Holding

The explanation was unsupported by evidence, the presumption under Section 4 was not rebutted, and the accused was guilty; the High Court's acquittal was set aside and the conviction restored.

Summary

Rashid Babubhai Mulani, a talathi, demanded Rs 1,000 to delete a mortgagee's name from revenue records; the complainant paid Rs 300 after a trap was laid. Mulani accepted the marked notes and later claimed the payment was repayment of a government loan, supported by a purported notice sent by registered post. The High Court acquitted him, finding the explanation reasonable. The Supreme Court held that the explanation lacked evidential support, the statutory presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was not rebutted, and the evidence of demand, payment and acceptance of illegal gratification proved guilt. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, restored the conviction under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Act, and reduced the sentence to four months.

Issues considered

The explanation offered by the accused that the payment was towards a government loan can rebut the statutory presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Whether a certificate of posting is sufficient proof of a notice sent by registered post.
Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused despite the trap evidence.
The appropriate quantum of sentence for the offences.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 161
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 4, s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(2)

Subjects

corruptionbribestatutory presumptionbenefit of doubttrap casecertificate of postingevidencesentencing

Judgment

)
A
ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA
V.

RASHID BABUBHAI MULANI

JANUARY 4, 2006
B
[S.B. SINHA AND R.Y. RAVEENDRAN, JJ.]

Conslilulion of India, 1950:

Article 136-Acquillal by High Court-Interference with-If two views C
are possible and the view of High Court in acquilling the accused cannot be
said to be wholly improbable, Supreme Court will no/ interfere, but where
material on record leads lo only conclusion of guilt of accused, judgment of
High Court will no/ be sustained-On facts, High Court was no/ justified in
accepting explanation of the accused and giving him benefit of doubt.
D
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947/Penal Code, 1860:

ss. 4,5(2) read with s.5(/)(d)/s. I 6/-Presumption that gratification
accepted as motive or reward-Rebultal of-Accused in his stalemenl uls 313
Cr.P.C. explaining that the money was received towards a government loan-
Held, the statutory presumption will no/ stand rebutled merely by offering an E
explanation uls 313-Contrary position should be established by the accused
either.from inferences legally drawn from the evidence on record lei in by
1 prosecution or by felling in direct evidence in regard lo the explanation-On
facts, the evidence relating lo demand, payment and acceptance of illegal
gratification is clear-There is nothing on record lo support the explanation
of the accused. F

Service of communication-Certificate of posting-Held, is not
comparable lo a recei.pt for sending a communication by registered post-
Department of Posis may have lo evolve some procedure whereby a record in
regard lo issuance of certificates of posting is regularly maintained.
G
Respondent, while working as Talathi of the village of the
complainant, demanded a certain amount as bribe from the complainant
to delete the name of the mortgagee from the revenue records over his
land. The complainant made the part payment and as regards demand
189 H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006 J I S.C.R.

A for balance of Rs. 300/-, lodged a report with the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
A trap was laid; the accused was said to have made again a demand for
balance amount of Rs.300/-; the complainant paid the marked currency
notes to the accused and gave a signal to the raiding party, which
apprehended the accused and recovered the marked currency notes from
B his pocket. During the trial, the accused gave an explanation in his
statement u/s 313 Cr.PC that he accepted Rs.300/- from the complainant
as repayment of interest on loan taken by his brother from the
Government in respect of which he had sent a notice dated 6.9. 1986 to
the complainant. The trial court convicted the accused of offences
punishable under s.161 IPC ands. 5(2) read with s.5(1)(d) of the
C Prevention of Corruption Act, I 947. However, the High Court held that
the explanation offered by the accused was reasonable and probable; and
acquitted him of the charge giving him benefit of doubt. Aggrieved, the
State filed the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court T

D
HELD: I. I. Though, it is well-settled that the accused is not required
to establish his explanation by the strict standard of 'proof beyond
reasonable doubt', and the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act , I 947 would stand rebutted if the explanation or
defence offered and proved by the accused is reasonable and probable,
E yet the burden on the accused is to be discharged by bringing on record
evidence, circumstantial or direct, which establishes with reasonable
probability, that the money was accepted by the accused, other than as a
motive or reward such as is referred to in Sec. 161. 1197-C-E-FI '

Chaturdas Bhagwandas Pale/ v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1976 SC
F
I 497 and Dhanvantrai Balvan/rai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1964)
SC 575, relied on. 1196-Et

Punjabrao v. State ofAfaharash1ra, [20021 10 SCC 371, distinguished.
1195-EI
G A. Abdul Kaffar v. S1are of Kera/a, 120041 9 SCC 333 and T Shankar
Prasad v. S1are uf AP. [20041 3 SCC 753, referred to. 1196-AI

1.2. The evidence of PW-I (complainant), PW-2 (Panch witness) and
PW-3 (Police Inspector) clearly proves the ingredients of a valid trap case.
H The evidence of the complainant shows that there was a demand by the
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. RASHID BABUBHAI MULA NI 191
}
accused, payment of Rs. 300 as illegal gratification by the complainant to A
the accused and acceptance thereof by the accused. The evidence of PW-
2, who accompanied the complainant, fully corroborates the evidence of
the complainant. (197-H; 198-A(

1.3. As regards the defence, the evidence clearly shows that no
amount was due from complainant to the State; and therefore, the case B
put forth by the defence that a notice of demand dated 6.9.1996 was sent
"'
I
to complainant to pay the dues cannot be accepted. Besides, the said notice
of demand on 6.9.1986 was.not sent by registered post to the complainant,
nor delivered personally against acknowledgement; it was said to have
been posted on 6.9.1986 at Pune and a certificate of posting was obtained. C
It is clear that no notice dated 6.9.1986 was issued to the complainant and
the accused has tried to create an explanation by securing a certificate of
posting dated 6.9.1986 from Pune after the event. (198-F; 199-B-E(

2. A certificate of posting obtained by a sender is not comparable to
a receipt for sending a communication by registered post, as in the tase D
of certificate of posting, no record is maintained by the Post Office either
about the receipt of the letter or the certificate issued. The ease with which
such certificates can be procured by affixing ante-dated seal with the
connivance of any employee of the Post Office is a matter of concern. The
Department of Posts may have to evolve some procedure whereby a record E
in regard to the issuanc'! of certificates is regularly maintained showing a
serial number, date, sender's name and addressee's name to avoid misuse.
In the absence of such a record, a certificate of posting may be of very
little assistance, where the dispatch of such communications is disputed
or denied as in this case. (199-F, G, HI
F
3. It is no doubt true that if two views are possible and the view of
the High Court acquitting the accused cannot be said to be wholly
improbable, this Court will not interfere with the decision of the High
Court. But where the material on record Ieads·to only one conclusi•m viz.,
the guilt of the accused, the judgment of the High Court will not be G
sustained. In the instant case, the High Court was not justified in accepting
the explanation regarding receipt of Rs.300/- by the accused as being
towards Tagai loan. The conclusion of guilt is inescapable. Consequently,
the order of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court
is restored. (200-A-q '
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006 I I S.C.R.

A State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCALE 266,
relied on. 1200-BI

4. In regard to sentence, the incident occurred about 19 years ago.
The accused was a Talathi coming from a poor background with a family
to support. In the circumstances, while restoring the conviction, the
B sentence is reduced from one year to four months both under Section 161
IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of thr Act. 1200-D-EI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 557
of 1999.
c From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.1997 of the High Court of
Bombay in Crl. A. No. 92 of 1990.

V.N. Raghupathi and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Appellant.

D Mrs. Jayashree Wad, Ashish Wad, Neeraj Kumar, Arvind Gupta and y

Priyank Adhyaru for Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RAVEENDRAN, J. State has come up in appeal by special leave,
E against the judgment of acquittal dated 25.11.1997 passed by the Bombay
High Court allowing Criminal Appeal No.92 of 1990 filed by the accused,
thereby setting aside the conviction and sentence under the judgment dated
7.2.1990 passed by the Additional Special Judge, Pune, in Special Case No. I/
1987. By the said judgment, the Special Judge had convicted and sentenced
the respondent herein to undergo RI for one year in regard to an offence
F under Section 161 of the 1.P.C. and RI for one year for an offence punishable
under Section 5(2) read with Section 5( I)( d) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 194 7 ('the Act' for short), and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 and in default
to suffer further RI for three months, with a direction that both the substantive
sentences shall run concurrently.
G 2. The prosecution case was as under : -

(2.1.) The respondent was working as the Talathi of village Kodit.
District Pune. One Mahadeo Bhimaji Badade (complainant) and his elder
brother Baban were the owners of an ancestral field at village Kodit. They
H had taken a loan from one Krishna Badade and had secured the said land in
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. RASHID BABUBHAI MULANI [RA VEENDRAN, J.] J.93
j
his favour by way of a mortgage. The mortgage suit filed by the mortgagee A
ended in a compromise on 16.6.1973. In the year 1986, when the complainant
obtained a '7/12 extract' in regard to the said land, he found that the name
of the mortgagee was continued to be shown as the holder and person in
possession. The complainant, therefore, requested the respondent/accused to
delete the name of Krishna Badade in view of repaymiint of the mortgage
loan in terms of the compromise. The accused informed the complainant that
B
there will be some expenses in that behalf. Thereafter, when the complainant
~ again went to the office of the accused on 6.9.1986 to verify whether the
name of Krishna Badade was deleted, he found to his surprise that the names
of the sons of Krishna Badade had also been entered. Krishna Badade and ·his
sons had no objection for removal of their names from the revenue record. c
Therefore, the complainant again met the accused on 7.9.1986 with a request
to remove the names of Krishna Badade and his sons. The accused informed
him that the complainant will have to pay Rs.1,000. When the complainant
expressed his financial difficulty, the accused reduced the demand to Rs.900,
I''
I and instructed the complainant to come with the money.
D
(2.2.) The complainant went to the Circle Office on 10.9.1986 and paid
Rs. 600 to the accused. The accused wrote out the necessary application for
the complainant and obtained his signature. He, however, stated that the work
would not be done unless the balance of Rs. 300 was paid. Thereafter, when
the complainant went to Gram Sevak's Office on 2.10.1986, for some work, E
the accused met him and asked him again to bring Rs. 300 to Circle Office
at Saswad and he would keep the '7/12 Extract' ready.
)-
!'- (2.3.) At that stage, the complainant went to the Anti-corruption Bureau,
Pune and lodged a report on 4. I0.1986. On 6.10.1986,"the amount brought
by the complainant (one currency note of Rs.I 00 and four currency notes of F
Rs.50) were applied with a chemical and the chemically treated .currency
notes were kept in complainant's pocket. The raiding party along with the
complainant and Panch witnesses went to Saswad. The Complainant and
Guiab Kangane (PW-2), a Panch witness, went to the Circle Office together,
and the Police party followed them. That office was closed. However, they G

- )--
met the accused on the way and he asked the complainant to come to his
residence. They also met one Kotwal. The complainant, Guiab and Kotwal
went to the house of the accused. When complainant asked the accuseJ as
what happened to his work, the accused stated that the work was done, but
he had to obtain the signature of the Circle Inspector. The accused asked the
+
complainant whether he had brought the 'money. The complainant answered H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A in the affirmative and paid the marked currency notes aggregating to Rs.300.
The accused accepted the same, counted the notes and put them in his pocket.
Thereafter, the complainant went out and gave a signal to the raiding party.
The raiding party came inside and apprehended the accused and recovered
the marked three currency notes (Rs.300) from his pocket. A Panchnama was
B drawn and the amount was seized. Statements of witnesses were recorded.
After completing the investigation and necessary formalities relating to
sanction, a charge-sheet was filed before the Special Court, Pune, under
Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section 5( I)( d) of the Act.

3. The defence as put forth in the cross-examination of the prosecution
C witnesses and the explanation given in the statement under section 313 of
Cr.P.C was as follows :-

Some amount was outstanding from the complainant in regard to a
Tagai loan taken in the name of his elder brother Saban. The Tehsildar,
Purandhar sent a communication dated 3.9.1986 to the accused stating that
D one Baban Bhimaji Badade of Kodit (brother of the complainant) was due in
a sum of Rs.2575.90 towards interest in respect of an engine loan taken in
the year 1966. The accused was, therefore, instructed to recover the said
amount and deposit it in the Government Treasury. Therefore, the accused
sent a notice dated 6.9 .1986 to the complainant, demanding payment of the
E amount due. In pursuance of it, the complainant came to his house on 6.10.1986
and paid him Rs.300 towards the amount outstanding to the Government, and
it was received by him as government dues and not as a bribe for showing
any official favour to the complainant.

4. The explanation given by the accused was rejected by the Special
F Judge, with detailed reasons. Accepting the case of the prosecution; he
convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated above.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the accused filed Criminal Appeal No.92/1990.
The High Court by judgment dated 25. 11.1997 allowed the appeal, holding
that the explanation given by the accused for receiving the amount was
G reasonable and probable and therefore, the charge against the accused that he
had accepted Rs.300 as illegal gratification was not proved beyond doubt and
that the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The said judgment, acquitting
the accused, is challenged by the State in th is appeal.

H 6. The State contends that the High Court ought not to have disturbed
the clear findings recorded by the Special Court based on specific evidence.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. RASHID BABUBHAI MULANI [RAVEENDRAN, J.Jl 95
)
It is also contended that there is no justification for the High Court to accept A
a vague explanation without factual basis, that in respect of a Tagai loan due
by the complainant, the accused had issued a notice of recovery to the
complainant on 6.5.1986 by registered post and that in pursuance of it, the
complainant paid Rs. 300 on 6.10.1986 towards the Tagai loan.

7. The respondent does not dispute the fact that Rs. 300 was received B
;... by him from the complainant on 6.10.1986. He contends that there was no
demand for or acceptance of any illegal gratification and the amount was
received as payment towards a government loan. He submits that if his
explanation is reasonable and plausible, then he is entitled to benefit of doubt
as held by the High Court. He places reliance on the decision of this Court C
in Punjabrao v. State of Maharashtra, [2002] I 0 SCC 371. In that case, the
accused was a Patwari and his explanation was that he received the amount
as repayment of a loan. The Special Judge had accepted the explanation and
acquitted the accused. But the High Court had reversed the decision. Interfering
with the decision of the High Court, this Court observed :-
D
"It is too well settled that in a case where the accused offers an
explanation for receipt of the alleged amount, the question that arises
for consideration is whether that explanation can be said to have been
established. It is further clear that the accused is not required to
establish his defence by proving beyond reasonable doubt as the E
prosecution, but can establish the same by preponderance of
probability. It is undisputed that from 24th to 26th the Patwari was
collecting loans in a collection campaign. It is, of course, true as
observed by the High Court that when the investigating officer seized
the amount from the accused Patwari, he did not offer the explanation
that it was in relation to a collection of loan, but that by itself would F
not be sufficient to throw away the explanation offered by the accused
in his statement under section 313 when such explanation could be
held to be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case,
as indicated by the learned Special Judge while acquitting the accused."

In Punjab Rao 's case (supra), it was admitted that on the date when the G
payment was made, the Patwari was on a collection campaign collecting loan
amounts. The fact that the complainant was a debtor froRl whom amount was
due to the government was also not disputed. In these peculiar circumstances,
this Court accepted the explanation, ·even though such explanation was not
immediately offered to the Investigating Officer, but was given in the section H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 I S.C.R.

A 313 statement. But for such special facts, courts are wary of accepting belated
explanations given for the first time in the statement under section 313 and
not at the first available opportunity. (See : A. Abdul Kaffar v. State of
Kera/a, (2004] 9 SCC 333 and T Shankar Prasad v. State of AP. (2004] 3
sec 753]
B 8. Section 4 of the Act, inter alia, provided that where in any trial of
an offence punishable under Section 161 !PC or Section 5(l)(a) or (b)
punishable under section 5(2) of the Act, it is proved that an accused person
has accepted any gratification (other than legal remuneration), it shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted that gratification as
C a motive or reward, such as is mentioned in the said Section 161. This would
mean that a mere explanation in the statement under Section 313 that the
amount was received towards a loan will not be sufficient. The contrary
position should be established by the accused either from inferences legally
drawn from the evidence on record let in by the prosecution, or by letting in
direct evidence in regard to the explanation. The statutory presumption raised
D under Section 4 will not stand rebutted merely by offering an explanation
under Section 313 if such explanation does not find support from the evidence
let in by the prosecution.

9. In Dhanvantrai Balvantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1964)
E SC 575, this Court observed thus :

"Therefore, the Court has no choice in the matter once it is
established that the accused person has received a sum of money
which was not due to him as a legal remuneration. Of course, it is
.....
open to that person to show that though money was not due to him
F as legal remuneration, it was legally due to him in some other manner
or that he had received it under a transaction or an arrangement
which was lawful. The burden resting on the accused person in such
a case would not be as light as it is where a presumption is raised
under Section 114, Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged
merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the accused
G is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the
explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved'
which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has
to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is
merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is
H directly established or when upon the material before it the Court
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. RASHID BABUBHAI MULAN! [RAVEENDRAN, J.] J97

finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act A
on the supposition that it exists. Unless therefore, the explanation is
supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot
be said to be rebutted ...... Someth.ing more, than raising a reasonable
probability, is required for rebutting a presumption of law. The bare
word of the appellant is not enough and it was necessary for him to B
show that upon the established practice his explanation was so
probable that a prudent man ought; in the circumstances, to have
accepted it. "

[Emphasis supplied]

I0. Though, it is well-settled that the accused is not required to establish
c
his explanation by the strict standard of'proofbeyond reasonable doubt', and
the presumption under Section 4 of the Act would stand rebutted if the
explanation or defence offered and proved by the accused is reasonable and
probable, the following words of caution in Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel v.
The State of Gujarat, AIR (1976) SC 1497 should be kept in mind before it D
can be said that the presumption stood rebutted :

"Thus it had been indubitably established that the appellant, a public
servant accepted a gratification that is a sum of Rs. 500 which was
not his legal remuneration, from Ghanshamsinh (PW I). On proof of
this fact, the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention E
of Corruption Act was attracted in full force and the burden had
shifted on to the appellant to show that he had not accepted this
money as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in S. 161, Penal
I J Code ...... It is true that the burden which rests on an accused to
displace this presumption is not as onerous as that cast on the p
prosecution to prove its case. Nevertheless, this burden on the accused
is to be discharged by bringing on record evidence, circumstantial or
direct, which establishes with reasonable probability, that the money
was accepted by the accused, other than as a motive or reward such
as is referred to in Sec. 161. "
G
(Emphasis supplied)

11. The evidence of PW-I (complainant}, PW-2 (Panch witness) and
PW-3 (Police Inspector) clearly prove 'the ingredients of a valid trap case.
The evidence of the complainant (PW-I) shows that there was a demand by
the accused, payment of Rs.300 as illegal gratification by the complainant to H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) I S.C.R.

A the accused and acceptance thereof by the accused. The evidence of PW-2
(Guiab) who accompanied the complainant, fully corroborates the evidence
of the complainant. PW-2 has stated that the Police Inspector Mulani called
him and disclosed to him about the trap, that four currency notes of Rs.50
each and one note of Rs. I00 were kept in the shirt pocket of the complainant,
B after being treated with chemicals; that he accompanied the complainant to
the Circle Office; that the Office was closed and when they came near the
bus-stand, the accused met them and took them to his house; that in his
presence, the complainant asked the accused about the fate of his work and
the accused enquired whether the complainant had brought the money and
told that he had to obtain the signature of the Circle Officer; that thereafter
C the complainant took out a sum of Rs.300 and gave it to the accused who
took it, counted it and kept it in his pocket; and that was followed by the
Police party and Panch witnesses entering the house and seized the amount.

12. If the accused has received the money towards a Government loan
or at least being under a bona fide impression that it was towards repayment
D of the Government loan, he will not be guilty. Let us examine whether the
explanation by the accused is reasonable and plausible. The evidence clearly
shows that no amount was due from complainant to the State. Even the case
of the defence is that certain amount was due from Baban (complainant's
brother) and the Tehsildar had instructed the accused by letter dated 3.9.1996
E to recover the amount due from Baban. When no amount was due from
complainant, and when the instruction of the Tehsildar was that the amount
outstanding from Baban should be recovered, there is no explanation as to
why the accused should send a demand notice to the complainant and not
Baban on 6.9.1986. In fact, the trial court has referred to the partition between
F Baban and complainant three years before the incident. Be that as it may.
When nothing is shown to be due from the complainant, the case put forth
by the defence that a notice of demand dated 6.9.1996 was sent to complainant
to pay the dues cannot be accepted. It is obviously an afterthought. If no
amount was due to the government from the complainant, the question of
accused accepting it as payment towards a government loan does not arise.
G The evidence relating to demand, payment and acceptance of illegal
gratification, is clear. The Trial Court had considered the entire evidence in
detail and drawn proper inferences. On the other hand, the High Court accepted
as explanation, an unsupported submission of counsel for the accused that the
payment was in response to a notice of demand dated 6.9.1986 sent by
H accused to complainant by registered post, (thereby ignoring the entire evidence
regarding demand, payment and acceptance of a bribe) and held that the
.STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. RASHID BABUBHAI MULA NI [RAVEENDRAN, J] J99

accused should be given benefit of doubt. A
13, The entire story of sending a notice dated 6.9.1996 by the accused
to the complainant is a clumsy belated attempt to explain away the receipt of
the illegal gratification on 6.10.1986. Firstly, the direction dated 3.9.1996 by
the Tehsildar, as noticed above, was to recover the amount due from Saban
and there is no direction to recover the amount from the complainant. Accused B
could not have, therefore, issued any notice of demand to the complainant.
Secondly, the notice of demand on 6.9.1986 was not sent by registered post
to the complainant, nor delivered personally against acknowledgement. The
High Court appears to have accepted the explanation of the accused (that the
payment was towards government dues) as probable, because it was submitted C
on behalf of the accused that a notice of demand dated 6.9.1986 was sent to
the complainant by the accused by registered post. On a specific query by us
with reference to the list of documents dated 3 .2.1990 filed by the accused
before the Special Judge, learned counsel for the respondent conceded that
the notice dated 6.9.1986 was not sent by registered post. She submitted that
the notice was posted on 6.9.1986 at Pune and a certificate of posting was D
obtained. It is strange that the notice dated 6.9.1986, if really sent, was not
posted at the place where the accused was working, but from Pune. which is
at a distance of about 40 kms. from his place of work. In the written
submissions filed before us on 3.10.2005, the accused has confirmed that the
notice was not sent by registered post and has attempted to offer some lame E
explanation as to why the notice dated 6.9.1986 was posted at Pune. It is
clear that no notice dated 6.9.1986 was issued to the complainant and the
accused has tried to create an explanation by securing a certificate of posting
dated 6.9.1986 from Pune after the event.

14. A certificate of posting obtained by a sender is not comparable to F
a receipt for sending a communication by registered post. When a letter is
sent by registered post, a receipt with serial number is issued and a record is
maintained by the Post Office. But when a mere certificate of posting is
sought, no record is maintained by the Post Office either about the receipt of
the letter or the certificate issued. The ease with which such certificates can G
be procured by affixing ante-dated seal with the connivance of any employee
of the Post Office is a matter of concern. The Department.of Posts may have
to evolve some procedure whereby a record in regard to the issuance of
certificates is regularly maintained showing a serial number, date, sender's
name and addressee's name to avoid misuse. In the absence of such a record,
a certificate of posting· may be of very little assistance, where the dispatch of H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) I S.C.R.

A such communications is disputed or denied as in this case. Be that as it may.
15. It is no doubt true that if two views are possible and the view of
the High Court acquitting the accused cannot be said to be wholly improbable,
this Court will not interfere with the decision of the High Court. But where
the material on record leads to only one conclusion viz., the guilt of tl•e
B accused, the judgment of the High Court will not be sustained [vide State of
Andhra Pradesh v. K. Narasimhachary, (2005) 8 SCALE 266]. In this case,
we are clearly of the view that the High Court was not justified in accepting
the explanation regarding receipt of Rs.300 by the accused as being towards
Tagai loan. The conclusion of guilt is inescapable. Consequently, we allow
C this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the judgment
of the Additional Special Judge, Pune, in Special Case No.1/1987 convicting
the respondent for the offences punishable under Section 161 IPC and Section
5(2) read with Section 5( I)( d) of the Act.

16. In regard to sentence, we find that the incident occurred about 19
D years ago. The matter was pending for about 3 years before the Special
Judge, and about 8 years before the High Court and, thereafter, for 8 years
before this Court. The accused was hardly 32 years old when the incident
occurred and now more than 50 years old. The accused was a Talathi coming
from a poor background with a family to support. In the circumstances, while
E restoring the conviction, we reduce the sentence from one year to four months
both under Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Sect.ion 5( IXd) of the
Act. Both the sentences to run concurrently. The accused, who is on bai I,
shall surrender forthwith to serve out the sentence.

R.P. Appeal allowed.