Holding

A court may not reduce the sentence below the minimum prescribed for offences under Section 376 IPC unless the judgment records adequate and special reasons, which the High Court failed to do.

Summary

The accused, Rakesh Kumar, was convicted under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code for kidnapping and rape of a girl who was under sixteen years of age. The trial court sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment for the kidnapping and seven years for the rape; the Punjab and Haryana High Court reduced the rape sentence to the period already undergone, citing the accused's youth, alleged love between the parties and his rural background. The State appealed, arguing that the High Court had not complied with the statutory requirement to record "adequate and special reasons" before departing from the minimum sentence prescribed for rape under Section 376. The Supreme Court held that unless such reasons are expressly recorded, a court cannot award a sentence lower than the statutory minimum, and that the High Court's rationale was neither adequate nor special. Consequently, the Supreme Court fixed the sentence at three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000, partially allowing the appeal. The judgment underscores the principle of proportionality and the limited discretion available in sentencing for serious sexual offences.

Issues considered

The High Court's reduction of the sentence for an offence under Section 376 IPC without recording adequate and special reasons.
Whether "rural background" or alleged consensual love constitute adequate and special reasons to depart from the minimum sentence prescribed for rape.
The scope of judicial discretion under Sections 376(1) and 376(2) IPC regarding sentencing below the statutory minimum.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 366, s. 376

Subjects

rapeSection 376 IPCminimum sentencejudicial discretionadequate and special reasonsproportionalitysexual offencessentencing

Judgment

[2008] 12 S.C.R 929

STATE OF PUNJAB A
v.
RAKESH KUMAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 1365 of 2008)
AUGUST 29, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNOAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Sentence/Sentencing: Reduction/Imposition of sentence
less that the minimum prescribed - In rape case - Held: c
Liberal view by imposing meager sentences or taking too
sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect
of such offences is against societal interest - In both sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section 376 /PC, minimum sentences
are prescribed - However, Court has discretion to impose
D
sentence of imprisonment less than prescribed minimum for
-+ 'adequate and special reasons' - If Court does not mention
such reasons in judgment, there is no scope for awarding ·
sentence lesser. than the prescribed minimum - On facts,
High Court affirmed conviction for rape however reduced
sentence of 7 years to period undergone considering that E
accused belonged to rural areas - Reason so indicated by
High Court cannot be considered either· adequate or special
- Father of victim filed affidavit before High Court that since
victim is settled in life, liberal view may be taken so far as
...I sentence is concerned - Considering all these facts, sentence F
fixed at 3 years RI - Penal Code, 1860- s. 376 -Administration
of criminal justice - Principle of proportionality.
Words and phrases: Rape - Meaning of
., Respondent was convicted under ss.366 and 376 G
IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 3 years in respect of offence punishable under s.366
IPC and 7 years rigorous imprisonment for offence
relatable to s.376 IPC. High Court affirmed the conviction
929 H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A however ·reduced the sentence to the period undergone.
The reason· for such reduction_ given in the order of High
Court was that the appellant was aged about 19 years at
the time. of his statement recorded under Section 313
Cr.P.C. and the victim and the accused appeared to be in
B love with each other as was evltl'ent from lovt:f letters.
In appeal to this Court, appellant-State contended
thaf°the parameters relating to imposition of lesser
sentenc~ for often·ce relatable to Section 376 IPC were
··not kept ii} .view by High Court .
c
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
-·
HELD: 1. Th_e offence of rape occurs in Chapter XVI
of IPC. It is an offence affecting the human body. In that
Chapter, there is a separate heading for 'Sexual offen~e',
D which encompasses ss. 375, 376, 376-A, 376-8, 376-C,
and 376-D. 'Rape' is defined in s.375. ss. 375 and 3'76
have been substantially changed by Criminal Law +
(Amendment) Act, ·1.983, and several new sections were
·introduced by" the new Act, _i.e. 376-A, 376-8, 376-C and
E 376-0
. .. The fact that sweeping changes .
were introduced
reflects the legislative intent to ·curb With iron hand; the _
- \..

offence of rape· which affect$ the dignity of a woman. The .
re-~ offence of rape. in-its simplest term is 'the-ravishment of
a woman, without her consent, by force, fear or fraud', or
F as 'the ·carnal knowledge of a woman by force against
her will'. 'Rape' or 'Raptus' is when a man hath carnal
knowledge of a woman by force and against her will (Co.
Litt. 123-b); or as expressed more fully,' rape is the carnal
knowledge of any wom~n, above the age of particular
G years, against her will; or of a woman child, under that
age,. ·with or against her will'. [Para 6] [936-B,C &. D]
Hale PC 628; Stephen's "Criminal Law" 9th Ed. p.262;
'Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice' (Volume 4, page 1356);
Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales (Fourth Edition)
H Volume 12 - referred to.
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 931

2. Security of persons and property of the people is A
an essential function of the State. It could be achieved
through instrumentality of criminal law. Protection of
society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the
object of law which must be achieved by imposing
appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone B
of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges
confronting the society." In operating the sentencing
system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the
deterrence based on factual matrix. The facts and given
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the c
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive
for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
the nature of weapons used and,, all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into
the area of consideration. Undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice 0
+ syste'm to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy
of law and society could not long endure under such
serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to
award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the
offence and the manner in which it was executed or E
c~mmitted etc. [Paras 8, 9] [937-C to H; 938-D & E]

Mahesh V. State of M.P. (1987) 2 SCR 710; Sevaka
Perumal etc: v. State of Tamil Naidu AIR (1991) SC 1463 -
relied on. F
Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society-:- referred to.
3.1. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle
of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the
culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily G
allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving
.at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences
that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that
are raised by the special facts of each case. ·Judges in
essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R

A crime; yet in practice, sentences are determined largely by
other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional
needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a
sentence. Sometimes. the desirability of keeping him out
of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his
B crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure
from j1;1st desert as the basis of punishment and create
cases of apparent injustice that are serious and
widespread.· [Para 10) [938-F,G & J:i; 939-A]
3.2. Proportion between crime and punishment is a
C goal respected in principle, and inspite of errant notions,
it remains a strong influence in the determination of
sentences.· The practice of punishing all serious crimes
with equal severity is now unknown in civilized societies,
but such a radical departure from the princ·iple of
D proportionality has disappeared from. the law only in
recent times. Even now for a single .grave infraction draStic
sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of +
greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to
be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and
E unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations
that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of
proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate
punishment has some very undesirable practical
consequences. [Para 11) [939-8,C & DJ
F 3.3. After giving due consideration to the facts and \
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and
appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the
aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in
which a crime has been committed are to be delicately
G balahced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in
a dispassionate manner by the. Court.· Such act of
balancing is indeed a difficult task. Imposition of sentence
without considering its effect on the social order in many
cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The soc.ial impact
H of the crime, e.g. where it relates to o'ffenc.es a:gairist
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 933

-1
women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public A
money, treason and other offences involving moral
turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact
on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight
of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal
attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too B
sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in
~
respect of such offences will be result-wise counter
productive in the long run and against societal interest
which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string
of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. [Paras 12, c
13] [939-E & F; 940-8,C & D]
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of WB. (1994) 2 SCC
220; State of M.P v. Ghanshyam Singh (2003) 8 SCC 13 -
relied on.
D
Dennis Councle MCGOautha v. State of Callifornia 402·
US 183: ·28 L.D. 2d 711 - referred to.
+
4.1. In both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 376
IPC, minimum sentences are prescribed. Both in cases of
sub-sections (1) and (2), the Court has the discretion to E
impose a sentence of imprisonment less than the
prescribed minimum for 'adequate and special reasons'. If
the Court does not mention such reasons in the judgment,
there is no scope for awarding a sentence lesser than the
prescribed minimum. [Paras 16,17] [941-A & B] F
.A
4.2.ln order to exercise the discretion of reducing the
sentence the statutory requirement is that the Court has to
record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment
and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to
..,, impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The G
reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What
is adequate and special would depend upon several factors
and no strait-jacket formula can be indicated. What is
applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for
a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A to the High Court. [Para 18] [941-C & D]
4.3. The only reason indicated by the High Court is
that the accused belon~ed to rural areas. The same cannot
be consider.ed either adequate or speciaL The
requirement in law is cumulative. Undisputedly, the victim
s· was less than 16 years of age at the time of occurrence.
Evidence also shows that the victim and accused were in
love and the victim admitted that she had sexual
intercourse with the accused because of that. That of
course has no relevance because of her age being less
·--cthan sixteen years. Th~ father of the v_ictim had al~o filed
an affidavit before the High Courfthat~~ince the_victim is
settled in life a liberal view may be taken so far as sentence
is concerned. Consfclerir)9 all these facts, the sente.nce is
fixed at 3 years RI and fine of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited
D within three months. In case of default.in making ~eposit,
default sentence shall be one year. In case deposit is
made, a sum of Rs~8,000/- shall be paid to the victim .. +
[Paras 18 to 20] [941.,D,E,F,G & H; 942-A]
Iqbal v. State of Kera/a 2007(11} SCR 655 - relied on.
E
Case Law Reference
(1987) 2 SCR 7101 relied on Para 8
AIR (1991) SC 1463 relied on Para 9
F (1994) 2 sec 220 relied on Para 14
(2003) s sec 13 relied on Para 15
2007(11) SCR 655 relied on Para 20
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
G · No. 1365 of 2008
From the Judgment and final Order dated 18.1.2006 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 67-SB of 1994 ~-

H K.K. Khurana, Addi, A.G., A.K. Mehta and Kuldip Singh for
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 935
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
--f . the Appellant. A

Nanci Lal Sammi, Rakesh Taneja and K.L Taneja for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was .delivered by
B
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.

~ 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') was found
guilty'of offence punishable under Sections 366 & 376 of the c
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and was sentenced
I to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years
and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation in respect
of offence punishable under Section 366 IPC and 7 years
D
rigorous imprisonment for the offence relatable to Section 376
IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-. Though the conviction as
-+ recorded 'by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, was
affirmed by the High Court it reduced the sentence to the period
undergone. The reason for such reduction appears from the E
cryptic order of the High Court that the appellant was aged
about 19 years at the time of his statement recorded under
Section 313 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
'Cr.P.C.) and the victim and the accused appeared to be in love
with each other as is evident from love letters. F
3. _Learned _counsel for the appellant-State submitted that
the parameters relating to imposition of lesser sentence for
offence relatable to Section 376 IPC have not been kept in
view.
G
:) 4. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused on the
· · other hand supported the judgment of the High Court.

5. The crucial question which needs to be decided is the
proper sentence and whether merely because of lapse of time H
j
...
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

._._
A or that the accused belonged to rural areas, the accused is to
be waived from undergoing it. It is to be noted that the sentences
prescribed for offences reiatable to Section 376 are t-I-
imprisonment for life or up to a period of 10 years.

8 6. The offence of rape occurs in Chapter XVI of IPC. It is
an offence affecting the human body. In that Chapter, there is a \-
. separate. heading for 'Sexual offence', which encompasses ~·
Sections 375, 376, 376-A, 376-8, 376-C, and 376-D. 'Rape'
is defined in Section 375. Sections 375 and 376 have been \

c substantially changed by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983,
and several new.sections were introduced by the new Act, Le.
376-A,. 376-8, 376-C and 376-D. The fact that sweeping
changes were introduced reflects the legislative intent to curb
with iron hand, the offence of rape which affects the dignity of
D a woman. The ~ffence of .rape in its simplest term is 'the
ravishment of a ~oman, without her consent, by force, fear or
fraud', or as 'the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against
-t- .
her will'. 'Rape' or 'Raptus' is when a man hc;1th carnal knowledge
of a woman by force and against her will (Co. Litt. 123-b); or as ...
E expressed more fully,' rape is the carnal knowledge of any
woman, above -the age of particular years, against her will; or
ofa woman chjld, under that age, with or against her will' (Hale
PC 628). The essential words in an indictment for rape are
rapuit and carnaljter cognovit; ·but carnaliter cognovit, nor any
F
other circumlocution without the word rapuit, are not sufficient '
).._
in a legal sense to express rape; 1 Hon.6, 1a, 9 Edw. 4, 26 a
(Hale PC 628). In the cri":le of rape, 'carnal knowledge' means
the penetration to any the slightest degree of the organ alleged
G to have been carnally known by the male organ of generation
(Stephen's "Criminal Law" gth Ed. p.262). In 'Encyclopoedia of
!
Crime and Justice' (Volume 4, page 1356) it is stated "...... even
slight penetration is sufficient and emission is unnecessary". In
Halsbury's Statutes of Engla'nd and Wales (Fou'rth Edition)
H ·Volume 12, it is stated that even the slightest degree of
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 937
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

penetration is sufficient to prove sexual intercourse. It is violation A
with violence of the private person of a woman-an-outrage by
all means. By the very nature of the offence it is an obnoxious
act of the highest order.

7. The physical scar may heal up, but the mental scar will B
always remain. When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is
- -w not merely physical injury but the deep sense of some deathless
shame.

8. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
.,
. claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the c
people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved
\\
through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a
cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the
new challenges and the courts are required to mould the
D
sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of
lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins.
Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must
be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing
appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the E
edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the
society. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that,
"State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a
decisive reflection of social consciousness of society".
Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt F
.,I
the corrective machinery or the deterrenct: based on factual
matrix. By .deft modulation sentencing process be stern where
it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to. be.
The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of
the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, G
-~
the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the
,,
~

accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the
area of consideration. For instance a murder committed due to
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R

A deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty
of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent
people would call for imposition of death sentence as
deterrence. In Mahesh v. State of M.P. (1987) 2 SCR 710), this
Court while refusing to reduce the death sentence observed
B thus:

"It will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to
escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such
evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser
c punishment for the accused would be to render the justicing
system of the country suspect The common man will lose
faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and
appreciates the language of deterrence more than the
reformative jargon."
D
9. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society ..-
could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore,
E the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly
stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil
Naidu (AIR 1991 SC 1463).
F
10. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability ...
of each kind of criminal conduct It ordinarily allows some
significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in
each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more
G
subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special
facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment
ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are
determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is
H the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 939
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
. ....,
justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him A
out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his
crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from
just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of
apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.
B
11. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal
,,. respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions. it remains
a strong ·influence in the determination of sentences. The
practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is
now unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical departure c
from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the
law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction
drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of
greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a
measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in D
fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment
unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly
disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable
practical consequences.
E
12. After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been
committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really F
relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court.
Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very
aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of
Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a
foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable G
• criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in
the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity
of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may
provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess
H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity
of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case,
is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably
distinguished.

8 13. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect
on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates
•· .
to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences
c involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great
impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight
of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any· liberal attitude
by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view
merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences
D will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against
societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened
by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
14. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of WB. (1994 (2)
E SCC 220), this Court has observed that shockingly large number
of criminals go unpunished thereby increasingly, encouraging
the criminals and in the ultimate making justice· suffer by
weakening the system's creditability. The imposition of
appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Court
F responds to the society's cry for justice against the criminal.
Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment ~-
befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence
of the crime. The Court must not only keep in view the rights of
the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime and the
G society at large while.considering the imposition of appropriate
punishment. ,:1'•" x.• '~&l;::~~1~~,

15. These aspects have been elaborated in State of M.P
v. Ghanshyam Singh (2003(8) SCC 13).
STATE OF PUNJAB v. RAKESH KUMAR 941
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

16. In both sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 376 A
minimum sentences are prescribed.
17. Both in cases of sub-sections (1) ·anc:I (2) the. Court
has the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment less
than the prescribed minimum for 'adequate and special 8
reasons'. If the Court does not mention such reasons in· the
judgment there is no scope for awarding a sentence lesser
than the prescribed minimum.
18. In order to exercise the discretion ()f reducing the
sentence the statutory requirement is th~t the. Court has to C
record "adequate and special reasons" in thejudgmentand not
fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a
sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has ·
not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and
0
special would depend upon several fa9tors and no strait-jacket
formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts
regarding recording reasons for a departurf;} from minimum
sentence is equally applicable to the High Court.The only reason
indicated by the High Court is that the accused belonged to E
rural areas. The same can by no stretch of· imagination be
considered either adequate or special. The requirementirf law·
is cumulative.

19.Undisputedly, the victim was less than 16 years of age
at the time of occurrence. Evidence also shows that' the victim F
and accused were in love and the victim admif~ed that she had ·
sexual intercourse with the accused becau.se of that That of
course has no relevance because of her age being less than
sixteen years. The father of the victim had also filed an affidavit G
before the High Court that since the victim is settled in life a
liberal view may be taken so far as sentence ls concerned.
. ' .

20. Considering all these facts, as was (:Jone in Iqbal\!;
State of Kera/a, Criminal Appeal No.1463 of20d7·&ecided on_,~"·Fr··
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2008) 12 S.C.R.

A 24.10.2007, the sentence is fixed at 3'years RI and fine of
Rs,10,000/~ to be deposited within three months. In case of
d~fault in making deposit, default sentence shall be one year.
In case deposit is made, a sum of Rs.8,000/- shall be paid to
the
. ..victim
·:1. ..
8
' · · 21. The ·respondent ;is directed to surrender to custody
forthwith to ser\ie the remainder ofthe s.entence. The appeal is
allowed to the extent indicated. · ·
D.G.·. Appeal partly allowed .

.~ . ' .

'.

·1:.:

,.·,