Holding

A confession made voluntarily and corroborated by independent circumstantial evidence, together with reliable child testimony, is sufficient to uphold conviction, and the death penalty is not warranted where the motive is superstitious belief, thus life imprisonment is appropriate.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra prosecuted four accused for abducting and murdering infant children as part of a superstitious ritual to uncover hidden treasure. The trial court relied on a voluntary confessional statement, corroborating circumstantial evidence, and the testimony of a child who escaped two abduction attempts, convicting the accused and imposing death sentences. The Bombay High Court acquitted them, doubting the confession’s voluntariness and the child’s memory. The Supreme Court held that the confession was voluntary, the child’s testimony reliable, and the circumstantial evidence sufficient to uphold conviction; it also ruled that the motive did not merit the death penalty, converting the sentence to life imprisonment. The appeal was allowed, reinstating conviction and modifying the punishment.

Issues considered

The voluntariness and admissibility of the confessional statement recorded by a magistrate.
The reliability and admissibility of child witness testimony regarding the abduction attempts.
The sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and recovered articles to corroborate the confession.
The applicability of Sections 30 and 10 of the Evidence Act to use a confession against co‑accused.
Whether the case qualifies as "rarest of rare" justifying death penalty.
The correctness of the High Court's acquittal on the basis of doubt about confession and child testimony.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 162, s. 164, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 10, s. 27, s. 30
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 134, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364

Subjects

abductioninfanticideconfessional statementchild witnesscircumstantial evidencecriminal conspiracyrarest of raredeath penaltylife imprisonmentIndian Penal CodeEvidence ActCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

A STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ~-
v.
DAMU AND ORS.

MAY I, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 : .J..-
Ss. 302134, 120B and 364-Abduction and murder of infant children-
Circumstantial evidence-Confessional statement ofan accused-Testimony of
c a child who miraculously escaped ftvm the abduction attempt-Recovery of
articles-Conviction and sentence by Trial Court-On appeal, High Court
disbelieving the confessional statement and testimony of child witness, acquit-
ting the accused-Validity of-Held, the circumstances in the case, sufficiently
l.-
establish that pursuant to a criminal conspiracy, accused committed abduction
D and murder ofchildren-High Court erred in acquitting the accused persons by
side-stepping each one of the circumstances established by the prosecution-
Conviction passed by Trial Court upheld-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S.
164-Evidence Act, 1872-Ss. 27, 30 & 10.

Section 302134 :
)..~
E
Sentence-Death sentence-Award of-Rarest of rare cases-Abduction
and murder of children on a superstitions belief of unearthing hidden treas-
ure-Children not abducted and killed for ransom or for vengeance or for
committing robbery-Held, though the acts of accused were horrendous but
since it was committed due to utter ignorance, nonnal punishment prescribed
F
for murder would serve the ends ofjustice-Thus, death sentence converted to
'"'t(
imprisonment for life.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Section 164.
.
Confessional statement-Recording of-Police influence-Precautions
G ~
to be taken by Magistrate-Held, Magistrate should not record the confession
until a lapse ofsuch time till the fear ofpolice is completely extricatedfrom the
>--~
mind of accused.

Confessional statement-Recording of-Police influence-Police Sta-
H tion situated adjacent to sub-jail-Effect of-Held, not sufficient to infer that
880
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. 881
there was police control over the accused. A
Confessional statement-Recording of-Magistrate from a distant place
recording the statement-Effect of-Held, not sufficient to vitiate the confes-
sional statement.

S. 162-Confessional Statement-Recording of-Sources from where the B
Investigation Officer came to know that the accused was desiring to confess-
Held, not obliged to disclose.

Criminal Tlial:

Cricumstantial evidence-Murder-Recovery of an article on the infor- C
mation supplied by the accused-Blood found sticking on the outer side of the
said a11icle-Subsequent denial of recove1y of 011icle by the said accused-
Held such denial is sufficient to pmvide missing link in the chain of circum-
stances-Criminal Pmcedure Code, 1973 S. 313.

Witnesses-Child witness-Reliability of-Abduction and murder-Mi-
D
nor incidents relating to past-Revival of-Held, it is possible to revive if the
consequences of the incidents is told to the child.

Evidence Act, 1872 :
E
S. 27-Doctrine of Confi1mation by subsequent events-Statement by
accused that dead body was cmTied in a mot01r:ycle and thrown in the canal-
Recovery of a piece ofglass fmm the spot found to be a pa11 of the motorcycle-
Held, it can be inferred that the body was carried by the accused in the
moto1r:ycle-Info1mation supplied by the accused admissible in evidence.
F
S. 10-Confessional statement by an accused-Relevancy of against co-
accused-Criminal conspiracy to abduct and murder-Confessional statement
by an accused disclosing common intention of conspirators-Held, usable
against the co-accused also.

Accused-Respondents were prosecuted for offences under Sections G
302/34, 120-B and 364 of the Penal Code. According to the prosecution,
-1.. accused persons abducted and killed children for human sacrifice on the
belief of unearthing hidden treasure. However, one 'S' (PW 31), aged
about 5 or 6 years escaped from the abduction attempt twice and narrated
the incidents before the court which was duly corroborated by his father H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A (PW 30). On arrest A-4 made a confessional statement (Exh.38) before
PW 19, Judicial Magistrate. Trial Court believing the said confessional
statement as voluntary and true and relying upon the testimony of 'S'
(P'V 31) convicted and sentenced the accused to death. However, on
appeal, High· Court disbelieving the confessional statement on flimsy
grounds and also rejecting the testimony of 'S' on the ground that it
B
would not have been possible for a child of his age to remember s~ch
minor instances after 3 years, acquitted the accused persons by extending
benefit of doubt. Hence the present appeal.
,
Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD : 1. The circumstances in the case are sufficient to establish
that there was criminal conspiracy to abduct and slay the children by the
accused-persons and as a sequal to the said conspiracy, three children were
abducted and killed by the accused persons. The Divisions Bench of the
High Court erred in acquitting the accused-persons by side stepping each
D one of the circumstances established by the prosecution. [900-D-E]

2.1. The reasons built up by the Division Bench of the High Court for
carrying out an area of doubt regarding the voluntariness of the confession
made by A-4 cannot stand scrutiny. Trial Court rightly relied on the said
E confession as voluntary and true and the High Court was not justified in
upsetting the findings of the Trial Court regarding that respect. [892-H;
893-A; 890-F; 900-E]

2.2. A Magistrate who proposed to record the confession has to
ensure that the confession is free from police interference. Even if he was
F produced from poli~e custody, the Magistrate was not to record the confes-
sion until the lapse of such time, as he thinks necessary to extricate his ....,.,
mind completely from fear of police to have the confession in his own way
by telling the Magistrate the true facts. In the instant case. A-4 remained in
police custody only till 26.4.1995 and the confession was recorded only on
G 25.5.1995 which means, there was an interval of almost a full month after
he was removed from police custody to judicial custody. [892-A-C]

2.3. The geographical distance between the sub-jail and the police
station should not have been a consideration tO decide the possibility of
police exerting control over a detenue. To keep a detenue in the police fear
H it is not necessary that the location of the police station should be proximal
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. 883
to the edifice in which the prisoner is detained in judicial custody. In many A
places judicial courts are situated very near to police station houses, or the
offices of higher police officers would be housed in the same complex. It is
not a contention to be countenanced that such nearness would vitiate the
independence of judicial function in any manner. (892-D-E]

2.4. High Court was not justified in doubting the voluntariness of the B
confessional statement on the ground that it was recorded by a Magistrate
from a distant place. Further it is a worthless exercise to ponder over how
or from which source the investigating officer would have come to know
that the accused was desiring to confess. Investigating Officer can have
different sources to know that fact and he is not obliged to state in court the C
same, particularly in view of the ban contained in Section 162 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. [892-F-H; 893-A]

3.1. The confession statement made by A-4 was voluntary and it
contained the true narration of what all transpired between the conspira-
tors and how the children were abducted and killed. Further, the said D
confessional statement was duly corroborated by large number of circum-
stances. Thus, the said confessional statement can he used against A-4
without any difficulty. (898-E-F]

---+ Sarwan Singh Ratan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1957) SC 637 and E
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR (1988) SC 1883, relied on.

State of Gujarat v. Subamiya Deshmohmed, (1992) 1SCC473, referred
to.

Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 159, F
distinguished.

3.2. On the foremost among the circumstances which supports the
confessional statement was a testimony of PW 31, the boy who escaped
from the abduction attempt twice. The Division Bench of the High Court
brushed aside his evidence holding that the boy was 5-6 years of age when G
the instances occurred and the instances being so minor that in ordinary
course any body being of that age would not have remembered the same
even by the end of the day. For the boy the said instances might have been
very minor not to keep them alive in memory even till evening of that day.
But when he was told later of the danger he escaped from, that minor H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A incident would winch to the surface of his mood. This is how human mind
works and mind of a child is no exception to the process. For the parents of
~· ..-
the boy the two episodes could not have created any impact at the time the
incident happened. But when they knew later that A-4 was kidnapping
'
infants and killing them it would have created the most probable reaction
of human mind in them also by realizing how they escaped by the skin of
B their teeth from a perennial calamity. The Division Bench was, therefore
too unrealistic when it brushed aside the truthful evidence of PW 31 and
his father PW 30. [894-C; F-H; 895-A-B] A-
3.3. PW 41, a 11 years girl when examined said that deceased 'G' was
her neighbour and one day while they were playing together A-4 took 'G'
c with him. She told that she had not seen 'G' thereafter. High Court
disbelieved her testimony solely on the ground that it is not possible for a
child of that age to remember what happened 3 years ago. As a matter of
fact PW 41 had seen 'G' last while they were playing together and later the ,1.,-
dead body of 'G' was recovered. If so, the one thing which a child of that
D age could have never forgotten would have been the last occasion they have
played together. The reasoning of the High Court in rejecting her testi-
mony was not only unreasonable, it reflected a poor understanding of how
children would react and retain. [895-C-E]
4. When A-2 was arrested and interrogated, he stated to PW 44 .,.__
E Investigating Officer regarding a ''Kalash" (Pitcher) which was later
recovered by PW 44 from his house. When chemical test was made on that,
blood was found sticking on the outer side of the vessel. But when A-2 was
questioned under Section 313 of the Code regarding the said circum-
stances he simply denied even the recovery of the "Kalash". When there
F was blood on the pitcher it is for A-2 to explain; But when he denied even
the seizure of the pitcher, such a denial can be treated as sufficient to
provide 'missing link' to the chain of circumstances. [896-B-E)
State of Maharashtra v. Suresli, [2000) 1 SCC 471, relied on.
5. On the information of A-3 that the body of one of the deceased
G child was carried by him and A-2 on his motor cycle, and thrown in the
canal, the Investigation Officer went along with him to the spot. There he
found a broken piece of glass laying on the ground. In the mean-time a k-
motor cycle was recovered from the house of A-2 and its tail lamp was
found broken. But when the broken piece of glass recovered from the spot
H was placed on the broken situs of the motor cycle it so fitted with the space
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. 885
that PW 44 had no doubt whatsoever that the said glass piece was origi- A
nally part of the tail lamp of the motor cycle. The basic idea embedded in
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is doctrine of confirmation by subsequent
event. If nothing more was recovered pursuant to and subsequent to
obtaining the information from the accused, there would not have been
any discovery of any fact at all. But when the broken glass piece was B
recovered from the spot and that piece was found to be part to the trial
lamp of the motor cycle of A-2, it can safely b°'e held that the Investigating
Officer discovered the fact that A-3 had carried the dead body on that
particular motor cycle upto the spot. Thus, the information supplied by A-
3 that the dead body was carried on the motor cycle up to the particular
spot is admissible in evidence. [896-F-H; 897-A-B; F-H; 898-A] C
6.1. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act permits only a limited use
of the confession as against a co-accused to whom a major role is ascribed
by the confessor. It is well settled that the confession made by one accused
can be used against the co-accused even when the other conditions under
Section 30 are satisfied only for the purpose of corroboration of other D
evidence. However, in the instant case, one of the offences alleged against
all the accused is criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the Penal
Code. Section 10 of the Evidence Act dealing with "relevancy of facts"
provides that anything said, done or written by anyone of the conspirators
in reference to their common intention as a relevant fact, not only as E
against each of thP. conspirators but for proving the existence of the con-
spiracy itself. Further, the said fact can be used for showing that a particu-
lar person was a party to the conspiracy. The only condition for applica-
tion of the rule in Section 10 is that there must be "reasonable ground to
believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an
offence." [898-G-H; 899-A-C] F

6.2. In the instant case, there are reasonable grounds to believe that all
the four accused have conspired together to commit the offences of abduc-
tion and murder of the children involved in the case. So what these accused
have spoken to each other in reference to their common intention as could be
G
gathered from Exh.88 can be regarded as relevant facts falling within the
purview of the Section 10 of the Evidence Act. All the things reported in
that confession referring to what A-1 and A-3 have said and done in refer-
ence to the common intention of the conspirators are thus usable under s.
10 of the Evidence Act as against those two accused as well, in the same
manner in which they are usable against A-4 himself. [899-H; 900-A-C] H
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A S. Nalini and Others v. State by D.S.P., C.B.I. SIT, Clzenna~ [1999] 5
SCC 253 and State of Gujarat v. Mohd. Atik, [1998) 4 SCC 351, relied on.

7. Looking at the horrendous acts committed by the accused, it can
doubtlessly be said that this is an extremely rare case. Nonetheless, a factor
which looms large in this case is that the accused genuinely believed that a
B hidden treasure trove could be winched to the surface by infantile sacrifice
ceremoniously performed. It is germane to note that none of the children
were abducted or killed for ransom or for vengeance or for committing
robbery. It was due to utter ignorance ·that these accused became so
gullible to such superstitious thinking. Consequently, the normal punish-
c ment prescribed for murder is preferable for these accused. Accordingly,
while restoring the sentence passed by the trial court in respect of other
counts of offences, it is ordered that the accused shall undergo imprison-
ment for life for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 14 of the
I.P.C. [900-G-H; 901-A-B]
D CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos.
992-993 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.3.99 of the Bombay High Court
in Confirmation Case No. 1 of 1998 with Cd.A. No. 274 of 1998.
E
V.B. Joshi, Gopal Balwant Sathe, A.R. Phadnis, S.H. Gandhi, S.S.
Shinde and S.V. Deshpande for the Appellant.

Satishchandra V. Sudrik and Shivaju M. Jadhav for the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Abduction and triple infanticide are the gravamen of this
case. Kids, male and female, were abducted not for ransom but for their blood
to propitiate gods to reveal the spot beneath which a treasure trove was
believed to have been embedded. What finally disinterred were not the
G treasures - not even a tiny bit of it - but the putrefied corpses of three infants
whose blood had copiously been collected in vain for searching out a non
existing cauldron of jewelleries. One of the abducted kids (Sagar) was not
destined to die then as he escaped from the clutches of the kidnappers and
his infantile recollections were utilised by the prosecution to tell the tale
H to the court.
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 887
The Sessions Judge found all the four persons who were arraigned A
before him for such grisly perpetrated acts, guilty of the offences charged
against them and they were all sentenced to death. But a division bench of
the High Court of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench (VK Barde and JA Patil, JJ)
extended benefit of doubt which they entertained and set all the accused free.
This is the appeal which the State of Maharashtra has filed by Special Leave
B
in challenge of the order of acquittal.

Sri Satish Chandra B.Subrik learned counsel who entered appearance
for the accused reported to us that the first accused (Dami Gopi Nath) died
during the pendency of this appeal and hence the appeal as against him can
be treated as abated. The remaining three respondents are A2- Gangadhar C
Gitaram Kotka @ Guruji, A3-Mukinda Anna Thorat and A4 Dhananj%'a @
Balu Joshi. It is convf'.nient for us to refer to them in the rank as they were
arraigned as accused in the trial court.

The events narrated in this case have the silhouttee of a crime thriller. D
Mystery hovered around Chanda village in Newasa Taluk (Ahrnadnagar
district in Maharashtra) over the sudden disappearances of children one after
the other. Horror struck the minds of the villagers when cadavers of the
children were recovered one after another from a canal which flowed through
Newasa.
E
The episodes started on 4.3.1992 whe~ a little girl by name Meera (one
of the four children of Ramdas) was missing from her house. The elders of
the family made hectic searches and then caused announcements to be
broadcast through loudspeakers fitted at the Gram Panchayat' s office regard-
ing the disappearance of the child. Next day a complaint was lodged with F
the police. On the third day her dead body was recovered from the canal
flowing through the locality. It was wrapped in a gunny bag made for urea
storage. Among the injuries noted on the dead body two were so peculiar that
the mystery deepened further. Dr. Ramprasad (PW33) who conducted autopsy
on the body has described one injury as anti-mortem and the other as post-
mortem. The former was multiple abrasions on the left labia majora on the G
lateral aspect. The latter was a "triangular wound on the perenial region just
posterior to vaginal opening." PW33 Doctor opined from the other injuries
noted by him that death of Meera was caused by throttling.

On 9.2.1994 a five-year-old kid by name Devidas (one of the two H
',

888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A children of PW 26 - Khandu) was found missing. A complaint was lodged
with the police on the succeeding day and three days later the dead body of
Devidas was found floating in the canal at Dedgaon in Newasa Taluk. He
had an injury on the back of his head and his penis was seen chopped off.
His father PW26, a rustic villager, wished to avert a post-mortem examination
B on the remainings of his dear child and hence he did not choose to inform
the police about recovery of the dead body.

On 13.2.1995 another little male child by name Deepak (who was· then
studying in the 2nd standard) was found missing from his house. His father
PW2 Suresh deputed his uncle to lodge the complaint with the police. Three
C days later the dead body of Deepak was found in the same canal and penis
of that child was also seen chopped off, besid~s the lobes of his two ears were
sliced off.

While the above events had rocked the locality, the particular village
D at Newasa Taluk was agog with different stories - In the meanwhile a
seemingly event-less incident took place. A five year old boy by name Sagar
(PW31) was endeared to A4 Balu Joshi whom the boy used to address "Balu
Mama" (as the nephew of A4 Balu Joshi by name Krishna and Sagar were
classmates and friends). On two occasions A4 (Balu Joshi) tried to allure
Sagar by offering sweets to him and took him to some distance but on both
E occasions Sagar wriggled out from his grip and ran off. The first attempt took
place in February 1993 and second was in 1995. The boy told his father
PW30 Ramakant about it but the latter did not take it as a matter of serious
implication to be reported to any authorities. But later when things crystal-
lized into larger dimensions PW30 felt the need to bring it to the notice of
F the police.

Al Darou Gopi Nath was arrested on 26.2.1995 and with his interro-
gation the police could make a break-through regarding the mysterious
disappearances and death of the children. Arrests of the remaining three
accused were followed swiftly and thereafter irivestigation progressed to a
G
considerable extent. Certain articles were recovered coni?equent upon the
information elicited from the accused and such recovery threw further light
on the multiple infanticides. A confession was recorded by Ms. Anjali Apte,
a Judicial Magistrate, First Class on 26.5.1995 and it became the sheet-
anchor of the prosecution matrix::'The confession is marked by the prosecu-
H tion as Ex.88.
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 889
Narration of the prosecution case would be incomplete without giving A
at least a sUmmary of what has been recorded by PW19 in Ex.88. Hence the
following extract is taken the~efrom.

- When Balu Joshi(A-4) ~lked to Kotkar @ Guruji(A- 2) about his
\' ..
financial problems; the latter brought Mukinda Thorat(A-3) for suggesting
some solution. Mukinda Thorat(A-3) mentioned about the hidden treasures B
in the property of Guruji(A-2) and wanted to seek the assistance of someone
who practiced occult things. The genesis of that thinking was the recovery
of a gold ring from this land twenty five years ago when a manual labourer(PW
25) tilled the land for agricultural operation. Pursuant to it, Damu Gopinath(A-
1) was brought and the latter told them that sacrificing five infant children c
would help to disinter the treasure trove. Damu Gopinath(A-1) then suggested
the sequences to be adhered to as well as the auspicious days for performance
of each such sacrifice. Guruji(A-2) would perform the necessary ceremonies
- ..A.. or rituals for the same.
D
As suggested by Guruji(A-2), the first to be sacrificed was a female
child by name 'Guddi'. The task was assigned to Balu Joshi(A-4) for
procuring the girl. So Balu Joshi(A-4) managed to abduct Meera @ Guddi
on 4.3.92 from the place where she was playing with her friends and brought
her to the house("Wada") of Guruji(A-2). At 11.30 p.m.,the girl was bathed
and thereafter her legs were held by Guruji(A-2) and Mukinda Thorat(A-3). E
Damu Gopinath(A-1) took out a knife and inflicted a cross shaped incised
wound on her vagina and collected the blood in a brass pitcher(Kalash). After
the blood collection was over, she was throttled to death and the dead body
was covered in a gunny bag. Guruji(A-2) and Mukinda Thorat(A-3) carried
the dead body to the canal on a motor cycle(Bajaj-M50) and threw it into F
the water.

As directed by Guruji(A-2), an endeavour was made by Balu Joshi(A-
4) to abduct a boy by name "Sagar"(PW 30) in March, 1993. But the boy
did not respond to the allurement offered by Balu Joshi(A-4). The accused
persons became fearful lest Sagar might disclose it to other people about the G
abduction attempt but nothing happened for one year and hence they decided
-j to revive their operation. Then Guruji(A-2) mentioned the name of Bhau
Khandu Murge(@ Devidas) as a sacrificial kid. Balu Joshi(A-4) succeeded
in abducting Devidas on 4.3.94 and brought him to the Wada of Guruji(A-
2). After performing the rituals in the night, Damu Gopinath(A-1) directed H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A Mukinda Thorat(A-3) to take up the knife and inflict the cut. Strictly adhering
to the said direction, Mukinda Thorat (A-3) chopped t11e penis of the child
off and collected the blood in a pitcher. Thereafter, a heavy blow was inflicted
on the head of the boy with a club and Devidas died instanteously. His body
was also disposed of in the canal.
B Almost one year elapsed thereafter and the treasure hunters wanted to
try once again to get Sagar(PW30). On 10.2.95, Balu Joshi(A-4) went to the
school where that boy was studying and he took the boy to some distance i_-
by offering sweets to be purchased. But somehow, Sagar did not bite the bait
and hence the child ran away from Balu Joshi(A-4).
c
Three days after, Darou Gopinath(A-1) was directed to procure another
boy by name Dipak Waware. Balu Joshi(A-4) went prowling for that boy and
succeeded in abducting him on 15.2.95. As it was a full moon night, Al to
A3 bathed him first and took him out of the room for exposing his penis to
moonrays. Darou Gopinath(A-1) commanded Mukinda Thorat(A-3) to cut the
D
earlobes of the boy first and then to chop down his penis and the commands
were implicitly obeyed. After collecting his blood a heavy blow was given
to his head and the boy died. The dead body was carried on a TVS Suzuki
Motor Cycle and was consigned to the same canal.

E The above narration is only a summary of the confession recorded by
PW19 Judicial Magistrate First Class. In fact, the confession contains much
greater elaboration of each episode with minute details. We thought it not very
necessary to reproduce the whole details.

The trial court relied on the said confession as voluntary and true but
F the Division Bench of the High Court, after a detailed discussion, reached
the following conclusion: -

"It will be, thus, seen that there is reasonable doubt to hold that Balu
Jos!li (A-4) made the confession voluntarily. On scrutinizing the
details given in the confessional statement, it does not appear that
G
whatever is stated would be possible or probable. The confessional
statement does not appear to be true. Furthermore, it is retracted,
may be at a late stage by the accused."

As we pointed out earlier, the confessional statement was recorded by
H PW19 Mrs. Anjali Apte (Judicial Magistrate First Class), and when she was
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 891
examined in Court, she pointed to the details of the various steps adopted by A
her for ensuring that the confession was voluntary. In fact, the Division bench
of tl:ie High Court discussed the procedure adopted by PW 19 elaborately and
found that no fault could be discerned regarding the steps adopted for
recording the confession. The finding made by the Division Bench in that
regard is extracted below: -
B
"So, on going through the evidence ofleamed Judicial Magistrate(F.C.),
Mrs. Apte (PW 19), and the statement of Balu Joshi (A-4) recorded
by her on 25th and 26th May 1995, it can very well be said that the
learned Judicial Magistrate(F.C.) followed the provisions regarding
recording confession properly and correctly. No defect can be found C
in recording of confession."

What persuaded the Division Bench to sideline the confession are the
following reasons: -

1. The fourth accused Balu Joshi remained in police custody for a D
considerably long period and that circumstance is sufficient to view the
confession with suspicion.

2. The Sub-Jail, Newasa (in which the accused was interred) was
located adjacent to the police station and hence the mere fact that he was
locked up in the Sub-Jail is not enough to dispel the fear in the mind of the E
confession regarding police survillence.

3. PW 19 (Mrs. Anjali Apte) was a Judicial Magistrate at Ahmednagar,
whereas, there was a Judicial Magistrate First Class at Newasa itself. As the
accused was locked up in the Sub-Jail at Newasa, there is no explanation why
F
a magistrate belonging to a distant place was asked to record the confession,
in preference to a magistrate at a near place.

4. The Investigating Officer (PW42) has not explained how he knew
that Balu Joshi(A-4) was willing to make a confession to him. Learned
judges draw an inference like the following:- G

-l "If the circumstance, that the Police Station is adjacent to Sub-Jail,
Newasa, is taken into consideration, then an inference can very well
be drawn that nobody but Police contacted Balu Joshi(A-4) and Police
informed Mr. Suryawanshi(PW 44) that the accused was willing to
make confessional statement." H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A We have considered the above reasons and the a11-rwnents addressed for
and against them. We have realised that those reasons are ex facia fragile.
Even otherwise, a Magistrate who proposed to record the confession has to
ensure that the confession is free from police interference. Even if he was
produced from police custody, the Magistrate was not to record the confession
B until the lapse of such time, as he thinks necessary to extricate his mind
completely from fear of police to have the confession in his own way by
telling the magistrate the true facts.

In fact, A4 (Balu Joshi) remained in police custody only till 26.4.1995
and the confession was recorded only on 25.5.1995, which means, there was
C an interval of almost a full month after he was removed from police custody
to judicial custody.

TI1e geographical distance between the two buildings - sub-jail and the
police station - should not have been a consideration to decide the possibility
of police exerting control over a detenue. To keep a detenue in the police
D fear it is not necessary that the location of the police station should be
proximal to the edifice in which the prisoner is detained in judicial custody.
In many places judicial courts are situated very near to police station houses,
or the offices of higher police officers would be housed in the same complex.
It is not a contention to be countenanced that such nearness would vitiate the
E independence of judicial function in any manner. ~--·

Newasa is a taluk located within the territorial limits of the district of
Ahmadnagar. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmadnagar was approached for
nominating a magistrate within his jurisdiction for recording the confession.
There could have been a variety of reasons for the Chief Judicial Magistrate
F for choosing a particular magistrate to do the work. When not even a question
was put to PW19 or PW 44 (the Investigating Officer) as to why the CJM,
Ahmadnagar did not assign the work to a magistrate at Newasa, it is not
proper for the High Court to have used that as a ground for holding that
voluntariness of the confession was vitiated. Similarly, it is a worthless
G exercise to ponder over how or from which source the investigating officer
would have come to know that the accused was desiring to confess. fuves-
tigating Officer can have different sources to know that fact and he is not
obliged to state in court the same, particularly in view of the ban contained
in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

H llms the reasons built up by the division bench of the High Court for
STATE v. DAMU Ai'ID ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 893
carving out an area of doubt regarding the voluntariness of the confession A
made by A4 (Balu Joshi) cannot stand scrutiny. High Court should not have
upset the fmding of the trial court regarding that aspect.

The division bench has erroneously understood the ratio laid down by
this court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC
159. The portion of the decision extracted by the division bench in the
B
impugned judgment was the same as this court has quoted in State of Gujarat .
V. Subamiya Deshmohmed, [1992] 1 sec 473. The following is that portion:

"The confession of an accused person is not evidence in the ordinary
sense of the term as defmed in Section 3. It cannot be made the C
foundation of a conviction and can only be used in support of other
evidence. The proper way is, first, to marshal the evidence against the
accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and
- -4 see whether, if it is believed a conviction could safely be based on
it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of
course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may D
arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as
it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession
and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify
himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would E
not be prepared to accept."

We may make it clear that in Kashmira Singh (supra) this Court has
rendered the ratio that confession cannot be made the foundation of convic-
tion in the context of considering the utility of that confession as against a
co- accused in view of Section 30 of the Evidence Act. Hence the observa- F
tions in that decision cannot be misapplied to cases in which confession is
considered as against its maker. The legal position concerning confession
vis-a-vis the confessor himself has been well-neigh settled by this court in

- Sarwan Singh Ratan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1957) SC 637 as under:

"In law it is always open to the court to convict an accused on his
G
confession itself though he has retracted it at a later stage. Neverthe-
less usually courts require some corroboration to the confessional
statement before convict~g an accused person on such statement.
What amount of corroboration would be necessary in such a case
would always be a question of fact to be determined in the light of H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A the circumstances of each case."

This has been followed by this Court in Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi
Administration), AIR (1988) SC 1883.

There are quite a large number of circumstances in this case which
B substantially support the tmth of the version contained in the confessional
statement given by A4 to PW19. We may now refer to them one by one.

The foremost among such circumstances can be seen from the testi-
mony of PW31 (Sagar) the boy who escaped from the abduction attempt
twice. His father PW30 (Ramakant) also supported it. The boy was aged nine,
c when he was examined in court, and he said that he knew A4 as "Balumama",
he being the uncle of his classmate. He said in court that once he was playing
with his friends A4 Balu Joshi took him to a short distance by offering sweets
but he did not like to go with him further and hence he ran away. He also
said that while he was studying in the first standard A4 (Balu Joshi) went )._ -
D near him and caught hold of his hand by saying that he (A4-Balu Joshi) would
escort him to his house but then also the boy ran away to the school. His
father PW30 said that Sagar told him of both the above episodes but his initial
reaction was not to treat them seriously. It was only when he heard later about
the arrest of A4 in connection with abducting and killing of children, that
E he and the other elder members of his family realised how narrowly their ~-
child escaped.

The unrealistic approach made by the Division Bench of the High Court
to the evidence of PW 30 and PW31 cah be seen even by a glance through
the observation made by the learned judges which is extracted below:
F
"Sagar is stating about the instances which took place, according to
him, when he was of 5 or 6 years of age. The instances by themselves
are so minor that anybody, in ordinary course, being of that age,
would not remember the same even by the end of the day on which
the incident took place. Trying to find corroboration to the deposition
G
of Sagar (PW31) from the deposition of Ramakant (PW30) is a futile
exercise."

For the boy the said instances might have been very minor not to keep
them alive in memory even till evening of that day. But when he was told
H later of the danger he escaped from, that minor incident would winch to the
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 895

' -.I· surface of his mood. This is how human mind works and mind of a child A
is no exception to the process. For the parents of the boy the two episodes
could not have created any impact at the time the incident happened. But
when they knew later that A4 was kidnapping infants and killing them it
":'
would have created the most probable reaction of human mind in them also
by realising how they escaped by the skin of their teeth from a perennial
B
calamity. The Division Bench was therefore too unrealistic when it brushed
aside the truthful evidence of PW 31 (Sagar) and his father PW30 (Ramakant).
-_).
PW 41 Kum. Archana was 11 years old when she was examined as a
witness. She said that Guddi was her neighbour and they were playmates. The
last occasion she saw Guddi was when they played together with some other c
children. During then, A4 Balu Joshi reached there and after a few minutes,
Guddi was found walking with A4 balu Joshi. PW41 Kum. Archana had not
seen her thereafter. The said evidence of PW 41 Kum. Archana has been
- __.\ found reliable by the trial court, but the High Court disbelieved her testimony
on the sole ground that it is not possible for a child of that age to remember D
what happened three years ago.

It is rather unfortunate that the Division Bench of the High Court said
so. As a matter of fact, PW 41 had seen Guddi last while they. were playing
together and later dead body of Guddi was recovered. If so, the one thing
:. . -. -t which a child of that age could have never forgotten would have been the E
last occasion they had played together. The reasoning of the High Court in
rejecting her testimony was not only umeasonable, it reflected a poor
understanding of how children would react and retain.

Recovery of dead body of the children from the canal, the post-mortem
F
findings of the Doctors(PW22 Dr. Ashok who conducted the autopsy on the
body of Dipak and PW33 Dr. Ram Prasad who conducted the autopsy on
the dead body of Mira); the condition of the dead body of Devidas as seen
by his father(PW 26 Khandu) as the penis of the child was seen cut off are
all circumstances which unmistakably corroborate the detailed confessional
statement made by A4 Balu Joshi. The High Court did not even believe that G
death of Devidas was homicidal because no post-mortem examination was
-~ conduct~d on that dead body. The position would be different if the High
Court had concluded that death of Devidas could not have been homicidal.
The Court should be circumspective over the broader features in deciding
whether death was homicidal or not. PW 26 Khandu had noted, besides the H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 3 S.C.R.
A devastation caused on the penis of the child, an injury on the back of his
head. If the latter alone was noticed by PW 26 perhaps one could ltave
entertained the doubt that the death of the child could as well be accidental.
But the presence of the other injuries on the dead body, would lead any
sensible person to the conclusion that the child was done to death and it
B is no matter that a post-mortem examination was not conducted on the dead
body.

When A2-Guruji was arrested and interrogated, he stated to PW44- 4.,-
Investigating Officer regarding a "Kalash"(pitcher) which was recovered by
PW44-Investigating Officer from-the house of A2-Guruji. What is significant
C about the recovery is that when chemical test was made on the pitcher, blood
was found sticking on the outer side of the vessel. Of course, the chemical
analyst could not determine the origin of the blood as it was disintegrated
by that time. But the lea.med Judges of the High Court did not attach any
value to the circumstance on that sole reason. At the first blush, the approach )-- -
D of the High Court may appear to be sound. But when we considered the
answer which A2-Guruji had given to the questions put on him under Section
313 of the Code regarding the said circumstance, he simply denied even the
recovery of "Kalash" as stated by PW44 Investigating Officer. When we
know that there was blood on the pitcher it is for A2 Guruji to explain how
it was. But when he denied even the seizure of the pitcher, such a denial,
E in this context, is not inconsequential. In another case, a similar denial was
treated by this Court as sufficient to provide a "missing link" to the chain
of circumstances. (State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000] 1 SCC 471)

After the arrest of A3 Mukinda Thorat, he told the Investigating Officer
F that "Dipak's dead body was carried by nie and Guruji(A-2) on his motor
cycle and thrown in the canal." The said statement of A3 Mukinda Thorat
was not found admissible in evidence as the dead body was not recovered
pursuant to the said statement. This aspect requires more consideration. It
must be pointed out that pursuant to the said statement and the offer made
by A3 Mukinda Thorat that he would point out the spot, he was taken to the
G spot and there PW44(1nvestigating Officer) found a broken piece of glass
lying on the ground. It was picked up by him. In this context, it is important
to refer to another item of evidence. A motor cycle was recovered from the
house of A2 Guruji and its tail lamp was found broken and one piece of it
was missing. But when the broken glass piece recovered from the spot pointed
H out by A3 Mukinda Thorat was placed on the broken situs of the tail lamp
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 897
of the motor cycle, it so fitted with the space that PW44 Investigating Ofticer A
had no doubt whatsoever that the said glass piece was originally part of the
tail lamp of that motor cycle.

The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the
doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on
the principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength
B
of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee
that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might
be confessional or non- inculpatory in nature, but if it results in discovery
of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the legislature permitted
such information to be used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion c
to the minimum. It is now we11-settled that recovery of an object is not
discovery of a fact as envisaged in the Section. The decision of Privy Council
in Pullukurri Kottayya v. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67 is the most quoted
- .J.
authority for supp011ing the interpretation that the "fact discovered" envisaged
in the Section embraces the place from which the object was produced, the D
knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information given must relate
distinctly to that effect.
\
No doubt, the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is
confined to that portion of the information which "distinctly relates to the fact
thereby discovered". But the information to get admissibility need not be so E
truncated as to make it insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of infor-
mation admitted should be consistent with understandability. In this case, the
fact discovered by PW 44 is that A3 Mukinda Thorat had carried the dead
body of Dipak to the spot on the motor cycle.
F
How the particular information led to the discovery of the fact? No
doubt, recovery of dead body of Dipak from the same canal was antecedent
to the information which PW 44 obtained. If nothing more was recovered •
pursuant to and subsequent to obtaining the information from the accused,
there would not have been any discovery of any fact at all. But when the
broken glass piece was recovered from that spot and that piece was found
G
to be part of the tail lamp of the motor cycle of A2 Guruji, it can safely be
held that the Investigating Officer discovered the fact that A2 Guruji had
carried the dead body on that particular motor cycle upto the spot.

In view of the said discovery of the fact, we are inclined to hold that H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
A the information supplied by A2 Guruji that the dead body of Dipak was
carried on the motor cycle up to the particular spot is admissible in evidence.
That information, therefore, proves the prosecution case to the above-men-
tioned extent.

In Exh. 88 confession, A4 Balu Joshi has stated that on 4.2.95, A3
B Mukinda Thorat had handed over to him a list in which A3 Mukinda Thorat
had written down the articles to oe purchased for performing the ceremony
before Sagar and Dipak were killed. Later, A4 Balu Joshi had purchased those ~-
herbals as per the said list. Now, it is important to,note that when PW44
Investigating Officer made a search in the house of A4 Balu Joshi on 8.3.95,
C a small book(an Almanac) which contained a slip of paper inside. A few
names of herbal articles were written on that slip(such as frankencense). That
slip was forwarded to the handwriting expert alongwith the specimen
handwritings collected from A3 Mukinda Thorat for comparison. Ex. 64 is
the opinion forwarded by the said handwriting expert holding that the scribe
D who wrote the slip and the specimen manuscripts was the same.

Exh. 64 is only the opinion of the Asstt. State Examiner of Documents.
From that description alone, it cannot be gathered whether his office would
fall within the purview of Sec. 293 of the Code. Hence, without examining
the expert as a witness in Court, no reliance can be placed on Exh. 64 alone.
E
But, excluding Exh. 64, we have come across a lot of other circum-
stances to corroborate the truth of the confessional statement contained in
Exh. 88. As we have adverted to many such circumstances, we do not think
it necessary to exhaust all of them for a detailed discussion here. All the
F circumstances discussed above would ensure confidence in our mind in
believing that the confession was made voluntarily and it contained the true
narration of what all transpired between the conspirators and how the
children were abducted and killed. No doubt, it can be used against A4 Balu
Joshi without any difficulty whatsoever.

G For using Exh. 88 as aga~st _A2 Guruji and A3 Mukinda Thorat. there
is a constraint. Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act pennits only a limited
use of the confession as against a co-accused to whom a major role is ascribed
by the confessor. It is well settled that the confession made by one accused
can be used against the co-accused even when the other conditions under
H Section 30 are satisfied only for the putpose of corroboration of other
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 899
evidence. But this aspect is not sufficient to end the travails of A2 Guruji A
and A3 Mukinda Thorat in this case.

One of the offences alleged against all the accused is criminal
conspiracy under Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code. Section 10 of
the Evid~nce Act falls within Chapter 2 which deals with "relevancy of
facts". That Section renders anything said, done or written by anyone of the B
conspirators in reference to their common intention as a relevant fact, not only
as against each of the conspirators but for proving !he existence of the
conspiracy itself. Further, the said fact c~ be used for showing that a
particular person was a party to the conspiracy. The only condition for
application of the rule in Section 10 is that there must be "reasonable ground c
to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an
offence". In this context, we may refer to S. Nalini and Others v. State by
D.S.P. CBI, SIT, Chennai, [1999] 5 SCC 253. In paragaraph 107, this Court
- 4 has stated thus:-

"The first condition which is almost the opening lock of that provision D
is the existence of "reasonable ground to believe" that the conspira-
tors have conspired together. This condition will be satisfied even
when there is some prima facie evidence to show that there was such
a criminal conspiracy. If the aforesaid preliminary condition is
fulfilled then anything said by one of the conspirators becomes E
substantive evidence against the other, provided that should have been
a statement "in reference to their common intention". Under the
corresponding provision in the English law the expression used is "in
furtherance .of the common object". No doubt, the words "in
reference to their common intention" are wider than the words used
in English law (vide Sardar Sardul Singh Carveeshar v. State of
F
Maharashtra)."

The basic principle which underlies in Section 10 of the Evidence Act
is the theory of agency and hence every conspirator is an agent of his
associate in carrying out the object of the conspiracy (State of Gujarat v. G
Mohd. Atik, [1998] 4 SCC 35L Section 10 permits "anything said, done or
written by anyone of such persons in reference to their common intention"
to be recorded as a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to
be so conspired.

In this case, there can be no doubt, relying on Exh. 88 that, there are H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
A reasonable grounds to believe that all the four accused have conspired
together to commit the offences of abduction and murders of the children
involved in this case. So what these accused have spoken to each other in
reference to their common intention as could be gathered from Exh. 88 can
be regarded as relevant facts falling within the purview of the Section 10 of
B the Evidence Act. It is not necessary that a witness should have deposed to
the fact so transpired between the conspirators. A dialogue between them
could be proved through any other legally permitted mode. When Exh. 88
is legally proved and found admissible in evidence, the same can be used to
ascertain what was said, done. or written between the conspirators. All the
things reported in that confession referring to what Al Damn Gopinath and
c A3 Mukinda Thorat have said and done in reference to the common intention
of the conspirators are thus usable under Section 10 of the Evidence Act as
against those two accused as well, in the same manner in which they are
usable against A4 Damu Joshi himself.

D The net result is, the circumstances in this case are sufficient to
establish that there was criminal conspiracy to abduct and slay five little
children in which the four accused persons were the conspirators and further
that abductions of four children and killing of three of them were carried out
as sequel to the said conspiracy. There is no escape for them from conviction
of the offen~es found against them by the Sessions Court. The Division Bench
E of the High Court has gone gravely erroneous in side-stepping everyone of
the circumstances established by the prosecution. Criminal justice became the
unfortunate casualty as a consequence of the unwarranted interference made
by the High Court with a well-considered conclusion arrived at by the trial
court. By acquitting the accused in a case of this nature, despite so much of
F sturdy and reliable circumstances, the judicial system became mauled and
faith of the public in the efficacy of the juqicial function would have
considerably impaired.

Now, we have to make up otir mind regarding the sentence to be
imposed on the three accused. Learned Counsel for the state pleaded for
G restoration of the same sentence which the trial court has imposed. i.e., death
____.penalty. The question is whether this case can be regarded as rarest of rare
· cases in which the lesser alternative is unquestionably foreclosed. Looking )... -
at the horrendous acts committed by the accused, it can doubtlessly be said
that this is an extremely rare case. Nonetheless, a factor which looms large
ff, in this case is that the accused genuinely believed that a hidden treasure trove
-~
STATE v. DAMU AND ORS. [THOMAS, J.] 901
could be winched to the surface by infantile sacrifice ceremoniously per- A
formed. It is germane to note that none of the children were abducted or killed
for ransom or for vengeance or for committing robbery. It was due to utter
ignorance that these accused became so gullible to such superstitious thinking.
Of course, such thin.king was also motivated by greed for gold. Even so, we
persuade ourselves to choose the normal punishment prescribed for murder B
as for these accused. Accordingly, while restoring the sentence passed by the
trial court in respect of other counts of offences, we order that the accused
shall undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the l.P.C.

S.V.K. Appeals allowed C