STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.versusMOHAMMED IQBAL BHATTI
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 988
- Decided
- 31 July 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The State possesses a power of review in sanction matters, but the second sanction was invalid as no fresh material was placed before the authority.
Summary
The respondent, a Block Development and Panchayat Officer, faced an FIR under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The State, through the Minister, initially refused sanction for prosecution on 15‑12‑2002/2003. After a change of government, the same authority granted sanction on 14‑9‑2004 without any new material being placed before it. The respondent challenged the second sanction by filing a writ petition; the High Court held that the State had no power to review its earlier order and set aside the sanction. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the State does possess a power of review in sanction matters, but such a review must be based on fresh material and a proper application of mind. Since no new evidence was presented, the second sanction was invalid, and the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the State has a power of review over its own order refusing or granting sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Whether a second sanction can be granted on the same material after an earlier refusal.
- Whether the procedural requirements of Rules of Business (Rule 8 vs Rule 9) affect the validity of the sanction order.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 197
- Constitution of Indias. 162, s. 166
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(2), s. 7
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 11 S.C.R. 790
A STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
v.
MOHAMMED IQBAL BHATII
(Civil Appeal No. 4969 of 2009)
JULY 31, 2009
B
[S.B. SINHA AND DEEPAK VERMA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.197 - State's power
of review in the matter of grant of sanction in terms of s.197 -
c Sanction for prosecution refused by competent authority -
Matter again placed before competent authority after about 2
years and sanction granted - High Court holding that State
had no power of review - Interference with - Held: Not called
for - High Court had perused the entire records and arrived
D at a finding of fact that no fresh material was placed before
the competent authority for reconsidering the matter- Perusal
of earlier order showed that before the competent authority all
the relevant records were produced - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 166 - Rules of Business - rr.8 and 9.
E
An FIR was lodged against respondent-public
servant. The sanction for prosecution was refused by
...
competent authority. The matter was again placed before
the competent authority and sanction was granted. The
respondent filed writ petition before High Court. High
F Court allowed the writ petition holding that the State had
no power of review and in any event, the impugned order
could not be passed as Uie State while passing its earlier
order dated 15.12.2003 had exhausted its jurisdiction.
Hence the appeal.
G
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The respondent is a public servant. The ..
Governor of the State of Punjab is his appointing
H 790
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 791
BHATII
authority. He is, therefore, not removable from his office A
save by and with the sanction of the Government and in
that view of the matter if he is accused in any offence
alleged to have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in discharge of his official duty, grant
of prior sanction is imperative in character in terms of B
Section 197 Cr.PC. The power of the State is performed
by an executive authority authorized in this behalf in
terms of the Rules of Executive Business framed under
"' Article 166 of the Constitution of India insofar as such a
power has to be exercised in terms of Article 162 thereof. c
Once a sanction is refused to be granted, no appeal lies
thereagainst. [Para 6] [795-G-H; 796-A-B]
2. Although the State in the matter of grant or refusal
to grant sanction exercises statutory jurisdiction, the
same, however, would not mean that po.wer once D
exercised cannot be exercised once again. For exercising
its jurisdiction at a subsequent stage, express power of
review in the State may not be necessary as even such
a power is administrative in character. It is, however,
beyond any cavil that while passing an order for grant of E
sanction, serious application of mind on the part of the
concerned authority is imperative. The legality and/or
validity of the order granting sanction would be subject
to review by the criminal courts. An order refusing to
grant !:!anction may attract judicial review by the Superior F
Courts. All such material facts and material evidences
must be considered by it. The sanctioning authority must
apply its mind on such material facts and evidences
collected _during the investigation. Even such application
of mind does not appear from the order of sanction, G
extrinsic evidences may be placed before the court in that
• behalf. While granting sanction, the authority cannot take
into consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an
order on extraneous consideration not germane for_
H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A passing a statutory order. It is also well settled that the
Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority
either to grant sanction or not to do so. The source of
power of an authority passing an order of sanction must
also be considered. The concerned authority cannot also
B pass an order of sanction subject to ratification of a
higher authority. [Paras 7 and 8) [796-C-H; 797-A]
Mansukhla/ vitha/das Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997)
3 SCC 622; State (Anti Corruption Branch) Govt. of N.C. T.
of Delhi and Anr. v. Dr. R.C. Anand and Anr. (2004) 4 sec
c 615, relied on
3. The High Court called for the entire records. It
perused the same. It noticed that several queries were
raised but remained unanswered. The Departmental
D proceeding initiated against the respondent was
dropped. The recommendations therefore were made not
to grant sanction on the basis whereof the earlier order
dated 15.12.2003 was passed. A finding of fact was
arrived at by the High Court that no material was placed
E before the competent authority. Only a communication
was received from the Director, Vigilance Bureau dated
22.6.2004 wherein reference of the letter dated 26.5.2004
was made. It, according to the High Court, was not a new
-
material. [Para 9) [797-B-D]
F 4. The First Information Report was lodged in 2001.
The proceeding for grant of sanction was initiated in that
year. Several queries were made to the Vigilance
Department. Such queries had to be made as the
respondent herein made a representation that he had
G been falsely implicated at the instance of some of the
officers of the Vigilance Department who had set up a tout
therefor. [Para 14) [799-B-C) ~
5. In terms of Clause (3) of Article 166 of the
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 793
BHATTI
...
Constitution of India all orders of the government must A
be issued in the name of the Governor. Such orders,
however, may be signed by any authorities specified in
Rule 9 of the Rules of Business. By reason of either Rule
8 or Rule 9 of the Rules of Business, no substantive
power is conferred. The Rules of Executive Business B
provided for three authorities before whom the records
are to be placed, viz., Minister of the Department, Chief
Minister and Cabinet It is now well-known that in the
f event it appears from the order and the records produced
before the court, if any occasion arises therefor that even c
if a valid order is not authenticated in terms of Clause (3)
of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the same would
not be vitiated m law. Failure to authenticate an executive
order is not fatal. The said provision is directory in nature
and not mandatory. [Paras 19 and 20] [801-A-E] D
I. T. C. Bhadracha/am Paperboards and Another v.
•'
Manda/ Revenue Officer, A.P. and Others (1996) 6 SCC 634,
relied on.
6. From a perusal of the order dated 15.12.2003, it is E
evident that before the Hon'ble Minister all the relevant
records were produced. The Vigilance Department did
not contend that the Hon'ble Minister did not have any
jurisdiction. It accepted the said order. It was not
challenged. Only when a new government came in, a F
request was made for reconsideration of the earlier order,
as would be evident from the memo of the Secretary of
the Department. It was, therefore, not a case where fresh
materials were _placed before the sanctioning authority.
No case, therefore, was made out that the sanctioning G
authority had failed to take into consideration a relevant
fact or took into consideration an irrelevant fact. If the
--t clarification sought for by the Hon'ble Minister had. been
supplied, the same should have formed a ground for
H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.
A reconsideration of the order. [Paras 20 to 22] [801-F-H;
802-A-B]
7. The High Court in its judgment has clearly held,
upon perusing the entire records, that no fresh material
was produced. There is also nothing to show as to why
8
reconsideration became necessary. On what premise
such a procedure was adopted is not known. Application
of mind is also absent to show the necessity for
reconsideration or review of the earlier order on the basis
of the materials placed before the sanctioning authority
c or otherwise. [Para 23] [802-C-D]
Case law reference:
(1997) 3 sec 622 relied on Para 7
D (2004) 4 sec 615 relied on Para 8
(1996) 6 sec 634 relied on Para 20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
E
4969 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 22.12.2005 of the High
Court of Judicature at Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil
..
Writ Petition No. 16402 of 2004.
Vivek K. Goyal, AAG, Pb., Kuldeep Singh (for Arun K.
F
Sinha) for the Appellants.
Jasdeep Singh Gill, Dinesh Verma, A.P. Mohanty for the
Respondent.
G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The short question which arises for consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the State has any power of review i~
H the matter of grant of sanction in terms of Section 197 of the
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 795
BHATTI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 197. A
3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute
Respondent was working as Block Development and
Panchayat Officer. A First Information Repiort was lodged
against him on or about 6.9.2001 under Sections 7 and 13(2) B
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Upon completion of
investigation, the Vigilance Department sought for sanction from
,.; the competent authority so as to enable it to prosecute the
respondent. By an order dated 15.12.2002, grant of such
sanction was refused. The matter, however, was placed before c
the competent authority once again and on or about 14.9.2004
sanction to prosecute the respondent was granted. Questioning
the legality and/or validity of the said order, the respondent filed
a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
D
By reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ petition
;,
was allowed opining that the State has no power of review and
in any event, the impugned order could not have been passed
as the State while passing its earlier order dated 15.12.2003
has exhausted its jurisdiction.
E
4. Mr. Vivek K. Goyal, learned Additional Advocate
General appearing on behalf of the appellants, would urge that
the jurisdiction for grant of sanction being an administrative one,
1
the State has the requisite power to review its earlier order. It
"- was urged that it is incorrect to contend that power once F
exercised stands exhausted.
5. Mr. Jasdeep Singh Gill, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, urged that the order
impugned in the writ petition having been passed by the State
G
on the same material, the said order was wholly illegal.
.., 6. The respondent is a public servant. The Governor of the
State of Punjab is his appointing authority. He is, therefore, not
removable from his office save by and with the sanction of the
Government and in that view of the matter if he is accused in H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A any offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in discharging of his official duty,
grant of prior sanction is imperative in character in terms of
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
power of the State, as is well known, is performed by an
8 executive authority authorized in this behalf in terms of the Rules
of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the
Constitution of India insofar as such a power has to be
exercised in terms of Article 162 thereof. Once a sanction is
refused to be granted, no appeal lies thereagainst.
C 7. Although the State in the matter of grant or refusal to
grant sanction exercises statutory jurisdiction, the same,
however, would not mean that power once exercised cannot be
exercised once again. For exercising its jurisdiction at a
subsequent stage, express power of review in the State may
D not be necessary as even such a power is administrative in
character. It is, however, beyond any cavil that while passing
an order for grant of sanction, serious application of mind on
the part of the concerned authority is imperative. The legality
and/or validity of the order granting sanction would be subject
E to review by the criminal courts. An order refusing to grant
sanction may attract judicial review by the Superior Courts.
Validity of an order of sanction would depend upon application
of mind on the part of the authority concerned and the material
placed before it. All such material facts and material evidences
F must be considered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply
its mind on such material facts and evidences collected during
the investigation. Even such application of mind does not appear
from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidences may be placed
before the court in that behalf. While granting sanction, the
G authority cannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor
can it pass an order on extraneous consideration not germane
for passing a statutory order. It is also well settled that the
Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either
to grant sanction or not lo do so. The source of power of an
H authority passing an order of sanction must also be considered.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 797
BHATTI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
" [See Mansukh/a/ vitha/das Chauhan v. State of Gujarat A
[(1997) 3 sec 5221
8. The concerned authority cannot also pass an order of
sanction subject to ratification of a higher authority. [See State
(Anti Corruption Branch) Govt. of N. C. T. of Delhi and Anr. v. B
Dr. R.C. Anand and Anr. [(2004) 4 SCC 615].
9. The High Court called for the entire records. It perused
,. the same. It noticed that several queries were raised but
remained unanswered. The Departmental proceeding initiated
against the respondent was dropped. The recommendations c
therefore were made not to grant sanction on the basis whereof
the aforementioned order dated 15.12.2003 was passed. A
finding of fact has been arrived at by the High Court that no
material was placed before the competent authority. Only a
communic;ation had been received from the Director, Vigilance D
Bureau dated 22.6.2004 wherein reference of the letter dated
26.5.2004 was made. It, according to the High Court, was not
a new material. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court,
opined:
E
"Once the Government passes the order under Section 19
of the Act or under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, declining the sanction to prosecute the
concerned official, reviewing such an order on the basis
of the same material, which already stood considered,
F
would not be appropriate or permissible. The Government
is expected to act consciously and cautiously while taking
such serious decisions. The perusal of the record shows
that pointed queries had been raised to be answered by
the Vigilance Bureau but no answer was forthcoming nor
any had been submitted subsequently which culminated G
into passing of the later order dated September 30, 2004.
We refrain ourselves from mentioning the queries which
had been raised but it would suffice to say that the queries
were never answered at the relevant time when the order
dated December 15. 2003 had been passed nor the same H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A was ever commented upon as no answers were placed
before the competent authority for passing the impugned
order dated September 30, 2004."
10. The State of Punjab in exercise of its jurisdiction under
B Article 162 of the Constitution of India framed Rules of
Executive Business. Pursuant to Rules 18 and 19 thereof, the
Department of Rural Development and Panchayat made
Standing Orders.
11: Rules 8 and 9 of the said Rules read, thus:
c
"8. All orders or instruments made or executed by or on
behalf of the Government of the State of Punjab shall be
expressed to be made or executed in the name of the
Governor.
D 9.(1) Every order or instrument of the Government of the
State of Punjab shall be signed either by a Secretary, ·an
Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary, a Deputy
Secretary or an Under Secretary or such other officer as
may be specifically empowered by the Governor in that
E behalf and the signature so made shall be deemed to be
the proper authentication of such order or instrument. .. "
12. In terms of the said Rules as also the Standing Order,
the Minister of Rural Development and Panchayats is the
F competent authority to grant or refuse to grant sanction, so far
as the respondent is concerned.
13. Before embarking on the rival contentions, we may also
place on record that the Government of Punjab, Department of
Vigilance had issued guidelines in terms whereof the grant of
G sanction by the Administrative Department may be refused;
some of the provisions whereof read as under:
"3. The cases should not be delayed at the level of
administrative department when sent for prosecution
H sanction. Generally, the cases should be decided with in
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 799
BHATTI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
two months time from the date, the reference is made by A
the vigilance department.
4. Although the grant or refusal of prosecution sanction is
a matter within the sole discretion of the competent
, .authority. However, the authority can refuse to grant B
·prosecution sanction for reason such as ... "
14. The First Information Report was lodged in 2001. The
proceeding for grant of sanction was initiated in that year.
Several queries were made to the Vigilance Depprtment. Such
queries had to be made as the respondent herein made a C
representation that he had been falsely implicated at the
instance of some of the officers of the Vigilance Department
who had set up a tout tnerefor.
15. The Hon'ble Minister noticed the said representation '': 0
and by an order dated 15.12.2003 refused to grant sanction,.·· ·-
stating:
"3. After minutely going through the averments made in the
representation submitted by the said officer the Hon'ble
Minister issued order for submitted the file. After E
scrutinizing the fil~\by Hon'ble Minister it was found that
the Vigilance Department has been unable to provide the
clarification with regard to certain points as asked by the
Panchayat Department from the Vigilance Department
from which it is cleared that they did not want to submit F
the clarification and want the true facts remain hidden and
not come to the fore. Therefore, in this ~ituation, the
sanction to prosecution Sh. Bhatti by the Vigilance
Department is refused."
G
The said order was signed by the Special Secretary,
Government of Punjab.
16. Before us, however, it was contended that requisite
clarification was made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
Vigilance Bureau on 17.12.2002 stating: H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A "Besides this Sh. Hans Raj Golden has no link with
Vigilance Department. It is false that he is a tout of
Vigilance Department."
17. However, it is stated that with the change in the
Government and after more than nine months of the said refusal
8
to grant sanction, the Vigilance Department again approached
the concerned Secretary for grant of sanction by a letter dated
16.05.2004. The Deputy Secretary, Government of Punjab,
Village Development and Panchayat Department by a letter
C dated 30.09.2004 addressed to the Deputy Secretary,
Vigilance Bureau, stated as under:
"On the above mentioned subject this department vide
letter memo no. 6/37/2001-3 RDE-3/ 9925 dated
15.12.2003 had refused to grant sanction for prosecution
D of Sh. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti.
2. Vide your letter under reference you had again
requested to grant sanction for prosecution of the
concerned official in the case and after reconsidering the
case, sanction for prosecution Sh. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti,
E
District Development and Panchayat Officer is granted ... "
18. The Governor of Punjab in his order of sanction dated
14.09.2004 recorded the prosecution case presumably as
c0ntained in the First Information Report and opined:
F
"Therefore, after perusing the above case police file,
documents, challan and attached all the documents
minutely the Rajya Pal Ji has become fully satisfied that
the above Mohd. Iqbal D.D.P.O. Ferozepur during the
G tenure of his service/ posting, have committed an offence
u/s 7, 13(2) 88 P.C. Act."
The said order was also signed by the Secretary,
Government of Punjab, Rural Development and Panchayat
Department.
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. MOHAMMED IQBAL 801
BHATTI [S.B. SINHA, J.]
19. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate A
General for the appellants is that Rule 8 of the Rules of
Business shall apply whereas according to the learned counsel
for the respondent, Rule 9 thereof shall apply. In terms of Clause
(3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India all orders of the
government must be issued in the name of the Governor. Such B
·orders, however, may be signed by any authorities specified
in Rule 9 of the Rules of Business. By reason of either Rule 8
or· Rule 9 of the Rules of Business, no substantive power is
conferred. The RtJles of Executive Business inter alia provided
for three authorities before whom the records are to be placed, c
viz., Minister of the Department, Chief Minister and Cabinet. It
has not been contended that in terms of the Rules of Executive
Business read with the Standing Order, the Minister of the
Department concerned could not have refused to grant
sanction. What is contended before us is that Rule 8 of the
.D
Rules of Business should have been complied with .
.l
20. ifis'now well-known that in the event it appears from
the order and the records produced before the court, ifany
occasion arises therefor that even if a valid order is not
authenticated in terms of Clause (3) of Article 166 of the E
Constitution of India, the same would not be vitiated in law.
Failure to authenticate an executive order is not fatal. The said
provision is directory in nature and not mandatory. [See I. T.C.
Bhadrachalam Paperboards and Another v. Manda/ Revenue
Officer, A.P. and Others (1996) 6 SCC 634]. From a perusal F
of the order dated 15.12.2003, it is evident that before the
Hon'ble Minister all the relevant records were produced.
21. ·The Vigilance Department did not contend that the
Hon'ble Minister did not have any jurisdiction. It accepted the
G
said order. It was not challenged. Only when a new government
came in, a request was made for reconsideration of the earlier
order, as would be evident from the memo of the Secretary of
the Department.
22. It was, therefore, not a case where fresh materials were H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
A placed before the sanctioning authority. No case, therefore, was
made out that the sanctioning authority had failed to take into
consideration a relevant fact or took into consideration an
irrelevant fact. If the clarification sought for by the Hon'ble
Minister had been supplied, as has been contended before us,
B the same should have formed a ground for reconsideration of
the order. It is stated before us that the Government sent nine
letters for obtaining the clarifications which were not replied to.
23. The High Court in its judgment has clearly held, upon
C perusing the entire records, that no fresh material was
•
produced. There is also nothing to show as to why
reconsideration bec~me necessary. On what premise such a
procedure was adopted is not known. Application of mind is
also absent to show the necessity for reconsideration or review
of the earlier order on the basis of the materials placed before
D the sanctioning authority or otherwise.
24. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in
this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
E as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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