or caprice. The court will not be justified in embarking upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint. It has also been laid down by way of          E
illustration as to under what circumstances the High Court can be justified
in interfering with the criminal proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or Section 482 Cr.PC. Seven illustrative circumstances
under which such interfer.::nce may be justified were listed as under :
                                                                                F
        "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
             the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
             accepted in their entirety do not prim a f acie constitute any
             offence or make out a case against the accused.

        (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other G
            materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
            cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police of-
            ficers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order
            of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
             c~                                                                 H
    508                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A           (3) Where the uncontroverted allegation made in the FIR or
                complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
                do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
                a case against the accused.

            (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cog-
B               nizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
                no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an
                order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
                of the Code.

c           (5) Where the allegations made in tl::e FIR or complaint are so
                absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
                prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
                sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

             (6) Where there is an e~press legal bar engrafted in any of the
D                provision of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
                 criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and con-
                 tinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
                 provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing effica-
                 cious redress for the grievance for the aggrieved party.
E            (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma la
                 fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with
                  an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
                 with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

F As this is a trap case wherein it is alleged that the respondent had taken
  a bribe of Rs. 2,500 for giving favourable treatment to the complainant,
  only circumstance No. 6, if at all, could be pressed by learned senior
  counsel for the respondent in support of the order of the High Court. That
  is to the effect that there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
  provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the concerned Act for
G prosecuting the case. In the present case, therefore, validity of the sanction
  would assume importance. If that sanction is found to be invalid then the
  proceedings could be validly quashed by the High Court in exercise of its
  jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC. So far as this aspect is concerned our
  attention wa& invited by learned senior counsel for the appellant to the
H sanction order dated 27th July 1989 which was annexed to the special
               STATEv. KC.SAKSENA[S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.]                       509

 Leave Petition at page 22. A reading of the relevant recitals in the sanction   A
 order shows that the sanctioning authority had looked into the statements
 of witnesses from Police Case Diary and other relevant documents and it
 was observed that the complainant :was to be given an order of Rs. 9,520
 by the accused Dr. Saksena to supply medicine on which account the
 accused had asked for commission/gratification of Rs. 2,500 at the rate of      B
 25 per cent. The said medicine was to be supplied by M/s. Kankur
 Laboratories, Ahmedabad. Because the complainant did not want to give
 gratification, he made a written complaint against him on 1st January 1987
 to the Vigilance Branch of Lok Aayukt. But since it was late on that day,
 i.e., 1st January 1987 the necessary action was taken on 2nd January 1987.
 The complainant had produced 25 notes of Rs. 100 and their numbers were         c
 taken on the Preliminary Panchnama and Phenoltheine Powder as put on
 these notes. After necessary instructions were given to the complainant
 Sunil Kumar Jain, the trapping group moved towards the destination. After
 reaching Dr. K.C. Saksena's clinic situated at Adarsh Colony, the com-
 plainant and a witness Giriraj Sharma went inside the clinic and other          D
members were hiding nearby. After sometime Dr. Saksena came to his
clinic. The complainant gave the said notes of Rs. 2,500 to accused Dr.
Saksena when he asked for the same. The accused kept those notes in the
back pocket of his pants. And after taking that money accused Dr. Saksena
granted supply order to complainant Sunil Kumar Jain. Then the com-              E
plainant came outside and gave a pre- planned signal, i.e., putting his hand
on head. On that members of trapping group. reached there immediately
and introduced themselves and caught hold of wrists of accused Dr.
Saksena's both hands. After that when both the hands of accused Dr.
Saksena were put into the solution of Sodium Carbonate the colour of             F
solution became rosy. The witness Sakharam, Deputy Collector searched
accused Dr. Saksena and recovered 25 notes of Rs. 100 from back pocket
of his full pants. And when the numbers of said notes were tallied with the
numbers mentioned in the Preliminary Panchnama they were found to be
bearing the same numbers and thereafter these notes were seized. The
sanctioning authority has also noted in the sanction order that the evidence     G
comprising of complainant Sunil Kumar Jain and witnesses Giriraj Sharma,
Sakharam, Ran Singh Kushwaha, Tulsi Ram, K.C. Patoria, Vijendra Singh,
R.S. Sharma and Lala Ram clearly indicated about these facts. Apart from
these statements which were kept in view by the sanctioning authority the
Chemical Examination Report was also seen by the sanctioning authority           H
    510                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A and it was found to support the case of the prosecution. In our view it could
  not prima facie be said that the sanction order was patently illegal. We must
  further hasten to add that if ultimately at the stage of trial it is found that
  the sanction was liable to fail on any relevant ground well made out by the
  defence then the respondent may be entitled to acquittal. But at the stage
B of quashing of criminal proceedings where even challan had not been filed
  the aforesaid order of sanction could not have been treated by the High
  Court as er facie illegal or invalid. The reasons given by the learned Single
  Judge of the High Court in treating the sanction invalid were twofold.
  Firstly the sanction, according to the learned Judge was bad on the ground
  that the accused was not heard. This ground is rightly not pressed by the
C learned senior counsel for the respondent as it is now well settled that at
  the stage of granting of sanction the accused need not be heard (State of
  Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri & Ors., (1995) 6 SCALE 674 and
  Superintendent of Police (C.B.l.) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors., AIR (1996)
  SC 186. The second ground given by the High Court was to the effect that
D the affidavits filed by the staff members of the clinic of the respondent were
   not considered by the sanctioning authority. It is true that the learned
   Single Judge had observed in paragraph (21) of his judgment that
   'admittedly' in this case, representation of the petitioner, documents relied
   by him which have been lost, and the affidavits of the witnesses present on
E the spot who were large in number were not placed before the sanctioning
   authority and, therefore, the sanction granted is definitely bad in law.
   However it must be kept in view that without Icoking at the relevant
   documents comprised in the file which were lost during the pendency of
   the proceedings before the High Court it would be too premature to say
   whether the lost documents were seen by the sanctioning authority or not
F before granting sanction. Even otherwise if it is found on evidence which
   may be led at the stage of trial that the affidavits of the staff were
   self-serving statements obtained by the respondent to support his case and
   were of such a nature that they could not adversely affect the trap evidence,
    then it could not be urged by the prosecution that non-consideration of
G such irrelevant and self-serving evidence would have affected the efficacy
    of the sanction. In Short all these aspects could have been better examined
    at the stage of trial for invalidating the sanction. It is too premature at the
    present stage to hold that all necessary and relevant evidence must not have
    been considered by the sanctioning authority. It appears that the word
H 'admittedly' as found in paragraph (21) of the order passed by the learned
                                                                        •

                STATEv. K.C.SAKSENA[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.]                        511
Single Judge appears to have been mentioned loosely and in an inadvertent A
 manner. Learned senior counsel for the appellant fairly stated that the
sanction order does not on the face of it indicate that the affidavits of staff
members were considered by the sanctioning authority. But the recitals in
the last but one paragraph of the sanction order show that the sanctioning
authority was satisfied after complete and conscious scrutiny of the records
                                                                                B
produced in respect of the allegation against the accused. Now the question
whether all the relevant evidence which would have tilted the balance in
favour of the accused if it was considered by the sanctioning authority
before granting sanction and which was actually left out of consideration
could be examined only at the stage of trial when the sanctioning authority
comes forward as a prosecution witness to support the sanction order if C
challenged during the trial. As that stage was not reached the prosecution
could not have been quashed at the very inception on the supposition that
all relevant documents were not considered by the sanctioning authority
while gianting the impugned sanction. We, therefore, hold that the twin
reasons given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for quashing D
the proceedings on the ground that the sanction was invalid are unsus-
tainable and unjustified.

       The further circumstance that during the pendency of the proceed-
ings before the High Court the respondent was promoted by the State or
that he retired thereafter cannot have any impact on the question whether         E
on the evidence available at the stage of investigation and filing of char-
gesheet, the prosecution had made out a case for prosecuting the respon-
dent or not. For all these reasons, therefore, the impugned order cannot
be sustained. Learned Single Judge had patently erred in law in quashing
the proceedings and in foreclosing the trial of the respondent. It is clarified   F
that whatever observations are made by us in this judgment are confined
to the limited question as to whether the respondent should be prosecuted
or not and these observations shall not be given any weightage while
deciding the culpability of the respondent at the stage of trial and such
decision would be strictly confined to the evidence led by the prosecution        G
at the stage of trial and the defence evidence, if any, led by the respondent.

      Before parting with these proceedings we may mention. that the
learned Single Judge had observed that one of the contentions of the
defence was that the complainant is not traceable. We fail to appreciate
how this aspect is relevant at this stage. It has to be kept in view that this H
          ..

    512                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A is a trap case, the investigating agency has already recorded the statement
    of the complainant,_ the sanctioning authority has also considered, amongst
    others, the statement of the complainant. Consequently it could not be
    urged that the complainant was not available at the stage of investigation
    and the subsequent stage of filing the Challan against the accused. If at the
B   stage of trial, the complainant is not available to support the case what will
    be its effect on the fate of the trial is a question which will have to be
    decided by the Trial Court on its own merits. Whether the complainant
                                                                                     ,>
    will ultimately support the prosecution case at the stage of trial or not is
    not a relevant circumstance for deciding whether the proceedings could be
    quashed under Section 482 Cr.PC by not permitting the trial to proceed
C   when there is sufficient material collected during investigation including
    the version of the complainant to implicate the accused and to call upon
    him to face the trial.

        In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order
  is quashed and set aside. As we have found the sanction to be prima f acie
D valid the criminal proceedings may now be launched against the respon-
  dent in a proper court for being proceeded further in accordance with law.

    S.V.K.I.                                                     Appeal allowed.


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