Holding

Leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC must be granted if the appellate court finds a prima facie case or arguable points on the record, and the High Court cannot refuse leave merely on the ground that the trial judgment is not perverse.

Summary

The trial court acquitted Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar of offences under Sections 307 and 504 IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The State of Maharashtra filed an application under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for leave to appeal the acquittal, which the High Court rejected on the ground that the trial judgment was not perverse. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was required to apply its mind, ascertain a prima facie case, and consider arguable points before refusing leave. It held that the High Court must assess the material evidence and cannot refuse leave merely because the acquittal is not perverse, and that the power to grant leave is discretionary but must be exercised with reasons. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, granted leave to appeal, and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the State’s application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC.
What is the scope of the appellate court’s power in appeals against an order of acquittal.
Whether the High Court must consider a prima facie case and arguable points before refusing leave.
Whether the ground that the trial judgment is not 'perverse' suffices to deny leave to appeal.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378, s. 439
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 307, s. 504

Subjects

leave to appealacquittalSection 378 CrPCappellate jurisdictionrevisional jurisdictionperverse judgmentreappreciation of evidencedouble presumption of innocence

Judgment

[2008] 13 S.C.R. 750

A STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
v.
SUJAY MANGESH POYAREKAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 1492 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 19, 2008
B
[C.K THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S.378(3):
Leave to appeal against order of acquittal - Grant of -
C Held: In deciding about grant of leave to appeal, appellate
Court must apply its mind and consider as to whether prima
facie case has been made out and arguable points have been
raised against the acquittal of the accused or not - However,
the Court need not to enter into minute details of prosecution
D evidence - If arguable points have been raised and material
on record discloses deeper scrutiny and re-appreciation, re-
view or re-consideration of evidence, the appellate Court must
grant leave and decide it on merits - In the instant case, High
Court erred in rejecting the application for grant of leave with-
E out recording reasons on the ground that the judgment of the
trial Court could not be termed as perverse - Hence, order of
the High Court cannot be sustained and set aside - Matter
remitted to the High Court for disposal afresh.
Power of appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal
F - Ambit and Scope of - Discussed.
Revisional Jurisdiction - Exercise of - Held: Powers of
Revisional Court are limited - Rejection of revision petition
not disentitling the party to invoke statutory remedy available
G u/s.378 of the Code.
Right to appeal - Scope of - Discussed.
According to the prosecution, on the fateful day,
when the complainant, an advocate by profession, was
H 750
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 751
MANGESH POYAREKAR

talking to the wife of the accused in the Railway Station, A
accused came there and started abusing him in filthy lan-
guage alleging that the complainant was teasing his wife
and assaulted him with knife and injured him. The com-
plainant made a complaint to the Station Master. In the
meantime, his sister and another person came there and B
took him to a Government Hospital, where police recorded
his statement and forwarded the same to the concerned
Railway Police Station where the case was registered
against the accused person for committing the offences
punishable under Sections 307 and 504 IPC. After inves- c
tigation, charge-sheet was filed by the Police in the Court
of Judicial Magistrate and the case was committed to the
Sessions Court. The Trial Court acquitted the accused as
the prosecution failed to establish the case against the
accused person. The application for grant of leave to ap- D
peal filed by the State was rejected by the High Court ob-
serving that the judgment of the Trial Court could not be
said to be 'perverse'. Hence the present appeal.
Appellant-State contended that the High Court has
committed an error of law in not granting leave to the State E
to file an appeal against the order of acquittal recorded
by the Sessions Court; that from the material placed be-
fore the Court, it was clearly established that PW1 sus-
tained injuries which were proved froin the evidence of
1 PW12; that it was clearly proved from the evidence on F
record that there was enmity between the parties; that the
accused was admittedly present at the Railway Station;
and that the High co'urt had failed to consider all these
facts .
. Respondent submitted that there was suppression G
of fact by the State, as the fact of filing Revision Petition
by the complainant and dismissal thereof had not been
mentioned in the present proceedings; that the Trial Court
considered the prosecution evidence in detail and came
to the conclusion that the prosecution was unable to H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A prove case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt
and he was, therefore, entitled to acquittal; and that it was
not necessary for the High Court, when it agreed with the
order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court, to record
reasons again for such acquittal.
B Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The case in hand was instituted on the ba-
sis of First information Report. It was thus a Police case. De
facto complainant, therefore, has no right to file an appeal.
c He, therefore, preferred a revision. (Para -16) [760-D-E]
1.2 It is well settled that revisional jurisdiction can be
exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. A
Revisional Court cannot convert itself into a regular Court
of Appeal. (Para - 16) [760-D-E]
D
1.3 Powers of Revisionai Court are limited. Rejec-
tion of a revision application, therefore, cannot affect the
power of the State in invoking statutory remedy available
under Section 378 of the Code. (Para-18) [761-F-G]
E Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., (1963) 3 SCR 412
- relied on.
2.1 Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of ap-
peal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) de-
clares that no appeal "shall be entertained except with
F the leave of the High Court". It is, therefore, necessary for
the State when it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal re-
con:::~d by a Court of Session to file an application for leave
to appeal as required by sub-section (3) of Section 378 of
the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be registered and
G heard on merits by the High Court only after the High Court
grants le-ave by allowing the application filed under sub-sec-
tion (3) of Section 378 of the Code. (Para-21) [762-E]
2.2 In deciding the question whether requisite leave
H should or should not be granted, the High Court must
~ STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 753
MANGESHPOYAREKAR

apply its mind, consider whether prima facie case has been A
made out or arguable points have been raised and not
whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set
aside. (Para - 22) [762-F-G]
~
2.3 It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition
--"". of law of universal application that each and every peti- B
tion seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of
acqui~I recorded by a trial Court must be allowed by the
appellate Court. and every appeal must be admitted and
decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that
at that stage, the Court would not enter into minute de- c
tails of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observ-
ing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court could not be said to be 'perverse' and, hence, ne
leave should be granted. (Para - 23) [762-H; 763-A-B]
D
3.1 In the case of Sita Ram & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, this Court held that a single right of appeal is
more or less a universal requirement of the guarantee of
life and liberty rooted in the concept that men are fallible,
judges are men and making assurance doubly sure, be-
fore irrevocable deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass, E
a full-scale re-examination of the facts and the law is made
an integral part offundamental fairness or procedure. This
Court is aware and mindful that the above observations
were made in connection with an appeal at the instance
of the accused. But the principle underlying the above F
rule lies in the doctrine of human fallibility that 'Men are
fallible' and 'Judges are also men'. It is keeping in view
the said object that the principle has to be understood
and applied. (Paras - 24 & 25) [763-C-E]
G
Sita Ram & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC
656 - relied on.
3.2 Every crime is considered as an offence against
the Society as a whole and not only against an individual
even though it is an individual who is the ultimate suf- H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
"
A ferer. It is, therefore, the duty of the State to take appropri-
ate steps when an offence has been committed. (Para -
26) [763-E-F]
3.3 Where there is application of mind by the appel-
late Court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such
..
B view are recorded, the order of the Court may not be said
to be illegal or objectionable. At the same time, however,
if arguable points have been raised, if the material on
record discloses deeper scrutiny and r~-appreciation,
review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate Court
c must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on
merits. (Para - 27) [763-H; 764-A-B]
3.4 In view of the facts, circumstances and findings
of the trial Court, the High Court should not have rejected
the application for grant of leave by passing a 'brief' or- ..,
D
der. (Para - 35) [766-C]
3.5 The High Court was not right in rejecting the ap-
plication for leave on the ground that the judgment of the
trial Court could not be termed as 'perverse'. If, on the ba-
E sis of the entire evidence on record, the order of acquittal
is illegal, unwarranted or contrary to law, such an order
can be set aside by an appellate Court. (Para - 39) [768-C]
3.6 The Judgment of the High Court falls short of the
test laid down by this Court in various cases referred to
F in Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka. The order of the High
Court, therefore, cannot stand and must be set aside. The
matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in
accordance with law. (Paras - 39 & 40) [768-E-F]
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 -
G
relied on.
4.1 So far as powers of the appellate Court in an ap-
peal against acquittal are concerned, no restrictions have
been imposed by the Code on such powers while deal-
H ing with an order against acquittal. In an appeal against
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 755
MANGESHPOYAREKAR

acquittal, the High Court has full power to re-appreciate, A
review and reweigh at large the evidence on which the
order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclu-
sion on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law
are open to determination by the appellate Court. (Para -
"' 36) [766-0-E] B
4.2 It is no doubt true that in a case d acquittal, there
is a double presumption in favour of the respondent-ac-
cused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurispru-
dence that every person should be presumed innocent c
unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced by the
. trial Court (and certainly not weakened). Nonetheless, it
is not correct to say that unless the appellate Court in an D
appeal against acquittal under challenge is convinced that
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is 'per-
verse', it cannot interfere. If the appellate Court on re-ap-
preciation of evidence and keeping in view well estab-
lished principles, comes to a contrary conclusion and E
records conviction, such conviction cannot be said to be
contrary to law. (Para - 37) [766-F-H; 767-A]
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 -
relied on.
F
5. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any
opinion one way or the other on the merits of the matter.
(Para - 41) [768-G]
Case Law Reference
(1963) 3 SCR 412 Relied on G
Para - 17
-... (1979) 2 sec 656 Relied on Para - 24
(2001) 4 sec 415 Relied on Para - 18

H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1492 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 12.6.2007 of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Application ,.,,
No. 1390 of 2007
B
Madhvi Divan and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Ap-
pellant.
J.P. Dhanda, Raj Rani Dhanda, Vineet Dhanda K.P. Singh,
M.S. Hussain and Amrendra Kumar Singh for the Respondent. ·
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is filed against the order passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on June 12, 2.007 in
D
Criminal Application No. 1390 of 2007. By the said order, the
High Court refused to grant leave to appeal to the State against
an order of acquittal recorded by HI Ad hoc Addi. Sessions Judge,
Palghar on January 16, 2007 in Sessions Case No. 148 of
2003.
E
3. Short facts of the case are that complainant-Rajan
Mukund Patil is the resident of Chinchani, Bhandar Ali, Taluka
Dahanu, District Palghar, Maharashtra. He is a practising ad-
vocate at Dahanu Court. According to the prosecution, on June
F 07, 2003, complainant had gone to Dahanu Court. In the evening,
he went to Vangaon by train and therefrom he was to go to his
residence at Chinchani. For that purpose, he went to Dahanu
Railway Station at about 6.00 p.m. and boarded Firozpur Janta
Train. He reached Vangaon at 6.15 p.m. On platform No.2, he
G saw Deepa Gajanan Patil who was going to Mumbai. The com-
plainant was knowing her. He, therefore, asked her as to where
she was going. She told the complainant that she had come to y
receive her father. Meanwhile, accused Sujay Mangesh
Poyarekar-respondent herein alighted from Virar-Surat shuttle.
The accused came near the complainant and asked him why
H
~
~ STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 757
MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKEH, J.]
he was standing there and started abusing him. The accused A
also alleged that the complainant was flirting with his wife. So
saying, the accused assaulted the complainant with knife in his
stomach, on right shoulder, below left armpit and on bc;ick-side.
j The complainant received Injuries. He Immediately went to Stac
tion Master's cabin. In the meanwhile, his sister Charushila and B
one Hitendra came there and took complainant to the Vangaon
Government Hospital. Later on, police went to the hospital and
recorded statement of the complaini'!nt.
4. On the basis of the statement, initially C.R. No. 00 of
2003 was registered in Vangaon Police Station. The said com- c
plaint was then forwarded to Palghar Railway Police Station
where C.R. No. 1-9 of 2003 was registered at 23.00 hours vide
Station Diary No. 42 of 2003 for offences punishable under
~
Sections 307 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The ac-
cused was arrested at about 23.45 hours and was released on D
bail on June 12, 2003. After usual investigation and recording
of statement of witnesses, charge-sheet was filed in the Court
of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Railway, Virat.

.... 5. Since the offence under Section 307, IPC was exclusively
triable by a Court of Session, the Judicial Magistrate, by an order E
dated November 27, 2003 committed the case to Sessions Court,
Palghar. It was registered as Sessions Case No. 148 of 2003.
" Necessary charge was framed against the accused who pleaded
1 not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried.
F
6. The prosecution In order to establish the case against
the accused, examined 15 witnesses. It mainly relied upon tes-
timony of PW1-Rajan (complainant and victim) and PW2-
Charushila (real sister of complainant). Deposition of PW12-
Dr. D'Souza was recorded to prove injuries sustained by the
G
victim. After the prm~ecution evidence, statement of the accused
" .... was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') wherein he
admitted his presence on the Railway platform on the date of
occurrence. He, however, denied to have committed any offence.
H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R. J .~

A 7. The learned trial Judge, vide his judgment and order
dated January 16, 2007, acquitted the accused for the offences
with which he was charged. According to the learned Judge,
the prosecution failed to establish the case against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. I(

B 8. The State, being aggrieved by the order of acquittal,
filed an application, being Criminal Application No. 1390 of2007
for leave to appeal in the High Court. The High Court, vide the
impugned order dated June 12, 2007, rejected the application
observing that the judgment of the trial Court could not be said
c to be 'perverse' and no interference was called for. The State
has challenged the said order in this Court.
9. On November 23, 2007 when the Special Leave Peti-
tion was placed for admission hearing, notice was issued. It
was indicated in the order that the notice will state as to why
D
Special Leave Petition should not be disposed of by setting
aside the order passed by the High Court and by remitting the
matter to the High Court to be decided in accordance with law.
Service of notice had been effected on the accused who ap-
peared through counsel. An affidavit in reply is also filed justify-
E ing the order passed by the High Court refusing leave.
.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
11. The learned counsel for the State contended that the
High Court has committed an error of law in not granting leave
F to the State to file an appeal against the order of acquittal re-
corded by the Sessions Court. The counsel submitted that from
the material placed before the Court, it is clearly established
that PW1-Rajan sustained injuries which were proved from the
evidence of Dr. D'Souza-PW12. According to PW1-Rajan, in-
G juries had been caused by the accused. PW2-Charushila real
sister of complainant had corroborated the version of PW1-
Rajan. The High Court ought to have appreciated the prosecu-
)'
...
'

tion evidence, ought to have granted leave and decided the
appeal on merits.
H
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 759
MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

12. It was also submitted that from the record, it was clearly A
proved that there was enmity between the parties. It was the
allegation of the accused that PW1-Rajan was harassing
Deepa. It has also come in evidence that on the date of incident
j
i.e. on June 7, 2003, the complainant was assaulted. Initially, he
went to cabin of the Station Master, Dahanu Railway Station B
where a report was lodged which was subsequently sent to
Palghar Railway Police Station where a case was registered
for offences punishable under Sections 307 and 504, IPC. The
accused was admittedly present at the Railway Station. The High
Court has not considered all these facts. It has also not dis- c
cussed evidence of PW1-Rajan nor of PW2-Charushila. A
sweeping statement was made in the order that the trial Court
had appreciated the evidence properly by taking into consider-
ation several complaints filed against the complainant who had
--. tendered apology to the President, Bar Association, Dahanu.
D
~
An action was also taken by the Bar Council. According to the
High Court, the judgment of the trial Court could not be said to
be 'perverse'. It accordingly dismissed the application. It was
submitted that keeping in view all these facts, the present ap-
peal deserves to be allowed by remitting the matter to the High
Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. E

· · · , 13. The learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand,
., supported the order passed by the High Court. In the counter-
l affidavit, it was said that there was suppression of fact by the
State. It was stated that being aggrieved by the order passed F
by the trial Court acquitting the accused, the complainant filed a
revision which was registered as Criminal Revision Applica-
tion No. 166 of 2007 and a Single Judge of the High Court, vide
order dated July 18, 2006, dismissed it. The State was joined
as party. The Assistant Public Prosecutor also appeared for
G
the State and the High Court refused to interfere with the order.
The fact of filing revision by the complainant and dismissal
thereof has not been mentioned in the present proceedings.
On this ground alone, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
14. Even on merits, the counsel submitted that no error H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A can be said to have been committed by the High Court in refus-
ing leave and in dismissing application filed by the State, The
Trial Court considered the prosecution evidence in detail and
came to the conclusion that the prosecution was unable to prove
case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and was,
B therefore, entitled to acquittal. It was not necessary for the High
Court when it agreed with the order of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court to record reasons again for such acquittal. It was,
therefore, submitted that no case has be.en made out for inter-
ference by this Court and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
c 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our
opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
16. So far as the preliminary objection raised by the learned
counsel for the accused is concerned, we find no substance
therein. The case in hand was instituted on the basis of First T
D
Information Report. It was thus a Police case. De facto com-
plainant, therefore, has no right to file an appeal..He, therefore,
preferred a revision. Now it is well settled that revisional juris-
diction can be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases.
A revisional Court cannot convert itself into a regular Court of
E Appeal.
17. Interpreting the provisions of Section 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (similar to Section 401 of the
present Code of 1973), in the leading case of Chinnaswamy
F Reddy v. State of A.P., (1963) 3 SCR 412, this Court stated;
It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set
aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private
parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal;
but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by
G the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is
some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest
error on a point of law and consequently there has been
a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of s. 439
forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal
H into one of conviction and that makes it all the more
. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 761
MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert A
the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect
method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly
convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction.
This places limitations on the power of the High Court to
set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in B
exceptional cases that this power should be e_xercised. It
is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining
such exceptional cases which would cover all
contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of
this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court · c
in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These
cases may be : where the trial court has no jurisdiction to
try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where
the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the
prosecution wished of produce, or where the appeal court
0
has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial
court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has
been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal
court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding
of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and
other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be E
cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can
justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such
a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High
Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in
view of the provisions of s. 439(4). F
18. Powers of revisional Court are thus limited. Rejection
of a revision application, therefore, cannot affect the power of
the State in invoking statutory remedy available under Section
378 of the Code. The preliminary objection has, therefore, no G
force and is hereby rejected.
19. So far as an application for leave to appeal by the
State is concerned, the High Court rejected it without consider-
ing the evidence of the prosecution. In the impugned order, the
High Court noted that it had heard the learned Assistant Public H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A Prosecutor. It went on to state that none of the injuries sustained
by the victim was 'fatal'. According to the High Court, the cause
behind the assault was that the complainant-advocate was teas-
ing the wife of the accused, who was also working in the Court.

20. It then proceeded to observe;
B
"The trial Court has appreciated the evidence properly
and has also taken into consideration the number of
complaints filed against the said advocate complainant
including the apology tendered by the complainant to the
c President, Bar Association, Dahanu and the action taken
by the Bar Council. The trial Court found inherent
improbabilities in the case of the complainant and
therefore acquitted the accused. The judgment of the trial
Court cannot be. said to be perverse. No interference is
called for. Application rejected".
D
21. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of
appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) de-
clares that no appeal "shall be entertained except with the leave
of the High Court". It is, therefore, necessary for the State where
E it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of
Session to file an application for leave to appeal as required by
sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an
appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High Court
only after the High Court grants leave by allowing the applica-
F tion filed under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code. ...-
22. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question
whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the
High Court must apply its mind, consider whether prima facie
case has been made out or arguable points have been raised
G and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set
aside.
23. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of
law of universal application that each and every petition seek-
H ing leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal re-
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 76~
-,I
MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.)

corded by a trial Court must be allowed by the appellate Court A
and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But
it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the Court would.
not enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and
refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded
)
by the trial Court could not be said to be 'perverse' and, hence, B
no leave should be granted.

24. In Sita Ram & Ors. v. State' of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2
sec 656, this Court held that a single right of appeal is more or
less a universal requirement of the guarantee of life and liberty
rooted in the concept that men are fallible, judges are men and c
making assurance doubly sure, before irrevocable deprivation
of life or liberty comes to pass, a full-scale re-examination of
the facts and the law is made an integral part of fundamental
fairness or procedure.
.,, 25. We are aware and mindful that the above observa-
D

tions were made in connection with an appeal at the ins.tance of
the accused. But the principle underlying the above rule lies in
the d.octrine of human fallibility that 'Men are fallible' and 'Judges
are also men'. It is keeping in view the said object that the prin-
ciple has to be understood and applied. E

26. Now, every crime is considered as an offence against
the Society as a whole and not only against an individual even
though it is an individual who is the ultimate sufferer. It is, there-
-f fore, the duty of the State to take appropriate steps when an F
offence has been committed.

27. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be under-
stood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should
be refused by the appellate Court against an order of acquittal
recorded by the trial Court. We only state that in si.Jch cases; the G
appellate Court must consider the relevant material, swomtes- ·
timonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave
sought by the State should not be granted and the order of ac-
quittal recorded by the trial Court should not be disturbed. Where
there is application of mind by the appellate Court and reasons H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 $.C.R. Ir

A (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order
of the Court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable. At
the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if
the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and re-appre-
ciation, review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate ~

B Court must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on
merits.
28. In the case 011 hand, the High Court, with respect, did
neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require
grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of
c such leave.
29. We have gone through the judgment and order of ac-
quittal recorded by the trial Court which runs into more than 30
typed pages. It records that 15 witnesses were examined by
the prosecution including injured victim PW1-Rajan and PW2-
D r
Charushila, real sister of the victim. The trial Court observed
that the testimony of PW1-Rajan revealed that the incident oc-
curred on June 7, 2003 at about 6.15 p.m. The injuries sus-
tained by PW1 Rajan were proved from the evidence of Dr.
D'Souza, PW12.
E
30. The trial Court also recorded the following finding in
para 15 of the judgment.
"15. Anyway, the oral testimony of PW1-Rajan, his sister,
PW2-Charusheela, PW9-Nareshkumar of Vangaon ¥
F Railway Station as well as the testimony of Dr. Ravidas
Purshottam Patil-PW-15 show that Rajan Mukund Patil
sustained bleeding injuries".
31. PW12-Dr. D'souza, Medical Officer of KEM Hospital,
G Mumbai stated that he had examined victim PW1-Rajan on June
8, 2003 at 4.00 a.m. in the early morning and found following
four injuries.
1. C.L.W. right shoulder 3 x 1 x 1 cm anterior aspect,
caused by sharp object. age within 24 hrs, nature
H simple.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 765
""<!
MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

2. C.L.W. on 1 x 3 x 6 ems in epigastria (upper part of A
abdomen) caused by sharp object, grievous injury.

3. C.L.W. 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm, left axilla i.e. left arm pit
caused by sharp object, injury is simple.
'I
4. C.L.W. 5 x 1 x 1 cm left flank (left side of abdomen) B
caused by sharp object, grievous.
1
32. He issued necessary certificate which is at Ext. 34.
According to him, injuries could be caused by sharp cutting in-
strument like knife. Though initially he stated that injuries 2 and
4 were grievous and fatal in nature, thereafter he stated that c
they were not fatal but could become fatal. The Court also noted
that the circumstantial evidence supported the contention of the
complainant that he sustained bleeding injuries. Bloodstains
were found on the shirt and pant of accused which was of Group
.,_. .,. 'A' i.e. blood group of the complainant. D

~ 33. The accused in his statement under Section 313 of
the Code admitted that he was present at Vangoan Railway
Station on June 07, 2003; that he complained to PW9 Naresh
Kumar that one person was flirting with his wife; that he was
E
arrested by PW 13 Dattatraya and was sent for medical exami-
nation, that PW11 Dr. Padmaja examined him and issued Medi-
cal Certificate (Ex. 32). He stated that his wife and passengers
at the Railway Station had severely beaten the complainant. It
" has also come on record that complaints were made to the
.-. Dahanu Bar Association. Certain documents were also pro- F
duced relating to objectionable behaviour by the complainant,
lodging of complaints by the accused and resolution passed by
the Dahanu Bar Association.
34. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the defence
G
counsel had successfully established enmity between the com-
plainant and the accused. According to the Court, on the date
of incident i.e. on June 7, 2003, around 6.15 p.m., there was a
scuffle between the complainant on one hand and the accused
on the other hand on account of misbehaviour by the complain-
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.
..
A ant towards the wife of the accused. The trial Court came to the
conclusion·that from the testimony of PW10-Dr. Padmaja who
examined the accused on June 8, 2003, found three injuries on
the person of the accused as mentioned in Ext.32. They were
on the left shoulder and the right upper limp of the accused.
.v
B According to the Court, injuries on the person of the accused
supported his defence that he was beaten by the complainant
and prosecution failed to explain the injuries on the person of
the accused.
35. In view of the all these facts, circumstances and find-
c ings, in our opinion, the High Court should not have rejected the
application for grant of leave by passing a 'brief' order. More-
over, the High Court observed in the impugned order that the
judgment of the trial Court cannot be said to be 'perverse'.
36. Now, so far as powers of the appellate Court in an
D
appeal against acquittal are concerned, no restrictions have
been imposed by the Code on such powers while dealing with
an order against acquittal. In an appeal against acquittal, the
High Court has full power to re-appreciate, review and reweigh
at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded
E and to reach its own conclusion on such evidence. Both ques-
tions of fact and of law are open to determination by the appel-
late Court.
37. It is no doubt true that in a case of acquittal, there is a
F double presumption in favour of the respondent-accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence available to him under the funda-
..
mental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
should be presumed innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further rein-
G
forced by the trial Court (and certainly not weakened). Nonethe-
less, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate Court in an
appeal against acquittal under challenge is convinced that the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is 'perverse', it
cannot interfere. If the appellate Court on re-appreciation of
H
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SUJAY 767
"' MANGESH POYAREKAR [C.K. THAKKER, J ]

evidence and keeping in view well established principles, comes A
to a contrary conclusion and records conviction, such convic-
tion cannot be said to be contrary to law.
38. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007)
"i
4 sec 415, after considering all leading decisions on the point,
one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down the following general prin- B
ciples regarding powers of the appellate Court in dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal.

(1) An appellate Court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon c
which the order of acquittal is founded;

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate Court on the evidence before
it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of D
fact and of law;
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds',
'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions',
'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail E
extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in
' .... the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize
.... the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to F
review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that
in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in
G
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
.,. innocence available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R.

A accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court
B should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court.
39. The High Court, in our judgment, was not right in re-
jecting the application for leave on the ground that the judgment
c of the trial Court could not be termed as 'perverse'. If, on the
basis of the entire evidence on record, the order of acquittal is
illegal, unwarranted or contrary to law, such an order can be set
aside by an appellate Court. Various expressions, such as, 'sub-
stantial and compelling reasons', 'very strong circumstances',
'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', 'judgment being per-
0
verse', etc. are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language'
than restricting ambit and scope of powers of the appellate
Court. They do not curtail the authority of the appellate Court in
interfering with an order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
The Judgment of the High Court, with respect, falls short of the
E test laid down by this Court in various cases referred to in
Chandrappa. The order of the High Court, therefore, cannot
stand and must be set aside.
40. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be
F allowed and is allowed accordingly by remitting the matter to
the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
41. Before parting with the case, we may state that we
may not be understood to have expressed any opinion one way
or the other on the merits of the matter. As and when the High
G Court will hear the matter, the Court will decide the case without
being influenced by any observations made by us in this judg-
ment.
42. Ordered accordingly.
H S.K.S. Appeal allowed.