STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.versusSAROJ KUMAR SAHOO

A                          STATE OF ORISSA AND ANR.
                                       v.
                             SAROJ KUMAR SAHOO

                                 DECEMBER 7, 2005

B                [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.]


          Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

          Section 482-lnherent powers of High Court-Single Judge of High
C Court quashed FIR in a case against accused during investigation holding
     that ingredients of the offences alleged were not in existence-Correctness
     of-Held: Exercise of the power under S. 482 is the exception and not the
    rule-It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction
     may be exercised, namely, (i) to give affect to an order under the Cr.P.C., (ii)
D   to prevent abuse of the process of court and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
     ofjustice-S. 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-
    circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death-Powers under S.
     482 are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great
     caution in exercise-When the investigation was not complete and at that
    stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the
E   acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial-The Court is not
     required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced
     are sufficient or not for convicting the accused-Hence, High Court not
    justified in quashing the investigation and proceedings in the connected case
    and the charge sheet.
F         The respondent filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the High Court for quashing of FIR and
    connected proceedings registered against him in a case in which investigation
    was not complete. The High Court quashed the proceedings holding that on
    perusal of the statements recorded during investigation it was clear that the



                                                                                        -
G   ingredients of the offences alleged were not in existence, and it would be an
    abuse of the process of Court and may lead to gross miscarriage of justice if
    the proceedings were continued. Hence the appeal.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

H                                         548
                 STATE OF ORISSA v. SAROJ KUMAR SAHOO                       549
        HELD: I. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal A
 Procedure, 1973 is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer
 any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which
 the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C. It envisages three
 circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
 namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C., (ii) to prevent abuse of B
the process of court and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is
 neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing
with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts,
therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which
are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them C
by law. That is the doctrine which finds expressio!l in the Section which merely
 recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution all such powers as are necessary to do the right
and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle
 "Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res D
 ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him
 that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section,
the court does not function as a court of appeal or r-;:vision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the E
tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
 courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if
 any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
 court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court
 to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of F
justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
 proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
 process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the
ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report the court may
examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed it is G
 permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged
and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
 toto. (555-C, D, E, F, G, H; 556-A-BI

     2. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where
there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly            H
    550                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
 · evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations.
   When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court
   would riot ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question
   in reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation
B would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process
   should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court
   should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take
   all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
   lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
   vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not
C an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and
   bring about its sudden death.1556-E, F, G, HJ

          R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866 and State ofHaryana
    v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 335, relied on.

D          3.1. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the
    Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great
    caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
    exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
    not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the
    highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prim a facie
E   decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
    when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and
    the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
    seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard
    and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
p   exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
    stage. [558-8, C, DJ

          Janata Dal v. Chowdhary, [ 1992) 4 SCC 305 and Raghubir Saran (Dr.)
    v. State ofBihar, AIR (1964) SC 1, relied on.

G         3.2. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyze the case of the
    complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
    conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion
    that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the
    material before it and conclude that the compliant cannot be proceeded with.
    When information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered,
H   then the malafides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is
                 ST ATE OF ORI SSA v. SAROJ KUMAR SA HOO                   551
the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which   A
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against
the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis
for quashing the proceedings. (558-D-E-F(

      Dhanola/<..shmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, (1990( Supp. SCC 686, State of
Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, AIR (1996) SC 309, Rupan Deal Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal           B
Singh Gill, (19951 ~ ~~C 194i.S.~pte,af Keralri v. Q.C. Kuttan, AIR (1999) SC
1044, State of UP. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705, Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh
Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397, Satyinder Kaur v. State Govt. of NCT of
Delhi, AIR (1996) SC 2983, Rajesh Bajajv. State NCTof Delhi, [1999) 3 SCC
259, State of Karnataka v. M Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, State of MP.           C
v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 and Jehan Singh v. Delhi
Administration, AIR (1974) SC 1140, relied on.

      4. In the present case, the investigation was not complete and at that
stage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the
acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising        D
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is not permissible for the
Court to act as if it was a trial Court even when charge is framed at that
stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose,
the Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot
appreciate evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to
conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting
the accused. (559-D-E)

        Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v. Jawahar Lal, [l992) 3 SCC 317, relied on.

      5. When the factual position of the case at hand is considered in the       F
light of principles of law highlighted, the inevitable conclusion is that the
High Court was not justified in quashing the investigation and proceedings
in the connected case and the charge sheet filed. (560-El

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 920 of G
2003.

      From the Judgment and Order dated l.7.2002 of the Orissa High Court
in Crl. Misc. Case No. 3175 of 200 I.

                                    WITH
                                                                                  H
    552                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         Crl.A. Nos. 1639 and 1640 of2005.

          M.N. Rao, A. Ramesh and Radha Shyam Jena for the Appellants.

          Jana Kalyan Das for the Respondent.

B         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3190 of2004 and
    3199 of2004.

          As the appeals have some common features and links, the appeals are
C disposed of by the common judgment. In these appeals challenge is to· the
    legality of orders passed by learned Single Judges of the Orissa High Court
    quashing the proceedings initiated against respondents on the basis of first
    information reports lodged by the functionaries of the State of Orissa. Criminal
    Appeal No. 920 of2003, and the appeal relatable to SLP(Crl.)No. 3199 of2004
    relates to FIR No. 61 dated 30.12.2000 where investigation was in progress
D   and appeal relatable to SLP (Crl.) No. 3190 of2004 relates to FIR No. 43 dated
    16.9.2000 where charge sheet had already been filed. The High Court in each
    case exercised power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
    1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.'). In the FIR No. 61 of2000 accusations were against
    respondents Saroj Kumar Sahoo and Nalinikanta Muduli.
E         Background facts giving rise to the three appeals in a nutshell are as
    follows:

          On 8.1.1997 a trust named Nabaprabhat Trust was registered in which
                                                                                       -
    respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo was the Chairman cum Managing Trustee. It
F   appears that a registered sale deed No. 3 86 dated 4.3 .1997 was registered
    before Sub Registrar, Pipli in respect of about l 0 acres of land. According to
    the prosecution on 14.l.1997 the respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo in the capacity
    of Chairman cum Managing Trustee of Nabaprabhat Trust applied for
    establishment of a new polytechnic with approval of All India Council for
    Technical Education (in short 'AICTE'), though the trust was not having the
G   requisite land of 20 acres and funds to the tune of Rs.25 lakhs as the trust
    was registered with a corpus of a paltry sum i.e. Rs. I 0,000/-. Zerox copy of
    the sale deed according to the prosecution was submitted to the Director,
    Technical Education and Training, Orissa for establishment of technical
    education institution. The respondent got land and shed on the pretext of
H   using the lands and sheds for bona fide industrial use in the Mancheswar
          STATE OF ORIS SA v. SARO.I KUMAR SAHOO [PASAYA T, J.]            553
Industrial Estate.                                                               A
       On 25.6.1997 approval for running the technical education institutions
was accorded. On 26. 7.1997 the respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo along with
Smt. Sukanti Muduli, (mother of Sh. Nalinikanta Muduli), registered gift deed
iii respect of I 0 acres of land and projected to AICTE as if it had got 20 acres
of land. The approvzj was given on 8.8.1997. On 19 .11.1998 both respondents B
Saroj Kumar Sah~ and Nalinikanta Muduli got District Industries Centre
Registration for jetting up fabrication unit in the same industrial shed and
land though technical institutions namely Nillachal Polytechnic and Nilachal
Institute of c/mputer Science were shown to be running in the same industrial
land and shed. On 30.12.2000 the investigating agency while investigating C
          1
cases iygistered at the Bhubneshwar Vigilance Division police Station Case
no ..-n/2000 and 43/2000 against Nalinikanta Muduli and his father Sh.
Bichitranand Muduli seized some incriminating documents and therefore, FIR
was registered. Though orders were passed by the High Court for appearance
before concerned Court while rejecting the application for bail under Section
438 Cr.P.C., the respondents never appeared before the concerned Court and D
on the contrary on 19.4.2001 respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo filed an application
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court for quashing FIR and
connected proceedings in Bhubneshwar Vigilance Police Station Case No. 61
of 2000 registered for alleged commission of offences under Sections 120(8),
420, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code, 1872 (in short the 'IPC') read with E
Section 13(2) and 13(1 )(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short
the 'Act'). During investigation, the Tehsildar, Pipli reported to the investigating
agency that the land mentioned in the gift deed was non-existent. By order
dated 1.7.2002 a learned Single Judge of the High Court quashed the First
Infonnation Report in the concerned case and subsequent proceedings during
investigation, so far as Saroj Kumar Sahoo is concerned. The learned Single F
Judge held that on perusal of the statements recorded during investigation
it was clear that the ingredients of the offences alleged were not in existence,
and it would be an abuse of the process of Court and may lead to gross
miscarriage of justice if the proceedings are continued. Therefore, so far as
the respondent Saroj Kumar Sahoo is concerned the proceedings were G
quashed.

      In the appeal relatable to SLP(Crl.) No.3190 of 2004, before the High
Court, respondent NaliniKanta Muduli had questioned legality of the
proceedings relating to Bhubneshwar Vigilance Police Station Case No. 43 of
2000. In the said allegations which were against respondent Nalinikanata and     H
    554                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   his father Muduli (in short 'Bichitrananda') Bhubneshwar Vigilance PS case
    no.25 of 2000 was registered against Bichitrananda on the allegation that he
    had acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. During
    investigation business premises ofNalinikanta were searched and incriminating
    materials/documents were seized for which FIR no.43 of 2000 was lodged
B   against Nalinikanta and Bichitrananda. In the appeal relatable to SLP (Crl.)
    3199 of 2004, the challenge before the High Court was to the FIR 61 of 2000.
    In these cases, learned Single Judge exercised power under Section 482 and
    gave certain directions which shall be dealt with infra.

           Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the scope and
C   ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been analysed in various cases. The power
    is to be exercised sparingly and not in the manner done 'in the present cases.
    In Criminal Appeal No. 920 of2003 the High Court interfered at a stage when
    investigation was not even over. Similar is the appeal relating to SLP (Crl.) No.
    3199 of 2004. The illegality and vulnerability are so manifest that a bare
    reading of the impugned orders would show that the learned Single Judges
D   have not kept in view the parameters of Section 482 Cr.P.C. in view. Though,
    Bichitrananda was not a party in any of the petitions before the High Court,
    in the Criminal Appeal relating to SLP (Crl.) No. 3190 of2004, learned Single
    Judge even quashed the proceedings against him. Interestingly, he even
    referred to submissions purportedly made on behalf of him in the impugned
E   order though he was not a party and there was no question of any submission
    being made by learned counsel on his behalf. The illegality does not end
    there. Learned Single Judge has even directed renewal of the contractor's
    licence issued to _Zerina Marines Pvt. Ltd . where Nalinikanta is a Director. The
    allegations are of very serious nature. The investigating agency had collected
    documentary and oral evidence to substantiate the allegations and the
F   investigation was in progress. At that stage the interference made by the
    High Court is clearly uncalled for. The allegations were, inter a/ia, that
    Nalinikanta gave false information about his educational qualifications and
    working experience to fraudulently obtain Super Class and Special Class
    contractor's licenses. He claimed to be Engineering Degree holder whereas in
G   reality he was not so. Similarly, he had submitted false and forged experience
    certificate to get the contractor's licenses. Bichitrananda was a member of the
    Committee of Chief Engineers which granted renewal of license which was
    submitted after due date. Subsequently license grating authority cancelled
    Super Class contractor's license.

H         In response, learned counsel for the respondents Saroj Kumar Sahoo
         STATE OF ORISSA v. SAROJ KUMAR SA HOO [PASAYA T. J.)            555
and Nalinikanta Muduli submitted that the prosecuting agency is acting with     A
ma/a fide intents in order to harass Bichitranand and with a view to unleash
political vendetta the respondents and Bichitrananda are being victimized.
Continuance of proceedings against them would be sheer abuse of the process
of court. The High Court has analysed the factual position keeping in view
the principles relating to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and,     B
therefore, no interference is called for. It is pointed out that though
Bichitrananda Muduli was not a party, the High Court on going through the
entire records came to hold that an innocent person like Bichitrananda should
not be penalized and, therefore, quashed the proceedings so far as he is
concerned. Without making him a party in these proceedings the appellants
cannot take away the relief granted to him by learned Single Judge.             C
      Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in a case of this
nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new
powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court
possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give D
effect to an order under the Cr.P.C., (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible ,
nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent E
powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the
doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo F
a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non
potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which
it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not
function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the G
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down ,
in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority
of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to H
    556                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
    action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
    exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if
     it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
    court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
    justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine
B   the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible
    to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether
    any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

         In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR (1960) SC 866 this Court
C   summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should
    be exercised to quash the proceedings.

            (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
            institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

            (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint
D           taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute
            the offence alleged;

            (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
            evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails
            to prove the charge.
E
           In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the
    distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there
     is evidence which is cle!irly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a
    case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
F   support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of
    the Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry
    whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
    appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of
    the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression,
    or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
G   exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
    consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the
    hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
    needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over
    to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.
H   The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and the
         STATE OF ORIS SA v. SAROJ KUMAR SAHOO [PASA YAT, J.]               557

categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it           A
relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 335. A note of caution
was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that
too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court   B
are as follows:

        "( 1) Where the allegations made in the first infonnation report or the
        complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
        their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
        a case against the accused.
                                                                                   c
        (2) Where the allegations in the first infonnation report and other
        materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
        offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
        156( 1) of the Cr.P.C. except under an order of a Magistrate within the
        purview of Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C..                                  D
        (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
        and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
        commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

        (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
        offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation     E
        is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
        contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C.

         (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
       . and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person
         can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for      F
         proceeding against the accused.

       (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
       provisions of the Cr.P.C. or the Act concerned (under which a criminal
       proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the         G
       proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Cr.P.C.
       or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
       the aggrieved party.

       (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a fide
        and/or where the pr~ceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior     H
    558                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A           motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
            spite him due to private and personal grudge."

         As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section
  482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
  great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
B exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
  should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court
   being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima
  facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more
  so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court
C and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot
   be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
  hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court
   will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any
   stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, [1992] 4 SCC 305, and Raghubir
  Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR (1964) SC I). It would not be proper for
D the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
   probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable
   and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are 'to be
   quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude
  that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged
E at the police station and an offence is registered, then the ma/a fides of the
   informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected
   during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of
  the accused person. The allegations of ma/a fides against the informant are
  of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the
  proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, [1990] Supp SCC
F 686, State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR (1996) SC 309, Rupan Deol Bajaj v.
  Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, [1995] 6 SCC 194, State of Kera/av. O.C. Kuttan, AIR
  (1999) SC 1044, State ofUP. v. OP. Sharma, [1996] 7 SCC 705, Rashmi Kumar
  v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, [1997] 2 SCC 397, Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt.
  ofNCT ofDelhi, AIR ( 1996) SC 2983 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi/,
    r
G J999] J sec 259).
         The above position was again re-iterated in State of Karnataka v. M
    Devendrappa and Anr., [2002] 3 SCC 89 and State of MP. v. Awadh Kishore
    Gupta and Ors., [2004] l SCC 691.

          In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1974) SC 1140 while
H
             STATEOFORISSAv. SAROJ KUMARSAHOO[PASAYALI.]                         559
    considering a case under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,            A
    1898 (in short the 'Old Code') corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., it
    was observed as follows :

                 "Where at the date of filing the petition under Section 561-A, no
            charge sheet or a complaint has been laid down in Court and the
            matter is only at the stage of investigation by Police, the Court            B
            cannot, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A,
            interfere with the statutory powers of the Police to investigate into the
            alleged offence and quash the proceedings. Even assuming that the
            allegations in the FIR are correct and constitute an offence so as to
            remove the legal bar to institute proceedings in Court, the Court            C
            cannot at that stage appraise the evidence collected by the Police in
            their investigation. Any petition under Section 561-A at such a stage
            is, therefore, premature and incompetent."

           It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that
    stage it was impennissible for the High Court to look into materials, the            D
    acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising
    jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., it is not pennissible for the Court
    to act as if it was a trial Court. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the
    Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient
    ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the
    Court can evaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate        E
    evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude
\   whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.
    In Chand Dhawan (Smt.) v. Jawahar Lal and Ors., [1992] 3 SCC 317, it was
    observed that when the materials relied upon by a party are required to be
    proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude        F
    the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on annexures to
    the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which cannot be termed as
    evidence without being tested and proved.

          Learned Single Judges did not keep in view the correct position in law
    while allowing the petitions filed by the respondents. It baffles us as to how       G
    a learned Single Judge while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
    could even direct grant of renewal of licence. It is somewhat akin to a learned
    Single Judge of another High Court directing creation of criminal courts to
    deal with cases under a particular statute. It is baffling how learned Single
    Judge referred to submissions purportedly made by learned counsel for
                                                                                         H
    560                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   Bichitranand who was not even a party. It is not clear how such submissions
    if any could be made. The conclusions are based on surmises and conjectures
    without any material to support them. Learned Single Judge arrived at certain
    conclusions which are utterly fallacious. It is not clear as to on what basis
    such conclusions were arrived at. Some of the conclusions, by way of
B   illustration are giveri below:

           (a)   No work experience certificate is taken as criteria for issue of
                 fresh license.
           (b)   Renewal of license after three years is an automatic process.

           (c)   Educational qualification of Managing Director is not a criteria
c                for issuance of Special Class Contractor, when the allegation was
                 of filing false/forged educational qualification certificate.
           (d)   Bichitrananda did not influence any member of the Committee of
                 Chief Engineers though he was a member (This conclusion was
                 arrived at purportedly on the basis ofBichitrananda's submission,
D                though he was not a party).

    The grant of relief to Bichitranand when he was not a party is equally
    indefensible. Therefore, we find no reason to accept the plea of learned
    counsel for the respondents that he should be heard in these proceedings.

E
          When the factual position of the case at hand is considered in the light
    of principles of law highlighted, the inevitable conclusion is that the High
    Court was not justified in quashing the investigation and proceedings in the
    connected case and the charge sheet filed.
F        In the background of the legal principles set out above the High Court's
    impugned orders are indefensible and are accordingly quashed.

          So far as Criminal Appeal No. 920 of 2003 and the Appeal relating to
    SLP (Crl.) No. 3199 of 2004 are concerned, since the investigation is not
G   complete, we direct that the investigation be completed within a period of six
    months from today. The respondents are directed to cooperate in the completion
    of the investigation and shall appear before the investigating officer, as and
    when required, without fail.

          It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that interim
H   protections were given by the High Court as regards the respondents being
           STATEOFORISSAv. SAROJKUMARSAHOO(PASAYAT,J.)                      561
on bail. That protection shall continue, but in case the respondents fail to       A
cooperate in the investigation and do not .appear before the investigating
officer for the purpose of investigation as and when required, the interim
protection shall cease to be operative and it shall be open to the investigating
agency to move the concerned court for cancellation of the protection which
was granted. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that in
case charge sheet is filed and in the case where charge sheet is already filed,    B
respondents shall seek discharge. If any such motion is made the concerned
Court shall deal with the same in accordance with law. We do not express any
opinion about the acceptability or otherwise of such motion, if made.

        The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.                           C
V.SS.                                                        Appeals allowed.