STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.versusJOGINDER PATJOSHI AND ANR.

A                         STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.
                                     v.
                         JOGINDER PATJOSHI AND ANR.

                              NOVEMBER 13, 2003

B                    [V.N. KHARE, CJ. AND S.B. SINHA, J.]


          Service Law:

          Orissa Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1985:
c
           rr. 8(/)(a) and (b)-Revision of pay scales and fixation of pay-
    Lecturers and Professors-Prior to revision of pay w.ef 1.1.1986, getting
    emoluments less than the minimum of revised pay scale-Pay fixed at the
    minimum of revised pay scale as per r. 8(/)(a)--Claim for increasing pay by
    one increment under r. 8(/)(b)-High Court allowing writ petition holding
    that though petitioners' case fell under r. 8(/)(a), they were entitled to one
    further increment as per exception contained in r.8(/)(b), and the rule being
    a beneficial one required liberal construction-Held, there being no ambiguity
    in r. 8(/)(a), writ petitioners were only entitled to the minimum of revised
    scale-On fact, the principle of liberal interpretation has no application
     inasmuch as by reason of r.8, the State merely specified mode and manner
     ofapplication thereof-Furthermore, clauses (a) and (b) ofr.8, having regard
     to the rule ofpunctuation, must be read separately-Interpretation ofstatutes.

          Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State ofT.N. and Ors., (2002) 3
    SCC 533; Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors., (2002) 7 SCC
    273 and Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 593,
    relied on.

          ll/achi Devi (D) by Lrs. and Ors. v. Jain Society, Protection ofOrphans
    India and Ors., (2003) AIR SCW 4824, referred to.

          l.R.C. v. Hinchy 1960 Appeal Cases 738, referred to.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5579of1998.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 19.11.96 of the Orissa High Court
    in O.J.C. No. 7869of1994.
                                      492
                 STA TE OF ORIS SA v. JOGINDER PA TJOSHI                      493
                                      WITH                                            A
      C.A. No. 5580 and 5581 of 1998.

      Jana Kalyan Das for the Appellants.

      Y.P. Mahajan and R.C. Verma for the Respondents.                                B
      The following Order of the Court was delivered :

       Interpretation of Rules 8(1) (a) and (b) of the orissa Revised Scales of
Pay Rules, 1985 (for short the Rules'), purported to have been framed under
Article 309 of the Constitution of India, falls for consideration in these            C
appeals which arises out of the judgment and order dated 19th November,
1996. The respondents herein were holding the post of Lecturers and professors
in the University. The interpretation of the Rules arose in the context ofa writ
petition filed by the Lecturers and Professors of the Berhampur University
Teachers' Association in the High Court of Orissa. The pay scales of the
Lecturers and Professors was Rs. 700-1600 and Rs. 1500-2500 respectively. By          D
the aforesaid Rules, which came into force on 1st January, 1986, the scales
of pay of the Lecturers and Professors were sought to be revised. The revised
pay scales of the Lecturers and Professors was fixed at Rs. 2200-4000 and
4500-7300 respectively. On the relevant date i.e. immediately prior to I st
January, 1986, the professors were getting Rs. 2927 under the Rules.                  E
      The respondents filed a writ petition before the Orissa High Court,
claiming therein that in addition to the minimum of Rs. 4500-7300, one further
increment is also to be given as required under Rules 8( I) (b ).

      At the time when the aforesaid writ petition was filed, a Division Bench        F
of the High Court ofOrissa in O.J.C. No. 2588of1991 took a view that while
fixing the emoluments of the Teachers of the University under the UGC scales,
an additional increment is to be given at the initial stage. However, another
Division Bench in O.J.C. No. 6405 of 1992 was of the view that no such
increment is to be given at the initial stage of fixation in the revised pay scales
under the Rules. In view of the conflicting decisions of two coordinate               G
Benches of he High Court, the writ petition filed by the Berhampur University
Teachers' Association was referred for decision to a larger Bench.

      Rules 8 (I) (a) and (b) of the Rules reads as thus:

        "8 (I) Unless in any case the University by special order otherwise           H
    494                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          directs, the pay of a University employee, who elects or is deemed to
           have elected so be governed by the revised scale from the Ist day
           of January, 1985 shall be fixed:

               (a) at the minimum of the revised scale if the amount of the
           existing emolument is less than the minimum:
B
                (b) at the stage of the revised scale, which is equal to the amount
           of existing emoluments or, if there is no such stage, at the stage next
           above the existing emoluments and the pay so fixed, except where it
           is fixed at the minimum shall be increased by one increment admissible
           at that stage of the revised scale."
c
           The Full Bench of the Orissa High Court was of the view that although
    the case of the Teachers fall under Rule 8(1) (a), they are entitled to one
    further increment, in terms of the exception contained in Rule 8(1) (b); as a
    liberal construction is required to be put thereto, as the Rule is a beneficial
    one.
D
          The Full Bench of the High Court, interpreting the aforementioned
    Rules, was thus of the opinion that the explanation contained in sub-clause
    (b) of clause (I) of Rule 8 would apply both to clauses (a) and (b) as the same
    is beneficent legislation.

E       Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Orissa submits that
  a bare perusal of the impugned Rule would show that as two meanings cannot
  be put thereto, the Full Bench of the High Court must be held to have erred
  in passing the impugned judgment. Reliance in this behalf has been placed
  on Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors., reported
p in (2002] 3 SCC 533, Union of India and Anr. v. Hanso/i Devi and Ors.,
  reported in [2002] 7 SCC 273, Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and
  Ors.. reported in [2003] 2 SCC 593 and ll/achi Devi (D) by L.Rs. and Ors., v.
  Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and Ors., [2003] AIR SCW 4824.

          Learned counsel for the respondents stated that the legislation has
G been correctly interpreted being beneficent in nature. He further contended
    that even the Department of Industries of the Government of Orissa
    implemented the same by amending the Rules in terms of the resolution
    adopted on 26th March, 1996, which now reads as under:

            "The question of liberalising the pay fixation formula adopted for the
H           teachers of Engineering Colleges under AICTE scale of pay in
                STATEOFORISSAv. JOGINDER PATJOSHI                           495
        accordance with the pay fixation formula under the Orissa Revised           A
        Scales of Pay Rules, 1985 was under active consideration of
        Government for some time past.

            After careful consideration, the State Government have been
        pleased to amend the Para-22 of this Depatt. Resolution No. 7981-1 dt.
        29/3/90 as follows:                                                         B
        (a) In cases where the existing (pre-revised) emoluments is less than
        the minimum of the revised scale of pay in the revised scale of pay
        in the revised scale shall be fixed at the stage next above the minimum.

        (b) The next increment of a Government Servant whose pay has been C
        fixed in the revised scales shall be granted on the anniversary of the
        last increment in the existing scale, unless otherwise inadmissible."

      The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment even directed
grant of the minimum of the pay scales of Rs. 4500 with one increment, while
fixing the pay in the pay scale of Rs. 4500-7300. It is against the said judgment   D
of the High Court, the appellants are in appeal before us.

      It is not disputed that the revised pay scale of the Professors was Rs.
1500-2500 and the appeliants were getting Rs. 2927 and after revision they
were required to be placed on the minimum of the scale, which was admittedly
more than what they had been getting prior to the revision of the pay scale.        E
       A bare perusal of the aforementioned Rule would clearly show that
fixation of pay in the revised scale of pay would be governed by the said
Rule. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 contemplate two different
situations. In a case where the minimum of the revised scale is less than the
existing emolument, the concerned employee will get at least the minimum            F
scale of pay as is provided in clause (a) thereof or if there is no such stage
of the existing emoluments then it shall be fixed at the stage next above the
existing emoluments. The exception clause contained therein is referable only
to a situation occurring in clause (b) and not to clause (a). If the exception
is held to cover both the situations contemplated under clauses (a) and (b)         G
of sub-rule (I) of Rule 8 for all intent and purport, sub-rule (a) shall become
meaningless.

      Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents' submiSsion
that subsequently another Department of the State of Orissa intended to
grant a higher benefit is of no consequence. In this case, this Court is H
    496                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A required to interpret Rule 8 of the Rules as it stood prior to the amendment
    and not the amended Rules. It is now well settled principle of law that where
    the language used in a Statute is clear and unambiguous, the question of
    taking recourse of any principle of interpretation would not arise. In Padma
    Sundara Rao 's case (supra), this Court held:

B          "While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and
           cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misuse and subjected to the
           abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or
           repeal it, if deemed necessary. See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v.
           P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd, [2000] 5 SCC 515. The legislative casus
           omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language
c          of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for
           reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In
           Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time
           period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view
           cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6( I). If the view is
D          accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause
           (I) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1 ), but also by a non-
           prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent."

          Similarly in Hanso/i Devi's case (supra), .this Court held:

E               "9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the
            correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear
            in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statllte. The rule
            stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85
            : 8 ER I034 still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect: (ER
            p. 1057)
F
                "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
            unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those
            words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves
            alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver."

G                It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the
            language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must
            give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open
            to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that
            such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
            policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd, [1995] 2
H
        STATE OF ORISSA v. JOG IND ER PAT JOSHI                     497
All ER345: (1995) AC 696: [1955] 2 WLR 1135 Lord Reid pointed out           A
as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that: (All ER p.
366C-D)

     "A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word
which in different contexts is capable or different meanings. It would
be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not            B
contain such a word. A provision, is in my judgment, ambiguous only
if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is
capable of having more than one meaning."

     It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of
 the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and            C
 absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the
 statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which
 would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J in the
 case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR (1952) SC 369:
 [1953] SCR l had held that it is not a sound principle of construction     D
to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplausage, if
 they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably
 within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light
Heat & Power Co. Ltd v. Vandry, AIR (1920) PC 181, it had been
observed that the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to
say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy         E
to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons,
Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not
there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute
becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an
omission in the Act it should be possible to state with certainty that      F
these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved
by the legislature and. their attention been drawn to the omission
before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the
legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman
in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent
ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be          G
permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make
the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle let us
now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the
questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no
doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer         H
    498                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made
           a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a
           person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on
           the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the
           Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and
           the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-
B          A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal
           interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application
           to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The
           aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an
           application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is
c          entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible
           for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then
           subsequently make another application when some other person gets
           the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep
           Kumari 's case the three learned Judges, while enumerating the
           conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28-
D          A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10 ) "the
           person moving the application did not make an application to the
           Collector under Section 18". The expression "did not make an
           application", as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an
           effective application which had been entertained by making the
E          reference and the reference was answered. When an application under
           Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not
           fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to the
           effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant
           emanating from some other reference being answered to move an
           application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly,
F          answer Question I (a) by holding that the dismissal of an application
           seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would
           tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section
           28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."

G        Jn Dayal Singh 's case (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court, in
    which both of us were members, observed as under: "

               "37. It is a well-settled principle of law that the court cannot read
           anything into the statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.
           The court has to find out legislative intent only from the language
           employed in the statutes. Surmises and conjectures cannot be restricted
H
               STATE OF ORIS SA v. JOGINDER PATJOSHI                      499
        to for interpretation of statutes. See Union of India v. Filip Tiago De A
        Gama,(1990} I SCC277:AIR(l990)SC981.

           "38. This Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill
       (P) ltd., [2003) 2 SCC I 11: [2002) 9 Scale 102, has observed: (SCC
       p.121, para 25)
                                                                                 B
          "25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature
       cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and
       unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordim!rily be
       construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be
       added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to
       prevent a .provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, C
       unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."

      The said decision has been followed by this Court in lllachi Devi's case
(supra).

       The principle of liberal interpretation which is applied in case of an D
beneficent legislation has no application in the instant case inasmuch as by
reason of Rule 8 of the said Rules, the State had merely specified the mode
and manner of application thereof. The same was necessary having regard to
the difficulty which may cause to the employees who might have been
receiving higher emoluments than the minimum prescribed under the revised E
pay scale at a point of time when the revised pay scale came into force.
Furthermore, clauses (a) and (b) having regard to the rule of the punctuation
must be read separately. Even the decision referred to by the High Court,
namely, LR.C. v. Hinchy, (1960) Appeal Cases 738, shows that in modem
statute punctuation has a role to play.
                                                                                 F
     In that view of the matter, we are of the view that there being no
ambiguity in Rule 8 (I) (a), the writ petitioners were only entitled to the
minimum of the revised scale.

     For the aforesaid reason, the appeals deserve to be allowed. The
judgments under challenge are set aside.                              G
      The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

RP.                                                         Appeals allowed.