Holding

Premature increments granted by the Chief Justice do not require the Governor’s approval; the Chief Justice can create posts and grant such increments, and the State must include them in pension calculations.

Summary

The respondent, a former employee of the Allahabad High Court, received four premature salary increments by orders of the Chief Justice but the State of Uttar Pradesh excluded those increments when calculating his pension. The respondent challenged this in a writ petition, which a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowed. The State appealed, arguing that such increments required the Governor’s approval under Article 229 of the Constitution and the High Court’s service rules. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice, who has the power to create posts in the High Court, can also grant premature increments without the Governor’s sanction, as the relevant provisions vest that authority in the Chief Justice. Consequently, the State must incorporate the premature increments in the pension calculations. The Court also emphasized judicial discipline, directing that a Division Bench should not re‑examine a Full Bench decision de novo. The appeals were dismissed and the State was ordered to pay the pension arrears.

Issues considered

The orders granting premature increments by the Chief Justice required the Governor’s approval under Article 229 and the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff Rules.
Whether the Chief Justice has the authority to create posts and grant premature increments under Rule 27 of the Financial Hand Book.
Whether the State must consider the premature increments while calculating pension benefits.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 229

Subjects

Service lawPremature incrementsPension calculationHigh Court officersArticle 229Governor approvalJudicial disciplineStare decisis

Judgment

STATE OF U.P. AND ANR. A
v.
C.L. AGARWAL AND ANR. ETC.

MAY 2, 1997

[J.S. VERMA, CJ., M.M. PUNCHHI, S.C. AGRAWAL, B
DR. A.S. ANAND AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.)

Service Law :

"" ....~ Allahabad High Court Officers und Staff (Conditions of Service and c
Conduct) Rules, 1976/Financial Hand Book, Vol. II.

- Rules 3, 40 and 41/Rule 27-f'remature increments-<iranted to
employees of High Court by the Chief Justice-Approval of Governor-Held,
not required-Chief Justice has power to create posts in the High Court, and,
there[ore, he has power to grant premature increments to employees of the D
High Court-Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 229.

Judicial prop1iety-Division Bench of High Court-Held, should not
examine de novo the issue concluded by a Full Bench of that High
Court-Stare decisis.
:-=:. E
":' Respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 10568/96), an employee of the Al-
lahabad High Court, was granted four premature increments by orders of
' the Chief Justice. But, on his superannuation, the said premature incre-
ments were not taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating his
pensionary benefits. The. respondent filed a writ petition before the High F
Court. The matter was referred to a Full Bench, which allowed the writ
petition. Aggrieved, the State Government filed the appeal. The other
appeals were also filed in similar circumstances.

f It was contended for the appellant-State Government that the
premature increments could not have been given without the approval of G
the Governor inasmuch as the orders granting the premature increments
. were orders relating to salaries and, therefore, required approval of the
Governor as provided under Article 229 of the Constitution and the first
'
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 of the Allahabad High Court Officers
and Staff (Con4ition of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976. It was con- H
l

'
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. l S.C.R.

A tended that by virtue of Rule 27 of the Financial Hand Book Vol. II an
authority competent to create the post could only grant premature incre-
ments, and since it was Governor who had created the post occupied by
the respondent, it was only the Governor who could have approved the
grant of premature increments.

B It was also brought to the notice of this Court that some other writ
petitions, involving a similar issue, were still pending before the High
Court, and in one of the said writ petitions, a Division Bench of the High
Court had observed that in view of the decision of this Court in the case
of Supreme Cowt Employees' Welfare Association*, the issue required to be
C examined notwithstanding the impugned decision of the Full Bench. -

Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The orders of the Chief Justice granting premature
D increments did not require approval of the Governor under the provisions
of the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and
Conduct) Rules, 1976 or under the provisions of Article 229 of the Con-
stitution. (6-C-D]

1.2. The second proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 of1976 Rules states
E that the powers which are exercisable by the Governor under the rules and
orders of the Government in resped of matters regarding conditions of
Service not provided for by the 1976 Rules shall be exercised by the Chief
Justice or by such officer as he may direct. Insofar as officers and servants
of the High Court are concerned, therefore, the Chief Justice or his
p delegate exercises the powers exercisable by the Governor under such rules
and orders of the Government. Thus, it is enough that the Chief Justice
exercises the powers conferred upon the Governor under such rules and
orders of the Government; no further approval by the Governor is re-
quired. Besides, the rules and orders that are referred to are rules and
I
orders of a general nature and not orders made in exercise thereof in
G individual cases. (8-C-D; E-F]

2.1. It is the Chief Justice who has the power to create posts in the :; .
High Court. That he may do so with the approval of the Governor does
not detract from this position. The creation of a post precedes and is
H different from the approval of its creation. (9-D-E]
STAIB v. C.L.AGARWAL 3

2.2. Article 229 does not state that posts in the High Court are to be A
created by the Governor; it does not even deal with the creation-of posts. It
empowers the Chief Justice, inter alia, to make appointments of officers and
servants of a High Court. Further, Rule 3 of the 1976 Rules requires that the
number of permanent posts of the various categories in classes I to IV in the
establishment of the High Court shall be determined from time to time by B
the Chief Justice with the approval of the Governor. In any event, by reason
of the provisions of the 1976 Rules, the powers of the Governor under the
Rules and orders of the Government are exercisable by the Chief Justice in
respect of matters not covered by the 1976 Rules. [9-B; D-E]

3.1. Since it is the Chief Justice who has the power to create posts in C
the High Court, it is the Chief Justice who may grant premature incre-
ments under Rule 27 of the Financial Hand Book to the Officers and
Servants of the High Court. Moreover, even if the power under the
aforesaid Rule 27 be exercisable by the Governor, by virtue of the second
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 of the 1976 Rules, the power is exer- D
cisable by the Chief Justice. [9-F-G]

4. The approach of the State Government in refusing to take the
premature increments into account for the purposes of calculating the first
respondent's pensionary benefits, without taking appropriate proceedings,
must be deplored. The appellants shall finalise the pensionary benefits pay- E
able to the respondents taking into account the premature increments.
[10-F-H]
M. Gurnmoorthy v. Accountant Genera~ Assam & Nagaland & Ors.,
[1971) Supp. SCR 420, relied on.

5. Proposals relating to salaries, allowances, leave or pension made F
by the Chief Justices of High Courts shall be dealt with by the States with
due deference and respect. [12-B]

Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association v. Union of India &
Ors., AIR (1990) SC 334, affirmed and reiterated.
G
.- 6. Judicial discipline requires that a Division Bench should not
examine de nova an issue that is concluded by the decision of a Full Bench
of that High Court. If the Division Bench found any merit in the submis·
sion that the decision of the Full Bench was erroneous, the proper course
for it was to refer the matter to a Full Bench. The High Court shall now H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP .1 S.C.R.

A proceed expeditiously to hear and dispose of the other writ petitions
pending before it in the light of this judgment. (12-G-H; 13-A-B]

H.C. Puttaswamy & Ors. v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Kamataka
High Court & Ors., AIR (1991) SC 294, cited.

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10568 of
1996 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.9.95 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 1672 of 1995. . .....
c Sudhir Chandra, Raju Ramachandran, Kavin Gulati, R.B. Misra,
Kamlendra and M.C. Dhingra for the Appellants.
f.-

Rakesh Dwivedi, H.N. Salve, Niti Dikshit, Prashant Kumar, S.A. Syed
and Naresh Kumar for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.P. BHARUCHA, J. : These civil appeals arise upon identical facts
and may be disposed of by a common judgment. The principle judgment
~
under appeal is that of a Full Bench of the High Court at Allahabad, in
E Civil Appeal No. 10568 of 1996. The Full Bench judgment was followed by
a Division Bench of the High Court and that order is impugned in Civil
,,
~
Appeal No. 10596 of 1996.

The facts that we state relate to Civil Appeal No. 10568 of 1996. The
first respondent was appointed a Lower Division Assistant in the High
F Court at Allahabad on 1st June, 1957. He was given, on the orders of the
Chief Justice in office at the relevant time, one premature (or advance)
increment in the year 1989, two premature increments in the year 1990 and
one premature increment in the year 1991. He retired from service on 31st
July, 1994. For the purposes of calculating his pensionary benefits, the
G appellants did not take into account these premature increments. They
acled upon the basis of a letter dated 27th June, 1992, which had been
addressed by the Joint Secretary of the appellant State to the Registrar of "
the High Court in respect of a premature increment that had been granted
to one Naziin Hussain, a Section Officer of the High Court, who had then
H retired. The letter stated, "As the power to create the post is vested with
STATE v. C.LAGARWAL[BHARUCHA,J.] 5
the Governor, so under Fundamental Rule 27 it is mandatory for His A
Excellency the Governor to exercise aforesaid powers. There is similar
provision in Article 229 of the Constitution and Allahabad High Court
{Condition of Service of Staff) Rules, 1976". The letter referred to a
communication dated 30th May, 1955, addressed by the Accountant
General of the appellant State explaining the provisions in this behalf in B
the Allahabad High Court {Condition of Service of Staff) Rules, 1946, and
stated that there was no provision for grant of premature increment in the
1976 Rules. The letter concluded, "it shall be an irregularity to approve the
premature increment without prior approval of His Excellency the Gover-
nor".
c

- The first respondent filed a writ petition to quash the letter dated
27th June, 1992, and to seek a writ of manclamus to the appellant State and
its Director of Pensions to make payment of the balance of his pensionary
dues without reducing the amounts of the four premature increments that
had been granted to him by the Chief Justice of the High Court. The writ D
petition was referred to a Full Bench, and the Full Bench allowed it by the
judgment and order now impugned.

Article 229 of the Constitution deals with the officers and servants -
and the expenses of High Courts. It reads thus : E

"229. Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts. - (1)
Appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be
made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or
officer of the court as he may direct : •
F
Provided that the Governor of the State may by rule require
that in such cases as may be specified in the rule no person not
already attach.:d to the Court shall be appointed to any office
connected with the Court save after consultation with the State
Public Service Commission.
G
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature
of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a
High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by
the Chief Justice of the Court or by some other Judge or officer
of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the H
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS (1997)SUPP.1S.C.R.

A purpose:

Provided that the rules made under this clause shall, so far as they ·
relate to salaries allowances, leave or pensions, require the ap-
proval of the Governor of the State.

B (3) The administrative expenses of a High Court, including all
salaries, allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the
officers and servants of the Court, shall be charged upon the
Consolidated Fund of the State and any fees or other moneys taken
by the Court shall form part of that Fund." 't
c The Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service
and Conduct Rules, 1976, were made by the Chief Justice of the High
c
Court in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article 229 and
were notified on 13th July, 1976. Rules 3, 40 and 41 were called in aid by
D learned counsel for the appellants. They read thus :

"Strength of the establishment: - (1) The number of permanent
posts of the various categories in classes I, II, III and IV, respec-
tively, in the establishment of the High Court shall be such as may
be determined by the Chief Justice from time to time with the
E approval of Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

The Chief Justice may from time to time, create such temporary
posts as may be considered necessary with the approval of the
Governor.

F (3) The Chief Justice may leave unfilled or may hold in abeyance
any vacant post without thereby entitling any person to compen-
sation.

(4) There shall be separate cadre for each category of posts .."
G 40. Regulation of other matters - (1) All officers and servants of
the Court shall be subject to the superintendence and control of
the Chief Justice.

(2) In respect of all matters (not provided for in these rules)
H regarding the conditions of service of officers and servants of the
STATE v. C.L.AGARWAL[BHARUCHA,J.] 7
Court including matters relating to their conduct, control and A
discipline, the rules and orders for the time being in force and
applicable to Government servants holding corresponding posts in
-~
the Government of Uttar Pradesh shall apply to the officers and
servants of the Court subject to such modifications, variations, and
exceptions if any, as the Chief Justice may, from time to time, B
'
-- specify.

Provided that no order containing modifications, variations or
exceptions in rules or orders relating to salaries, allowances, leave
......
or pensions shall be made by the Chief Justice except with the
approval of the Governor. c
Provided further that the said powers exercisable under rules
and orders of Government of Uttar Pradesh by the Governor shall
be exercised by the Chief Justice or by such officer as he may, by
general or special order, direct.
D
(3) If any doubt arises in regard to a particular post in the
establishment being corresponding to a post in the State Govern-
ment, the matter will be decided by the Chief Justice.

41. Residuary powers-Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to E
-: affect the power of the Chief Justice to make such orders, from
time to time, as he may, deem fit in regard to all matters incidental
or ancillary to these rules not specifically provided for herein or
in regard to matters as have not been sufficiently provided for :

Provided that if any such order relates to salaries, allowances, F
leave or pension, the same shall be made with the approval of the
Governor of U.P."

Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the premature
increments could not have been given to the first respondents in these G
appeals without the approval of the Governor. In his submission, the orders
granting the premature increments were orders relating to salaries that
required the approval of the Governor by reason of the provisions of the
first proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40.

The argument, on a plain reading of Rule 40, is untenable. The first H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 speaks of rules or orders relating to
salaries, allowances, leave or pensions and states that these shall not be
made by the Chief Justice except with the approval of the Governor. The
second proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 refers to the powers exercisable
under rules and orders of the Government by the Governor. Reading the
c
,__

two provisos together, it is apparent that the rules and orders that are
B referred to are rules and orders of a general nature and not orders made
in exercise thereof in individual cases.

The second proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 is of importance for a

c
more fundamental reason. It states that the powers which are exercisable
by the Governor under the rules and orders of .the Government in respect
of matters regarding conditions of service not' provided for by the 1976
'{
Rules shall be exercised by the Chief Justice or by such officer as he may
direct. Insofar as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned,
therefore, the Chief Justice or his delegate exercises the powers exercisable
by the Governor under such rules and orders of the Government. Insofar .
D as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, it is enough that
the Chief Justice exercises the powers conferred upon the Governor under
such rules and orders of the Government; no further approval by the
Governor is required.

E Rule 41 gives the Chief Justice residuary powers to make orders in ..
regard to matters incidental or ancillary to the 1976 Rules and if the orders
relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pension, they are to be made with
the approval of the Governor. Once again, clearly, the reference is to the
making of general orders in regard to matters incidental or ancillary to the
1976 Rules and not in regard to orders in individual cases.
F
The orders of the Chief Justice granting premature increments did
not, therefore, require the approval of the Governor under the aforesaid
provisions.

G Learned counsel for the appellants then based his case upon Rule
27 of the Financial Hand Book, Vol. II Part II to IV, which reads thus :
~
"27. An authority may grant a premature increment to a Govern-
ment servant on a time scale of pay if it has power to create a post
H in the same cadre on the same scale of pay."
STATE v. C.L.AGARWAL[BHARUCHA,J.] 9

Learned counsel submitted that it was the Governor who~ad created the A
posts which the first respondents in these appeals had· occupied and,
therefore, it was only the Governor who could have approved the grant of
\ premature increments to them.

Article 229 does not state that posts in the High Court are to be B
created by the Governor; it does not even deal with the creation of posts.
Clause (1) thereof empowers the Chief Justice to make the appointments
of officers and servants of a High Court. Clause (2) empowers the Chief
Justice to make rules prescribing the conditions of service of officers and
servants of a High Court with the proviso that so far as these rules relate
to salaries, allowances, leave or pensions, they require the Governor's C
approval. Clause (3) requires the administrative expenses of the High
Court to be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of the State.

Rule 3 of the 1976 Rules requires that the number of permanent
posts of the various categories in classes I to IV in the High. Court's D
establishment shall be determined from time to time by the Chief Justice
with the approval of the Governor. It is, therefore, the Chief Justice who
has the power to create posts in the High Court. That he may do so with
the approval of the Governor does not detract from this position. The
creation of a post precedes and is different from the approval of its E
creation. In any event, by reason of the provisions of the 1976 Rules
referred to above, the powers of the Governor under the rules and orders
of the Government are exercisable by the Chief Justice in respect of
matters ·not covered by the 1976 Rules.

Since, then, it is the Chief Justice who has the power to create posts F
in the High Court, it is the Chief Justice who may grant premature
increments under the aforesaid Rule 27 to the officers and servants of the
High Court. Moreover, even if the power under the aforesaid Rule 27 be
exercisable by the Governor, by virtue of the Second proviso to sub-rule
(2) of Rule 40 of the 1976 Rules, the power is exercisable by the Chief G
Justice.

It needs to be noted that the appellants had before them an analysis
of the power of Chief Justice to grant premature increments in the com-
munication dated 30th May, 1955, addressed by the Additional Deputy
Secretary of the appellant State to its Accountant General, with a copy to H
A
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. lS.C.R.

the Registrar of the High Court. The letter dated 27th June, 1992, which
has been quashetfby the impugned Full Bench decision, refers to it. The
communication of 30th May, 1955 stated :
c
"Rule 7 of these rules provides that the rules and orders for the
time being in force and applicable to Government servants of
B
corresponding classes in the service of the State shall regulate
conditions of service (other than these covered by the Rules) of
persons serving on the staff attached to the High Court provided
that the powers exercisable under the said rules and orders by the

c Governor shall be exercisable by the Chief Justice or by such I-"
person as he may direct. Accordingly, the power exercisable by the
Governor under Fundamental Rule 27 Financial Hand Book Vol.
II regarding grant of premature increments is vested in the Chief
Justice in so far as the High Court staff is concerned. I am further
to invite your attention to the explanatory Note to the Financial
D Hand Book, Vol. II Part II-IV and to say that in the circumstances
the Chief Justice was fully competent to grant three premature
increments to Sri Lalloo Lal Jouhary. These orders are being
issued with the concurrence of Finance Department.

E
The letter dated 27th June, 1992, seeks to distinguish the analysis on the
basis that there was no provision for grant of premature increment in the
1976 Rules. The distinction was not justified for the substance of the
relevant provisions in the 1946 Rules remains unaltered in the 1976 Rules,
as has already been pointed out.
F
It will have been noted that the appellants did not directly challenge
the orders of the Chief Justice giving the premature increments to the first
respondents. They employed a side wind, by refusing to take these prema-
ture increments into account for the purposes of calculating the first
G respondents' pensionary benefits and, accordingly, compelled the first
respondents to file the writ petitions challenging the orders in this behalf. ~
The appellants' approach must be deplored. We can do no better than to
refer to the observations of a Constitution Bench in M. Gummoorthy v.
Accountant General, Assam & Nagaland & Ors., [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 420,
H thus:
STATE v. C.LAGARWAL[BHARUCHA,J.] 11

"Once an order had been passed by the Chief Justice of the High A
Court in exercise of his power under Article 229 of the Constitution
the only course open to the Government, if it wanted to challenge
those orders, was to take appropriate proceedings either by way
of persuading the Chief Justice to rescind or amend his order on
the Administrative side or to file a writ petition challenging his
B
orders in the High Court. But the Government took the extraor-
dinary and somewhat unusual step of directing the Accountant
General not to issue any pay slip to the appellant until final orders
of the Government were issued."

-
__.. During the course of the hearing of these appeals we noticed that an
order dated 27th October, 1995, made by a Division Bench of the High
c
Court (in Writ Petition No. 32987 of 1993, S.D. Dixit v. State of U.P. & Ors.
had been included in the paper books and asked about it. It appears that
the said writ petitioner is in the same position as are the first respondents
in the appeals before us. Learned counsel on his behalf prayed that the
Division Bench hearing the said writ petition follow the impugned Full
D
Bench Judgment. The Division Bench observed :

"The submission made above by Dr. Padia appears to be contrary
to the Apex Court decisions rendered in Supreme Court Employees
Welfare Association v. Union of India & Others, A.l.R. (1990) S.C. E
334, and in H.C. Puttaswamy & Others v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice
""· of Kamataka High Court & Others, A.LR. (1991) S.C. 294. Further,
these two decisions appear to have not been brought to the notice
of the Full Bench inadvertently as the Full Bench has not referred
to these two above mentioned Apex Court decisions which have
binding effect. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the issue F
involved in this petition in the light of the above referred decisions
of the Apex Court as the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court are
binding on this court notwithstanding the aforesaid pronounce-
ment of the Full Bench in C.L. Agarwal's case in this regard. Sri
Padia has prayed for and is granted time .. G
List this case on 15th December, 1995 ."
A

We asked learned counsel for the appellants whether he desired to rely .. '

upon the aforementioned judgments of this Court in the cases of the
Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association and H.C. Puttaswamy. H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Learned counsel stated that they were not relevant having regard to the
interpretation of the Rules that has appealed to us.

There is a passage in the judgment in the case of Supreme Court
Employees' Welfare Associatio11 that, in the context of the matters before
us, deserves to be set out. We endorse what is observed and commend it
c
B to the States so that they may deal with proposals made by their Chief
Justices with due deference and respect.

"57. So far as the Supreme Court and the High Courts are con-
cerned the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the
c concerned High Court, are empowered to fram~ rules subject to
this that when the rules are framed by the Chief Justice of India
or by the Chief Justice of the High Court relating to salaries,
allowances, leave or pensions, the approval of the President of
India or the Governor, as the case may be, is required. It is
apparent that the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of
D the High Court have been placed at a higher level in regard to the
framing of rules containing the conditions of service. It is true that
the President of India cannot be compelled to grant approval to
the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India relating to salaries,
allowances, leave or pensions, but it is equally true that when such
E rules have been framed by a very high dignitary of the State, it
should be looked upon with respect and unless there is very good
reason not to grant approval, the approval should always be
granted. If the President of India is of the view that the approval
cannot be granted, he cannot straightway refuse to grant such
approval, but before doing so, there must be exchange of thoughts
F
between the President of India and the Chief Justice of India."

We are dismayed that the Division Bench hearing the said writ
petition should have proposed to examine the issue "notwithstanding the
aforesaid pronouncement of the Full Bench judgment.. .... ". If the judgment
G in the cases of Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Associatio11 and H.C.
Puttaswamy were cited and the respondents to the said writ petition
submitted that the Full Bench judgment was erroneous by reason thereof, .;.
the proper course for the Division Bench to follow, if. it found any merit
in the submission, was to refer the said writ petition to a Full Bench. ,
H Judicial discipline requires that a Division Bench should not ex-
STATE v. C.L.AGARWAL[BHARUCHA,J.] 13

amine de novo an issue that is concluded by the decision of a Full Bench A
of that High Court.

The High Court shall now proceed to expeditiously hear and dispose
of the said writ petition and the three or four other similar writ petitions
that are stated to be pending before it in the light of this judgment.
B
The appeals are dismissed. The appellants shall finalise within 6
weeks from today the pensionary benefits payable to the first respondents
in the appeals taking into account the premature infrements that had so
far been excluded and shall pay them all arrears in this behalf within 12
weeks from today. C
The appellants shall pay to the first respondents in each of these
appeals the costs thereof fixed at Rs. 10,000.

R.P. Appeals dismissed.