Holding

The High Court erred in granting probation without applying sentencing principles; the appeal is allowed and the sentence is set at six months imprisonment with a fine.

Summary

The respondents were convicted under Section 61(1) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 for illegally transporting 2,000 litres of rectified spirit and were sentenced by the trial court to one year imprisonment. The High Court, noting that the offence occurred 19 years earlier, reduced the sentence by granting probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 without considering the statutory sentencing principles or the respondents' social background. The State of Punjab appealed, contending that the High Court failed to apply the principles of deterrence, proportionality and the procedural safeguards prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that sentencing must be guided by established principles and that the High Court erred in its discretionary exercise. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the sentence was modified to six months imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000, with a default month of imprisonment for non‑payment. The judgment underscores the need for judicial discretion to be exercised judiciously, especially in offences affecting public health.

Issues considered

The High Court's exercise of discretion in granting probation and reducing the sentence under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
Whether courts must apply sentencing principles such as deterrence, proportionality, and statutory guidelines under the CrPC when imposing sentences.
Whether the nature of the offence affecting public health warrants a stricter sentencing approach.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 235, s. 248(2), s. 325, s. 360, s. 361
Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 47
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
Punjab Excise Act, 1914s. 61(1)

Subjects

sentencingprobationjudicial discretiondeterrenceproportionalitypublic health offencesPunjab Excise ActProbation of Offenders ActCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 574

,,,
A STATE OF PUNJAB -i
v.
PREM SAGAR & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 872 of 2008)
MAY 13, 208
B
[S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
_.,
~
Criminal Law:
Sentencing - HELD: Courts while imposing sentence
c must take into consideration the principles applicable thereto
- In the instant casA, High Court did not rest its decisions on
any legal principle - No sufficient and cogent reason was ar-
rived while giving the accused benefit of Probation of Offend-
ers Act- Sentence of one year imprisonment awarded by trial
D court for commission of offence u/s 61(1) of Punjab Excise
Act modified to six months imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50001 ~
- - Punjab Excise Act, 1914 - s.61(1) - Probation of Offend-
ers Act, 1958- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 235,
248(2), 325, 360 and 361 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Ar-
E tic/es 47 and 136. -.
The respondents were convicted by the trial court
for commission of an offence uls 61(1) of the Punjab Ex-
cise Act, 1914 as they were caught unlawfully carrying
2000 litres of rectified spirit. The trial court sentenced them
F to one year's imprisonment. The High Court, considering .\
"
the fact that the offence had been committed 19 years
back, gave the accused benefit of Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958. Aggrieved, the State filed the instant appeal.

G Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Courts while imposing sentence must take
into consideration the principles applicable thereto. It -t -
requires application of mind. The purpose of imposition
of sentence must also be kept in mind. [para 25) [589-F,G]
H 574
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 575
& ORS.

1.2 Whether the court while awarding a sentence A
would take recourse to the principle of deterrence or re-
form or invoke the doctrine of proportionality, would no
doubt depend upon the facts and circumstance of each
case. While doing so, however, the nature of the offence
said to have been committed by the accused plays an im- B
portant role. The offences which affect public health must
be dealt with severely. For the said purpose, the courts
must notice the object for enacting Article 47 of the Con-
stitution of India. [para 6-7] [578-C,D]
1.3 Even while introducing the doctrine of plea bar- C
gaining in the Code of Criminal Procedure, certain types
of offences were kept out of the purview thereof. While
imposing sentences, the said principles should be borne
in mind. [para 7] [578-E]
D
1.4 The Parliament, in providing for a hearing on sen-
tence, as would appear from Sub-section (2) of Section
235, Sub-section (2) of Section 248, Section 325 as also
Sections 360 and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 has laid down certain principles. The said provisions
lay down the principle that the court in awarding the sen- E
tence must take into consideration a large number of rel-
evant factors, sociological backdrop of the accused be-
ing one of them. [para 8] [578-F,G,H]
1.5 Although a wide discretion has been conferred F
upon the court, the same must be exercised judiciously.
It would depend upon the circumstances in which the
crime has been committed and the mental state of the .
Age of the accused is also relevant. [para 8] [579-A]
Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of W B. (1994) G
2 SCC 220; Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and Another v. State
• t
of A.P [(1996) 6 SCC 241 - Shailesh Jasvantbhai and An-
other v. State of Gujarat and Others (2006) 2 SCC 359; Sevaka
Perumal v State of TN. (19°91) 3 SCC 471; State of M.P v
Bala @ Balaram, (2005) 8 SCC 1; State of M.P v. Govind, H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 577
. & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
/ ·~
Mishra for the Appellant. A
Dinesh Verma and Dr. Kai lash Chand for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J : 1. Leave granted.

• ,.
B
2. In our judicial system, we have not been able to develop
legal principles as regards sentencing.
The superior courts except making observations with re-
gard to the purport and object for which punishment is imposed
upon an offender, had not issued any guidelines. Other devel- c
oped countries have done so. At some quarters, serious con-
cerns have been expressed in this behalf. Some Committees
as for example Madhava Menon Committee and Malimath Com-
mittee have advocated introduction of sentencing guidelines .
.... ....
3. Before, however, we delve into the said question, we
D
may notice the fact of the matter.
Respondents herein were convicted for commission of an
offence under Section 61 (1) of the Punjab Excise Act for carry-
ing 2000 litres of rectified spirit. They were sentenced to un- E
dergo an imprisonment for a period of one year.
4. The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned
judgment purported to be upon taking into consideration the
., >-. fact that the offence was committed in the year 1987 and the
~
I
appeal was dismissed in the year 1992, thought it fit to give an F
opportunity to the respondents to reform themselves, observ-
ing:
" ... The accused have suffered lot of agony of protracted
trial. They having joined the main stream must have G
.-t- expressed repentance over the misdeed done by them
about 19 years back. In the aforesaid circumstances and
in the absence of any of their bad antecedents, it will not
be appropriate to deny them to the benefit of probation
under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and to send
H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

~ .,
A them to jail at this stage."
5. On the said premise, the respondents were directed to
be released on probation on their executing a bond of Rs.
20,0001- with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfac-
tion of the.Trial Judge.
B ..
No report of the Probation Officer was called for. The so-
cial background of the respondent had not been taken into con- ~ ·•
..
sideration. What was. their occupation was not noticed.
6. Whether the court.while awarding a sentence would take
c recourse to the principle of deterrence or reform or invoke the
doctrine of proportionality, would no doubt depend upon the facts
and circumstance of each case.
While doing so, however, the nature of the offence said to
have been committed by the accused plays an important role.
D ~·
The offences which affect public health must be dealt with se- 4

verely. For the said purpose, the courts must notice the object
for enacting Article 47 of the Constitution of India.
7. There are certain offences which touch our social fab-
E ric. We must remind ourselves that even while introduCing the
doctrine of plea bargaining in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
certain types of offences had been kept out of the purview thereof.

F
While imposing sentences, the said principles should be borne
in mind.
8. A sentence is a judgment on conviction of a crime. It is
resorted to after a person is convicted of the offence. It is the
ultimate goal of any justice delivery system. The Parliament,
~
., ""

however, in providing for a hearing on sentence, as would ap-
pear from Sub-section (2) of Section 235, Sub-section (2) of
G Section 248, Section 325 as also Sections 360 and 361 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, has laid down certain principles. -+ ..
The said provisions lay down the principle that the court in award-
. ing the sentence must take into consideration a large number
of relevant factors; sociological backdrop of the accused being
H one of them.
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 579
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

Although a wide discretion has been conferred upon the A
court, the same must be exercised judiciously. It would depend
upon the circumstances in which the crime has been commit-
ted and his mental state. Age of the accused is also relevant.
What would be the effect of the sentencing on the society
is a question which has been left unanswered by the legisla- 8
, ~ ture. The Superior Courts have come across a large number of
cases which go to show anomalies as regards the policy of
sentencing. Whereas the quantum of punishment for commis-
sion of a similar type of offence varies from minimum to maxi-
mum, even where same sentence is imposed, the principles C
applied are found to be different. Similar discrepancies have
been noticed in regard to imposition of fine.
9. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of WB.
[(1994) 2 SCC 220], this Court held:
D
"15 ... Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner
in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice
against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should
impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts
reflect public abhorrence of the crime ... " E
Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao and Another v. State of A.P
((1996) 6 SCC 241], following Dhananjoy Chatterjee (supra),
states the principles of deterrence and retribution but the same
... cannot be categorized as right or wrong. So much depends
upon the belief of the judges. F
10. In a recent decision in Shailesh Jasvantbhai and An-
other v. State of Gujarat and Others [(2006) 2 SCC 359], this
Court opined:
7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting G
claims and demands. Security of persons and property of
the people is an essential function of the State. It could be
achieved through instrumentality of criminal law.
Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living
law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.
'

A are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the
challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine
social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and
stamping out criminal proClivity must be the object of law
which must be achieved by imposing appropriate
B sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice
of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the
society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated
that: "State of criminal law continues to be-as it should
be-a decisive reflection of social consciousness of
c society." Therefore, in operating the sentencing system,
law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence
based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing
process be stern where it should be, and tempered with
mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the
D
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive
for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into
the area of consideration.
E
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Sevaka Perumal
v. State ofT.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471], this Court furthermore held
that it was the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
F which it was executed or committed etc.
11. It is interesting to note that this Court in some cases
severely criticized the pattern adopted in the matter of passing
of sentence on the accused. [See State of M.P v. Bala @
Balaram, (2005) 8 SCC 1 and State of M.P v. Govind, (2005)
G a sec 121.
12. Recently, in State of Karnataka v. Raju [2007 (11) ,.. •
SCALE 114], where the facts of the case were that the Trial
Court imposed custodial sentence of seven years after convict-
H :Jng the respondent for rape of minor under Section 376 of the

. ,.\-. <L >.
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 581
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
:. ;.
Indian Penal Code; on appeal, the High Court reduced the sen- A
tence of the respondent to three and half years.
This Court held that a normal sentence in a case where
rape is committed on a child below 12 years of age, is not less
than 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, though in exceptional
cases "for special and adequate reasons" sentence of less than B
~ 10 years' rigorous imprisonment can also be awarded. It was,
' thus, opined that socio-economic status, religion, race, caste
or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant consider-
ations in sentencing policy. To what extent should the judges
have discretion to reduce the sentence so prescribed under c
the statute has remained a vexed question.

However, in India, the view always has been that the pun-
ishment must be proportionate to the crime. Applicability of the
said principle in all situations, however, is open to question. Ju-
~ D
dicial discretion must be exercised objectively having regard to
the facts and circumstances of each case.
13. We may also notice that in Dalbir Singh v. State of
Haryana [(2QOO) 5 SCC 82], this Court opined:
E
"13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents
in India and the devastating consequences visiting the
victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the
nature of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting
. ~ the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While
considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for F
the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving
of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should
be deterrence.A professional driver pedals the accelerator
of the automobile almost throughout his working hours.
He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to G
• t have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his
leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot
and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving
need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any
accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death H
A
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

of any human being; or even if such death ensues he
might not be.convicted of the offence; and lastly that even
~ .
if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the
court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche
that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of
B a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he
cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which
the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, 1 ~.

for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous
driving of automobiles."
c In Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1979) 4 SCC 719],
this Court held:
"5. Nevertheless, sentencing must have a policy of
correction. This driver, if he has -to become a good driver,
D
must have a better training in traffic laws and moral
responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury
,., .
to human life and limb. Punishment in this area must,
therefore, be accompanied by these components. The
State, we hope, will attach a course for better driving
together with a livelier sense of responsibility, when the
E punishment is for driving offences. Maybe, the State may
consider, in cases of men with poor families, occasional
parole and reformatory courses on appropriate application,
without the rigour of the old rules which are subject to
Government discretion." -4 ...
F
14. The Ministry of Law, Government of.India, Committee
on Reforms of the Criminal Justice Sy&tem, 2003 was estab-
lished by the Government of India to recommend changes to
the criminal justice system in India.
G It had observed that the judges were granted wide discre-
tion in awarding the sentence within the statutory limits. It was --t· •
also of the opinion that as there was no guidance in selecting
the most appropriate sentence in the fact situation thereof, there
was no uniformity in awarding sentence as the discretion was
H exercised according to the judgment of every judge. Thus, the
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 583
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
~
~
committee emphasized the need for having sentencing guide- A
lines to minimize uncertainty in awarding sentences. It recom-
mended the appointment of a statutory committee to lay down
the sentencing guidelines.
15. Don M-. Gottfredson in his essay on "Sentencing
Guidelines" in "Sentencing: Hyman Gross and Andrew von B
Hirsch" opines:
~ ~

"It is a common claim in the literature of criminal justice-
and indeed in the popular press- that there is considerable
"disparity" in sentencing .. The word "disparity" has become c
a prerogative and the concept of "sentencing disparity"
now carries with it the connotation of biased or insidious
practices on the part of the judges. This is unfortunate in
that much otherwise valid criticism has failed to separate
justified variation from the unjustified variation referred to
D
~ as disparity. The phrase "unwarranted disparity" may be
preferred; not aU sentencing variation should be considered
unwarranted or disparate. Much of it properly reflects
varying degrees of seriousness in the offense and/or
varying characteristics of the offender. Dispositional
variation that is based upon permissible, rationally relevant E
and understandably distinctive characteristics of the
offender and of the offense may be wholly justified,
beneficial and proper, so long as the variable qualities
are carefully monitored or consistency and desirability over
,; + time. Moreover, since no two offenses or offenders are F
identical, the labeling of variation as disparity necessarily
involves a value judgment- that is, disparity to one person
may be simply justified variation to another. It is only when
such variation takes the form of differing sentences for
similar offenders committing similar offenses that it can G
be considered disparate."
• t-
[Emphasis supplied]
The learned author further opines:
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A "In many jurisdictions, judicial discretion is nearly unlimited ~ ...
as to whether or not to incarcerate an individual; and bound
only by statutory maxima, leaving a broad range of
discretion, as to the length of sentence."
16. Kevin R. Reitz in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,
B Second edition "Sentencing guidelines" states:

"All guideline jurisdictions have found it necessary to create ~ ~
rules that identify the factual issues at sentencing that must
be resolved under the guidelines, those that are potentially
c relevant to a sentencing decision, and those viewed as
forbidden considerations that may not be taken into
account by sentencing courts. One heated controversy,
addressed differently across jurisdictions, is whether the
guideline sentence should be based exclusively on crimes
for which offenders have been convicted ("conviction
D
offenses"), or whether a guideline sentence should also )>
reflect additional alleged criminal conduct for which fOimal
convictions have not been obtained ("nonconviction
offenses").
E Another difficult issue of fact-finding at sentence for
guideline designers has been the degree to which trial
judges should be permitted to consider the personal
characteristics of offenders as mitigating factors when
imposing sentence. For example: Is the defendant a single
F parent with young children at home? Is the defendant a
drug addict but a good candidate for drug treatment? Has
~
.
the defendant struggled to overcome conditions of
economic, social or educational deprivation prior to the
offense? Was the defendant's criminal behavior explicable
G
in part by youth, inexperience, or an unformed ability to
resist peer pressure? Most guideline states, once again
including all jurisdictions with voluntary guidelines, allow
trial courts latitude to sentence outside of the guideline
~ .
ranges based on the judge's assessment of such offender
characteristics. Some states, fearing that race or class
H

/
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 585
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

disparities might be exacerbated by unguided A
consideration of such factors, have placed limits on the
list of eligible concerns. (However, such factors may
indirectly affect the sentence, since judges are permitted
to base departures on the offenders particular
"amenability" to probation (Frase, 1997).)" B
17. Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg have divided
the process of determining sentence into stages of determin-
ing proportionality while determining a sentence, namely:
1. What interest are violated or threatened by the c
standard case of the crime- physical integrity, material
support and amenity, freedom from humiliation,
privacy and autonomy.
2. Effect of violating those interests on the living
standards of a typical victim- minimum well-being, D
adequate well-being, significant enhancement
3. Culpability of the offender
4. Remoteness of the actual harm as seen by a
reasonable man. E
[See Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice,
2005, 4th edition]
18. Guidelines in United Kingdom originated from two
+ separate sources in the 1980s. The first was the Magistrates' F
Association, which took the first steps in producing road traffic
offence guidelines for the lower courts. This process has wid-
ened and deepened, so that the latest set of sophisticated guide-
lines, effective from 2004, covers all the main offences likely to
be encountered in those courts. The second source of guide- G
lines was the Court of Appeal which, of its own initiative, devel-
oped guideline judgments as a means of providing assistance
to Crown Court sentencers in the disposal of particular types of
offence, mainly the most serious forms of crime which attract
long prison sentences. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 ere- H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A ated the Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP), a body with a di-
verse membership, to assist and advise the Court of Appeal in
the promulgation of sentencing guidelines. The Panel and the
Court of Appeal worked together effectively in this way from 1999
to 2003, at which point the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC)
B was established. One of the most significant innovations intro-
duced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was the setting up of
the Sentencing Guidelines Council. The Council, composed ~ ;.
mainly but not exclusively of sentencers, took over the task of
issuing sentencing guidelines, with the Panel pert:orming much
c the same function as before, but now advising the Council ratl)er
than the Court of Appeal. The personnel on the SGC/SAP all
work on guidelines in a part-time capacity, but supported by a
joint full-time secretariat.
19. The idea of a "commission on sentencing" can be
D traced to Marvin's Frankel's influential writings of the early 1970's )--·
, most notably his 1973 book Criminal Sentences: Law With-
out Qrder.·
He also advocated:
E "Greater uniformity in punishments imposed upon similarly
. situated offenders , with a concomitant reduction in
inexplicable disparities, including racial disparities in
punishment and widely varying sentences based simply

F
on the predilections of individual judges"
[See Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Second edition
"Sentencing guidelines" Kevin R. Reitz]
-
20. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to promulgate binding sentencing
guidelines in response to a regime of indeterminate sentenc-
ing characterized by broad judicial discretion over sentencing
and the possibility of parole. The Act sought to create a trans-
parent, certain, and proportionate sentencing system, free of
"unwarranted disparity" and able to "control crime through de-
terrence, incapacitation, and the rehabilitation of offenders" by
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 587
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

sharing power over sentencing policy and individual sentenc- A
ing outcomes among Congress, the federal courts, the Justice
Department, and probation officers.
21. The heart of the Guidelines is a one-page table: the
vertical axis is a forty-three-point scale of offense levels, the
horizontal axis lists six categories of criminal history, and the B
> .,_ body provides the ranges of months of imprisonment for each
combination of offense and criminal history. A sentencing judge
is meant to use the guidelines, policy statements, and commen-
taries contained in the Guidelines Manual to identify the relevant
offense and history levels, and then refer to the table to identify C
the proper sentencing range. Though in all cases a sentence
must be at or below the maximum sentence authorized by stat-
ute for the offense, in certain circumstances the Guidelines al-
low for both upward and downward departures from the sen-
tence that would otherwise be recommended. D
22. In 'THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: A STRUCTURAL ANAL>r'SIS' [Ill 105 Colum.L.
Rev. 1315], Frank 0. Bowman criticised thee Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines in the following terms:
E
"(1) The severity and frequency of punishment imposed
by the federal criminal process during the guidelines era
is markedly greater than it had been before.
(2) For most crimes it is difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to isolate the effect of federal prosecutorial and sentencing F
policies from effects of state policies and practices, not to
speak of the broader economic, demographic, and social
trends that influence crime rates.
(3) The federal process of making sentencing rules and G
imposing sentences on individual defendants has gone
astray."
23. In United States v. Booker[125 S. Ct. at 757] Booker
found the federal guidelines unconstitutional as previously ap-
plied, but upheld them as a system of"effectively advisory" sen- H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A tencing rules.
24. In the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
Gall v. United States [552 U.S. 2007], the court had to deter-
mine the correctness of the decision of the Eight Circuit court
that reversed the decision, of the district court on sentencing
8 Gall to 36 months probation period on the ground that a sen-
tence outside the Federal sentencing Guidelines range must ~ ,..
be and was not in this case, supported by extraordinary circum-
stances.
c Reversing the decision of the court, it was opined:
" While the extent of the difference between a particular
sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is
relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences-
whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
D Guidelines range-under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.
(a) Because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate
review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining
whether they are "reasonable," United States v. Booker,
E 543 U. S. 220 , and an abuse-of-discretion standard
applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. A
district judge must consider the extent of any departure
from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness
of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient + _
F justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of
variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation
from the Guidelines, but it may not require "extraordinary"
·circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula
using a departure's percentage as the standard for
G determining the strength of the justification required for a
specific sentence. --1 ~
(b) A district court should begin by correctly calculating
the applicable Guidelines range. The Guidelines are the
starting point and initial benchmark but are not the only
H
STATE OF PUNJAB v. PREM SAGAR 589
& ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]
~
consideration. After permitting both parties to argue for a A
particular sentence, the judge should consider all of 18
U. S. C. §3353(a)'s factors to determine whether they
support either party's proposal. He may not presume that
the Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an
individualized assessment based on the facts presented. B
If he decides on an outside-the-Guidelines sentence, he
~ >- must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that
the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of variation."
25. Andrew von Hirsch in "The Sentencing Commission's c
functions", The Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines
(Northeastern University Press, 1987), Ch.1.] more than twenty
years ago summarised the central tasks of a sentencing com-
mission by observing that the function was:
~ D
"(1} to decide the future direction of sentencing policy,
informed by the study of past sentencing practice;
(2) to structure judicial discretion, rather than to eliminate
it, allowing judges to interpret and apply the guidelines
and to deviate from them in special circumstances; and E
(3) to select a predominant rationale for sentencing, and
to base guidelines upon it, so as to promote consistency

-
in sentencing and to reduce disparity."
~
The High Court does not rest its decision on any legal prin- F
ciple. No sufficient or cogent reason has been arrived.
We have noticed the development of law in this behalf in
other countries only to emphasise that the courts while impos-
ing sentence must take into consideration the principles appli-
cable thereto. It requires application of mind. The purpose of G
"' t- imposition of sentence must also be kept in mind.
26. Although ordinarily, we would not interfere the quan-
tum of sentence in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, but in a case of this nature we are of
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

~
A the opinion that the High Court having committed a serious er-
ror, interest of justice would be subserved if the decision of the
High Court.is set aside and the respondent is sentenced to un-
dergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and a
fine of Rs. 5,000/- is imposed, in default to undergo imprison-
s ment for a further period of one month.
27. The Appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned herein- -..c
before. "
RP. Appeal allowed.