Supreme Court of India
STATE OF RAJASTHANversusCHAMPA LAL
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 449
- Decided
- 1 April 2009
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
A dying declaration recorded by a police officer is admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and can form the basis of conviction when corroborated by reliable evidence, notwithstanding non‑compliance with procedural police rules.
Summary
The appellant State of Rajasthan prosecuted Champar Lal for murder under Section 302 IPC, relying primarily on the victim's dying declaration recorded by a police officer in the presence of a doctor. The trial court convicted based on that declaration, but the Rajasthan High Court acquitted, holding that the declaration was invalid because it was not recorded in accordance with the Rajasthan Police Rules. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a dying declaration recorded by a police officer, without a magistrate, is admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act despite procedural guidelines. The Court held that the Police Rules are merely procedural and do not override Section 32, especially when the officer testified that no magistrate was available and the declaration was corroborated by other witnesses. It further found that the prosecution evidence, including testimonies of several eyewitnesses, supported the dying declaration. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal, restored the conviction, and ordered the respondent to surrender. The decision reaffirms the admissibility of dying declarations recorded by police officers when no better method is feasible and when corroborated by reliable evidence.
Issues considered
- Whether a dying declaration recorded by a police officer, without a magistrate, is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
- Whether the procedural requirements of the Rajasthan Police Rules, 1964 can defeat the statutory admissibility of a dying declaration.
- Whether the corroborative testimony of eyewitnesses suffices to uphold a conviction based primarily on a dying declaration.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 162(2)
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307
Subjects
dying declarationadmissibilitySection 32 Evidence Actpolice recordingprocedural guidelinescorroborative evidencemurder convictionappeal
Judgment
[2009] 5 S.C.R. 463
STATE OF RAJASTHAN A
v.
CHAMPA LAL
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 305-306 of 2003)
) APRIL 1, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Conviction by trial court -
On the basis of dying declaration recorded by police official c
- Acquittal by High Court holding that dying declaration not
in accordance with Police Rules - On appeal held: Accused
liable to be convicted - The dying declaration is admissible
- ,, - The police official categorically stated that it was not
possible to get a Magistrate to record the dying declaration - D
Reliance on the Police Rules which provide procedural
guidelines, cannot take away effect of s. 32 - Evidence of
prosecution witnesses also prove the case - Evidence Act,
1872 - s. 32 - Rajasthan Police Rules, 1964.
E
Respondent-accused was prosecuted for having
killed his wife by burning. The deceased had given her
dying declaration which was recorded by the police
official (SHO) in the presence of the doctor. Trial court
- ~ convicted the respondent relying on the dying
declaration. High Court acquitted him holding that the F
conviction could not have ·been based on dying
declaration as the same was not in accordance with
applicable Police Rules relating to recording of dying
declaration. Hence the present appeal.
G
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Police official (PW-20), who recorded the
dying declaration, categorically stated that it was not
.463 H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A possible to get a Magistrate to record the dying
declaration. The High Court dis-believed him without
even recording any reason therefor. The dying
declaration was recorded in the presence of a doctor
(PW-13). In addition, the evidentiary value of the evidence
B of PWs 7, 9 and 10 has not been considered in its proper
perspective. [Para 7] [468-D]
1.2. The High Court has concluded that there was no
other reliable evidence. This conclusion runs counter to
the High Court's observation about the evidence of PWs
C 6 and 7 which was held to be credible. The evidence of
PWs 8 and 9 provide ample corroboration. [Para 10] [471-
F-G]
1.3. Rajasthan Police Rules, 1964 on which the High
D Court has placed reliance is at the most a set of ._ -
procedural guidelines. That cannot take away the effect
of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 1OJ (471-E]
Dalip Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1979 (4) SCC 332;
Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar 1983 (1) SCC 211 and
E Laxman v. State of Maharashtra 2002 (6) SCC 710, relied on.
Munna Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1976 (3) SCC
104, distinguished.
F Case Law Reference:
1976 (3) sec 104 Distinguished. Para 5
. '
1979 (4) sec 332 Relied on. Para 5
1983 (1) sec 211 Relied on. Para 8
G
2002 (6) sec 110 Relied on. Para 9
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 305-306 of 2003.
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. CHAMPA LAL 465
From the Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2001 of the High A
-l" Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Crl. Appeal
No. 400 of 1996.
Dr. Manish Singhvi, MG, Milind Kumar and Sandeep
....,.. ) Bajaj for the Appellant. B
Sudhir Kulshreshtha for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. The State of Rajasthan has C
filed appeals against the judgment of a Division Bench of the
Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur allowing the appeal filed by
the respondent directing his acquittal. Respondent faced trial
for the alleged commission of offence punishable under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and was D
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life by learned
Additional Sessions Judge, No.1, Jodhpur.
2. Background facts in a nutshell as projected by the
prosecution are as follows:
E
On 11.12.1995 at about 10.30 p.m. Om Prakash (PW-8)
submitted a written report at Police Station, Mahamandir,
Jodhpur stating inter-alia that his sister Smt. Pani Devi was
married to respondent about twenty five years back. From their
wedlock five girls and one boy were born. His sister used to F
earn a livelihood and maintain the children. Respondent used
to go for earning casually. Respondent used to demand money
from her for consuming liquor. Respondent also used to harass
and beat her. On the fateful day, when she returned from her
job, respondent was consuming liquor. Respondent abused his G
sister Pani Devi saying that she was keeping a number of
paramours and she used to stay with them during day hours.
"TUNE DAS HMTI BANA RAKKHE HAIN, DIN BHAR UNKE
SMTH RAHTI HAI." (You have a number of friends and
throughout the day, you stay with them.) He locked the children H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 5 S.C.R.
A in one room. Thereafter, the respondent poured kerosene on
her and with intention to kill her, threw a burning matchstick. His
.~
sister made hue and cry, which attracted a number of people
including Pappu Ram (PW-7). Having seen the incident, Pappu
Ram rushed to his house and narrated the incident. At that time,
8 his cousin Doonger Singh (PW-6) was also sitting with him. They l ~
rushed to the house of respondent and found that his sister Pani
Devi was burning and lying in a pit. She was taken out of the
pit by Prakash (PW- 18), brother of respondent. The fire was
extinguished. On enquiry, deceased Pani Devi narrated the
c incident. She was taken for treatment to the M.G. Hospital. On
this information, police registered a case for the offence under
Section 307 IPC and proceeded with investigation. At 10:40
p.m., Joga Ram (PW-20), SHO Police Station Mahamandir,
Jodhpur recorded the statement of Smt. Pani Devi in the M.G.
Hospital in the presence of Dr. M.K. Parihar (PW-13). She died ..
...
D '
on 12.12.1995 at 4: 10 a.m. The police prepared the site plan,
inquest report and sent the dead body for post mortem. The
post mortem was conducted by a Board of three doctors. The
Board found it to be a case of hundred percent burn. In the
opinion of the Board, the cause of death was shock due to
E extensive burns. After usual investigation police laid charge
sheet against the respondent for the offence under Section 302
IPC. Trial was held as accused abjured guilt. Trial Court relied
upon the dying declaration and held the accused guilty. In
appeal, High Court directed acquittal.
F ~
The High Court observed that the dying declaration on
...
which the prosecution relied and which the trial Court found to
be the basis of conviction was not in accordance with
applicable Police Rules relating to recording of dying ~-
G declaration. Therefore, the same was to be kept out of
consideration. Only on the basis of that the acquittal was
directed. ,
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
authenticity of the dying declaration having not been doubted,
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. CHAMPA LAL 467
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
A
-
acquittal is indefensible.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
supported the judgment of the High Court.
5. It is to be noted that a decision of this Court in Munna
Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976 (3) SCC 104), on B
which High Court placed reliance related to the efficacy of
investigating officer himself recording the dying declaration and
the necessity to discourage the practice. There is nothing in the
decision to show that whenever the investigating officer records
the dying declaration the same has to be kept out of c
consideration. In fact in Dalip Singh v. State of Rajasthan
(1979 (4) sec 332) it was observed as follows:
"8. There were two dying declarations of Ram Singh
•. - one oral and the other written - which was recorded by
- "' the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, PW 28 on
D
December 12, 1975. The oral dying declaration was made
to PW 11 Tara Singh. Neither of the dying declarations was
relied upon by the High Court because he had named
Baldev Singh also. We may also add that although a dying E
declaration recorded by a police officer during the course
of investigation is admissible under Section 32 of the
Indian Evidence Act in view of the exception provided in
sub-section (2) of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, it is better to leave such dying
... ,I F
declaration out of consideration until and unless the
----r-
prosecution satisfies the court as to why it was not
recorded by a Magistrate or by a doctor. As observed by
this Court in Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. the practice of
the Investigating Officer himself recording a dying
declaration during the course of investigation ought not to G
be encouraged. We do not mean to suggest that such
,. dying declarations are always untrustworthy, but what we
want to emphasize is that better and more reliable
methods of recording a dying declaration of an injured
person should be taken recourse to and the one recorded H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
-
A by the police officer may be relied upon if there was no
time or facility available to the prosecution for adopting
any better method.
(Underlined for emphasis)
-
B 6. In Dalip Singh's case (supra) it was categorically
observed that in case there was no time or facility available to
the prosecution for adopting any better method the dying
declaration can be taken into consideration. In fact in the
present case that is the categorical statement of PW-20. As
c rightly contended by learned counsel for the State the High
Court discarded the statement even without indicating any
reason.
7. It is to be noted that Jora Ram (PW-20) categorically
D stated that it was not possible to get a Magistrate to record the • .
·~
dying declaration. The High Court dis-believed him without even
recording any reason therefor. The dying declaration was
recorded in the presence of a doctor (PW-13). In addition, the •
evidentiary value of the evidence of PWs 7, 9 and 10 has not
been considered in its proper perspective.
E
8. In Ramawati Devi v. State ofBihar(1983 (1) SCC 211)
it was observed as follows:
"7. In our opinion neither of these two decisions relied
F on by the appellant is of any assistance in the facts and )L -
circumstances of this case. These decisions do not lay
down, as they cannot possibly lay down, that a dying
declaration which is not made before a Magistrate, cannot
be used in evidence. A statement, written or oral, made
G by a person who is dead as to the cause of his death or
as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
person's death comes into question, becomes admissible
under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Such statement
made by the deceased is commonly termed as dying
H
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. CHAMPA LAL 469
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,_
declaration. There is no requirement of law that such a A
statement must necessarily be made to a Magistrate.
What evidentiary value or weight has to be attached to
such statement, must necessarily depend on the facts and
> .l
circumstances of each particular case. In a proper case,
it may be permissible to convict a person only on the basis B
of a dying declaration in the light of the facts and
circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the dying
declaration has been properly proved. It is significant to
note that in the course of cross-examination of the witness
proving the dying declaration, no questions were put as to c
the state of health of the deceased and no suggestion was
made that the deceased was not in a fit state of health to
make any such statement. The Doctor's evidence also
clearly indicates that it was possible for the deceased to
~ --<
make the statement attributed to her in the dying D
declaration in which her thumb impression had also been
affixed. In the instant case, it cannot also be said that there
is no corroborative evidence of the statement contained
in the dying declaration. The evidence of PWs 1, 4, 5 and
8 clearly corroborates the statement recorded in the dying
E
declaration. We do not find any material on record on the
basis of which the testimony of these witnesses can be
disbelieved. It may also be noticed that none of these
witnesses including the police officer who recorded the
-
.. ) statement could be attributed with any kind of ill-feeling
against the accused. The High Court has elaborately dwelt F
on this aspect and has carefully considered all the
materials on record and also the arguments advanced on
.~ behalf of the appellant. We are in agreement with the view
expressed by the High Court and in our opinion the High
Court was right in upholding the conviction of the appellant." G
9. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002 (6) SCC 710
at para 3) it was observed as follows:
"3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying
H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 5 S.C.R.
A declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the /
B same, great caution must be exercised in considering the
weight to be given to this species of evidence on account
of the existence of many circumstances which may affect
their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed
is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept
c the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the
requirements of oath and cross-examination are
dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-
examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration
D
should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of
the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, "- -
however, has always to be on guard to see that the
statement of the deceased was not as a result of either
tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court
also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit
state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and
E
identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order
to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental
condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the
medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the
deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the ~ ,,,.
F declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it
be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as
to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying
declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be
oral or in writing and any adequate method of
G communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise
will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite.
In most cases, however, such statements are made orally
before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone
like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is
H recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. CHAMPA LAL 471
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure A
~ authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for
4
recording the statement of a man about to die. There is
no requirement of law that a dying declaration must
necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such
)
statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no B
specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently,
what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such
statement necessarily depends on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially
required is that the person who records a dying declaration c
must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of
mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate
-i
that the declarant was fit to make the statement even
-. ,
without examination by the doctor the declaration can be
acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same
to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is
D
essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and
truthful nature of the declaration can be established
otherwise."
10. It is to be noted that Rajasthan Police Rules, 1964 on E
which the High Court has placed reliance is at the most a set
of procedural guidelines. That cannot take away the effect of
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the
'Evidence Act'). To add to the vulnerability of the High Court's
- .· J judgment, the High Court has concluded that there was no other F
reliable evidence. This c:onclusion runs counter to the High
Court's earlier observation about the evidence of PWs 6 and
7 which was held to be credible. The evidence of PWs 8 and
9 provide ample corroboration. That being so, the appeals
deserve to be allowed which we direct. The judgment of G
acquittal passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the
~
trial Court is restored. The respondent shall surrender to custody
forthwith to serve the remainder of sentence, if any.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
H
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