Holding

Article 311(1) does not require that disciplinary proceedings be initiated by the appointing authority; a subordinate authority may do so unless a rule expressly provides otherwise.

Summary

The State of Uttar Pradesh dismissed Assistant Agriculture Inspector Chandrapal Singh after disciplinary proceedings initiated by the District Agriculture Officer, who was subordinate to the Director of Agriculture, the appointing authority. Singh challenged the dismissal before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal, arguing that a subordinate authority could not initiate disciplinary action, a view upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined Article 311(1) of the Constitution and held that the provision does not require the appointing authority to be the initiator of disciplinary proceedings unless a specific rule mandates it. Relying on precedents such as State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, P.V. Srinivas v. Union of India, and Registrar of Co‑operative Societies v. Fernando, the Court concluded that the dismissal was valid. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal and High Court orders and upheld the dismissal, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether disciplinary proceedings and dismissal of a civil servant can be initiated by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority under Article 311(1) of the Constitution in the absence of a specific rule.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 311(1)

Subjects

Service lawDisciplinary proceedingsArticle 311Appointment authorityDismissalPublic Service TribunalConstitutional law

Judgment

A STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.
--._;,..
v.
CHANDRAPAL SINGH AND ANR.

MARCH 12, 2003

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARJJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Service law:

Dismissal from service-Assistant Agricultural lnspeclor-Dis~iplinary
c proceedings against for irregularities and misconduct-Accepting inquiry
report, disciplinary authority dismissed the delinquent from service-Order
challenged before Service Tribunal on the ground that disciplinmy proceedings
were initiated by an officer lower in rank than that ofthe dis,:;iplinary authority
therefore, the disciplina1y proceedings initiated and i_ts further culmination in
D order of dismissal were all vitiated-Claim allowed by Tribunal and affirmed
by High Court-Held. looking to the terms and contents of Article 31 I of the
Constitution, it does not follow that even initiation or conduct of inquiry
proceedings should be by that authority itself which is empowered to dismiss
or remove an official under the said Article, unless there is an express rule
governing the official requiring it to be so-On facts, at the time ofappointment,
E disciplinary proceedings and order of dismissal, the authority initiating the
disciplinwy proceedings was itself disciplinary authority-Judgment of High
Court set aside-Order of dismissal restored-Disciplinmy Proceedings-
Authority competent to initiate-Constitution of India-Article 31 l(d).

State of MP. and Ors. v. Shardul Singh, (1970( I SCC 108; P.V.
F Srinivas and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., 11993] I SCC 419 and Registrar
of Co-operative Societies v. Fernando; (1994] 2 SCC 746, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeal No. 1295 of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.1995 of the Allahabad High
G Court in C.M.W.P. No. 14226 of 1981.
-
R.C. Verma, Mukesh Verma and Manish Shanker for the Appellants.

Rajeev Sharma, Tara Chandra Sharma and Ajay Sharma, for the
H Respondents.
1062
STA TE v. CHAND RAP AL SINGH 1063
The following Order of the Court was delivered : A
The State of U .P. and another are before us in this appeal, assailing the
order passed by the High Court in a writ petition affirming the order passed
by the U.P. Public Service Tribunal No. III, Lucknow. The respondent No.
1 herein was appointed as Assistant Agriculture Inspector, Group-III by the
Director of Agriculture. On account of certain irregularity or misconduct the B
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the District Agriculture
Officer. After holing enquiry, he submitted a report to the disciplinary authority
which authority, accepting the report of the District Agriculture Officer, passed
the order of dismissal dated 11.4.1977 dismissing the respondent no. I from
service. Challenging the said order of dismissal, the respondent No. I filed C
a claim petition before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal. Before the said
Tribunal, a contention wits raised that respondent No. I having been appointed
by the Director of Agriculture, the District Agriculture Officer could not have
initiated the disciplinary proceedings. Consequently, the disciplinary
proceedings initiated and further proceedings taken, culminating into an order
of dismissal, were all vitiated. The Tribunal accepted this contention, observing D
that subsequent delegation of power or making the District Agriculture Officer
an appointing authority in relation to Group III posts, to which respondent
No. 1 belonged at the relevant point of .time, would not cure the defect,
namely, initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the District Agriculture
Officer while the Director of Agriculture having been the appointing authority. E
Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the State filed writ petition
before the High Court. The High Court agreeing with the findings recorded
by the Tribunal, dismissed the writ petition. Hence, this appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellants contended that respondent No.
1 was appointed as Assistant Agriculture Inspector on 24.6.1966; disciplinary p
proceedings were initiated against him by the District Agriculture Officer on
10.1.1974 and the order of dismissed came to be passed on 11.4.1977. He

- pointed out two G.Os. dated 15.6.1961and26.12.1983 to show that on those
dates the District Agriculture Officer was the appointing authority by virtue
of the powers conferred on them by all the relevant G.Os. which had the
assent of the Governor. On the basis of these G.Os., the learned counsel G
contended that prior to the appointment of the respondent No. I, these G.Os.
were very much in existence. It appears to us that the Tribunal and the High
Court were under a wrong impression that the District Agriculture Officer
was made an appointing authority subsequent to the initiation of the
,..,- disciplinary proceedings. He further submitted that initiation of disciplinary H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A proceedings could be by an authority lower in rank than the disciplinary
authority. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on the decisions
of this court in 1970 (I) SCC 108, 1993 (!) SCC 419 and, 1994 (2) SCC 746.
According to the learned counsel, having regard to these aspects both the
Tribunal and the High Court committed an error and the impugned order
cannot be sustained.
B
In opposition, the learned counsel for respondent No. I strongly
contended that the two suspension orders were passed - one by the Project
Officer who was lower in rank to the District Agriculture Officer and the
second by the District Agriculture Officer and there was inconsistency between
C the two. Even though the G.Os. referred to by the learned counsel for the
appellant were prior to the appointment of respondent No. I, and the District
Agriculture Officer was the appointing authority yet he was appointed by the
Director of Agriculture. He further submitted that when the Tribunal and the
High Court have concurrently found in favour of respondent No., 1 this
Court may not disturb the concurrent finding.
D
The facts that are not in dispute are: the respondent no. I was appointed
on 24.6.1966; the two G.Os, afore-mentioned were very much in existence
and operative much prior to his appointment, under which G.Os. the District
Agriculture Officer was competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings as an
appointing authority, as is evident from the G.Os. themselves. He was
E appointed by the Director of Agriculture and the order of dismissal was
passed by the Director of Agriculture on 11.4.1977. In other words, it is the
appointing authority which passed the order of dismissal. Before the Tribunal,
the stand of respondent No. I was that the District Agriculture Officer being
lower in rank than the appointing authority of respondent No. I, namely the
p Director of Agriculture, neither he could initiate disciplinary proceedings nor
any action could be taken on the disciplinary proceedings so initiated by an
incompetent authority. This contention found favour with the Tribunal as
well as with the High Court. Before us, the learned counsel for respondent
No. 1 submitted that the District Agriculture Officer was the appointing
Authority in the year 1966, when tlie respondent No. I was appointed, the
G Director of Agriculture could not have appointed him. This submission ignores
the basic fact that if this order of appointment was incompetent, in that case
the very appointment of re~pondent No. I goes away: It appears that this is
a stand taken before us for the first time and we have no hesitation to reject
th is contention. In terms of Article 311 of the Constitution, no person who
H .is a member of civil service of the Union or All India Service or civil service
STATE v. CHAND RAP AL SINGH 1065
of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State, shall be dismissed A
or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which _he was appointed.
Admittedly, in this case, the Director of Agriculture actually appointed the
respondent No. I.

This Court in State of M.P. and Ors. v. Shardul Singh, [1970] 1 SCC
I 08 has held that Article 311 (I) provides that no person who is a member of B
civil service of the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. However, that Article
does not in terms require that the authority is empowered under that provision
to dismiss or remove an official should itself initiate or conduct enquiry
proceeding.
c
In the case of P. V Srinivas and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1993]
SCC 419 referring to the judgment of this Court in Shardul Singh (supra)
the position is retreated.

In Registrar of Cooperative Societies v. Fernando, [1994] 2 SCC 746, D
referring to the two afore-mentioned decisions of this Court, the position is
made clear thus in paragraph 16:-

"It was on the basis of this G.O., on March 20, 1989 the Registrar
issued the charge memo. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer
to a recent decision of this Court reported in P. V. Srinivasa Sas try v. E
Controller and Auditor General. The relevant Observations at pages
1323-24 are as under:- (SCC pp.422-23, paras 4-5 and 6)

'But Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental
proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority.
However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government F
to make any rule prescribing that even the proceeding against
any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not

- subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such rule shall
not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution
because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard
or protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of G
any such rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from
Article 311 of the Constitution.

It need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceeding
per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences, H
.,...
.

1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A and the framers of the Constitution did not consider it necessary to
guarantee even that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India
or under the State Government. At the same time, this will not give
right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against
whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any
such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a rule, any superior
B authority who can be held to be the controlling authority, can initiate
such proceeding.

In the case of State of UP. v. Shardul Singh, the departmental enquiry
had been initiated against the Sub-Inspector of Police by the
Superintendent of Police, who sent his inquiry report to the Inspector-
c General, who was the appointing authority. The Inspector General of
Police dismissed the officer concerned from the service of the State
Government. That order was challenged on the ground that the
initiation of the departmental enquiry by the Superintendent of Police
was against the mandate of Article 3 I I (I) of the Constitution. This
D contention was accepted by the High Court. But this Court said:-
(SCC p.I 12, para I 0)

"We are unable to agree with the High Court that the guarantee given
under Article 3 I I (I) includes within itself a further guarantee that
the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a
E civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authorities
mentioned in that Article.

Although Article 3 l l of the Constitution does not speak as to
who shall initiate the disciplinary proceedings but, as already stated
above, that can be provided and prescribed by the rules. But if no
F rules have been framed, saying as to who shall initiate the departmental
proceeding, then on the basis of Article 3 I I of the Constitution, it
cannot be urged that it is only the appointing authority and no officer
subordinate to such authority can initiate the departmental proceeding.
In the present case, it was not brought to our notice that any rule
prescribed that the Accountant General, who is the appointing authority
G
alone could have initiated a departmental proceeding."

Thus, looking to the terms and content of Article 3 I I (I) of the
Constitution, it does not follow that even initiation or conduct of inquiry
proceedings should be by that authori\Y itself, which is empowered to dismiss
H or remove an official under the said Article, unless there is an express rule
ST ATE v. CHAND RAP AL SINGH 1067
governing the official requiring it to be so. A
We have to take note of one more fact that is the order of dismissal was
passed in 1977. We are told that respondent No. I was not reinstated in
service even after the Tribunal passed the order of reinstatement because of
the interim order granted by the High Court as well as by the status quo order
passed by this Court. Even otherwise, having regard to the age of respondent B
No. I in all probability, the respondent No. I would have attained the age of
superannuation by now. Thus, having regard to all aspects, the impugm;d
judgment cannot be sustained. Hence, it is set aside, the order of dismissal
of respondent No. I· from service is upheld. Appeal allowed accordingly. No
costs.
c
R.P. Appeal allowed.

r