Holding

The Designated Court erred by illegally appreciating investigation‑stage statements and pre‑judging the evidence, and therefore the bail granted to the respondent was cancelled.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra charged Anand Chintaman Dighe under the Indian Penal Code and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) for the murder of a municipal corporator, alleging that Dighe had incited violence against political opponents through statements to the press. The Designated Court initially released Dighe on bail, which the Supreme Court later cancelled; Dighe then applied again for bail and the Designated Court granted it, relying solely on newspaper reports and dismissing investigation‑stage statements as evidence. The Supreme Court held that the Designated Court illegally evaluated investigation‑stage material and pre‑judged the evidence, effectively foreclosing the trial. It emphasized that bail decisions must be based on material properly recorded in court and that the court cannot substitute its own gloss for evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the bail order, directed Dighe’s surrender, and ordered a non‑bailable warrant if he failed to appear.

Issues considered

Whether the Designated Court may rely on statements made to the press and investigation‑stage material to grant bail under TADA.
Whether the Designated Court erred by pre‑judging evidence and thereby foreclosing the trial.
Whether cancellation of bail was proper in the absence of fresh material or recorded witness statements.
Whether the FIR under Sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was justified.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 3, s. 4

Subjects

bailDesignated Courtpre‑trial evidenceTADApolitical violencetrial pre‑closureinvestigation stage statementscriminal procedure

Judgment

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA A
v.
ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE

MAY2, 1991

[RANGANATH MISRA, CJ., KULDIP SINGH AND B
P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987:
Sections 3 and 4-Bail-Grant of-By the Designated Court-Validity
of-Appreciation of evidence collected at the investigating stage, fore-
closing the trial-Whether proper.
c
The respondent was arrested by the police in connection with the
murder of a Corporator, nnder Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 read· with
120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The prosecution
alleged that the respondent conspired and hatched the plot to murder
D
the deceased. This was based on the respondent's repeated statements
to the Press, which were also published in the local newspaper/
magazine and interview given to another paper, dubbing those party
Corporators who had voted against the respondent's party candidates
for the offices of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of the local civic body,
resulting in their defeat as traitors and threatening them with death.
E
The Designated Court, released the respondent on bail, but this
Court cancelled the bail. Thereafter, the respondent moved another
application for bail before the Designated Court, which granted bail on
the view that from the newspaper reports it could not be assumed or
inferred that the respondent was in any manner involved in the conspi-
racy, that there was no justification to record the First Information F
Report, that the statements of witnesses recorded by the investigating
officer, could not be relied upon.
Allowing the appeal preferred by the State, this Court·
HELD: 1: 1 The police Investigation prima facie shows that mafia-
type terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold-blooded G
murder of the deceased. The Judge, Designated Court acted illegally in
appreciating the statements of witnesses and material collected by the
investigating officer at the·investigaiion stage. He should have dealt
with the same in accordance with law. [623F]
1.2 The Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering the H
judgment oo the culpability _of respondent. The Jndge grossly erred in
(il9
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A fore-closing the trial by pre-judging the evidence which was yet to come
on record. l'jo doubt, while cancelling the bail order, this Court
observed that the cancellation of bail was without pre-judice to the
rights of the respondent to move the Designated-Court for bail at any
subsequent stage, but that was only in the event of any further evidence
being recorded by the court or any fresh material being made available
B during the investigation or before the court. This Court also directed
that it was necessary for the Designated-Court to consider further mate-
rial collected by the investigating agency, by recording statements of

c
witnesses. The Designated-Court did not record any evidence and there
was no fresh material available before the Court. The Judge, Desi-
gnated-Court, by putting his own gloss over the same material has
again granted bail to the res:iondent. The manner in which the Judge
has dealt with the matter cannot be appreciated. [623D-E]
-
1.3 Tlli' bail granted to the respondent is accordingly cancelled. I623GI
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 336 of 199 I.
0

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.2. 1990 of the Designated
Court, Pune in Crl. Misc. Application No. 5 of 1990.

V.V. Vage, V.N. Patil and A.S. Bhasme for the Appellant.
E
R.K. Jain, P.M. Hegde, Satish Samant and Kailash Vasdev for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KULDIP SINGH, J. Special Leave granted.
F
Shridhar Khopkar a Shiv Sena Corporator in the Municipal
Corporation Thane was murdered on April 21, 1989. The First Infor·
mation Report was lodged at Waghle Police Station Thane on the
same date. Anand Chintaman Dighe, the respondent before us, was
arrested by the police· in connection with the said case on charges
G under sections 147, 148, 149, 302 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal ~
Code and sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987. The allegations against Dighe are that he
conspired and hatched the plot to murder Shridhar Khopkar.
The prosecution case is that election to the office of Mayor and
H Deputy Mayor, Municipal Corporation T!Jane, was held on March 20,
1989. The Shiv Sena party, majority in the Corporation, was expecting
STATE OF MAHARASTRA v. CHINTAMAN DIGHE [SINGH, J.} 621

to win the election. The party was, however, defeated. The defeat was
imputed to the cross-voting on the part of one or two, members of the A
Shiv Sena. The said cross voting had angered the Shiv Sena leaders.
The cross-voters were dubbed as traitors. It is alleged that Dighe had
issued repeated statements to the press saying that the traitors' life
would be made difficult and probably they would be killed. These
statements were published in Marathi Daily "Navakal" dated March B
22, 1989 and were repeated in a weekly magazine "Lokprabha" on
April 9, 1989. Again in an interview to Daily "Urdu Times" dated
April 16, 1989 the respondent Dighe had asserted that he knew the
names of the traitors but could not disclose the same. He had also
asserted in the said statement that the punishment for traitors was
death and it would be difficult for them to survive.
c
The learned Judge, Designated Court, Pune, by his order dated
April 18, 1989 released Dighe on bail. This Court by an order dated
January 16, 1990 cancelled the bail with the following observations:

"In the present case the learned Judge observed that D
it is a case of respectable person of a big political organisa-
tion, his freedom cannot be curtailed if he is entitled to
bail. His liberty cannot be curbed if enlarged on bail and,
therefore, no kind of condition ·is required to be imposed.
The Court also observed that being a leader of the big
political organisation one cannot expect that the respon- E
dent will commit any- offence if enlarged on bail and he
cannot be called to be a criminal. The learned Judge was
obsessed by the fact that the respondent was associated
with a political party and was oblivious of the nature of the
allegations made against him and the relevant materials
indicating that the respondent had been making utterances F
inciting violence. The respondent gave repeated statements
to the Press saying that the traitors' life will be made dif-
ficult and probably they will be killed. This was published
in Marathi Daily 'Navakal' on 22.3.89. He repeated his
threat and this appeared in an interview given to the repor-
ter of the Weekly Magazine 'Lokprabha' in its issue G
of 9.4.1989. In an interview in daily 'Urdu Times' dated
16.4.1989 the respondent asserted that he knew the names
of the traitors but c_ould not disclose the same. He also
asserted that the punishment for traitors is death and they
would be killed and this decision has not been taken by him
in anger. H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A In the backdrop of such assertions, it was necessary
for the Court to consider the further materials collected by
the investigating agency by recording statements of witnes-
ses. The court below misdirected itself in refusing to look
into such statements and concluding that it is a case for
granting bail taking into account only the position held by
B the respondent in the party. The court clearly erred in dis-
posing of the application for bail."

Thereafter Dighe moved an application before the Designated
Court on January 23, 1990 for grant of time to surrender. Dighe sur-
rendered on February 5, 1990 and on the same day he moved an
application for bail before the said Court. The application was heard
c on February 8, 1990 and the orders were pronounced on February 9,
1990 releasing Dighe on bail. It is the said order which has been chal-
lenged before us in this appeal.

The learned Judge, Designated-Court, after lengthy discussion
D came to the conclusion that from the newspaper reports it could not be
assumed or inferred that Dighe was in any manner involved in the
conspiracy. The learned Judge observed as under:

"By such statement to the press, it cannot be
assumed, or no inference can be drawn as such that Shri
E Anand Dighe was the person who was trying to kill the
traitor."

"Mere statement does not amount to any kind of con-
spiracy. So, this cannot be the evidence of their agreement ,~
or meeting two minds to commit any kind of offence."
F
"I cannot take these newspaper cuttings into con-
sideration.''

The learned Judge further discussed the First Information
Report and came to the findings that there was no justification to
G ·record the same. The observations of the learned Judge are as under:

"The only thing that had happened on that day, was
the murder of Shri Shridhar Khopkar. He could very well
register the offence that such a murder had taken place. He
could not register the offence under Section 3 and 4 of the
H Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
STATE OF MAHARASTRA v. CHINTAMAN DIGHE {SINGH, l.] 623

because he was not possessed of any kind of substantial
material to register this offence. So, in short, this F.I.R. is A

... -. . of no use to the prosecution, at least for the purpose of this
offence under Section 3 and 4 of the Act, ibid."

" The learned Judge further discussed the statements of witnesses
recorded by the investigating officer. The Judge scrutinized the state- B
ments of Arnn Jagtap, Smt. Sangita Khopkar and Miss Sujata
Khopkar and treating those statements to be evidence before the
Court, came to the conclusion that the statements could not be relied
-1
upon. The learned Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering
the judgment on the culpability of respondent Dighe. We are of the
view that the Learned Judge grossly erred in fore-closing the trial by
pre-judging the evidence which was yet to come on record. c
It is no doubt correct that this court in its order dated January 16,
1990 observed that the cancellation of bail was without prejudice to
the rights of Dighe to· move the Designated-Court for bail at any
subsequent stage, but that was only in the event of any further evi- D
deuce being recorded by the Court or any fresh material being made
-;•
available during the investigation or before the Court. This Court also
directed that it was necessary for the Designated-Court to consider
further material collected by the investigating agency, by recording
statements of witnesses. The Designated-Court did not record any
J·-1- evidence and there was no fresh material available before the Court. E
The learned Judge Designated-Court by putting his own gloss over the
same material has again granted bail to the respondent. We do not
appreciate the manner in which the learned Judge has dealt with the
matter. The police investigation prima facie shows that mafia-type
, terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold-blooded
murder of Shridhar Khopkar. The learned Judge acted illegally in F
appreciating the statements of witnesses and material collected by the
investigating officer at the investigation stage. He should have permit-
ted the evidence to be recorded and thereafter deal( witlt'fhe same in
accordance with law.

We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the G
" Designated-Court and cancel the bail granted to Dighe. He is directed
to surrender himself to custody immediately. In case he does not so
surrender within ten days from today, the Designated-Court shall issue
non-bailable warrant for his apprehension.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed.