STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.versusALAGAR

A                     STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ANR.
                                          V.

                                      ALAGAR

                                   JULY 6, 2006

B         [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]


          Preventive Detention :

          Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug
C Offenders, Fores/ Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum
    Grabbers Act, 1982:

          Section 3(1)-0rder of detention-Requirement for placing of material
    by sponsoring authority before detaining authority-Held, sponsoring authority
    having appeared before detaining authority and placed material before him,
D   High Court's view that there should have been a forwarding letter or an
    additional affidavit is clearly without any basis.

          Preventive Detention :

          Order of High Court quashing detention order set aside-Surrendering
E   of detenu to serve remainder period of detention-Held, State Government to
    consider this aspect and pass appropriate orders.

           A detention order was passed against the respondent under Section
    3(1) of the Tamil Na du Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
p   Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
    and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982, since he was identified as a 'Goonda' as
    defined under the Act. The said order was challenged before the High
    Court on the ground that in the affidavit sworn by the sponsoring
    authority and sent to the detaining authority, there was no mention of the
    remand order but the order of detention refers to the said fact. The High
G   Court quashed the detention order holding that sponsoring authority
    should have sent the document relating to remand alongwith a forwarding
    letter or should have filed an additional affidavit. Aggrieved, the State filed
    the present appeal.


H                                        310
            STATE OFTAMlL NADUv. ALAGAR (PASAYAT, J.)                     311
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                             A
     HELD : I. The order of remand was placed by the sponsoring
authority before the detaining authority. The High Court's view that there
should have been a forwarding letter or an additional affidavit is clearly
without any basis. Order of the High Court is set aside. 1312-G-H; 313-AI
                                                                                 B
      2. As regards surrendering of detenu for serving remaining period
of detention in view of passage of time, the State shall consider whether
there still exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of
detention indicated in the order by which the detenu was required to be
detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant        C
to the present order. 1313-B-E]

      Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India & Ors., [2000[ 3 SCC 409 and
State of TN. and Anr. v. Kethiyan Perumal, [2004] 8 SCC 780, relied on.

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. I 067                 D
of 1999.

      From the Final Order dated 20.4.1999 of the Madras High Court in
11.C.P. No. 1298/1998.

      V.G. Pragasam and Subramonium Prasad (NP) for the Appellants.
                                                                                 E
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      ARrJIT PASA YAT, J. Challenge in this Appeal is to the judgment
rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing the order
of detention passed by the District Magistrate and Collector, Virudhunagar,      F
Tamil Nadu under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of bootleggers, Drug offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral
Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (in short the 'Act').

       The order of detention was passed as the respondent was identified as
a "Goonda" as defined in the Act. It was indicated in the order of detention     G
that it had come to the notice of the detaining authority that a large number
of cases were registered against him and on 27.4.1998 he acted in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The order of detention was
challenged before the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution'). The only plea taken
was that the sponsoring authority had sworn to an affidavit dated 15.6.1998      H
    312                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A and had forwarded the same to the detaining authority with the material for
    consideration of the detaining authority. In the said affidavit there could not
    have been any mention of the order of remand dated 24.6.1998. But in the
    order of detention reference was made to the said fact. The Detaining Authority
    produced the records to show that in fact the Sponsoring Authority had
    appeared before the Detaining Authority on 26.6.1998 and the file clearly
B   indicated that the order ofremand was brought to the notice of the Detaining
    Authority before he passed the order of detention on 26.6.1998. The High
    Court perused the original file but was of the view that the Detaining Authority
    should have sent the document in question i.e. order relating to the remand
    along with a forwarding letter and in any event an additional affidavit was
C   required to be filed. Therefore, it was held that the order of detention was not
    sustainable.

          Mr. V.G. Pragasam, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
    the order of remand had been brought to the notice of the detaining authority
    by the Sponsoring Authority before the order of detention was passed. On a
D   hypo-technical ground that, though the same was brought to the notice of the
    Detaining Authority, there should have been a forwarding letter to the
    Detaining Authority or at least an additional affidavit should have been filed
    the order of detention should not have been quashed. The order, therefore, is
    clearly unsustainable.
E         There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-detenu in spite of
    notice.

          We find that there is no dispute regarding the production of the order
    of remand dated 24.6.1998 when the sponsoring authority appeared before
F   the detaining authority who passed the order of detention on 26/6/1998. As
    a matter of fact in the grounds of detention it have been clearly noted as
    follows :

            "The accused was remanded to judicial custody in Central Prison,
            Madurai for a period of 15 days upto 12.5.1998 and the remand has
G           been extended upto 30.06.1998 and the accused is in Central Prison,
            Madurai."

           This clearly establishes, that as has been noted in the file which was
    produced before the High Court, the order of remand was placed by the
    Sponsoring Authority before the Detaining Authority. The High Court's view
H   that there should have been a forwarding letter or an additional affidavit is
              STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. ALAGAR [PASAYAT, J.]                  313
clearly without any basis.                                                        A
      There is no dispute that the sponsoring authority had placed the material
before the Detaining Authority. That being so the High Court should not
have quashed the order of detention.

       The order of the High Court is accordingly set aside.                      B
       The residual question is whether it would be appropriate to direct the
respondent to surrender for serving remaining period of detention in view of
passage of time. As was noticed in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India
and Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 409, and State of T.N. and Anr. v. Kethiyan Perumal,
[2004] 8 SCC 780, it is for the appropriate State to consider whether the         C
impact of the acts, which led to the order of detention still survives and
whether it would be desirable to send back the detenu for serving remainder
period of detention. Necessary order in this regard shall be passed within two
months by the appellant State. Passage of time in all cases cannot be a
ground not to send the detenu to serve remainder of the period of detention.      D
It all depends on the facts of the act and the continuance or otherwise of the
effect of the objectionable acts. The State shall .consider whether there still
exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention indicated
in the order by which the detenu was required to be detained and the date
when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the present order.
                                                                                  E
       Appeal is allowed.

R.P.                                                         Appeal allowed.