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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.versusMILAP CHAND JAIN & ANR. ETC.

Citation
2013 INSC 298
Decided
1 May 2013
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

A fresh batch of SLPs against an order already dismissed cannot be entertained by a coordinate bench and must be dismissed on the ground of parity.

Summary

The State of Rajasthan filed a fresh batch of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) challenging a High Court order dated 29‑11‑2011, which had already been the subject of earlier SLPs that were dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether a coordinate bench could entertain new SLPs against the same impugned order when the matter had already been decided. It held that such fresh SLPs cannot be entertained by a coordinate bench unless the bench is prepared to take a different view and refer the matter to a larger bench. Applying the principle of parity, the Court observed that allowing a different outcome for the same class of teachers would amount to discriminatory treatment. Consequently, the Court dismissed the batch of SLPs as being devoid of merit, and one petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

Issues considered

  • Whether a fresh batch of Special Leave Petitions challenging the same impugned order, previously dismissed, can be entertained by a coordinate bench of the Supreme Court.
  • Whether the principle of parity mandates dismissal of later SLPs when earlier SLPs on the same issue have been rejected.
  • Whether the State of Rajasthan can refuse to bear its 20% share of the financial liability under the Carrier Advancement Scheme after having accepted an 80% grant from the University Grants Commission.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Special Leave PetitionParity principleCoordinate benchLarger benchArticle 136Supreme Court procedureDiscriminatory treatmentUniversity Grants CommissionTeacher promotion schemeFinancial liability

Judgment

                         [2013] 5 S.C.R. 472


A                 STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.
                                  v.
                MILAP CHAND JAIN & ANR. ETC.
      (Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.20363-20368 of 2013)
                            MAY 1, 2013
B
      [GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

          Constitution of India, 1950 - Arlic/e 136 - SLPs filed by
    petitioner-State challenging the same order which was the
C   subject matter of challenge in previous SLPs - Held: A fresh
    batch of SLPs against the impugned judgment and order
    against which SLPs were earlier dismissed, cannot be
    enterlained by a coordinate Bench unless the coordinate
    Bench were inclined to take a different view and were to refer
o   the matter to a larger Bench - On facts, although the question
    of law was allowed to be kept open in the earlier matter, no
    discriminatory treatment should be meted out to another set
    of teachers who were affected by one and the same order of
    the State of Rajasthan, wherein the order of the State was set
E   aside by the High Courl and one batch of special leave
    petitions against the same as also Review were dismissed -
    The implication of the observation in regard to the fact that
    the question of law was allowed to be kept open was meant to
    be urged in a matter arising out of a subsequent event in
F   which a similar question arose - Insofar as instant SLPs are
    concerned, that is not the situation as the SLPs have been
    filed by the petitioner-State of Rajasthan against the same
    impugned order, which was the subject matter of challenge
    in the earlier appeals - Instant SLPs fit to be dismissed
G   solely on the ground of parity -Practice and Procedure.

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Civil) Nos.
    20363-20368 of 2013.

         From the Judgment & Order dated 29.11.2011 of the High
H                              472
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. v. MILAP CHAND                    473
              JAIN & ANR. ETC.
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Jaipur bench at Jaipur in D.B.     A
Civil Special Appeal (Writ) Nos. 29, 105, 154, 277, 564 & 673
of 2005.

                             WITH

SLP Nos. 20386-20390, 20373-20377, 20379-20383, 20378,               B
20812, 14592 of 2013 and SLP (Civil) No. C.C. No. 9440 of
2013 and SLP (C) No. 34866 of 2012.

      Dr. Manish Singhvi, AAG (for lrshad Ahmad), Manoj
Swarup, Lalita Kohli (for Manoj Swarup & Co.) Pragati Neekhra        C
for the Petitioners.

     Ashok Gaur, S.P. Sharma, Ranjit Kumar, Abhishek Gupta,
Ajat Shatru Mina, Sumit Attri, Kiran Suri, S.J. Amith for the
Respondents.
                                                                     D
     The following order of the Court was delivered by

                          ORDER

     SLP(C) .. C.C.NOS.7465-7470/2012,8287-8291/2012,
                                                                     E
     8403-8407/2012, 8464-8468/2012, 19503/2012,
     SLP(C) No.34866/2012, C.C.No.9200/2013,
     SLP(C) No.14952/2013

     1. Delay condoned.                                              F
     2. This batch of special leave petitions are directed against
the judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan dated
29.11.2011 by which the appeals filed by the petitioner-State
of Rajasthan were rejected by the Division Bench observing           G
therein that the Apex Court has already dismissed the appeal
of the State against the impugned judgment and order dated
10.3.2011. This order was passed by this Court in a batch of
petitions (C.A. Nos.469 of 2007 and C.A. No.470 of 2007)

                                                                     H
    474     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A   Thereafter, the petitioner-State filed review petitions against the
    order dated 10.3.2011 passed in the aforesaid petitions in
    which they also raised the grounds on the merit of the matter
    but the review petitions were also dismissed.

B       3. Thereafter, instant batch of special leave petitions were
  filed by the petitioner-State challenging the same order which
  was the subject matter of challenge in the previous special
  leave petitions. But it is obvious that a fresh batch of special
  leave petitions against the impugned judgment and order
C against which special leave petitions were dismissed, cannot
  be entertained by a coordinate Bench unless the coordinate
  Bench were inclined to take a different view and were to refer
  the matter to a larger Bench.

       4. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are of the
D view that although the question of law was allowed to be kept
  open in the earlier matter, no discriminatory treatment should
  be meted out to another set of teachers who were affected by
  one and the same order of the State of Rajasthan, wherein the
  order of the State was set aside by the High Court and one
E batch of special leave petitions against the same as also
  Review were dismissed. The implication of the observation in
  regard to the fact that the question of law was allowed to be
  kept open obviously was meant to be urged in a matter arising
  out of a subsequent event in which a similar question arose.
F       5. Insofar as these special leave petitions are concerned,
  that is not the situation as the special leave petitions have been
  filed by the petitioner-State of Rajasthan against the same
  impugned order, which was the subject matter of challenge in
  the earlier appeals, as already stated hereinabove. We are
G further conscious of the fact that if a view different from the
  earlier order were to be taken by this Court for any reason
  whatsoever, appropriate reasons could be assigned in this
  regard. But if a similar view is taken, then dismissing one set
  of the batch of matters but allowing the other set, is bound to
H result into unjust discrimination to the same class of persons.
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. v. MILAP CHAND                     475
              JAIN & ANR. ETC.
Apart from the fact that, we see no ground to differ from the         A
view taken earlier, we have been informed that the financial
implication of the payment towards Carrier Advancement
Scheme is borne by the University Grants Commission to the
extent of 80% and only 20% is to be borne by the petitioner-
State. If the petitioner-State has accepted the grant to the extent   B
of 80% from the University Grants Commission and the State
has to add 20%, it is not open for the State to urge that it will
not bear the 20% financial liability specially when its plea
already stands rejected. If the petitioner-State at all had any
reason to deny this claim in spite of the entitlement of the          c
respondent-teachers, the State in the first place should not have
accepted 80% grant from the University Grants Commission.
These obserifations have been recorded herein merely in the
interest of fairness and justice to the parties as these special
leave petitions are fit to be dismissed solely on the ground of       D
parity as the High Court had also refused to entertain the writ
appeals on the ground of parity which clearly implies that any
other view different from the one taken earlier is bound to result
into unjust and discriminatory treatment which we cannot permit
to prevail.
                                                                      E
     6. The special leave petitions are, thus, devoid of merit and
are, therefore, dismissed.

     S.L.P.(C) ... CC NO. 9440 of 2013

     7. The counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Manoj Swarup,             F
submitted that this petition is not maintainable as the petitioner
had not moved the High Court before the Division Bench
against the judgment and order of the Single Bench. He may,
therefore, be permitted to withdraw this special leave petition.
                                                                      G
     8. In view of his request, the special leave petition is
dismissed as withdrawn.

B.B.B.                                           SLP dismissed.


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