STATE OF PUNJABversusDIL BAHADUR

766                      [2023]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    3 S.C.R. 766               [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A                            STATE OF PUNJAB
                                       v.
                               DIL BAHADUR
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 844 of 2023)
B                              MARCH 28, 2023
               [M. R. SHAH AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
             Sentence/Sentencing – Principle of – High Court though
      confirmed the conviction of the respondent-accused for offences u/
      ss.279 and 304A, IPC, however, reduced the sentence from two years
C
      to eight months – Justification of – Held: While reducing the
      sentence, the High Court has not at all considered the gravity of
      the offence and the manner in which the accused committed the
      offence – Because of the rash and negligent driving on the part of
      the accused one innocent person died and two persons sustained
D     injuries – High Court did not consider the fact that IPC is punitive
      and deterrent in nature – Principal aim and object are to punish
      offenders for offences committed under IPC and the principle of
      proportionality between the crime and punishment has to be borne
      in mind – Further, the principle of just punishment is the bedrock of
      sentencing in respect of a criminal offence – Though, the principle
E
      of sentencing recognises the corrective measures but there are
      occasions when deterrence is an imperative necessity depending
      upon the facts of the case – Impugned judgment showing undue
      sympathy to the accused is unsustainable, set aside – Sentence
      imposed by Trial Court confirmed by the Session Court, restored –
F     Penal Code, 1860 – ss.279, 304A.
            State of Madhya Pradesh v. Surendra Singh (2015) 1
            SCC 222 : [2014] 13 SCR 554; State of Punjab v.
            Saurabh Bakshi (2015) 5 SCC 182 : [2015] 3 SCR
            590; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra Rabidas
G           (2019) 10 SCC 75 : [2019] 15 SCR 771 – relied on.
                             Case Law Reference
      [2014] 13 SCR 554            relied on            Para 3.3
      [2015] 3 SCR 590             relied on            Para 3.3
H     [2019] 15 SCR 771            relied on            Para 5.1
                                       766
              STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                 767


      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.                   A
844 of 2023.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2017 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRR No. 4113 of 2016.
      Ms. Kanika Ahuja, Karan Sharma, Rishabh Sharma, Advs. for
the Appellant.                                                               B

      Aftab Ali Khan, M. Z. Chaudhary, Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      M. R. SHAH, J.
                                                                             C
       1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in Criminal Revision Application being CRR No. 4113/2016, by which,
though the High Court has upheld the conviction of respondent herein
for the offence under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, however,
has reduced the sentence from two years to eight months, subject to a        D
prior deposit of Rs. 25,000/- towards compensation to be paid to family/
legal heir of the deceased, the State of Punjab has preferred the present
appeal.
       2. That respondent herein – original accused was driving a Scorpio
Car rashly and negligently, due to which one person died while over          E
taking the ambulance from the left side. Because of the rash and negligent
driving on the part of the respondent – accused two persons sitting in the
ambulance also suffered injuries. Due to the collision, in fact, the
ambulance turned turtle, which shows the manner in which the accused
was driving the Scorpio with high speed. The respondent herein came to
                                                                             F
be tried for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. The
learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the offences under Sections
279 and 304A of the IPC and the sentence of the accused came to be
confirmed by the learned Sessions Court. The accused preferred the
present revision application before the High Court. By the impugned
judgment and order, though the High Court has confirmed the conviction       G
of the accused for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC, however,
has reduced the sentence to eight months SI subject to a prior deposit of
Rs. 25,000/-. At this stage, it is required to be noted that at the time
when the High Court decided the revision application, the accused had
undergone an actual sentence period of seven months and fifteen days
                                                                             H
768             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     and therefore, the High Court seems to have reduced the sentence to
      eight months only.
             2.1 Against the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
      Court by which the High Court has reduced the sentence to eight months
      for the offence under Section 304A of IPC, the State of Punjab has
B     preferred the present appeal.
             3. Ms. Kanika Ahuja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
      State has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of
      the case, the High Court has seriously erred in interfering with the sentence
      imposed by the learned Trial Court confirmed by the First Appellate
C     Court.
              3.1 It is submitted that while reducing the sentence the High Court
      has shown undue sympathy to the accused. It is submitted that while
      reducing the sentence the High Court has not properly appreciated and/
      or considered the manner in which the accused committed the offence.
D     It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated the fact
      that because of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused
      one innocent person lost his life and two persons suffered injuries who
      were travelling in the ambulance.
              3.2 It is submitted that the accused was driving the Scorpio (car)
E     with such a high speed and that too when he was on the cross road,
      rashly and negligently and due to the collision, the ambulance turned
      turtle. It is submitted that therefore, the High Court ought not to have
      shown un-due sympathy in favour of such an accused person, because
      of whose act of rash and negligent driving one innocent person lost his
      life and two persons sustained injuries.
F
             3.3 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisions
      of this Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Surendra
      Singh (2015) 1 SCC 222 and in the case of State of Punjab Vs.
      Saurabh Bakshi (2015) 5 SCC 182, it is prayed to allow the present
      appeal and restore the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court and
G     confirmed by the learned Sessions Court.
             4. While opposing the present appeal Shri Aftab Ali Khan, learned
      counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent – accused, appointed by
      the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee, has submitted that when
      considering the mitigating circumstances the High Court has reduced
H     the sentence to eight months on a prior deposit of Rs. 25,000/- towards
               STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                      769
                        [M. R. SHAH, J.]

compensation to be paid to the family/legal heir of the deceased, the              A
same may not be interfered with by this Court.
       4.1 It is submitted that the respondent – accused is a poor person
and was only a driver and therefore, if he is sent to undergo two years
RI, he and his family members will suffer. It is submitted that when the
aforesaid facts have been considered by the High Court and the High                B
Court has reduced the sentence, the same may not be interfered with by
this Court.
       5. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the respondent
– accused has been convicted for the offences under Sections 279 and               C
304A of IPC. His conviction for the aforesaid offences have been
confirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order.
However, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has
interfered with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court affirmed
by the learned Sessions Court and has reduced the sentence from two
years to eight months. However, while reducing the sentence, the High              D
Court has not at all considered the gravity of the offence and the manner
in which the accused committed the offence and driving the Scorpio in
rash and negligent manner due to which one innocent person lost his life
and two persons who were travelling in the ambulance sustained the
injuries. The High Court has also not properly appreciated and considered          E
the fact that due to collision the ambulance turned turtle. This shows the
impact on the ambulance and the rash and negligent driving on the part
of the accused. Cogent reasons were given by the learned Trial Court
while sentencing the accused to undergo two years RI for the offence
under Section 304A of IPC. From the impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court, it appears that the case on behalf of the                F
accused that he is coming from a poor family, is considered as mitigating
circumstance. However, the High Court has not properly considered
that because of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused
one innocent person died and two persons who were travelling in the
ambulance sustained injuries.                                                      G
      5.1 The High Court has not at all considered the fact that the IPC
is punitive and deterrent in nature. The principal aim and object are to
punish offenders for offences committed under IPC. Sections 279 and
304A can be invoked only if act of the accused is negligent and rash. As
observed by this Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs.                H
770             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     Ramchandra Rabidas (2019) 10 SCC 75, this Court time and again
      emphasised on the need to strictly punish offenders responsible for
      causing motor vehicle accidents. With rapidly increasing motorisation,
      India is facing an increasing burden of road traffic injuries and fatalities.
      The financial loss, emotional and social trauma caused to a family on
      losing a bread winner, or any other member of the family, or incapacitation
B
      of the victim cannot be quantified. As observed and held, the principle of
      proportionality between the crime and punishment has to be borne in
      mind. As observed that the principle of just punishment is the bedrock of
      sentencing in respect of a criminal offence.
            5.2 At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh
C     Bakshi (supra), in which this Court was considering the offence under
      Section 304A of IPC is required to be referred to. On the principle of
      sentencing, this Court has observed and held as under: -
            “The eminent thinker and author, Sophocles, said centuries back :
            “Laws can never be enforced unless fear supports them.” The
D           statement has its pertinence, in a way, with the enormous vigour,
            in today’s society. It is the duty of every right-thinking citizen to
            show veneration to law so that an orderly, civilised and peaceful
            society emerges. It has to be borne in mind that law is averse to
            any kind of chaos. It is totally intolerant of anarchy. If anyone
E           defies law, he has to face the wrath of law, depending on the
            concept of proportionality that the law recognises. It can never
            be forgotten that the purpose of criminal law legislated by the
            competent legislatures, subject to judicial scrutiny within
            constitutionally established parameters, is to protect the collective
            interest and save every individual that forms a constituent of the
F           collective from unwarranted hazards. It is sometimes said in an
            egocentric and uncivilised manner that law cannot bind the
            individual actions which are perceived as flaws by the large body
            of people, but, the truth is and has to be that when the law
            withstands the test of the constitutional scrutiny in a democracy,
G           the individual notions are to be ignored. At times certain crimes
            assume more accent and gravity depending on the nature and
            impact of the crime on the society. No court should ignore the
            same being swayed by passion of mercy. It is the obligation of the
            court to constantly remind itself that the right of the victim, and be
            it said, on certain occasions the person aggrieved as well as the
H
              STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                   771
                       [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      society at large can be victims, never be marginalised. In this          A
      context one may recapitulate the saying of Justice Benjamin N.
      Cardozo “Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
      too.” And, therefore, the requisite norm has to be the established
      principles laid down in precedents. It is neither to be guided by a
      sense of sentimentality nor to be governed by prejudices.”
                                                                               B
      5.2.1 It is further observed that the principle of sentencing
recognises the corrective measures but there are occasions when the
deterrence is an imperative necessity depending upon the facts of the
case.
        5.2.2 In the aforesaid decision, the High Court reduced the            C
sentence and shown the mercy while applying the principle that payment
of compensation is a factor for reduction. To that, this Court has observed
that it is absolutely in the realm of misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way
mockery of justice. It is observed and held as under:-
      “Needless to say, the principle of sentencing recognises the             D
      corrective measures but there are occasions when the deterrence
      is an imperative necessity depending upon the facts of the case.
      In our opinion, it is a fit case where we are constrained to say that
      the High Court has been swayed away by the passion of mercy in
      applying the principle that payment of compensation is a factor
      for reduction of sentence to 24 days. It is absolutely in the realm      E
      of misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way mockery of justice. Because
      justice is “the crowning glory”, “the sovereign mistress” and
      “queen of virtue” as Cicero had said. Such a crime blights not
      only the lives of the victims but of many others around them. It
      ultimately shatters the faith of the public in judicial system.”         F
      5.2.3 Showing the concern about increasing the road accidents, it
      is observed in the said decision as under: -
      “India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a
      nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the
      “Emperors of all they survey.” Drunkenness contributes to                G
      careless driving where the other people become their prey. The
      poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of
      uncertainty and the civilised persons drive in constant fear but still
      apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who
      project themselves as “larger than life.” In such obtaining
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772            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A           circumstances, the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit
            the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense
            anguish.”
             5.3 At this stage, another decision of this Court in the case of
      Surendra Singh (supra) which is also on the offences under Sections
B     279 and 304A of IPC, is required to be referred to. In the case before
      this Court, the learned Trial Court while convicting the accused for the
      offence under Section 304A sentenced the accused to undergo two years
      RI. The High Court while maintaining the conviction, reduced the
      sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court from two years RI to the
      period already undergone and granted a further compensation of Rs.
C     2000/- payable to the widow/mother of the deceased. While disapproving
      the view taken by the High Court and setting aside the order passed by
      the High Court reducing the sentence, this Court has observed in
      paragraphs 6 to 14 as under: -
            “6. In the instant case, after proper appreciation of evidence the
D           trial court came to the conclusion that the accused had endangered
            the life of Vijay by driving the jeep on a public road in a rash and
            negligent manner. The accused dashed the jeep against a pulia
            first and then against a babul tree. As a result of such accident
            Vijay Singh, who was travelling in the jeep got injured and died,
E           and another person Mangilal, who was also in the jeep, received
            injuries. We are of the opinion that the trial court has not committed
            any illegality in passing the order of conviction and in the appeal
            preferred by the accused findings of the trial court were affirmed.
            However, without proper appreciation of the evidence and
            consideration of gravity of the offence, the learned Single Judge
F           of the High Court has shown undue sympathy by modifying the
            conviction to the period already undergone.
            7. In our considered opinion, the High Court while passing the
            impugned order [Surendra Singh v. State of M.P., Criminal
            Revision No. 3 of 2008, decided on 22-8-2012 (MP)] has
G           completely failed to follow the principles enunciated by this Court
            in a catena of decisions. Undue sympathy by means of imposing
            inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
            undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and the
            society cannot endure long under serious threats. If the courts do
H
        STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                   773
                 [M. R. SHAH, J.]

not protect the injured, the injured would then resort to personal       A
vengeance. Therefore, the duty of any court is to award proper
sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner
in which it was committed. (See Sevaka Perumal v. State of
T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724 : AIR 1991 SC
1463] )
                                                                         B
8. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. [(1994) 2 SCC 220
: 1994 SCC (Cri) 358] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 239,
paras 14-15)
“14. In recent years, the rising crime rate—particularly violent
crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the              C
courts a subject of concern. Today there are admitted disparities.
Some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive
grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime and
a shockingly large number even go unpunished thereby encouraging
the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by weakening
the system’s credibility. Of course, it is not possible to lay down      D
any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the
object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go
unpunished and the victim of crime as also the society has the
satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In imposing sentences,
in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety     E
of factors and after considering all those factors and taking an
overall view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider
to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored
and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into
consideration.
                                                                         F
15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case
must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the
criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim.
Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the
courts respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminals.
Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting           G
to the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the
crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the
criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society
at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.”
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774      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     9. While considering this aspect, the Supreme Court
      in Mahesh v. State of M.P. [(1987) 3 SCC 80 : 1987 SCC (Cri)
      379 : (1987) 2 SCR 710] remarked that: (SCC p. 82, para 6)
      “6. … it will be a mockery of justice to permit these appellants to
      escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence
B     and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the appellants
      would be to render the justicing system of this country suspect.
      The common man will lose faith in courts. In such cases, he
      understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more
      than the reformative jargon. When we say this, we do not ignore
      the need for a reformative approach in the sentencing process.”
C
      10. In Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar [(2013) 9 SCC 516 : (2014)
      1 SCC (Cri) 159] this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 521, para
      10)
      “10. … it is the duty of the courts to consider all the relevant
D     factors to impose an appropriate sentence. The legislature has
      bestowed upon the judiciary this enormous discretion in the
      sentencing policy, which must be exercised with utmost care and
      caution. The punishment awarded should be directly proportionate
      to the nature and the magnitude of the offence. The benchmark
      of proportionate sentencing can assist the Judges in arriving at a
E     fair and impartial verdict.”
      This Court further observed that: (Hazara Singh case [(2013) 9
      SCC 516 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 159] , SCC p. 521, para 11)
      “11. The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence
F     imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he has committed
      and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. This
      Court has repeatedly stressed the central role of proportionality in
      sentencing of offenders in numerous cases.”
      11. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat [(2006) 2 SCC
      359 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 499] the Apex Court opined that: (SCC
G
      pp. 361-62, paras 7-8)
      “7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims
      and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is
      an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through
      instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-
H
        STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                  775
                 [M. R. SHAH, J.]

cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new          A
challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing
system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would
undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society
and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law
which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence.
                                                                        B
Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of ‘order’ should
meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law
in Changing Society stated that: ‘State of criminal law continues
to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection of social consciousness
of society.’ Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law
should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on            C
factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern
where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants
to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature
of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed,
the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
                                                                        D
the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances
are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure
under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court   E
to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed,
etc.”
12. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ahmed Hussein Vali
Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 7 SCC 254 :                 F
(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368] observed as follows: (SCC p. 281,
paras 99-100)
“99. … The object of awarding appropriate sentence should
be to protect the society and to deter the criminal from
achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law by imposing          G
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would
operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence
which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing
process has to be stern where it should be. Any liberal attitude
by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view             H
776      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2023] 3 S.C.R.


A     merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences
      will be resultwise counterproductive in the long run and
      against the interest of society which needs to be cared for
      and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the
      sentencing system.
B     100. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment
      befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence
      of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights
      of the victim of the crime but the society at large while
      considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. The
      court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is
C     not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only
      against the individual victim but also against the society to
      which both the criminal and the victim belong.”
      13. We again reiterate in this case that undue sympathy to impose
      inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
D     undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the
      duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to
      the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed
      or committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all
      relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of
E     sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with
      the gravity of the offence. The court must not only keep in view
      the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large
      while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment.
      Meagre sentence imposed solely on account of lapse of time without
      considering the degree of the offence will be counterproductive
F     in the long run and against the interest of the society.
      14. In a recent decision in State of M.P. v. Bablu [(2014) 9 SCC
      281 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 1] , after considering and following the
      earlier decisions, this Court reiterated the settled proposition of
      law that one of the prime objectives of criminal law is the imposition
G     of adequate, just, proportionate punishment which is commensurate
      with the gravity, nature of crime and the manner in which the
      offence is committed. One should keep in mind the social interest
      and conscience of the society while considering the determinative
      factor of sentence with gravity of crime. The punishment should
H     not be so lenient that it shocks the conscience of the society. It is,
                STATE OF PUNJAB v. DIL BAHADUR                                  777
                         [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       therefore, the solemn duty of the court to strike a proper balance       A
       while awarding the sentence as awarding lesser sentence
       encourages any criminal and, as a result of the same, the society
       suffers.
      5.4 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of
Surendra Singh (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, the impugned           B
judgment and order passed by the High Court interfering with the sentence
imposed by the learned Trial Court confirmed by the First Appellate
Court by showing undue sympathy to the accused is unsustainable and
the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
       6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the            C
present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court reducing the sentence while maintaining the conviction
for the offence under Section 304A of IPC from two years RI to eight
months SI is hereby quashed and set aside. The sentence imposed by
the learned Trial Court confirmed by the First Appellate Court (learned
Sessions Court) is hereby restored. Now the accused be taken into custody       D
to undergo the remaining sentence. The accused is granted four weeks’
time to surrender. Present appeal is accordingly, allowed.

Divya Pandey                                                  Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Abhishek Agnihotri and Shevali Monga, LCRAs)                     E




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