STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.versusBASANTIBAL MOHANLAL KHETAN & ORS.

                                                                   707
                                                                         A
                         S'l:/ITE OF MAllARASIITRA & ANR,
                                       v.
                     BASAllTlBAl MOHANLAL KHETAN & ORS.

                               MARCH 13, 1986



')               [E,S. VENKATARAMIAH AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ,]

             Maharashtra   Housing    and   Development   Act,
       (Maharashtra Act XXVIIl of 1977), sub-sections 3 & 4 of
                                                                 1976



r      section 44, Constitutional validity of - Whether infringes the
       provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21, 31 and 300A. of the
       Constitution - Whether provisions of section 44(3) and (4) are
       protected by Article 3l(c) of the Constitution.
                                                                         c

             One Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan was the owner of a piece
       of land measuring 3. 98, 60 hectares bearing Survey No. .28 at
       village Bhuahi in Maval Taluka of Pune District having
                                                                         D
       purchased it under the sale deed dated january 18, 1966, The
       aaid land is, however, situated within the Dllnicipal limits of
       Lonavala town. Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan died on May 18, 1976
       leaving behind him his widow, respondent No. 1, and children
       respondents Nos. 2 to 5, as his heirs. In order to provide
       housing accomoodation to economically weaker aectiona and to
                                                                         E
       persons belonging to low income group and middle income group
       residing within Lonavala Dllnicipal limits and at the request
       of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority, a
i.     notice was published by the State Government under the proviso
~.     to section 41(1) of the Maharashtra Housing and Development
·~··   Act, 1976 in Government Gazette dated August 30, 1979 inviting
                                                                         F
F
,,
       objections to the proposed acquisition of land& including the
       land which originally belonged to Mohanlal Fakirchand Kiletan.
       Pursuant to the said notice Chandrakant l'.ohanlal Khetan,
       respondent No. 3 herein lodged his protest on September 6,
       1979. After considering the various objections received fl'Oll
       different people including the objections filed by Chandrakant
       Mohanlal Khetan on behalf of hi•elf and the other co-owners,      G
       the State Government published the notification under
       sub-section (1) of section 41 in its Gazette dated July 3,
       1980. On the publication of the said notification the land of
       Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan vested in the State Government free
       from all encumbrances. On December 12, 1980 a notice w.,;
                                                                         H
    708                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [19861 l s.c.R.


A   ·issued under section 42(1) of the Act, to the holders of the
     lands to surrender and deliver possession of their lands to
     the Collector, Pune within a period of 30 days. In January
     1981, the legal representatives of Mohanlal Fald.rchand Khetan
     objected to the notice on the ground that Survey No. 28 of
     village Bhushi that is, the land belonging to them had not
     actually been notified in the notification published in the
B    Gazette as it had been shown as lying in village Maval and not
      in village Bhushi. On discovering the error which had crept
      into the notification, on May 15, 1981 the State Government
      published a corrigendum making the requisite correction and
      thereafter issued a fresh notice on September 15, 1981 to the
      heirs of Mohanlal Fald.rchand Khetan to deliver possession of
c     the land bearing Survey No. 28 of village Bhushi situated
      within the Municipal limits of Lonavala. The widow and
      children of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan, respondents herein
      filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay questioning
      the validity of proceedings leading up to the issue of
      notification under section 41(1) of the Act and also the
D     notification. The High Court negatived all the contentions
      raised by the respondents in the writ petition except the
      conatitutionality of sub-section (3) and (4) of section 44 of
      the Act. It found that sub-section 3 and sub-section 4 of
      section 44 of the Act were unreasonable and discriminatory and
       therefore ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. It found
E      that the said provisions were not protected by Article 31C of
       the Constitution and further held that the impugned provisions
       of the legislation were otherwise unfair, unjust and un-
       reasonable. The High Court also found that the deprivation of
       the property under sections 41 and 42 of the Act had not been
       done by authority of law. The High Court accordingly allowed
F      the writ petition. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court
       the State of Maharashtra and the Maharashtra Housing and Area
       Development Authority have filed this appeal by special leave.

            Allowing the appeal the Court,

G          Bl!LD : 1. Sub-sections 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra
     Houaing and Development Act, 1976 are constitutionally valid.
     (730 F-G)

            2.1 Every Act carries with it the presU111ption of consti-
      tutionality and unless a party aggrieved in a writ petition is
H     able to discharge the said burden by placing adequate
                       STATE v. BASANTIBAI                    7.09


material, the Court should not    strike down a legislative          A
provision particularly by the application of Article 14. [726
A-Cl
      In the instant case, sub-1sections 3 and 4 of section 44
of the Act cannot be said to be discriminatory and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution, merely because in the caae        B
of lands in nunicipal area all the methods of valuation under
the Land Acquisition Act, are not made available. [726 B-Cl

       2,2 The Act is not introduced for the benefit of areas
like Bombay Corporation area and areas under the jurisdiction
of other corporations and nunicipalities only, It is enacted
for the whole State more than 90 per cent of which constitutes       c
rural area. The potentialities of a land in a 111111icipal area
are far higher than the potentialities of land in a rural
area. There is also no occasion under the Act for the State
Govet'Illlent to treat one piece of land in a nunicipal area in
one way and another piece of land in that area differently.
All lands in " nunicipal area have to be valued in only one          D
way that is in accordance with section 44(3) and (4) of the
Act and all lands in rural ar"49 have also to be valued only
in one way and that is in accordance with the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. There could have been two
different Acts one for 111111icipal areas and another for rural
areas, each providing for a different method of valuation of         E
land. Such a classification would have been un-exceptionable
having regard to the object and purposes of the two Acts and
the difference in the potentialities of the two types of
lands, The method of capitalization is also one of the
recognised ..,thods which is adopted for the purpose of valua-
tion of properties acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,          F
1894. All methods of valuation adopted under that Act are
intended to achieve the same purpose, namely, determination of
the market value of the land acquired. It is difficult to say
whether any of them is superior to the other in the context of
Article 14 of the Constitution and to hold that there will be
discrimination, if any of them is not allowed to be availed of       G
for purposes of valuation. [723 G-11; 724 A-El

       State of Gnjarat v. Shri Slumtilal Miqpld•       &   Ora.,
[1969] 3 s.c.R. 341; Prakash Alll.chand Shah v. State of Gnjarat:
6 Ora., (1986] 1 S.C.C, 581; Raja Vyricherla llaraymia Geja-
patiraju v. 'lbe Revenue Diviaional Officer, (1939] 66 IA 104 •      H
    710                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1986] 1 S.C.R.

A
    A.I.R. 1939 PC 98; llust• Cavasjee Cooper v. ll!rl.on of India
    [1970) 3 s.c.R. 530; Union of India &Anr. v. s..:. Shanti Devi
    & Ora., [1983] 4 s;c.c. 542; Special Land Acqniaition Officer,
    Davangere v. P. Veer.imdrappa & Ors., [1984) 2 s.c.c. 120; ·
    Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. & Ora. , v. State of West Beagal [l 979) 1
    s.c.R. 617 and Government: of Bombay v. llorwmji limcberji
B   Calla, 10 Dom. LR 907 referred to.

          2.3 Even granting for purposes of argument that sub-
    sections 3 & 4 of section 44 are violative of Article 14 of
    the Constitution, the said provisions receive the protection
    of Article 31C of the Constitution. (726 C-0)
c
          3.1 Article 31C does not say that an Act there should be
    a declaration by the appropriate legislature to the effect
    that it is being enacted to achieve the object contained in
    Article 39(b). In order to ascertain whether it is protected
    by Article 31C, the Court has to satisfy itself about the
D   character of the legislation by studying all parts of it. The
    question whether an Act is intended to secure the objects
    contained in Article 39(b) or not does not depend upon the
    declaration by the legislature but depends on its contents.
    [727 B-D)

E         3.2   The Maharashtra Housing and Development Act, 1976
    1lllkes provision ,or acquisition of private lands for providing
    sites for building houses or housing accoamodation to the
    comnunl.ty. The title to the lands of the private holders which
    are acquired first vests in the State Governaent; Later on the
    land is developed and then distributed 8110ngst the people as
F   house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing
    public llllllnl.ties without which people cannot live there.
    Comunity centres, shopping complex, parks, roads, drains,
    play grounds, are all necessary for civic life and these
    -nities are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distri-
    bution within the IM&ning of Article 39(b) of the Constitu-
G   tion. The Act is brought into force to implement the directive
    principle contained in Article 39(b) and hence even if there
    is any infraction of Article 14 it is cured by Article 31C
    which is clearly attracted to the case. [727 E-F; 729 A-Bl

          Sanjeev Cake llamf.eturing eo.pay "• llbarat Coking Coal
H   Ltd. • Anr., (19831 l s.c.R. 1000; Bl.a Bou- Ieeav....ta
    llbarati SrlpMmplnua "• State of lerala, [H73J Supp. S.C.R.
                          STATE v. BASANTIBAI                  711


    l; 111.nerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] A
    l s.c.R, 206 and State of lanatU4 & br. etc. v. Sbri
    Ranganetha led4)r & br. etc., [1978) l s.c.a. 641 referred to.

          4, The Maharashtra Housing and Development Act,       1976
    does not infringe Article 300A of the Constitution. Article B
    300A was not in force when the f!ct was enacted. Article 31 (1)
    of the Constitution which was couched in the s1111e language was
    however in force. Article 31C gave protection to the Act even
    if it infringed Article 31. In this case, sub-section 3 and 4
    of section 44 of the Act cannot be struck d<>Wn on the ground
    that they are neither just nor fair or reasonable. Nothing
    contrary has been done by the authorities. Certain vacant C
    lands lying inside a 1111nicipal area are being acquired for
    providing housing accolllllOdation after paying an amount which
    is computed in accordance with a D!thod considered to be a
    fair one by Courts. The purpose for which the lands are
    acquired is a public purpose. The owners are given opportunity
    to make their representations before the notification is
                                                                     0
    issued. All the require...nts of a valid exercise of the power
    of eminent domain even in thP. sense in which it is understood
    in the United States of America where property rights are
    g1ven greater protection than what is required to be done in
    our country are fulfilled by the Act. [729 B-PI

          5, Land ceiling laws, laws providing for acquisition of E
    land for providing housing accomodation, laws imposing
    ceiling on urban property etc. cannot be struck down by invok-
    ing Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 essentially
    deals with personal liberty. It has little to do with the
    right to own property as such. This is not a case where the
    deprivation of property would lead to deprivation of life or F
    liberty or livelihood. On the other hand land is being
    acquired to improve the living conditions of a larger nlimber
    of people. To rely upon Article 21 of the Constitution for
    striking down the provisions of the Act amounts to a clear
    misapplication of the great doctrine enshrined in Article 21.
    [730 A-<:]                             .                       G


          6, So... problems presettting difficulty of valuation in
    the application of clause 5 of First. Schedule to section 44(1) ·
I   of'the Act in regard to valuation of open lands situated in a
'   city like Bombay or lands with building potentialf.ties situat- H
    ed within the limits of big tOllllS, are easily surmountable
    712                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1986] 1 s.c.R.


A   problems of valuation in relation to individual lands and do
    not reflect on the constitutionality of the impugned
    provision. The concerned authorities entrusted with the
    function of lllllking evaluation will doubtless resolve such
    probl"""' aa are likely to arise appropriately in accordance
    with law. (730 D-E]

B          lluanti lbaf. !!nhap!al 1beta • Ors. v.   State of llabs-
    ....htra A.I.R 1984 Bombay 366 reversed.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1177 of
    1984.

C         From the Judgment and order dated 8.11.1983 of the
    Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 4192 of 1981.

         Ashok Desai, M. Ganesh, G.B. Sathe and A.S. Bhasme for
    the Appellants.

D         S.B. Bhasme, Mrs. V.D. Khanna, A.H. Khanwalkar and Anil
    Kumar Gupta for the Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          11!!!!1ATlRAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave is filed
E   against the judgment dated November 8, 1983 in Writ Petition
    No. 4192 of 1981 by which the High Court declared sub-section
    (3) and sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Maharashtra
    Housing and Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra Act No. XXVIU
    of 1977) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') as void and
    gave certain ancillary directions.
F
          One Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan was the owner of a piece
    of land measuring 3. 98. 60 hectares bearing Survey No. 28 at
    village Bhushi in Mavai taluka of Pune district having
    purchased it under the sale deed dated January 18, 1966. The
    said land is, however, situated within the 1111nicipal limits of
G   Lcinavala town. Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan died on May 18, 1976
    leaving behind him his widow, respondent No. I, and children,
    respondents Nos. 2 to 5 as his heirs. On August 1, 1978 the
    Maharashtra Housing       and    Area Development Authority
    (hereinafter referred to as 'the authority' establish"4 under
    section 3 of the Act wrote a letter to the Municipal Council,
H


    ,
            STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J,]           713

                                                                     A
Lonavala seeking information regarding its needs for providing
housing accormoodation to economically weaker sections and to
persons belonging to low income group and middle income group
residing within'' Lonavala municipal limits. In order to
ascertain the demand for tenements, the Municipal Council of
Lonavala issued two advertisements in local newspapers on            B
August 3, 1978 and February 10, 1979 inviting applications for
housing accommodation from the general public. After taking
into consideration the representations made by the people and
assessing there requirements, the municipal council informed
the authority about the extent of land needed for providing
housing accommodation for the people. The authority in .its
turn informed the State Government by its letter dated               C
September 15, 1979 that an extent of 26 hectares of land .was
needed initially for providing accommodation for people within
the limits of Lunavala Municipal Council and requested the
State Government to issue a notification under sub-section (l)
or section 41 of the Act. The proposal was. processed by the
Public Works Department and the Housing Department of the            D
State Government and a notice was publsied under the proviso
to section 41 (1) of the Act in Government Gazette dated
August 30, 1979 inviting objections to the propi>s~d
acquisition. In that notice it was mentioned that 'the
Government proposed to acquire the land which originally
belonged to Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan refer to above also.          E
Pursuant to the said notice Chandrakant Mohanlal .Khetan,
respondent No.3 herein lodged his protest on September 6,
1979, After considering the various objections received from
different people including the objections filed by Chandrakant
Mohanlal Khetan on behalf of himself and the other co-owners
the State Government published the notification under sub-           F
section. (1) of 41 in its Gazette dated July 3, 1980. On the
publication of the said notification the land mentioned in it
including the land of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan vested in the
State Government free from all incumbrances. On December 12,
1·980 a' riot ice was issued under section 42(1) of the Act to the
holders of the lands· which had been riotified under section         G
41(1) of the Act to surrender and deliver possession to the
Collector, Pune within a period of 30 days. In January, 1981
the legal representatives of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan
objected to the notice on the ground that Survey No. 28 of
village Bhushi, that is, the land belonging to them had not
actually been notified in the notification published in the          H
        714                   SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS      [1986l'l s;c,R.


A       Gazette as it had been shown as lying in village Maval and 119t
        in village Bhushi. On ·discovering the error which had crept
        into the notification, on May 15, 1981 the State Government
        published a corrigendum making the requisite correction and
        thereafter issued a fresh notice on September 15, 1981 to the
        heirs of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan to deliver possession of
        the land bearing Survey No.28 of village Bhushi situated
B       within· the llllnicipal limits of Lonavala. The widow and
        children of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan, respondents herein,
        thereafter filed the writ petition out of which this appeal
        arises on December 17, 1981 on the file of the High Court of
        Bombay questioning the validity of proceedings leading up to
        the issue of the notification under section 41(1) of the Act
c       and also the notification.

               The respondents contended in the writ petition filed by
        them inter alia : (1) that there was no material with the
        st'ate Govemiiii!rit to form an opinion about the need for issuing
        the notification under section 41(1) of the Act; (ii) that the
D       respondents had not been heard personally after they had filed
        the objections under the proviso to section 41(1) of the Act
        to the proposal of acquisition; (iii) that the land of the
        respondents had actually not been notified; and (iv) that the
        provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 of the
        Act lihich contained the basis for the determination of
E       compensation payable in respect of the land were violative of
        Article 14, 'Article 19 and Article 31 of the Constitution and
        therefore the said two sub-sections and the notification were
        liable to be declared as void. They also stated that the
        compensation payable to them was illusory in its quantum and
        the procedure prescribed for the acquisition was not fair and
F       reasonable.

              The petition was contested by the State Government and
        the Authority. The High Court negatived the contentions of the
        respondents namely that there was no material before the State
        Government for forming an opinion about the need for issuing
G       the notification under section 41(1) of the Act, that the
        respondents had not been given adequate opportunity to submit
        their objectiona to the notification under, the proviso to
        section 41(1) of the Act, and that the land belonging to them
        had .not been included in the notification. The High Court
        found that the correspondence which had preceded the issue of
    H   the notification between the Government, the Authority,
                STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]       715

                                                                     A
    Municipal Council, Lonavala and the representations received,
    by the Munkipal Council, Lonavala from the public and the
    proceedings of the State Government constituted sufficient
    basis for the Government to form- opinion about the need for
    issuing the notification under section 41(1) of the Act. The
    High Court found that although the names of the respondents B
    had not been shown in the record of rights after the death of
    Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan, respondent No.3 who was acting on
    behalf of all the heirs of Mohanlal Fakirchand Khetan had
    lodged his objections under proviso to section 41(1) of the
    Act and that he had also been personally heard by the
    Collector, Pune before the publication of the notification
\   under sub-section (1) of section 41. The High Court,           c
    therefore, held that the respondents suffered no prejudice
    whatsoever on that account. The High Court further found that
    the description of the land of the respondents as the land
    bearing Survey No.28 of village Maval had been duly corrected
    by the issue of the corrigendum and that there was no doubt
    about the 'identity of the land of the respondents which was   D
    being acquired. After rejecting the above contention, the High
    Court however proceeded to uphold the contention of the
    respondents as regards the constitutionality of sub-section
    (3) and sub-section (4) of section 44 of the Act. It found
    that sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of section 44 of the
    Act were unreasonable and discriminatory and therefore ultra E
    vires Article 14 of the Constitution. It found that the said
    provisions were not protected by Article 31C of the
    Constitution anrl further held that the impugned provisions of
    the    legislation were     otherwise   unfair;   unjust   and
    unreasonable. The High Court found that the deprivation of the
    property under sections 41 and 42 of the Act had not been done F
    by authority of law. The High Court accordingly allowed the
    writ petition. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the
    State of Maharashtra and the Authority have filed this appeal
    by special leave.

          In the course of this appeal the parties have not          G
    questioned the correctness of the decision of the High Court
    as regards the facts which had been found against the
    respondents. The arguments were confined to the constitutional
    validity of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 of the Act.

          Before the Act was enacted in the year 1976 by the State   H
    716                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986] l s.c.R.


A   Legislature there were in force in the State of Maharashtra,
    the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948, in the Bombay and
    Hyderabad areas of the State, the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board
    Act, 1950 in the Vidarbha area of the State, the Bombay
    Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 and the
    Maharaahtra Slum Improvement Board Act, 1973. All these Acts
    were repealed by section 188 of the Act and in their place,
B   the Act was brought into force inter alia with the object of
    unifying, ·consolidating and amending the laws relating to
    housing, repairing and reconstructing dangerous buildings and
    carrying out improvement works in slum areas. The Preamble to
    the Act stated that before the Act was passed there were in
    existence various corporate and statutory bodies in the State
c   for dealing with the problem of housing, accommodation, for
    repairing and reconstructing buildings in a bad state of
    disrepair and presenting a dangerous possibility of collapse,
    for carrying out improvemental works in slum areas, and for
    advancing loans for construction of houses. It took note of
    the fact that the programmes undertaken by these bodies were
D   more or less complementary and there was considerable over-
    lapping in their working or functioning and hence it was
    considered necessary and expedient to co-ordinate the housing
    programes for an orderly_ development of the urban· areas in
    the State. It was felt that it was necessary to provide for a
    more comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to the entire
E   problem of housing development in a balanced manner, with
    sufficient attention to ecology, pollution, over-crowding and
    amenities required for leading a wholesome civic life, and
    that it was expedient to establish a single Corporate Autho-
    rity for the whole State and establish new Boards for certain
    areas of the State to carry out the plans, programes and
F   other functions of the Authority. The Act was paased by the
    State Legislature for the aforesaid purposes. It received the
    assent of the President on April 25, 1977.

          Chapter II of the Act provides for the establishment of
    the Authority and Boards. Section 3 of the Act authorises the
G   State Government to establish the Authority by a notification
    in the Official Gazette for securing the objectives and
    purposes of the Act. The Authority is a body corporate having
    perpetual succession and a common seal with the powers to own
    property and to enter into contract. Section 18 of the Act
    provides for the establishment of Boards for implementing the
H
                         STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]        717
                                                                              A


             provisions of the Act. Four Boards are constituted for the
             four areas of the State namely, Bombay area, Nagpur area,
             Aurangabad area and the Pune area. The functions, duties and
             powers of the Authority and the Boards are set out in Chapter
                                                                              B
             Ill of the Act. Section 28 which is in Chapter Ill of the Act
             provides that subject to the provisions of the Town Planning
             Act and the provisions of clauses (b) and (h) of sub-section
    J.   "   (1) of section 12 and section 13 of the Metropolitan Act it is
             the duty and function of the Authority among others to prepare
             or direct th Boards to prepare and execute proposals, plans or
             projects for (i) housing accommodation in the State or any
             part thereof, sale, inclU:ding transactions in the nature of
             hire-purchase of tenements in any building vested in, or
             belonging to, the Authority, letting or exchange of property
             of the Authority (ii) development including provisions for
l            amenities in areas within the jurisdiction of the Authority,
             (iii) clearance and re-development of slums in urban areas,
                                                                              D
             (iv) development of peripheral areas of existing urban areas
             to ensure an orderly urban overspill, (v) development of
             commercial centres, (vi) development of new towns in
             accordance with the provisions of the Town Planning Act, (vii)
             development of lands vested in the Authority, etc. etc.. The
             functions of the Aiithority as stated above naturally involve
                                                                              E
             acquisition of land and disposal of property of the Authority.
             Chapter V of the Act deals with the acquisition of land and
             disposal of property of the Authority. Section 41 of the Act
             which deals with the power of the State Government to acquire
             land reads thus
                                                                              F
                       "41. ( 1) Where, on any representation from the
                       Authority or any Board it appears to the State
                       Government that, in order to enable the Authority
                       to discharge any of its functions or to exercise
                       any of its powers or to carry out any of its
                       proposals, plans or projects, it is necessary that
                                                                              G
                       anY land should be acquired, the State Government
                       may acquire the land by publishing in the Official
                       Gazette_ a notification to the effect that the State
                       Government has decided to acquire the land ·in
                       pursuance of this section :
                                                                              H
                       Provided that, before publishing such notification,
                       the State Government shall, by notice published in
        718                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1986] l S.C.R.

    A
                   the Official Gazette and served in the prescribed
                   manner, call upon the owner of, or any other person
                   who, in the opinion of that Government, may be
                   interested in, such land to show cause, why it
                   should not be acquired, and after considering the
                   cause, if any, shown .by the       owner or any other
    B              person interested in the land, the State Government
                   may pass such order as it thinks fit.

                   (2) The acquisition of land for any purpose
                   mentioned in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be
                   a public purpose.
c
                   (3) Where a notification as aforesaid is published
                   in the Official Gazette, the land shall, on and
                   from the date on which the notification is so
                   published, vest absolutely in the State Government
                   free from all encumbrances."
D
              Section 42 of the Act confers power on the State
        Government to require the person in possession of land which
        is vested under sub-section (3) of section 41 of the Act to
         surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State
        Government. Section 43 of the Act provides that every person
E       ha'ling any interest in any land acquired under Chapter V of
        the Act would be entitled to recei'le from the State Government
        an amunt as provided by the provisions contained in Chapter
        V, Sections 44 to 49 of the Act deal with acquisition of lands
        in mnicipal areas and section 50 deals with acquisition of
        lands in rural areas. The land situated in any area within the
F       Jurisdiction of any Municipal Corporation or Municipal Council
        is considered as land lying in a 1111nicipal area for purposes
        of determination of compensation .and the land outside the
        jurisdiction of a Municipal.Corporation or a Municipal Council
        is treated as land in a rural area for the said purpose.
        Section 44 which is material for purposes of this case which
G       lays down the basis for determination of the amunt for
        acquisition of lands in !lllnicipal areas read thus :

                   "44. (1) Where any land including any building·
                   thereon is acquired and 'lested in the State
                   Go'/ernment under this Chapter and such land is
H                  situated in any area within the jurisdiction of any
 STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]        719

                                                       A
Municipal Corporation or Municipal Council, the
State Government shall pay for such acquisition an
amount which shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of this section.

(2) Where the amount has been determined with the
                                                       B
concurrence of the Authority by agreement between
the State Government and the person to whom it is
payable, it shall be determined and paid in
accordance with such agreement.

(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the
amount payable in respect of any land acquired
shall be an amount equal to one hundred times the      c
net average monthly income actually derived from
such land, during the period of five consequtive
years immediately preceding the date of publication
of the notification referred to in section 41 as
may be determined by the Land Acquisition Officer.
                                                       D
(4) The net average monthly income referred to in
sub-section ( 3) shall be calculated in the manner
and in accordance with the principles set out in
the First Schedule.
                                                       E
(5) The Land Acquisition Officer shall, after
holding an inquiry in the prescribed manner,
determine in accordance with the provisions of
sub-section (4) the net average monthly income
actually derived from the land. The Land Acquisi-
tion Officer shall then publish a notice in a
                                                       F
conspicuous place on .the land and serve it in the
prescribed manner calling upon the owner of the
land and every person interested therein to inti-
mate to him, before a date specif led in the notice,
whether such owner or person agrees to the net
average monthly income actually derived from the
                                                       G
land as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer.
If such owner or person does not agree, he may
intimate to the Land Acquisition Officer before the
specified date what amount he claims to be such net
average monthly income.
    720                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS        [1986] I S.C.R.

A
               (6) Any person, who does not agree to the net
               average monthly income as determined by the Land
               Acquisition Officer under sub-section (5) and the
               amount for acquisition to be paid on that basis and
               claims a sum in excess of that amount may pref er an
               appeal to the Tribunal, within thirty days from the
               date specified in       the   notice     referred   to   in
B
               sub-section (5).

               (7) On appeal, the Tribunal shall, after hearing
               the appellant, determine the net average monthly
               income and the amount to be paid on that basis and
               its determination shall be final and shall not be
c              questioned in any court. 11

          Section 45 of the Act provides for apportionment of
    amount   payable   on   acquisition   amongst     different    persons
    claiming interest in the amount of compensation. Section 46 of
    the Act lays down the procedure for payment of atoc1unt for
D
    acquisition or for depositing of same in the Court. Section 47
                                                                             I
    of the Act lays down the powers of the Land Acquisition
    Officer in relation to determination of the amount for
    acquisition and section 48 of the Act provides for payment of
    interest on that am.June at the rates specified therein, by the
    State Government. The Land Acquisition Officer is appointed by
E   the State Government under the powers conferred by section 49
    of the Act. Section 50 of the Act which contains the
    provisions relating to th.e basis for determination of amount
    for acquisition of l.ands in rural areas and the procedure to
    be followed Jn that case reads thus :
F
               "SO.    (I) Where any land (including any building
               thereon) is acquired and vested in the State
               Government under this Chapter and such land is
               situated in any are'a out.o;ide the jurisdiction of
               any Municipal Corporation or Municipal Council (in
               this Chapter referred to as 'a rural area'), the
G              State Government shall pay for such acquisition an
               aroount, which shall be determined in accordance
               with the provisions of this section.

                (2) Where the amount has been determined, with the
                concurrence of the Authority, by agreement         between
H
                    STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]       721

                                                                         A
                   the State Government and the person to whom it is
                   payable it shall be determined and paid in
                   accordance with such agreement.

                   (3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the
                   State Government shall ref er the case to the B
                   Collector, who shall determine the amount for
                   acquisition in accordance with the principles for
                   determining compensation laid down in the Land
                   Acquisition Act, 1894, and the provisions of that
                   Act (including provisions for reference to Court
                   and appeal) shall apply thereto mutatis mutandis as
                   if the land has been acquired and compensation had c
                   to be determined, apportioned and paid under the
                   provisions of that Act, subject to the modifica-
                   tions that reference in section 23 and 24 of that
                   Act to the date of publication of the notification
                   under section 4, sub-section (1) were reference to
                   the date on which the notice under the proviso to D
                   sub-section (1) of section 41 of this Act is
                   published, and the references to the time or date
                   of the publication of the declaration under section
                   6 of that Act were references to the date of
                   publicationof the notification .refer to in
                   sub-section (3) of section 41 of this Act in the E
                   Official Gazette.

                   Explanation - In this section, "Collector" means
                   the Collector of a District and includes any
                   officer specially appointed by the State Government
                   or by the Commissioner to perform the functions of    F
                   a Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894".

           Wherever the amount payable on acquisition is settled by
      agreem_ent   there   is   no distinction between a land    in a
      municial area or a land in a rural area. The point of
      distinction which is alleged to be discriminatory between the G
      two types of land lies in the method of computation of the
      amount payable on acquisition where there is no agres ment •
 .,   Whereas in the case of the land situated in a rural areas
· I   section 50 of the Act provides that the valuation of the land
      shall be made in accordance with the provisions contained in
      section 23 and section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in H
    722                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1986] 1 s.c.R.

A
    the case of the land situated in a nunicipal area the amount
    payable has to be calculated according to sub-section (3) of
    section 44 of the Act. Section 44(3) of the Act provides that
    the said amount shall be equal to one hundred times the net
    average monthly income actually derived from such land during
    the period of five consecutive years immediately pr~ceding
    the date of publication of the notification referred to in       :<
B
    section 41 of the Act as may be determined by the Land                i
    Acquisition Officer. Under sub-section (4) of section 44 of
    the Act the net average monthly income ref erred to in
    sub-section (3) of section 44 is required to be calculated in
    the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in
    the First Schedule to the Act. The First Schedule to the Act
c   reads thus :

                                "FIRST SCHEDULE
                 (See sub-section (1) of section 44)

              Principles for determination of the net average
D
              monthly income

              1, The land Acquisition Officer shall first
              determine the gross rent actually derived by the
              owner of land acquired, i11cluding any building on
              such land, during the period of five consecutive
E
              years ref erred to in sub-section (3) of section 44,

              2. For such determination, the Land Acquisition
              Officer may hold any local inquiry and obtain, if
              necessary, certified copies of ei<tracts from the       ""
              property tax assessment books of the local             -I'""
F
              authority concerned showing the rental value of
              such land.

              3. The net a\rerage monthly income referred to in
              sub-section (3) of section 44 shall be sixty per
              cent, of the average monthly gross rent which shall
G
              be one-sixtieth of the gross rent during the five
              consecutive years as determined by the Land
              Acquisition Officer under paragraph 1.                 ·'11'
                                                                      ,-
              4. Forty per cent, of the gross monthly rental
              referred to above shall · not be taken int··
H
                 STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J.]          723

                                                                         A
                consideration in determining the net average
                monthly income but shall be deducted in lieu of the
                expenditure which the owner of the land would
                normally incur for payment of any property tax to
                the local authority, for collection charges, income
                tax or bad debts as well as for works of repair and
                                                                         II
                maintenance of the building, if any, on the land.

                5. Where the land or any portion thereof has been
                unoccupied, or the owner has not been in receipt of
                any rent for the occupation of the land during the
                whole or any part of the said period of five years,
                the gross rent . shall be taken to be the income         c
                which the owner would in fact have derived if the
                land had been leased out for rent during the said
                period, and for this purpose the rent actually
                derived from the land during a period prior or
                subsequent to the period during which it remained
                vacant or from similar land in the vicinity shall        D
                be taken into account."

          The High Court does not say that the amount payable under
     sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 of the Act for the land
     situated in 111.1nicipal area is illusory. It however says that
     the method of capitalization set out in section 44(3) and (4)       E
     of the Act being the only method out of the several methods of
     valuing the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the
     Owner of land in a 111.1nicipal area is placed in a less
     advantageous position and is denied equality of treatment. In
     order to appreciate this ground of objection, it is necessary
     to examine whether the classification of the land under the
                                                                         F
     Act into the land in lllllnicipal area and the land in rural area
     for purposes of determining the amount payable on acquisition
     is bad. It is not denied that the land in lllllnicipal area
     conmands various advantages which are not available in the
     case of land in rural areas. The Act is not introduced for the
     benefit of areas like Bombay Corporation Area and areas under       G
     the jurisdiction of other Corporations and Dl.lnicipalities
     ~nly. It is enacted for the whole State more than 90 per cent
     of which constitutes rural area. The potentialities of a land
't   in a Dl.lnicipal area are far higher than the potentialities of
     land in a rural area. There is also no occasion under the Act
     for the State Government to treat one piece of land in a            H
        724                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [19861 1 s.c.R.


A       mnicipal area in one way and another piece of land in that
        area differently. All lands in a 111micipal area have to be
        valued in only one way that is in accordance with section
        44(3) and (4) of the Act and all lands in rural areas have
        also to be valued only in one way and that is in accordance
        with the provisions of the Land Acquisition, 1894. There could
        have been two different Acts one for municipal areas and
B       another for rural areas, each providing for a different method
        of valuation of land. Such a classification would have been
        unexceptionable having regard to the object and purposes of
        the two Acts and the difference in the potentialities of the
        two types of lands. It may be noticed that in State of Qijarat
        v. Shri Sbantilal Hangaldaa & Ors., [1969] 3 s.c.R. 341 this
c       Court has upheld the classification of land under the same Act
        for purposes of valuation at different stages of town plann-
        ing. This view is adopted and followed in Prakash Amichand
        Shah v. State of Qijarat & Ors., [1986] l S.C.C. 581, recent-
        ly. The method of capitalization is also one of the recognised
        methods which is adopted for the purpose of valuation of
D       properties acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. All
        methods of valuation adopted under the Act are intended to
        achieve the same purpose, namely, determination of the market
        value of the land acquired. It is difficult to say whether any
        of them is superior to the other in the context of Article 14
        of the Constitution and to hold that there will be descrimi-
E       nation, if any of them is not allowed to be availed of for
        purposes of valuation. In the case of agricultural lands, the
        method of capitalization is followed by our Courts for several
        years (See Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraji v. The
        Revenue Divisional Officer, [1939] 66 I.A. 104, A.I.R. 1939
        P.c. 98, RustOll Cavaajee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970] 3
F       S,C,R, 530, Union of India & Anr. v. Smt. Shanti Devi & Ors.,
         (1983] 4 s.c.c. 542, Special Land Acquisition Officer,
        Davangere v. P. Veerabhadrappa &Ors., [1984] 2 S.C.C. 120 and
        Oriental Gaa Co. Ltd. &Ors. v. State of West Bengal, [1979] 1
        S.Q.R. 617), No doubt, such calculation has been made by
        adopting varying methods, that is, from 33-1/3 time3 to 8
G       times the annual net return as e>q>lained in Sbantidevi's case
        (supra). Such variation has taken place on account of the
        variation of the rate of interest on gilt-edge securities as
        pointed out in that case. The higher the rate of interest, the
        lower would be the number of years' purchase adopted by courts
        to determine the market value of the property acquired.
    H
           STATE v. BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J,]       725

                                                               A
     A reading of the rules contained in the First Schedule to
the Act shows that they lay down fairly appropriate principles
to be followed in determining the net average monthly income.
The net average monthly income referred to in sub-section (3)
of section 44 of the Act is required to be determined in
accordance with paragraph 3 of the First Schedule to the Act B
at sixty. per cent of the average monthly gross rent which
shall be one sixtieth of the gross rent during the five cons-
ticuti ve years as determined by the Land Acquisition Officer
under paragraph 1 of the First Schedule, In paragraph 7 of its
judgment the High Court observes that the Act does not give
any indication as to why the amount of forty per cent out of
the gross rental is required to be deducted. This is an c
incorrect statement. Paragraph 4 of the First Schedule gives
the reason for such deduction. It aays that forty per cent of
the gross monthly rental shall not be taken into consideration
in determining the net average monthly income but shall be
deducted .in lieu of the expenditure which the owner of the
land would normally incur for payment of any property tax to D
the local authority, for collection charges, income tax or bad
debts as well as for works of repair and maintenance of the
building if any on the land. In the case of agricultural lands
many times one-half of the annual yield is deducted towards
cultivation charges, land revenue, cost of personal labour
etc. before determining the net annual yield for purposes of E
capitalization. In the instant case the Act directs payment of
100 times the net monthly income, that is, 8 1/3 times the net
annual income from the property as the amount payable on its
acquisition which cannot be considered to be too low having
regard to the rate of interest on safe investments which is
prevailiiig from. 1976-77 onwards. In Oriental Gas Co's (supra) F
eight times the net annual income was considered to be ade-
quate compensation by this Court. The High Court erred in
relying upon the decision in Governmeut of Bombay v. Monranji
Muocberji Cama, 10 Bom. L.R. 907, a decision rendered at the
commencement of this century to say that 16 2/3 years'
purchase of unsecured annual ground rent as the basis for G
determination of market value by capitalization method in
recent years. It may incidentally be mentioned that even that
decision does not lay down that the valuation of vacant land
by the application of the rule of capitalization is not a
reasonable method. Paragraph 5 of the First Schedule to the
                                                               H
    726                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1986] 1 s.c.R.


A   Act provides that method of valuation of unoccupied lands or
    lands where the owner is not in receipt of rents. The High
    Court while deciding the case before it has overlooked the
    principle that every Act carries with it the presumption of
    constitutionality and unless the petitioner is able to
    discharge the said burden by placing adequate material, the
    Court should not strike down a legislative provision particu-
B   larly by the application of Article 14. We fail to see any
    hostile discrimination in the instant case which will make
    sub-section (3) and sub-section· (4) of section 44 of the Act
    violative of Article 14 of the Constitution merely because
    in the case of lands in municipal area all the methods of
    valuation under    the Land Acquisition Act are not made
c   available.

           Even     granting   for   purposes  of   argument     that
    sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 are violative of
    Articlel 14 of the Constitution, we are of the view that
    the said provisions receive the protection of Article 31C
D   of the Constitution. We shall proceed to test the validity of
    the argument keeping aside for the time being the obser-
    vations in Sanjeev Cote Hannfacturlng Company. v. Bharat
    Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 1000. Let us proceed
    on the basis that after Bis Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
    Srlpadagalavaru v. State of lerala [1973) Supp. S.C.R. 1. and
E   Minerva Mills Ltd & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [ 1981) 1
    s.C.R. 206, Article 31C reads as "notwithstanding anything
    contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of
    the State towards securing the principles specif led in clause
    (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on
    the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes ·away or
F   abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article
    19. Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution 'which is
    relevant for our purpose states that the State shall, in
    particularly direct its policy towards securing that the
    ownership and control of material resources of the c01B1nity
    are so distributed as best to subserve colllllOn good. The High
G   Court rightly observed at the end of paragraph 14 of its
    judgment following Sanjeev Cote llmmfacturlng Coapauy'a case
    (supra) that the expression 'material resources' of the
    coDllllnity' would cover the lands held by private !'Wllers also.
    But it however erred thereafter in reaching the concluaion
    that Article 31C was not applicable to the case for the reason
H   that (i) the Act did not contain a declaration that it was
            STATE v. BASANTIBAI (VENKATARAi'1IAH, J,]          727


enacted to give effect to Article 39(b), (ii) by. undertaking        A
development of commercial centres while providing housing
accommodation, the Authority was expected to make profits and
hence following that the power tc acquire was not conferred
with a view to achieving the directive principles in Article
39(b), and (iii) the object of enacting the legislation was
obviously to provide wholesome civic life to the citizens and        B
not distribution of material resources. We are of the view
that each one of these reasons is invalid and erroneous. First
Article 31C does not say that in an Act there should be a
declaration by the appropriate legislature to the effect that
it is being enacted to achieve the object contained in Article
39(b), In order to ascertain whether it is protected by
Article 31C, the Court has to satisfy itself about the               c
character of the legislation by studying all parts of it. The
question whether an Act is intended to secure the objects
contained in Article 39(b) or not does not depend upon the
declaration by the legislature but depends on its contents. We
have already dealt with the objects of the Act with which we
are concerned in this case. It inter alia makes provision for        D
acquisition of private lands for providing sites for building
houses or housing accomodation to the comm.tnity. The title to
the lands of the private holders which are acquired first
vests in the State Government. Later on the land is developed
and then destributed amongst the people as house sites. It
also provides for reserving land for providing public                E
amenities without which people cannot live there. Comnunity
centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, play
grounds, are all necessary for civic life and there amenities
are enjoyed by all. That is also a kind of distribution. In
State of Kamat aka & Anr. etc. v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr.
Etc. (1978] 1 S.C.R. 641 at pages 69 dealing with the                F
question whether nationalisation of bus transport was covered·
by Article 39(b), Justice Krishna Iyer has observed thus :
                 11
                      The next question is whether nationalisation
           can have nexus with distribution. Should we assign
           a narrow or spacious sense to this concept? Doubt-        G
           less, the latter, for reasons so apparent and elo-
           quent. To 'distribute' even in its simple dictio-
           nary meaning, is to 'allot, to divide into classes
           or into groups and distribution' embraces 'arrange-
           ment, classification, placement, disposition,
                                                                     H
    728                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [19861 t s.c.R.


A             apportionment, the way in which items, a quantity,
              or the like, is divided or apportioned; the system
              of dispersing goods throughout a comm.mity' (See
              Random House Dictionary). To classify and allocate
               certain industries    or services or utilities or
               articles between the private and the public sectors
               of the national economy is to distribute those
B              resources. Socially conscious economists will find
               little difficulty in treating nationalisation of
               transport as a distributive process for the goods
               of the colllllllnity. You cannot condemn the concept of
               nationalisation in our Plan on the score that
               Article 39(b) does not envelope it. It is a matter
c              of public policy left to legislative wisdom whether
               a particular scheme of takeover should be
               undertaken.

               Two conclusions strike as quintessential. Part IV,
               especially Article 39(b) and (c), is a furturistic
D              mandate to the state with a message of
               transformation of the economic and social order.
               Firstly, such change calls for collaborative effort
               fr01'1 all the legal institutions of the system: the
               legislature, the judiciary and the administrative
               machinery. Secondly and consequentially, loyalty to
E              the high purpose of the Constitution, viz. social
               and economic justice in the context of material
               went and utter inequalities on a massive scale,
               compass the court to ascribe expansive meaning to
               the pregnant words used with hopeful foresight, not
               to circumscribe their connotation into contradic-
F
               tion of the objectives inspiring the provision. To
               be Pharisaic towards the Constitution through
               ritualistic construction is to weaken the social-
               spiritual thrust of the founding fathers' dynamic
               faith. 11
G         These observations are noted with approval by another
    Constitution Bench in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing· Company's
    case (supra). it is true that when public money is invested on
    the development of land, the Authority is ·expected to
    reimburse itself to some extent. The Authority, however, is
    expected to conduct its operations as a public utlity concern
H
                STATE v, BASANTIBAI [VENKATARAMIAH, J. ]        729
                                                                       A
j

    and not as a private land development agency. The High Court
    erred in taking a very narrow view of the objects of the Act
    and the functions of the Authority under it. We are satisfied
    that the Act is brought into force to implement the directive
    principle contained in Article 39(b) and hence even if there       B
    is any infraction of Article 14 it is cured by Article 31C
    which is clearly attracted to the_ case.

         We neltt: proceed to consider a contention lacking in merit
    which has unfortunately been accepted by the High Court namely
    that the Act infringes Article 300A of the Constitution.
    Article 300A was not in force when the Act was enacted Article     c
    31(1) of the Constitution which was couched in the same
    language was however in force. Article 31C gave protection to
    the Act even if it infringed Article 31. Let us assume that
    the action of acquiring private properties should satisfy now
    Article 300A also because the proceedings to acquire the land
    started in the instant case after Article 300A came into
                                                                       D
    force. Let us ·also assume that a law should be fair and
    reasonable and not arbitrary and that a law should also
    satisfy the principle of fairness in order to be effective and
    let us also assume that the said principle of fairness lies
    outside Article 14. We are assuming all these, without
    deciding these questions, since the action can be upheld even
                                                                       E
    if all these assumptions are well-founded. What is it that is
    being done now in the instant case? Certain vacant lands lying
    inside a municipal area are being acquired for providing
    housing accomodation after paying an account which is computed
    in accordance with a method considered to be a fair one by
    courts. The purpose for which the lands are acquired to be is
                                                                       F
    a public purpose. The owners are given opportunity to make
    their representations before the notification is issued. All
    the requirements of a valid exercise of the power of eminent
    domain even in the sense in which it is understood in the
    United States of America where property rights are given
    greater protection ·than what is required to be done in our
                                                                       G
    country are fulfilled by the Act. Yet the High Court, with
    respect, grievously erred in holding that even assuming that
    the provisions of Chapter V of the Act are protected . from
    challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution due
    to the applicability of Article 31C of the Constitution still
    the impugned provisions of the Act are required to be struck
                                                                       H
    down as the said provisions are neither just nor fair or
    reasonable.
    730                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS     [1986] 1 s.c.R.
                                                                     I,
A        Then in the end we have to consider the argument based on
    Article 21 of the Constitution which is urged on behalf of the
    respondents. Article 21 essentially deals with personal
    liberty. It has little to do with the right to own property as
    such. Here we are not concerned with a case where the
    deprivation of property would lead to deprivation of life or
    liberty or livelihood. On the other hand land is being
B
    acquired to improve the living conditions of a large number of
    people. To rely upon Article 21 of the Constitution for
    striking down the provisions of the Act amounts to a clear
    misapplication of the great doctrine enshrined in Article 21.
    We have no hesitation in rejecting the argument. Land ceiling
    laws, law providing for acquisition of land for providing
c   housing accommodation, laws imposing ceiling on urban property
    etc. cannot struck down by invoking Article 21 of the
    Constitution.

         Before concluding we may refer to one other point. CX!r
D
    attention has been called to the fact that some problems          .
                                                                     '(
    presenting difficulty or valuation will have to be faced in
    the application of clause 5 of First Schedule (See Section 44
    (1) in regard to valuation of open lands situated in a city
    like Bombay or lands with building potentialities situated
    within the limits of big towns. These are easily surmountable
    problems of valuation in relation to individual lands and do
E   not reflect on the constitutionality of the impugned
    provisions. The concerned authorities entrusted with the
    function of making evaluation will doubtless resolve such
    problems as are likely to arise appropriately in accordance
    with law. Be that as it may the constitutionality of the
    impugned provisions remains unimpaired.
F
         In the result we hold that the jµdgment of the High Court
    is liable to be set aside to the extent thaat sub-sections (3)
    and ( 4) of Section 44 of the Act have been held
    unconstitutional and struck down. We wish to make it cleaar
    that the findings recorded against the writ petitioners on
G
    other points remain unaffected by this judgment. We accodingly
    allow thiH appeal, uphold the provisions contained in
    sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 of the Act and dismiss
    the writ petition filed by the· respondents. There shall,
    however 1 be no order as to costs.
H

    S.R.                                           Appeal allowed.