STATE OF U.P. & ANR.versusU.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS NIGAM S.S. & ORS.

                         [2008] 7 S. C.R. 536


A                     STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
                                v.
         U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS NIGAM S.S. & ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 3202 of 2008)
                           MAY 2, 2008
B
              [C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]

        Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Decision of
  retrenchment of employees of Government concern - On
                                                                    ,
c account of loss occurring to the concern - Writ petition
  questioning the decision of retrenchment - Praying for
  absorption in other Government concerns in case of
  retrenchment -Several interim orders passed in the petition -
  Difference of opinion between the judges of Division Bench of
  High Court - Reference to third judge - Final decision in
0
  favour of the workmen - Direction for their absorption on the
  basis of assurance given by the State and for payment of
  compensation - On appeal held: the writ petition was not
  maintainable in view of availability of alternative remedy - It
  cannot be laid down as legal proposition that once a petition
E is admitted, it can never be dismissed on the ground of
  alternative remedy - Propriety of the action of the employer
  being a disputed question of fact could have been decided by
  a Labour Court alone on the basis of evidence adduced -
  The absorption was regulated by statutory rules - Hence
F direction for absorption on assurance of State without
  considering the rules was not correct - There can be no
  estoppel against a statute - A court can direct a State by
  mandamus to act in consonance with law and not in violation
  thereof - The workers a/so failed to show having any right of
G absorption - Order of High Court to pay compensation is a/so
  wrong as entitlement to compensation on account of violation
  of any law has not been shown - Moreover, the order was not
  even capable of implementation - Writs - Mandamus -
  Compensation - Estoppel - Labour Laws.
H                               536
 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS       537
               NIGAM S.S. & ORS.

     The Board of Directors of U.P. State Mineral             A
Development Corporation Ltd. (appellant) decided to
retrench about 50% of its employees. Employees made
representation to the appellant-Corporation as well as to
the appellant-State making grievance that the action was
illegal. They also prayed for their absorption in other       B
departments of the State or other Public Sector
Undertakings. However, no final order of retrenchment
was passed. Since neither the Corporation nor the State
gave any assurance, respondent-Samiti filed a writ
petition. In the petition, by several interim orders, High    c
Court had directed the Corporation and the State to pay
salary to the workmen. Corporation contended that the
petition was not maintainable as the same was premature
because no action of retrenchment was taken and also
alternative and efficacious remedy under U.P. Industrial
                                                              0
Disputes Act was available to the employees; that decision
of retrenchment of excess employees was taken in view
of shrinkage of activities of the Corporation and because
the Corporation was in acute financial crisis. The matter
was placed before Division Bench for disposal of the
matter. One of the Judges held that since alternative         E
remedy was available to the workmen, writ petition was
not maintainable. He held that the Corporation was 'totally
sick' and dismissed the petition. Second judge held that
the petition having been entertained and several interim
orders having been passed, cannot be dismissed on the         F
ground of availability of alternative remedy and on merits
held in favour of the workmen and issued writ of
mandamus. In view of difference of opinion, matter was
referred to third judge, who concurred with opinion in
favour of the employees and observing that the State          G
Government had stated that employees would be
absorbed, directed for their absorption. In the meanttme
review petition against the order was dismissed by the
third judge, further directing the State to absorb the
employees in phased manner. Thereafter State/                 H
    538       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2008) 7 S.C.R.


A Corporation moved application for placing the petition
  before Division Bench of High Court for final order in the
  writ petition. In the application, they also sought
  permission to place on record Rules regarding absorption
  and certain facts, which was denied by the Division Bench.
B In appeal against that, Supreme Court directed the matter
  to be placed before Division Bench of High Court for final
  disposal. Accordingly when the matter was placed before
  Division Bench, it allowed the writ petition. Hence the
  present appeal.
C         Allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1 The High Court was wrong in holding that
  "the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of
  alternative remedy if the same has been entertained and
  interim order has been passed". True it is that issuance
D of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant
  consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to
  the High Court that the matter could be decided by a writ
  Court. But it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law
  that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed
E on the ground of alternative remedy. [Paras 35 and 38)
  [557-B, C, H; 558-A]
          Suresh Chandra Tewari v. District Supply Officer, AIR
    1992 All 331 - held inapplicable.
F        Methodist Church in India v. Bareilly Development
    Authority, AIR 1988 All 151; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar
    of Trademarks, AIR 1999 SC 22 - referred to.
       1.2 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
  particularly in view of assertions by the Corporation that
G its work had been substantially reduced; it was running
  into losses; the question was considered by the Board
  of Directors and it was resolved to retrench certain
  employees, it would have been appropriate, had the High
  Court not entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of
H the Constitution of India. [Para 39) [558-D, E]
     STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS        539
                   NIGAM S.S. & ORS.

          Scooters India v. Vijai E. V E/dre 1998 (6) SCC 549 -   A
    referred to.
          1.3 Whether the action could or could not have been
    taken or whether the action of the Corporation was or was
    not in consonance with law could be decided on the basis
    of evidence to be adduced by the parties. Normally, when 8
    such disputed questions offact come up for consideration
    and are required to be answered, appropriate forum
    would not be a writ court but a Labour Court or an
    Industrial Tribunal which has jurisdiction to go into the
    controversy. On the basis of evidence led by the parties, C
    the Court/Tribunal would record a finding of fact and reach
    an appropriate conclusion. Even on that ground,
    therefore, the High Court was not justified in allowing the ·
    petition and in granting relief. [Para 41] [558-G; 559-A, BJ
                                                                  D
          1.4 The pleas on behalf of the employees that the
    Corporation was not right when it stated that there was
    no work and several projects came to be closed; that
    many employees were absorbed by the Corporation and
    there was an element of 'pick and choose' which was
    arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of E
    Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution; and that
     according to the Samiti, loss caused to the Corporation,
     it was the result of wrong and improper decisions of the
     Corporation and the State Government and poor
     employees should not suffer on that count, it could be F
    examined by an appropriate Court/Tribunal under the
    Industrial Law and not by a writ Court exercising power ·
    of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. 1{
    the impugned action of the Corporation retrenching
    several employees is not in consonance with law, the G
    employees are certainly entitled to relief from an
<   appropriate authority. If any action is taken which is
    arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise not in consonance
    with the provisions of law, such authority or Court/
    Tribunal is bound to consider it and legal and legitimate H
   540      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A relief can always be granted keeping in view the evidence
  before it and considering statutory provisions in vogue.
  [Paras 49 and 50] [562-A-E]
       2.1 The High Court was not right in rejecting prayer
  of the Corporation to bring on record statutory rules
B framed under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution
  of India. If there were statutory rules and such rules
  provide for absorption of employees on certain grounds
  and on fulfillment of some conditions laid down in those
  rules, it was the duty of the High Court to consider those
C rules and to decide whether under the statutory rules,
  such absorption could be ordered. [Para 42) [559-C-E]
        2.2 A Court of Law can direct the Government or an
  instrumentality of State by mandamus to act in
  consonance with law and not in violation of statutory
D provisions. Unless a Court records a finding that act of
  absorption of all employees of the Corporation either in
  Government Department or in any other Public Sector
  Undertaking is in accordance with law, no writ can be
  issued. [Para 46) [561-A, BJ
E
        2.3 Since the High Court was considering the prayer
  of the petiUoners to grant a writ in the nature of
  mandamus, it was, expected of the High Court to keep in
  view the relevant provisions of law. The High Court mainly
  relied upon an assurance said to have been given by the
F Secretary on behalf of the Corporation that excess
  employees would be absorbed either in the Government
  Department or in other Public Sector Undertakings. From
  the record it appears that it was the case of the Secretary
  of the Corporation that no such assurance was given by
G him to the Court. But even if he had given such assurance,
  it was of no consequence since in the teeth of statutory       i-
  rules, such assurance had no legal efficacy. Moreover, an
  application was made on affidavit by the Secretary of the
  Corporation clarifying the position and praying for
H modification of the earlier order passed by the High Court
 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS     541
               NIGAM S.S. & ORS.

in which such statement on behalf of the Corporation A
appeared. The High Court, however, rejected even that
application. Even on that ground, the High Court ought
not to have issued final directions. [Para 43] [559-E-H;
560-A, B]
     2.4 It is settled law that there can be no estoppel 8
against a statute. If the field was occupied by statutory
rules, the employees could get their rights only under
those rules. The High Court was equally bound to
consider those rules and to come to the conclusion
whether under the statutory rules, the retrenched C
employees were entitled to absorption either in
Government Department or in any other Public Sector
Undertaking. Statement, assurance or even undertaking
of any officer or a counsel of the respondent-Corporation.
or of the Government Pleader of the State is irrelevant. D
The High Court, ought to have considered the prayer of
the Corporation and decided the question if it wanted to
dispose of the matter on merits inspite of availability of
alternative remedy to the employees.[Para 44] [560-8,
C,~                                                        E
     3. It was incumbent on the employees to show the
right of absorption of retrenched employees in
Government Department or other Public Sector
Undertakings. The petitioners had prayed for a writ of
mandamus which presupposes a legal right in favour of F
the applicant. Such right must be a subsisting right and
enforceable in a Court of Law. There must be
corresponding legal duty on the part of the respondent-
Corporation or Government which required the
Corporation or Government 'to do that which a statute G
required it to do'. No such right of absorption has been
shown by the petitioners. Nor any such corresponding
duty of the respondents could be shown to the High Court
by the employees. No such direction of absorption of all
employees, hence, could be issued by the High Court. H
    542      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2008] 7 S.C.R.


A The High Court failed to appreciate all these relevant
  considerations. [Para 45] [560-E-H; 561-A]
        4.1 Regarding payment of compensation to the
  employees also, the High Court was not right. No finding
  has been recorded by the High Court that a specific or
8 particular provision of law had been violated which
  entitled the workers to claim compensation. No reasons
  had been recorded by the High Court in the impugned
  judgment for issuing such direction nor any basis for such
  direction has been shown. Therefore, no such blanket
C direction could have been ·issued by the High Court
  which was not even capable of implementation. [Para 47]
  [561-C-F]
       4.2 It is worth consideration whether an order passed
D or direction issued is susceptible of implementation and
  enforcement, and if it is not implemented whether
  appropriate proceedings including proceedings for willful
  disobedience of the order of the Court can be initiated
  against the opposite party. The direction issued by the
  High Court falls short of this test and on that ground also,
E the order is vulnerable. [Para 48] [561-F, G]
        5. Though the writ petition filed by the petitioners
  stands dismissed, it is open to the employees to approach
  an appropriate Court/Tribunal in accordance with law and
F to raise all contentions available to them. It is equally open
  to the Corporation and the State authorities, to defend and
  support the action taken by them. [Para 52] [562-H; 563-A]
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    3202 of 2008.
G
         From the Judgment and Order dated 14.7.2006 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in
    W.P. No. 338 (S/B) of 1997.
        Dr. R.G. Padia, Mohd. Furzail Khan and Anuvrat Sharma
H for the Appellants.
      STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS               543
           NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

          L. Nageswar Rao, Vikrant Yadav, Amit Kumar Chawla,               A
     Sanjay R. Hegde and Pradeep Misra for the Respondents.
          The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by
          C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted.

,-         2. The present appeal is directed against the judgment B
     and final order dated July 14, 2006 passed by the High Court of
     judicature at Allahabad, (Lucknow Bench) in Writ Petition No.
     338 (SIB) of 1997. By the said order, the writ petition filed by
     Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sang harsh Samiti ·
     ('Samiti' for short) and Others against the U.P. State Mineral        c
     Development Corporation Ltd. and the State of U.P. was allowed
     and a writ of mandamus was issued to the respondents to
     absorb the employees of the Corporation in various
     organizations of State GovernmenU Public Sector Undertakings
     and to pay compensation in accordance with law.                  D

           3. The case has a chequered history and it is necessary
     to highlight it to understand the controversy raised in the present
     proceedings.
           4. On March 23, 1974, U.P. State Mineral Development E
     Corporation Ltd. ('Corporation' for short) was incorporated as
     a Government Company under Section 617 of the Companies
     Act, 1956. The Corporation was established with a view to
     provide acceleration in the field of mining and other incidental
     activities. Initially, the Corporation was floated with authorized F
     share capital of Rs.20 crores which was subsequently increased
     to Rs.60 crores. It was a Government Company wherein 100%
     paid up share capital was by the State. It was thus completely
     owned by the Government. It was under the direct control and
     supervision of the State Government. The Corporation was thus
                                                                          G
     an 'instrumentality' of the State. In the beginning, the Corporation
     showed profits. Subsequently, however, the financial status was
>
     deteriorated and it started incurring losses. The Board of
     Directors, therefore, on December 19, 1996 decided to retrench
     460 employees. The Board was required to pay retrenchment
                                                                          H
    544          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A compensation to those employees. Accordingly, a request was
  made to the State Government to advance loan of Rs.5 crores
  to enable the Corporation to pay retrenchment compensation
  to the employees. A resolution to that effect was also passed by
  the Board of Directors. In the resolution, reasons were indicated
B which impelled the Corporation to take a decision to retrench
  more than 50% of its staff. There were 838 employees out of
  which 744 were regu~ar employees and 94 were on
  consolidated salary.
        5. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Board of
C Directors, employees preferred a representation to the
  Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation and also
  to the State Government. In the representation, grievance was
  made by them that the proposed action was illegal and they
  should not be retrenched. It was indicated that financial position
D of the Corporation could be improved. A prayer was also made
  to absorb employees of the Corporation in other Departments
  of the State or other Public Sector Undertakings if they were to
  be relieved. No final order of retrenchment was, however,
  passed. Since neither the Corporation nor the Government gave
E assurance with regard to continuation or otherwise of the
  Corporation, nor as to absorption of employees working in the
  Corporation in the State Government or any other Corporation,
  the Samiti was constrained to file a writ petition in the High Court
  of Judicature at Allahabad, (Lucknow Bench) in 1997 for the
F following reliefs;
         Whereas, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
    Court may kindly be pleased to-
          (i)    To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
                 mandamus directing the respondent to absorb the
G
                 services of the employees of the Corporation on
                 suitable posts in any of the Corporation under its
                 control in any of its department;                       '·
          (ii)   To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
H                mandamus commanding the State of U.P. to prepare
          STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS                  545
               NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

                      a list of retrenched employees of the various                A
                      Corporations and absorb them in accordance with
                      length of their services;
                      In the alternative, issue a writ, order or direction in
    ~,
                      the nature of mandamus commanding the State of
                      U.P. and the Corporation to pay compensation at the          B
                      rate admissible under the provision of the Industrial
                      Disputes Act, 1947 and additional wages at the rate
                      of six years salary to the member of the petitioner-
                      Association who are sought to be retrenched;
                                                                                   c
               (iii) To issue a writ, order or any direction which the
                     Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the
                     circumstances of the case; and
               (iv)   To allow the writ petition with all costs in favour of ~he
                      petitioner.                                                  D

               6. It was the allegation of the Samiti in the writ petition that
         loss has been sustained by the Corporation because of various
         wrong policy decisions taken by the U. P. Government and the
         Corporation. Several employees of the Corporation were not
                                                                                   E
         paid their salary and they were facing great hardship. Their family
         members had also suffered a lot and they were on the verge of
         starvation.
               7. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Corporation
         through its Managing Director. By way of preliminary objections, F
         it was contended that the petition was premature inasmuch as
         no action of retrenchment was taken by the Corporation.
         Moreover, alternative and efficacious remedy under the U.P.
         Industrial Disputes Act was available to the petitioners. On
         merits, it was contended that in view of shrinkage in the activities G
)
         of the Corporation and also increase of wage bill because of
         huge surplus manpower, the Board of Directors of the
         Corporation took a decision on December 19, 1996 to retrench
         excess employees in accordance with law. According to the
         deponent, the Corporation was in acute financial crisis and totally
                                                                              H
    546       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A dependant on grant-in-aid from the U.P. Government. The
  Corporation had closed down its mining activities in Lambidhar
  Mines at Mussorie as per the direction issued by the Supreme
  Court (this Court). Even at other places, it had to face competition
  from private sector. Because of drastic change in global
B industrialization and liberalized economic policy introduced by
  the Government, non-resident Indians (NRls) were attracted and
  several industrial entrepreneurs in the State entered into the
  business of mining. Various projects had been developed in
  joint sector as well as in private sector which had also adversely
c affected the Corporation. The Corporation was not able to pay
  salary to its employees in its various Units at Dehradun, Chopan,
  Allahabad, Lalitpur etc. It was stated that an Undertaking cannot
  be forced to run its business on continuous loss and be directed
  to carry on huge surplus manpower and work force without work.
D It was, therefore, submitted that the writ petition filed by the
  Samiti was liable to be dismissed.
        8. It is clear from the record that several interim orders
  were passed by the High Court from time to time and the
  Corporation was directed to pay salary to the employees. The
E matter was then placed for hearing which came up before a
  Division Bench of the High Court. The Bench consisted of two
  Hon'ble Judges, viz. Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Katju (as His
  Lordship then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.K. Dhaon. Hon'ble
  Mr. Justice Katju, vide an order dated December 17, 1999 held
F that the petitioners should have availed of alternative remedy
  available under the Industrial Law and should not have
  straightaway filed a writ petition in the High Court under Article
  226 of the Constitution.According to His Lordship, if an industry
  was closed down, a remedy available to the workers was to
G apply for closure compensation under Section 25 FFF of the
  Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
  before the Labour Court/Tribunal. If it was not closed down, their
  remedy was to apply to the prescribed authority under the
  Payment of Wages Act or to a Labour Court!Tribunal under
  Section 33C(2) of the Act or under Section 6H(2) of the U.P.
H
       STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS              547
 ~'
            NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

      Industrial Disputes Act. But, it was not proper for the High Court A
      to entertain such prayer in a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
      the Constitution. It was also observed that in spite of the fact
      that virtually the Corporation had stopped its activities and the
      business had come to an end, by several interim orders passed
 t    from time to time, the High Court directed the Corporation and B
      the State to pay salary to the workmen though they had not
      worked. By such interim orders, crores of rupees had been paid
      to the workmen. Highlighting the difficulties of the Government
      and Public Sector Undertakings in commercial establishments,
      His Lordship made larger and wider observations as to the c
      policy of the Government in commercial matters. His Lordship
      recommended the Central and State Governments to rapidly
      privatize most of the public sectors and services like banks,
      telephone, electricity, waterworks, municipal services, etc. We,
,l    however, express no opinion on that issue.
                                                                           D
            9. As regards, the appellant-Corporation, His Lordship said
      that it was a 'totally sick' unit. On the prayers of the Samiti, it
      was observed that the workers had been treated over-indulgently.
      Most of them had been without work and were surplus and crores
      of rupees had been paid to them for doing nothing. The money E
      had come from public purse and it was unfair to grant relief in
      such a petition. Accordingly, the petition was ordered to be
      dismissed.
            10. The other Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.K. Ohaon),
      however, did not concur with the view expressed by Hon'ble Mr. F
      Justice Katju. According to His Lordship, the petitioners
      approached the Court by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution
      on April 10, 1997. Notice was issued by the Court on the petition
      on the next day i.e. on April 11, 1997 and several interim orders
      were passed thereafter from time to time. It would not be proper G
      to dismiss the petition on the ground of availability of alternative
      remedy after the writ-petition was entertained, observed Hon'ble
      Mr. Justice Dhaon. His Lordship stated that the Corporation had
      considered the problem and in the counter-affidavit, it was said
      that attempts had been made to absorb employees of the H
    548       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A Corporation either in the Government or in other Public Sector
  Undertakings. It was further observed that several interim orders
  which were passed by the Court came to be challenged by the
  Corporation in this Court and this Court also did not interfere
  with those orders. It was, therefore, not a fit case to dismiss the
B petition.

         11. Moreover, as held by the High Court of Allahabad in
    Suresh Chandra Tewari v. District Supply Officer, AIR 1992 All
    331, a petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative
    remedy if the same had been entertained and interim order had
C   been passed. Relying on another decision of the same Court in
    Methodist Church in India v. Bareil/y Development Authority,
  AIR 1988 All 151, it was indicated that alternative remedy does
  not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant relief under
  Article 226 of the Constitution and in spite of availability of such
D remedy, it is open to a High Court to grant relief if it is found
  necessary for promotion of justice or prevention of injustice which
  is the object of constitutional provision. Reliance was also
  placed on a decision of this Court in Whirlpool Corporation v.
  Registrar of Trademarks, Al R 1999 SC 22 that alternative
E remedy is no bar in case of infrin£iement of fundamental rights
  enshrined in Part 111 of the Constitution.

        12. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dhaon then considered the merits
  of the case and possible absorption of employees of the
  Corporation in Government Departments or Public Sector
F Undertakings. Various meetings were held for the said purpose
  and assurance was given to the Court by the Corporation as
  also on behalf of the Government. His Lordship, in the
  circumstances was of the view that the writ petition was required
  to be allowed. The petition was accordingly allowed and a writ
G in the nature of mandamus was issued directing the respondents
  to pay salary to the employees within four months from the date
  of the order and also to take necessary steps for their absorption
  in various organizations of the State GovernmenUPublic Sector
  Undertakings expeditiously. Liberty, however, was granted to
H the respondents to take appropriate steps for the retrenchment
             STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS              549
                  NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

       ..   of the employees keeping in view the resolution passed by the       A
            Corporation.
                 13. In view of difference of opinion between two Hon'ble
            Judges of the Division Bench, an order was passed on the same
            day, signed by both the Hon'ble Judges to place the papers
            before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate    B
            Bench.
      '           14. It appears that in view of cleavage of opinion, the matter
            was placed before a third Judge (Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H.A.
            Raza), who after hearing the parties and considering opinions c
            of two judges, held that he was in agreement with the view
            expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dhaon. His Lordship, however,
            observed that the State Government had stated that the
            employees of the Corporation would be absorbed and as such
            nothing remained to be decided except that the State
                                                                                 D
            Government should expedite their absorption in the State service
      -..   or Public Sector Undertakings on suitable post within a period
            of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of
            the order.
                 15. His Lordship then stated;                                  E
                 "List the petition before the Division Bench for appropriate
~                orders".

                 16. The above order was passed on January 5, 2001.
                 17. In view of the above direction, it was incumbent on the    F
       f
            Registry to place the matter before a Division Bench. It was,
            however, not done.
      "
                  18. Meanwhile, a Review Petition No. 70 s/s of 2001 was
            filed by the State Government highlighting difficulties in the
                                                                                G
            process of absorption. It was, therefore, prayed to review the
            order, dated January 5, 2001.
      I
       -          19. When the review was placed before Hon'ble Mr. Justice
            Raza, it was dismissed by the Court observing that the learned
-'I         Additional Chief Standing Counsel pressed only one point in         H
    550          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A   the review petition that the direction of the Court to absorb
                                                                         ..
    employees of the Corporation be extended so that the majority
    judgment of the Court could be implemented by the State
    Government. The request was accepted and the State
    Government was directed to absorb employees in a phased                          \,

B   manner within a period of six months.                                            ...
          20. The Court then stated;                                         ~       'fF




          "As the State Government itself has derived a policy of
          absorption, the matter need not put up before the Division
c         Bench".

        21. Review petition was thus disposed of on July 13, 2001.
  In view of the above observations, the matter was not placed
  before a Division Bench and no order was passed by the Bench.
  Contempt proceedings were also initiated by the employees
D that the orders passed by the Court were not obeyed and not
  implemented.
                                                                         ..-
           22. On March 19, 2005, the appellants moved an
    application before the Senior Judge of the High Court (Lucknow
    Bench) for listing the writ petition before an appropriate Bench
E
    for final disposal; since there was no final decision on the writ
    petition except opinions of three Hon'ble Judges. The application
                                                                                 t
    moved by the Corporation was registered as Civil Miscellaneous
    Application No. 12153 of 2005. The Senior Judge of the
    Lucknow Bench passed the following order on March 30, 2005;
F
          "List before a Division Bench in which Hon'ble U.K. Dhaon     ·•
          is a member in next week."                                     ..
       23. The matter was then placed before a Division Bench
  (Coram : U.K. Dhaon & J.M. Paliwal, JJ.) The Corporation on                        I
G May 9, 2005, filed supplementary counter-affidavit placing on                      i
  record inter alia the following facts and materials;
          (i) . Absorption Rules, 1991;


H
          (ii)   Policy of the State Government regarding absorption
                 of employees, dated July 10, 2000;                              .
                STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS              551
                     NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

      "             (iii) Application for modification of undertaking of            A
                          Harminder Raj Singh recorded in the order dated
                          August 4, 1999;

                    (iv)   Absorption Rules, 2003.

                    24. On July 19, 2005, the Division Bench of the High Court,     B
      1
               instead of deciding the writ petition decided the application,
               dated March 10, 2005 (which was for listing of the matter before
               a Division Bench). It was observed that the matter was heard
               and finally decided by the Hon'ble Third Judge in accordance
               with Rule 3 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules,       c
               1952 and, hence, no further order was required to be passed.
               The application was, therefore, rejected.
-.,
                     25. The High Court was obviously in error in passing the
               above order. The State and the Corporation, therefore, filed
               Special Leave Petition in this Court which was registered as         D

,     .,.
               Civil Appeal No. 5473 of 2005. It was contended before this
               Court that after difference of opinion between two Hon'ble
               Judges, the matter was placed before a third Judge who
               decided it and directed to place it before a Division Bench which
               ought to have been done and the case ought to have been placed       E
               before a Division Be.nch. Even if Review was rejected against
               the order passed by the third Judge, prof.Jer procedure was
               required to be followed which was not done. The Senior Judge
               (Lucknow Bench) also ordered to place the matter before a
               Division Bench. The order passed by the Single Judge,                F
          l-
               therefore, could not be said to be legal and lawful.
          ~
                    26 ..This Court referred to the relevant rules and upheld the
               contention of the State and observed that the matter ought to
               have been placed before a Division Bench. On September 2,
               2005, a two Judge Bench of this Court to which one of us (C.K.       G
               Thakker, J.) was a party, inter alia, passed the following order:
          I         "In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the
                    impugned judgment and direct that Writ Petition No. 338
                    (SIB) of 1997 shall be listed before appropriate Bench for
                                                                                    H
    552        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 7 S. C.R.


A         orders in accordance with law, considering the orders
          passed by two learned Single Judges on 17th December,
          1999 disagreeing with each other and also the opinion of
          the learned third Judge in the matter, dated 5th January,
          2001. The Division Bench will decide the matter
B         expeditiously, without being influencecrby any observations
          made by this Court and in accordance with law, preferably
          within a period of three months."
        27. In the light of the direction issued by this Court, the
  matter was remitted to the High Court and was placed before a
C Division Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed
  the writ petition filed by the petitioners and issued the following
  direction;
          "On a thoughtful consideration of the matter, we are also
          of the view that when the matter was referred to Hon'ble
D
          Third Judge and he recorded his opinion and issued a
          specific direction to the office that the matter be placed
          before the Division Bench of appropriate orders, it was
          duty of the office to have placed the matter before the
          Division Bench for suitable orders. The application dated
E         09113.05.2005 moved by the State of U.P. for taking
          on record the supplementary counter-affidavit
          pointing out difficulties in absorption of the
          employees of the corporation, is not maintainable.
          No additional material at this stage, can be entertained in
F         this petition. The application is, therefore, rejected. The
          writ petition is finally disposed of in the following terms;
                                                                          1
          The writ petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus is
          issued directing the opposite parties to absorb the
          employees of the petitioners-association within four
G
          months from today in various organizations of the
          State Government/Public Sectors and to pay
          compensation, in accordance with law. However, it will
          be open for the opposite parties to take necessary steps
          for the retrenchment of the employees of the petitioners-
H
       STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS                  553
y
            NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

           association keeping in view the resolution dated                     A
           19.12.1996 of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
           Parties shall bear their own costs."
                                                     (emphasis supplied)

           28. It is this order which is challenged by the appellants in        B
r
      the present appeal.
             29. Notice was issued on December 11, 2006. The
      respondents appeared, accepted the notice and prayed time
      to file counter affidavit. Meanwhile, operation of the judgment
      was stayed. The Registry was thereafter asked to place the                c
      matter for final hearing on a non-miscellaneous day and that is
      how the matter has come up before us.
            30. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
            31. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that           D
'•    the High Court was wholly wrong in entertaining a petition under
      Article 226 of the Constitution and in not relegating the writ
      petitioners to avail of alternative remedy available under the
      Industrial Law. It was also submitted that disputed questions of
      fact were involved in the petition which could not be appropriately       E
      dealt with and decided in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
      by a writ court and on that ground also the Court ought to have
      directed the writ petitioners to approach an appropriate forum.
      Moreover, no action of retrenchment of employees had been
 I-
      taken and, as such, the writ petition was premature and not               F
~-    maintainable.
            32. On merits, it was submitted that it is settled law that
      creation, continuation and abolition of post is a 'sovereign
      function' and such a decision cannot be interfered with by a court
      of law in exercise of power of judicial review on limited                 G
      parameters unless it is contrary to law, inconsistent with the
      provisions of the Constitution or mala fide. It has been clearly
      stated in the affidavit in reply by the Corporation that the activities
      of the Corporation were virtually stopped and 'no-work' resulted
      in taking a decision to close down the Corporation. It was urged          H
    554       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A   that apart from earning profits, the Corporation had incurred
    huge losses. There were financial problems and economic
    difficulties. There was excess of manpower and hence a policy
    decision was taken to retrench surplus employees. Such a
    decision cannot be made subject matter of 'judicial review' when
B   no provision of law had been violated. The counsel contended
    that even if there was violation of some provision of law and
    legitimate dues of employees were not paid or they were
    deprived of other benefits, such questions could have been
    agitated before an appropriate forum under appropriate law and
C   not by a writ Court. So far as absorption of employees of the
    Corporation is concerned, an action can be taken by a
    Corporation which is an instrumentality of State within the
    meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as also by the State of
    U.P. only in accordance with statutory rules framed by the State
    in exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the
0
    Constitution, viz. Uttar Pradesh Absorption of Retrenched
    Employees of Government or Public Corporations in
    Government Service Rules, 1991, as amended from time to
    time. A public authority cannot act inconsistent with or contrary
    to statutory rules. It was stated that no statement was made by
E   any officer on behalf of the Corporation that the employees of
    the Corporation would be absorbed by the Government either
    in Government service or in any Public Sector Undertaking. But,
    even if some statement was made, it had no legal force and
    binding effect and cannot be enforced inasmuch as no statement
F   could have been made which is not in consonance with law or
                                                                         .,
    against statutory rules. In the instant case, an application was
    also made by the Secretary of the Corporation stating therein
    that no assurance was given by him to the Court that the
    retrenched employees would be absorbed nor such assurance
G   could be given by any one else. But the High Court, unfortunately,
    rejected the said application and proceeded to decide the matter
    on so-called assurance. According to the learned counsel, there
    can be no estoppel against a statute. If the relevant provisions
    of law do not entitle an employee after retrenchment to be
H   absorbed in any other Department or Undertaking, no such right
         STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS            555
              NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

        can flow from a statement, assurance or even undertaking if it A
        is not in consonance with law. It was submitted that the Court
        ought to have appreciated the fact that no employer can be
        compelled by a Court of Law to continue its business in losses
        and if the employer decides to close down its Undertaking, it
        has right to do so subject of course to law in force. If there is B
        violation of any provision of law, appropriate authority can always
        pass an appropriate order but a writ Court cannot direct the
        employer to continue the employees in service, to pay salary to
        them nor it can order the State Government to absorb excess
        employees of such Corporation either in Government or any c
        other Public Sector Undertaking. The counsel also made
        grievance against the direction to the Corporation to pay
        'compensation'. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the
        appeal deserves to be allowed by setting aside the order passed
        by the High C.ourt.
                                                                            D
"..            33. The learned counsel forthe Samiti and the employees,
        on the other hand, supported the final order passed by the High
        Court. It was submitted that one of the Judges of the Division
        Bench was clearly in error in dismissing the petition on the
        ground of availability of alternative remedy. The other Judge was E
        right in observing that an alternative remedy is not an 'absolute'
        bar to a writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution
        particul1iny when it relates to enforcement of fundamental rights
        guaranteed by Part I.II of the Constitution. Moreover, the writ
  ~     petition had already been entertained, several orders were F
  ...   passed from time to time and as held in several decisions, once
        a petition is entertained, it cannot be dismissed on the ground
        of availability of alternative remedy and must be decided on
        merits. That was done by the other Judge and that part of the
        decision could not be said to be contrary to law.
                                                                            G
               34. On merits, it was submitted that the High Court was
 f      right in granting relief to the employees. The Corporation was
  ...
        established in 1974, employees were working since many years
        and keeping in view the facts and circumstances in their entirety,
        the High Court directed the State Government to absorb them H
'   I.

         556   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2008] 7 S.C.R.


A in the Government Departments or other Public Sector
  Undertakings and such a decision cannot be said to be contrary
  to law. On behalf of the Corporation, an assurance was given
  that the employees would be absorbed. The Court was
  requested to grant time for the said purpose which has been
B done. No fault can be found against such an action and the
  grievance raised by the Corporation is not well-founded. The
  Court, considering all the facts and circumstances, issued
  certain directions which are in consonance with law. It was also
  stated that several interim orders which were passed by the
c Court from time to time were confirmed even by this Court. It
  was only because the matter was not placed before a Division
  Bench of the High Court and the earlier order was not complied
  with that this Court allowed the appeal filed by the State and
  remitted the matter to the High Court to be dealt with and decided
  by a Division Bench. But once the Division Bench has decided
D
  the matter and passed an order, no interference is called for. It              r

  was also submitted that the Government has absorbed several                  •
  employees by adopting 'pick and choose' method which shows
  that it wants to oblige 'fortunate few' without any legal basis or
  principle. It was further stated that it is not true that the
E Corporation has closed its activities and mining work. It is
  working and several persons are still in service performing their
  functions and discharging their duties. For all these reasons,
  the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
        35. We have given most anxious and thoughtful                      ..,
F
  consideration to the rival contentions of the parties. So far as
  preliminary objection raised by the Corporation before the High          "
  Court is concerned, in our considered view, the same was well-
  founded and ought to have been upheld. It was urged before
  the High Court on behalf of the Corporation and the State
G
  Government that the writ petition was premature inasmuch as
  no retrenchment had been effected. Several disputed questions
  of fact were involved in the petition. If the contention of the Samiti   ~




  was that there was illegal closure of Undertaking or there was
  non-payment of wages by the employer, appropriate
H
                                     '
          STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS                  557
               NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

         proceedings could have been initiated under Industrial Law. In           A
         fact, one of the Judges of the Division Bench upheld the
         contention and observed that the employees could have claimed
         closure compensation under Section 25 FFF of the Act or could
         have approached prescribed authority under the Payment of
,,       wages Act relying upon Se"Ction 33C(2) of the Act or Section
         6H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The other Single Judge
                                                                                  B

         of the Division Bench, however, held that the writ petition had
         been entertained and interim orders were also passed. Relying
         upon Suresh Chandra Tewari, the learned Judge held that "the
         petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative                c
         remedy if the same has been entertained and interim order has
         been passed". (emphasis supplied).

               36. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal
         position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh
         Chandra Tewari that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be            D
'4       dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doui:Jt
         correct that in the 'head note' of All India Reporter (AIR), it is
         stated that "petition cannot be rejected on the ground of
         availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal". But it has not
         been so held in the actual decision of the Court.                        E
              37. The relevant paragraph 2 of the decision reads thus:

              "2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question,
              as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the
 '            impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore,
              before approaching this Court the petitioner should have
                                                                                  F
    '>
              approached the appellate authority. Though there is
              much substance in the above contention, we do not
              feel inclined to reject this petition on the ground of
              alternative remedy having regard to the fact that the
                                                                     G
              petition has been entertained and an interim order
I             passed".
 _,
                                                       (emphasis supplied)
              38. Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in
         law. True it is that issuance of rule msi or passing of interim          H
    558       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2008) 7 S.C.R.


A orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition
  if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided
  by a writ-Court. It has been so held even by this Court in several
  cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be
  held that a writ-petition is not maintainable. In our judgment,
B however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that
  once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the
  ground of alternative remedy. If such bald contention is upheld,
  even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which
  ought not to have been .entertained by the High Court under
c Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of alternative
  and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once the
  High Court has entertained a writ-petition albeit wrongly and
  granted the relief to the petitioner.
        39. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
D particularly in view of assertions by the Corporation that its work
  had been substantially reduced; it was running into losses; the
  question was con~idered by the Board of Directors and it was
  resolved to retrench certain employees, it would have been
  appropriate, had the High Court not entertained the writ petition
E under Article 226 of the Constitution. [See also Scooters India
               v
  v. Vijai E. Eldred, (1998) 6 sec 549)
          40. The matter, however, did not rest on averments and
  counter-averment&. The record reveals that the Corporation was
  convinced that retrenchment of certain employees was
F absolutely necessary. According to the Corporation, because
  of globalization and entry of private sector In the business and
  also becauae of various orders passed by this Court from time
  to time in Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the activities of the
  Corporation had been considerably curtailed. It was incurring
G loss@$ and was not able to pay salaries and wages to its
  employees. It was, therefore, decided to take recourse to
  retrenchment in ClCcordance with law.
         41. Now, whether such action could or could not have been
    taken or whether the action was or was not in consonance with
H
           STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS            559
                NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
~·
          law could be decided on the basis of evidence to be adduced A
          by the parties. Normally, when such disputed questions of fact
          come up for consideration and are required to be answered,
          appropriate forum would not be a writ court but a Labour Court
          or antlndustrial Tribunal which has jurisdiction to go into the
          controversy. On the basis of evidence led by the parties, the B
r         Court/Tribunal would record a finding of fact and reach an
          appropriate conclusion. Even on that ground, therefore, the High
          Court was not justified in allowing the petition and in granting
          relief.
                 42. There is yet one more reason. In the High Court, the c
          Corporation filed an application stating therein that regarding
          absorption of employees, statutory rules had been framed by
          the State Government in exercise of power under the proviso to
          Article 309 of the Constitution. A prayer was, therefore, made
          to allow the application to bring statutory rules on record and to D
          consider them. The Court, however, rejected the prayer. In our
""        opinion, the High Court was not right in rejecting such prayer. If
          there were statutory rules and such rules provide for absorption
          of employees on certain grounds and on fulfillment of some
          conditions laid down in those rules, it was the duty of the High E
          Court to consider those rules and to decide whether under the
          statutory rules, such absorption could be ordered.
                43. After all, the High Court was considering the prayer of
          the petitioners to grant a writ in the nature of mandamus. It was,
    '     therefore, expected of the High Court to keep in view the relevant F
    ~     provisions of law. The High Court mainly relied upon an
          assurance said to have been given by the Secretary on behalf
          of the Corporation that excess employees would be absorbed
          either in the Government Department or in other Public Sector
          Undertakings. From the record it appears that it was the case G
          of the Secretary of the Corporation that no such assurance was
    ..,   given by him to the Hon'ble Court. But even if he had given such
          assurance, it was of no consequence since in the teeth of
          statutory rules, such assurance had no legal efficacy. Moreover,
          an application was made on affidavit by the Secretary of the H
    560       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 7 S.C.R.


A   Corporation clarifying the position and praying for modification
    of the earlier order passed by the High Court in which such
    statement on behalf of the Corporation appeared. The High
    Court, however, rejected even that application. In our considered
    opinion, even on that ground, the High Court ought not to have
B   issued final directions.

         44. It is settled law that there can be no estoppel against a
  statute. If the field was occupied by statutory rules, the employees
  could get right only under those rules. The High Court was equally
  bound to consider those rules and to come to the conclusion
c whether under the statutory rules, the retrenched employees
  were entitled to absorption either in Government Department
  or in any other Public Sector Undertaking. Statement, assurance
  or even undertaking of any officer or a counsel of the
  respondent-Corporation or of the Government Pleader of the
D State is irrelevant. The High Court, in our view, ought to have
  considered the prayer of the Corporation and decided the               >   '
  question if it wanted to dispose of the matter on merits in spite
  of availability of alternative remedy to the employees.
        45. Again, in our considered opinion, it was incumbent on
E the employees to show the right of absorption of retrenched
  employees in Government Department or other Public Sector
  Undertakings. The petitioners had prayed for a writ of mandamus
  which presupposes a legal right in favour of the applicant. Such
  right must be a subsisting right and enforceable in a Court of
F Law. There must be corresponding legal duty on the part of the
  respondent-Corporation or Government which required the                j

  Corporation or Government 'to do that which a statute required
  it to do'. No such right of absorption has been shown by the
  petitioners. Nor any such corresponding duty of the respondents
G could be shown to the High Court by the employees. As noted
  above, the case of the Corporation was that the retrenched
  employees could be absorbed only in accordance with statutory
  rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
  No such direction of absorption of all employees, hence, could
H be issued by the High Court. The High Court failed to appreciate
            STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS                561
                 NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.)

           all these relevant considerations. Even the application by which       A
           the Corporation sought to place on record statutory rules was
           rejected by the Court and a writ of man.damus was issued.
                 46. It is well settled that a Court of Law can direct the
           Government or an instrumentality of State by mandamus to act
           in consonance with law and not in violation of statutory provisions.   B
;'<"'      Unless a Court records a finding that act of absorption of all
           employees of the Corporation either in Government Department
           or in any other Public Sector Undertaking is in accordance with
           law, no writ can be issued. Therefore, even on that ground, the
           directions of the High Court deserve to be set aside.                  c
                 4 7. Regarding payment of compensation to the employees
           also, the High Court was not right. We have extracted the
           operative part of the order of the High Court in earlier part of the
           judgment. The High Court has stated that the appellants herein
           would absorb the employees of the Corporation and would "pay           D
           compensation in accordance with law". It was contended by the
'
    -·     Corporation that there was no foundation in the entire writ petition
           as to the provisions of law under which such compensation could
           be claimed and violation of the law by the Corporation or by the
           State. No finding has been recorded by the High Court that a           E
           specific or particular provision of law had been violated which
           entitled the workers to claim compensation. No reasons had
           been recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment for
           issuing such direction nor any basis for such direction has been
           shown. In our opinion, therefore, no such blanket direction could      F
    •      have been issued by the High Court which was not even capable
    ....   of implementation .

                  48. To us, one of the considerations in such matters is
           whether an order passed or direction issued is susceptible of
           implementation and enforcement, and if it is not implemented G
           whether appropriate proceedings including proceedings for
    ,      willful disobedience of the order of the Court can be initiated
           against the opposite party. The direction issued by the High
    -<.

           Court falls short of this test and on that ground also, the order is
           vulnerable.                                                          H
    562        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2008] 7 S.C.R.


A         49. It is contended on behalf of the employees that the
    Corporation was not right when it stated that there was no work
    and several projects came to be closed. It was also contended
    that many employees were absorbed by the Corporation and
    there was an element of 'pick and choose'. The said action was
B   arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of Articles
    14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Regarding loss caused to the            ....
    Corporation, according to the Samiti, it was the result of wrong
    and improper decisions of the Corporation and the State
    Government. Poor employees should not suffer on that count.
c       50. In our considered view, however, all such actions could
  be examined by an appropriate Court/Tribunal under the
  Industrial Law and not by a writ Court exercising power of judicial
  review under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the impugned
  action of the Corporation of retrenchment of several employees
D is not in consonance with law, the employees are certainly
  entitled to relief from an appropriate authority. If any action is
  taken which is arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise not in
  consonance with the provisions of law, such authority or Court/
  Tribunal is bound to consider it and legal and legitimate relief
E can always be granted keeping in view the evidence before it
  and considering statutory provisions in vogue. Unfortunately, the
  High Court did not consider all these aspects and issued a writ
  of mandamus which should not have been done. Hence, the
  order passed and directions issued by the High Court deserve
F to be set aside.
         51, For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be
    allowed and the order passed by the High Court is liable to be           •
    set aside and is accordingly set aside.
          52. Since we are of the view that one of the Hon'ble Judges
G
    of the Division Bench of the High Court which decided the matter
    at the initial stage was right in relegating the petitioners to avail
    of alternative remedy under the Industrial Law and as we hold           ,...
    that the High Court !lhould not have entertained the petition and
    decided the matter on merits, we clarify that though the writ
H
 STATE OF U.P. & ANR. v. U.P. RAJYA KHANIJ VIKAS            563
      NIGAM S.S. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

petition filed by the petitioners stands dismissed, it is open to A
the employees to approach an appropriate CourUTribunal in
accordance with law and to raise all contentions available to
them. It is equally open to the Corporation and the State
authorities to defend and support the action taken by them. As
and when such a course is adopted by the employees, the Court/ B
Tribunal will decide it strictly in accordance with law without being
influenced by the fact that the writ petition filed by the writ
petitioners is dismissed by this Court.
      53. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Considering the
facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no C
order as to costs.
K.K.T.                                         Appeal allowed.