Holding

The Supreme Court held that G.O. No.126 (1998) was intended only for existing employees, that the claim of the retired employees is barred by delay, and that no fresh right arises from legitimate expectation, thereby setting aside the High Court order.

Summary

The case concerned employees of the Tamil Nadu Secretariat who, after the Finance and Law Departments were excluded from the "one unit" promotion scheme, were promoted ahead of their seniors in other departments. The State issued G.O. No.126 (1998) to step‑up the pay of senior employees recruited before 28‑Jan‑1994 to match their juniors in the Finance unit, but the order provided only prospective benefits and no arrears. Retired employees filed applications before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal seeking parity in pay, which were dismissed on the ground of limitation. The High Court held that the G.O. applied to the retired employees and set aside the Tribunal’s order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the G.O. was intended only for existing employees, that delay and laches are relevant, that legitimate expectation does not create a fresh right, and that the classification must satisfy the test of intelligible differentia and rational nexus. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

The applicability of G.O. No.126 (1998) to retired employees
Whether the delay in filing applications bars the claim (limitation, laches)
Whether Article 14 of the Constitution is violated by the classification
Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation creates a fresh right
Whether the classification of employees satisfies the test of intelligible differentia and rational nexus

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.16(1)

Subjects

service lawpromotionpay fixationone unit schemeArticle 14legitimate expectationlimitationdelayclassificationretrospective orderTamil Nadu Secretariat Service

Judgment

STATE OF TAMIL NADU A
r v.
SESHACHALAM

SEPTEMBER 18, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND H.S. BEDI, JJ.)

Service Law:
Stepping up ofpay-Secretariat of Tamil Nadu Government- c
Employees recruited through a common selection test under "One
Unit" Scheme-Later, Departments of Finance and Law separated
from the level of Superintendent (Section Officer)-Resulting in few
employees in these two departments getting promotion to higher posts
earlier than their seniors in other Departments recruited through "One
Unit" Scheme-GovernmentissuingG.O.Ms. No.126dated25.9.1998 D
stepping up pay ofaffected existing employees as one time measure-
~4
0.A. filed by retired employees rejected by Tribunal, inter alia, on
ground oflong delay-HELD: the Government under G. 0. Ms. dated
25. 9.1998 laid down a policy for providing financial benefits to
existing employees with prospective effect as a one time measure- E
No arrears ofpay was paid-Various pros and cons were examined-
Besides, delay or /aches is a relevant factor for a court of law to
determine the question as to whether claim made by applicant deserves
consideration-Article 14 in such a situation would not be attracted
only because a cut off date has been fixed-The same per se cannot F
be said to be arbitrary-Constitution of India-Article 14-Delay/
Laches-Natural justice-Legitimate expectation.
In the State of Tamil Nadu, different Departments of its
Secretariat were made "one unit" in the year 1961 for the purpose
of appointment and promotion. However, later, byG.O.Ms. No.1290 G
dated 5.6.1970 the Finance and Law Departments were excluded
from "one unit" system in that though the posts in the cadre of
Assistant, Assistant Section Officer. Typists/Personal Clerks in
these two Departments continued to be filled up from the common
53 H
t--·
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R.

A list of candidates, further promotions were effected from amongst -(
the employees allotted thereto. GOMs No. 3288 (Public Service
Department) was issued on 29.10.1971 specifying Finance and Law
Departments as separate units from the level of Superintendent
(Section Officer). Two employees filed application before the Tamil
B Nadu Administrative Tribunal in 1990 claiming promotion and scale
of pay at par with those who were working in the Finance Department
and were juniors to them but were promoted to higher posts in Finance
Department. The 1application was allowed and pursuant to the
directions of the Tribunal, the Government amended the relevant
C service rules and issued GO Ms. No. 126 dated 25.9.1998 providing,
inter alia, that pay of seniors in "one unit" recruited on or before
28.1.1994 would be stepped up on par with their juniors in Finance
Department by upgradation of scale accordingly and this stepping
up would be purely a person-oriented upgradation and would not
entitle the employee to any daim for arrears of pay. The
D respondents, who had retired much prior to issuance of the G.O.
dated 29.5.1998 filed applications before the Tribunal claiming
fixation of their pay at par with their juniors in Finance Department.
Their applications were dismissed by the Tribunal holding, inter alia,
that they should have raised the dispute long back when their juniors
E had been given promotions and as the .ipplications were filed after
20 years, the same could not be entertained. However, the High
Court having allowed the writ petitions of the respondents, the State
Government filed the instant appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
F
HELD: 1.1. The employees of the Finance and Law
Departments were being treated differently for a long time. The
respondents never questioned the purported different treatment
meted out to them by the State either by making representations or
G by filing any application before the State Administrative Tribunal.
However, pursuant to the observations made by the Tribunal in an
O.A. in its order dated 16.4.1993, the State amended the Rules with
retrospective effect. The said Rule is still i~ force. Validity of the
said Rule has not been questioned by the respondents. Different
treatments meted out to the employees of the Finance and Law
H
/
- -~

STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM 55

Department vis-a-vis other departments is now covered by Rules, A
but despite the same, the State intended to assuage the feelings of
the employees by issuance of GOMs No. 126 dated 29.5.1998.
[Para 9] (64-A-D]
1.2. Interpretation of GO Ms No. 126 dated 25.5.1998 would B
depend upon the backdrop of the events in which it was made but it
is trite that the intention of the maker of the policy must be drawn
from the language used therein. For this purpose the document
should be read in its entirety. The said notification was issued upon
considering various factors including pendency of a large number
of matters before the Administrative Tribunal on the issue. The State C
intended to lay down a policy for providing financial benefits with
prospective effect. No arrears of pay was to be paid. The
upgradation sanctioned was to lapse in the event of retirement of
the individuals or their promotion to the upgraded post. The said
upgradation were to be subject to the terms and conditions contained D
in clause 12 of the said G.O., a readingwhereofwouM clearly lead
to only one conclusion that it was meant to be applied to the existing
employees. By reason thereof, on upgradation, the seniors were
required to continue to perform the duties attached to the existing
post till they get their normal promotion to the next higher category. E
It was meant to be a one time affair. Various pros and cons therefor
were examined. Avenues available to the Staff were taken into
consideration. [Paras 9and14] (64-D-E; 68-D-H; 69-A]
1 Bannari Ammar. Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Qfjicer & Ors.,
(2005] 1 SCC 625, and Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. F
v. Electricity Inspector and E. Tl 0. and Ors., [2007] 5 SCC 447, relied
on.
1.3. It would, therefore, be incorrect to construe that the
notifications applied to all who had been recruited to the Tamil Nadu
Secretariat Service on or before 28.1.1994. Additional benefits have G
been accorded by reason of the said notification. A person who fulfills
the conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for
therein. Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any
benefit thereunder. For the said purpose, the Court should not give
a strained or extended meaning thereto. While construing such a H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A notification, the financial impact thereof is also required to be taken
into consideration. [Para 15) [69-B-C]
State ofA.P. & Anr. v.A.P. Pensioners' Association & Ors., [2005)
13 SCC 161 and Union ofIndia & Anr. v. ManikLal Banerjee, [2006]
9 sec, relied on.
B
R.L. Marwaha v. Union of India & Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 31 and
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 3 SCR 284, held
inapplicable.
2. Assuming that the cause of action for filing the applications
c by the respondents arose in view of the observations made by the
Tribunal in its order dated 16.4.1993, but then in terms of the Act
and the Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper
application within a period of one year only. Opinion of the High
Court that GOMs No. 126 dated 29.5.1998 gave a fresh lease of
D life having regard to the legitimate expectation is based on a wrong
premise. Delay or late.hes is a relevant factor for a court of law to
determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a
Government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been
given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution oflndia would not, in
E a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
[Paras 10and11] (65-C-F]
3. Legitimate expectation is a part of the principles of natural
p justice. However, no fresh right can be created by invoking the
doctrine of legitimate expectation. By reason thereof only the
existing right is saved subject, of course, to the provisions of the
statute. (Para 11) [65-F-G]
State ofHimachal Pradesh andAnr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan and
G Ors., [1992] 2 SCC 351; Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K Roy
a~Ors., [2004) 1 SCC347; Chariman, UP. JalNigamandAnr. v.Jaswant ~,
Singh and Anr., (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and New Delhi Municipal Council
v. Pan Singh and Ors., (2007) 4 SCALE 204, relied on.
4. Only because a cut off date has been fixed, the same per se
H cannot be said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed
STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 57

for that purpose. As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose A
is that classification must be rational and in order to pass the test:
(1) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the Act. (Paras 12 and 18) (66-E-F; 70-F)
K.S. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union of India and Anr., (2006) 12 B
SCALE 307, relied on.
The State ofJammu and Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and
Ors., [1974] 1SCC19 and UP. Raghavendra Acharya and Ors. v. State
ofKarnataka and Ors., (2006) 6 SCALE 23, held inapplicable.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE ruRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1938 of
2007.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition No. 7971 of 2004.
D·
WITH
--1.
C.A. Nos. 1940, 1941, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947,1949, 1950,
1952, 1954, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1960of2007.
M.S. Ganesh, V.G. Pragasam, S. Joseph Aristotle and S. Prabu E
Ramasubramanian for the Appellant.
Dr. A.E. Chelliah, R. Venkatramani, Vasanthakumari Chelliah, K.
Rarllanujam, A Annapurai, Dinesh Kumar Garg, R. Anand Padmanabhan,
Pramod Dayal, S. Lesi and Namachivayam (for P. Narasimhan) for
Respondent. F
Caveator-In-Person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. These appeals involving identical questions of
law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed G
ofQy this cornmonjudgment.
2. Respondents herein have been working in the Secretariat of the
Government of Tamil Nadu. Each and every department in the Government
Secretariat prior to 1961 had a separate unit for appointment, promotion H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A etc. The State, however, amended the Special Rules in the year 1961
whereby all the departments in the Secretariat were made the ''one unit''
for the purpose of appointment and promotion. Appointments in the
Secretariat at all entry level posts, i.e., Junior Assistants (subsequently re-
designated as Assistants), Assistants (subsequently re-designated as
B Assistant Section Officers), Typist/Personal Clerks were to be made from
the common list of candidates selected by the Tamil Nadu Public Service
Commission. Promotion to different higher posts in different departments
was also being made from amongst those employees. The Government
of Tamil Nadu, however, by issuing G.0.Ms. No.1290 dated 05.06.1970
C excluded the Finance and Law Departments from the "one unit" system.
Whereas posts in the cadre of Assistants, Assistant Section Officers,
Typists/Personal Clerks continued to be filled up from the common list of
candidates, but in Finance and Law Departments, further promotions were
effected from amongst the employees allotted thereto only. Appointments
D to Finance Department, however, were made at random and probably in
terms of the option exercised by any particular candidate. Many persons,
who have, thus, been ranking higher were employed in "one unit" >--.
departments whereas some of the candidates ranking lower were
employed under fortuitous circumstances in the Finance Department. The
E employees working in the Finance Department, therefore, obtained
promotions much ahead of their peers or even seniors who were
discharging their duties in other departments coming within the "one unit".
3. G.0.Ms. No. 3288 (Public Services Department) was thereafter
issued on 29.10.1971 specifying Finance and Law Departments as
I;'
. _ separate units from the level of Superintendent (Section Officer) and above.
Admittedly, however, Rule 4 of the Special Rules of the Tamil Nadu
Secretariat Service was amended in that behalf The said policy, however,
is said to have been implemented. Two employees, S. Kalaiselvan and S.
Sivasubramanian, filed an Original Application before the Tamil Nadu
G Administrative Tribunal in the year 1990 claiming promotion and scale of
pay at par with those who were working in the Finance Department and
who were said to be juniors to them but had been promoted to higher
posts in Finance Deparnnent. The said Original Application was allowed
by the Tribunal by an order dated 16.4.1993 opining that there existed
H no guidelines to allot any employee to the Finance Department, vis-a-vis,
,
I

- -~

STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,].] 59

other departments and, thus, the employees working in other A
departments could not have been deprived of the benefit of promotion.
It was furthermore pointed out that even Rule 4 of the Special Rules
for the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service had not been amended by the
said GOMs No.1290 dated 05.06.1970.
B
4. The Government of Tamil Nadu thereafter amended the
Service Rules with retrospective effect from 05.06.1970 by issuing
G.O.Ms. No.30 Personnel and Administrative Reforms (D)
Department dated 28.1.1994. Upon issuance of the said Government
Order, an application for review was filed but the same was dismissed
by the Tribunal by an order dated 30.1.1995. The Government was
c
thereafter advised to implement the order of the Tribunal by giving
promotion to the concerned employees with retrospective effect from
the date on which their juniors had been promoted as Assistant Section
Officers in the Finance Department. Sanction was also accorded for
creation of two supernumerary posts, namely, posts of Assistant Section D
Officers in the respective departments. Several representations thereafter
were made by persons said to be similarly situated claiming promotion
and parity in the scale of pay as compared to their counterparts in the
Finance Department. A large number of Original Applications were also
filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. Upon E
consideration of various pros and cons, the Government of Tamil Nadu
issued a GOM bearing No.126 dated 29.5.1998, relevant paragraphs
whereof read as under :
~
"10. The Government accordingly direct that:- F
(i) the pay of the seniors in One Unit who have been recruited
to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat Service on or before
28.1.1994, shall be stepped up on par with their juniors in
the Finance unit by upgrading the posts held by them to the
Scale of pay applicable to the juniors with immediate effect. G
(ii) The stepping up of their pay on par with the juniors in the
Finance Unit by upgrading the posts held by them to the
scale of pay applicable to the junior ordered in sub-para
(1) above is purely a person-oriented upgradation and no H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A new posts will be created for this purpose.

(Iii) The upgradation sanctioned for the seniors will lapse in the
event of the retirement ef the individuals concerned or their
promotion to the upgraded post in their normal tum.
B (iv) The pay of the other seniors in the One Unit in the same cadre
will be stepped up on par with immediate juniors in the Finance
Unit, with effect from the date of issue of this order.

(v) In respect of the Typists/Personal Clerks/Personal Assistants,
c in One Unit who have not relinquished their right for promotion
as Assistant Section Officer, and are still awaiting their tum
for promotion as Assistant Section Officer, their pay shall be
upgraded to Assistant Section Officer scale on par with their
immediate junior in the Finance Unit who got his promotion
D as Assistant Section Officer.

11. The benefits of upgradation of pay of the seniors on par with
their juniors as per Commission's Seniority list ordered in sub-paras
(i) to (iv) of Para 10 above, shall also be ex1ended to those seniors
in the Finance Unit who were recruited before 28.1.1994 and or
E drawing less pay than their juniors in One Unit.

12. The upgradation ordered above is subject to the following
terms and conditions :
( 1) The upgradation ordered will involve only stepping up of pay
F of the senior on par with his junior in the upgraded scale of
pay.
(2) It does not entitle him to any claim for arrears of pay.
xxx xxx xxx
G
These orders shall come into force with effect from the date of
issue of the orders.
13 ...
14. The 'Departments of Secretariat concerned shall issue
H
--"--
STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 61

necessary orders for upgradation of posts and for stepping-up A
r of the pay of the Seniors in One Unit in the upgraded scales
ordered in para 10 above, after obtaining necessary individual
undertaking in the fonnat enclosed from the seniors concerned
to the effect that they accept the tenns and conditions of this
order. B
5. The said Government Order further stipulated that undertaking
should be given by the seniors getting upgradation of their pay with
their juniors in the Finance Department in the fonnat enclosed to the
effect that they accept the tenns and conditions thereto. Respondents
before us, save and except R. Ragothaman in CA No.1955 of 2007
c
indisputably had retired much prior to issuance of the said Government
Order dated 29.5.1998. They also made representations before the
appellant demanding fixation of their pay at par with their juniors in the
Finance Department. As the said request was not acceded to, a large
D
number of original applications were filed before the Tamil Nadu
Administrative Tribunal. By a common judgment pronounced on
20.1.2004, the Tribunal dismissed the said applications opining that the
same were barred by limitation. It was held that the applicants having
retired long back and having filed applications between 1998 to 2003
and the promoters having retired as Under Secretaries, Deputy E
Secretaries and Joint Secretaries and in some cases as Additional
Secretaries, they should have raised the dispute long back when their
juniors had been given promotions in the Finance Department and as
the original applications were filed after 20 years, the same could not
be entertained. F

6. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, respondents filed
writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Madras. By reason
of the impugned judgment dated 21.4.2006, a Division Bench of the
High Court, inter alia, held that the cause of action for filing the original G
}.._ application arose only upon issuance of GOMS No.126 dated
29 .5 .1998 and in that view of the matter it cannot be said that the original
applications filed by the respondents suffered from delay and latches
and/or otherwise barred by limitation as GOMS No.126 applied also
in respect of those who had retired before 29.5.1998; It was also H
~--
(
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A opined that the respondents who had not been in service on or before
28.1.1994 came within the scope and ambit of the said GOMs.
Although GOMs 126 provided for operation with prospective effect
and by reason thereof past benefits were not made available, the same
should be construed in consonance with the provisions contained in
B Article 14 of the Constitution of India, holding :
"There is no specific clause in G.O.Ms. No.126 excluding the
applicability ofthis G.O. to the persons who had retired before
29.5.1998. The G.O. itself recites that the Government wanted
to provide a solution to the long standing problem and had
c decided to take a sympathetic view to effect lasting and
equitable solution to the long standing issue so as to redress the
grievances of the seniors in the One Unit by upgrading the pay
of the seniors in One Unit on par with their immediate juniors in
the Finance Unit.
D
Keeping in view the explicit intention of the Government, it is
apparent that the G.O. had been issued as a beneficial measure
and the provisions in such G.O. are to be liberally construed so
as to benefit the employees for whose benefit the G.O. was
E avowedly issued. It is not disputed that the petitioners were in
service on and before 28.1.1994 and therefore, they fall within
the scope and ambit of the impugned G.O. Once they are
covered under the said G.O., the benefit of the said G.0. will
flow automatically.''
T
F It was further held that the said Government Order applied not
only to the existing staff but also to the retired employees and as such
a beneficial interpretation to the said Government Order should be given
as the said provisions have to be read in consonance with Article 14
of the Constitution oflndia.
G
7. Mr. M.S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf ~
of the appellants, would submit that the High Court committed a serious
error in passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take
into consideration that :
H
__ ..._ \

STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 63

(i) no explanation was offered by the respondents for not preferring A
there claim petitions prior to or immediately after the announcement of
the order dated 16.04.1993;
(ii) the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the
finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal;
B
(iii) doctrine oflegitimate expectation does not postulate conferment
of any right which has been lost for any reason whatsoever; and
(iv) as in terms of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, no
employee has any fundamental right of promotion, upgradation, allocation
of any particular department or to receive any benefit after superannuation
c
the impugned judgment is unsustainable.
8. Mr. Venkataramani, Dr. A.E. Chelliah, senior counsel appearing
on behalf of respondents and caveator-in-person on the other hand
contended that : D
---<, (i) from the perusal of the order of Tribunal dated 16.04.1993, it
would appear that observations made therein were not confined only to
the two employees who had filed the original application but covered the
cases of all others similarly situated; E
(ii) having regard to the fact that the State was required to respond
comprehensively to the said observations and that the review application
filed by the State in view of the said order has been dismissed, before
issuing the GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998, the State must be held to
have considered the ground realities as also the plight of those employees F
who had suffered discrimination, irrespective of the fact as to whether
they were in service or had retired.

(iii) GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998 must be given effect to for
stepping up the scale of pay of the employees to bring them at par with G
J- their juniors in the Finance Department with the object of treating all the
employees equally;

(iv) no new right having been created by GOMs No.126 dated
29.5.1998, any mini classification or micro classification would offend
Article 14 of the Constitution of India as there was no rational object H
...\--
(
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A behind the same and it is not possible to segregate the cases of the
employees in service vis-a-vis the retired employees.

9. The employees of the Finance and Law Departments were being
treated differently from a long time. The respondents herein never
questioned the purported different treatment meted out to them by the
B State either by making representations or by filing any application before
the Central Administrative Tribunal. Only two of the employees did. Their
applications were allowed, inter alia, on the premise that posting of
employees in the Finance and Law Departments took place by way of --L
fortuitous circumstances and were not supported by any rationality. The
c State, we have noticed hereinbefore, amended the Rules with
retrospective effect. The said Rule is still in force. Validity of the said
Rule has not been questioned by the respondents. Different treatments
meted out to the employees of the Finance and Law Departments vis-
it-vis other department is now covered by Rules, but despite the same,
D the State intended to assuage the feelings of the employees by issuance
of the said GOMs No.126 dated 29.5.1998. The said notification was
issued upon considering various factors including pendency of a large >--
number of matters before the Administrative Tribunal on the said issue.
The State intended to lay down a policy for providing financial benefits
E with prospective effect. Various pros and cons therefor were examined.
Avenues available to the State were taken to into consideration. Only
thereafter it was directed :
"The Government, after careful consideration of all these points
y
F and also the related issues involved, have decided to take a
sympathetic view and attempt a lasting and equitable solution to
this long standing issue, so as to redress the grievances of the
seniors in the One Unit, by upgrading the pay of the seniors in
One Unit on par with their immediate juniors in the Finance Unit."
G 10. It is one thing to say that the State had come up with a policy
decision which is beneficial to all the employees irrespective of the fact ~
as to whether they had reached the age of superannuation or not, the
only criteria being that they were recruited to the Tamil Nadu Secretariat
Service on or before 28.1.1994 but it is another thing to say that the
H claim petitions filed by the responders were based on the success of their
I
--t-
STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 65

colleagues before the Administrative Tribunal in the year 1994. The A
employees working in the Finance Department had been promoted long
back. We have noticed hereinbefore that some of them retired as
Additional Secretaries whereas the respondents retired as merely
Assistants. Presumably, promotions to the employees of the Finance
Department were given systematically over a long period of time but no B
such grievance was made nor any application was filed before the
appropriate forum. Such grievance, in our opinion, should have been
raised or proper application before the Tribunal should have been filed
long long back. It was in the aforementioned situation, the Tribunal was
of the opinion that their applications were barred by limitation. Assuming C
that the cause of action for filing such applications arose in view of the
observations made by the Tribunal in its order dated 16.4.1993 passed
in Original Application No.166of1990, but then in terms of the Act and
the Rules, the respondents were required to file a proper application within
a period of one year only. It is borne out from the records that, in fact, D
62 such applications were already pending when GOMs No.126 was
issued.
11. Some of the respondents might have filed representations but
filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation.
Delay or latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the E
question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant
may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article
14 of the Constitution oflndia would not, in a situation of that nature, be
attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are F
alert and vigilant. Opinion of the High Court that GOMs No.126 dated
29. 5.1998 gave a fresh lease of life having regard to the legitimate
expectation, in our opinion, is based on a wrong premise. Legitimate
expectation is a part of the principles of natural justice. No fresh right
can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. By G
reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of course, to the
provisions of the statute. {See State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v.
Kai/ash Chand Mahajan & Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 351}.

H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A 12. We may notice that in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun
K Roy & Ors., [2004] 1 SCC 347, this Court held:
"The respondents furthe1more are not even entitled to any relief
on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the
B
writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976
wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in
1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had
been decided but one way or the other, even the matter had been
considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra). The plea of
delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for
c denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would
operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees
not being before this Court although they are ventilating their
grievances before appropriate courts of law no order should be
passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we
D are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of
grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally
entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to
be entitled thereto by a court oflaw."
E See also Chairman, UP. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh &
Anr., (2006) 12 SCALE 347 and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan
Singh & Ors., (2007) 4 SCALE 204.

Only because a cut off date has been fixed, the same per se cannot
F be said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that
purpose.
Recently, this Court in KS. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union ofIndia
& Anr., (2006) 12 SCALE 307 held:
"Nakara ·; case (supra) was a case of revision of pensionary
G benefits and classification of pensioners info two groups by drawing
a cut off line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to
employees retiring on or after the cut- off date. The criterion made
applicable was "being in service and retiring subsequent to the
specified date". This Court held t11at for being eligible for liberalised
H
STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 67

pension scheme, application of such a criterion is violative of Article A
14 of the Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory
in nature. It was further held that the employees who retired prior
to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one
class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate
classes/groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not B
founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus
with the object sought to be achieved. The facts of Na.''Xlra 's case
(supra) are not available in the facts of the present case. In other
J_
words, the facts in Nakara's case are clearly distinguishable."
13. In Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer C
& Ors., [2005] I SCC 625, a Division Bench of this Court, as regards
applicability of doctrine of promissory estoppel, opined :
"In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound
and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party D
invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting
material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party
invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance
of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the
doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including E
the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large,
because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the
Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity
must for ever be present in the mind of the Court.
20. In Shrijee Sales Coporation and Anr. v. Union of India, F
[1997] 3 sec 398 it was observed that once public interest is
accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity
the principle would be applicable even in cases where a period has
been indicated for operation of the promise. If there is a supervening
public equity, the Govenunent would be allowed to change its stand G
and has the power to withdraw from representation made by it
which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone
adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such
withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is competent to rescind
H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A from the promise even ifthere is no manifest public interest involved,
provided no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be
rectified. Similar view was expressed in Pawan Alloys and
Casting Pvt. Ltd Meerut etc. etc. v. P.P. State Electricity Board
and Ors., AIR (1997) SC 3810 and in Sales Tax officer and
B Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr., [1998] 1 SCC 573 and
it was further held that the Government could change its industrial
policy if·the situation so warranted and merely because the
resolution was announced for a particular period, it did not mean
that the government could not amend and change the policy under
--L
c any circumstances. If the party claiming application of the doctrine
acted on the basis of a notification it should have known that such
notifica#on was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of
time, if the government felt that it was necessary to do so in public
interest.''
D {See also Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v.
Electricity Inspector and E.T.IO. and Ors., [2007] 5 SCC 447].
14. Interpretation ofGOMS No.126 would, no doubt, depend upon
the backdrop of the events in which it was made but it is trite that the
E intention of the maker of the policy must be drawn from the language used
therein. For the said purpose, the entire document should be read in its
entirety. Original Application No.166of1990 was filed by two serving
employees. The State could in obedience to the Tribunal's order create
two supplementary posts and promote them thereto so as to treat them
F at par with their juniors working in the Finance Department. The
Notification envisages a personal pay by way of stepping up of pay. It
was given the prospective effect. No arrear of pay was to be paid. The
upgradation sanctioned was to lapse in the event of retirement of the
individuals or their promotion to the upgraded post. The said upgradation
G were to be subject to the terms and conditions contained in clause 12 of·
the said order, a reading whereof would clearly, in our opinion, lead to
only one conclusion that it was meant to be applied to the existing
employees. By reason thereof, on upgradation, the seniors were required
to continue to perform the duties attached to the existing post till they get
H their normal promotion to the next higher category. Upgradation of their
,/
-f
STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 69

( posts was further dependant on the fact as to whether they had been A
promoted in their normal course only. It was meant to be a one time affair.
In respect of some categories of employees, the question of upgradation
was deferred as specified in paragraph 12(6).
15. It would, in our opinion, therefore, be incorrect to construe that B
the notification applied to all who had been recmited to the Tamil Nadu
Secretariat Service on or before 28.1.1994. Additional benefits have been
accorded by reason of the said notification. A person who fulfills the
conditions, thus, would be entitled to the benefits provided for therein.
Those who had not fulfilled the same could not claim any benefit C
thereunder. For the said purpose, the Court, in our view, should not give
a strained or extended meaning thereto. While construing such a
notification, the financial impact thereof is also required to be taken into
consideration. {See State ofA.P. & Anr. v. A.P. Pensioners' 'Association
& Ors., (2005] 13 SCC 161 and Union ofIndia & Anr. v. Manik Lal D
Banerjee, [2006] 9 SCC 643}.
16. Reliance placed by the learned counsel on R.L. Marwaha v.
Union ofIndia & Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 31 is misplaced. This Court in
the said decision was considering validity of a subordinate legislation
whereby retrospective effect was granted. It was not a case where E
pensionary benefit was granted to a class of employees. The benefit was
meant to be accorded to the existing employees only.
17. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Venkataramani on the following
passage of The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] 3 F
SCR284:
"The learned Attorney-General, appearing in support of these
· appeals, however, contends that while a reasonable classification
of the kind mentioned above may be a test of the validity of a
particular piece of legislation, it may not be the only test which G
will cover all cases and that there may be other tests also. In answer
to the query of the Court he formulates an alternative test in the
following words : If there is in fact inequality of treatment and such
inequality is not made with a special intention of prejudicing any
particular person or persons but is made in the general interest of H
'
t-' I

70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 10 S.C.R.

A administration, there is no infringement of article 14. It is at once
obvious that, according to the test thus formulated, the validity of
State action, legislative or executive, is made entirely dependent
on the state of mind of the authority. This test will permit even
flagrantly discriminatory State action on the specious plea of good
B faith and of the subjective view of the executive authority as to the
existence of a supposed general interest of administration. This test,
if accepted, will amount to adding at the end of article 14 the words
"except in good faith and in the general interest of administration."
This is clearly not permissible for the Court to do. Further, it is
c obvious that the addition of these words will, in the language of
Brewer, J., in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W
H Ellis, (165 U.S. 150), make the protecting clause a mere rope
of sand, in no manner restraining State action. I am not, therefore,
prepared to accept the proposition propounded by the learned
D Attorney-General, unsupported as it is by any judicial decision, as
a sound test for determining the validity of State action."
This Court therein was dealing with the provisions of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act. The said decision, in our opinion, has no application
with the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly, when in the said
E decision itself, it has been pointed out that Article 14 does not insist that
every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does not
take away from the State the power to classify person for the purpose of
legislation.

F 18. As to what, therefore, is necessary for this purpose is that
classification must be rational and in order to pass the test : (1) the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia and (2) the
di:fferentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the Act.
G 19. Equally misplaced is the decision of this Court in The State of
Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors., [1974] 1
SCC 19, wherein this Court, inter alia, held that educational qualification
can be held to be a criteria for valid classification for different scales of
pay. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, held:
H
)
___,_

STATEOFTAMILNADUv. SESHACHALAM [SINHA,J.] 71

>- "The social meaning of Articles 14 to 16 is neither dull uniformity A
nor specious 'talentism'. It is a process of producing quality out
of larger areas of equality extending better facilities to the latent
capabilities of the lowly. It is not a methodology of substitution of
pervasive and slovenly mediocrity for activist and intelligent-but not
sn0bbish and uncommitted-cadres. However, if the State uses B
classification casuistically for salvaging status and elitism, the point
of no return is reached for Articles 14 to 16 and the Courts
jurisdiction awakens to dadden such manoeuvres. The soul of
Article 16 is the promotion of the common man's capabilities,
over-powering environmental adversities and opening up full C
opportunities to develop in official life without succumbing to the
sophistic argument of the elite that talent is the privilege of the few
and they must rule, wriggling out of the democratic imperative of
Articles 14 and 16 by the theory of classified equality which at
its worst degenerates into class domination." D
20. Reference has also been made by Mr. Venkataramani to a
decision of this Court in UP. Raghavendra Acharya & Ors. v. State
of Karnataka & Ors., (2006) 6 SCALE 23 wherein it was held that
pension is not a bounty and it is a deferred salary. This Court is not
concerned herein with such a situation. In the said decision, this Court E
was concerned with a case where an employee retiring on a particular
date was to receive 50% of the pension on the enhanced salary. In the
fact situation obtaining therein that as the revision of pay and consequent
revision in pension had come into force and by reason of a notification,
the modality of computing the pension was required to be determined, F
those who had fulfilled the conditions laid down therein were held to be
entitled to the benefits provided for thereunder holding that the concerned
employees had a vested right therein.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, we regret to express our inability G
.1.._ to agree with the view of the High Court. The impugned order of the High
Court is, therefore, set aside. The appeals are allowed. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no orders as to costs.
RP. Appeals allowed.
H