Holding

The bifurcation of Bench Secretaries into two grades with different pay scales, based on merit‑cum‑seniority, is a reasonable classification and does not violate the constitutional principle of equal pay for equal work.

Summary

The Bench Secretaries of the Allahabad High Court were split into Grade I and Grade II, with the former receiving a higher pay scale, while all performed the same duties. They challenged this bifurcation before the High Court, arguing that it violated Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. The High Court quashed the creation of Grade I, but the State appealed. The Supreme Court held that the classification based on merit and seniority, as prescribed by the Rules framed under the Chief Justice’s authority, is a reasonable classification and does not contravene the constitutional guarantee. It also held that the Bench Secretaries are not entitled to the pay scale of Section Officers, as the Pay Commissions had evaluated the duties and found the Section Officers’ responsibilities greater. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s judgment set aside, with the State’s order of a uniform pay scale for both grades from 1 January 1986 affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether Bench Secretaries are entitled to the pay scale admissible to Section Officers.
Whether the creation of two grades with different pay scales for Bench Secretaries performing the same duties violates the constitutional right to equal pay for equal work under Articles 14 and 39(d).

Legislation cited

Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975s. Rule 16, s. Rule 18, s. Rule 8
Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.39(d)

Subjects

equal pay for equal workArticle 14Article 39(d)classification of service postspay scalemerit and seniorityservice lawconstitutional lawbench secretaries

Judgment

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
A
v.
J.P. CHAURASIA & ORS,

SEPTEMBER 27, 1988

B [G.L. OZA AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ.]

Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Con-
duct) Rules 1975: Rule 8-Whether it is permissible to have two pay
scales in the same cadre for persons having same responsibilities-
Whether that is violative of constitutional right of "equal pay for equal
work".
c
Articles 14 and 39(d)-'Equal pay for equal work'-Concept of-
Whether permissible to have two pay scales in same cadre for persons
having same duties and responsibilities-Question of pay and equation
of posts-Must be left to the Executive Government-To be determined
D by expert bodies like Pay Commission.

Prior to 1955, the Bench Secretaries in the Allahabad High Court
were on a higher pay scale than that of the Section Officers. In 1965, the
. '
State Government appointed a Pay Rationalisation Coml)littee to con-
sider the duties and responsibilities of different categories of posts and
E recommend changes. The Committee recommended for the Bench Sec-
retaries a pay-scale lower than that of the Section Ufficers. The Bench
Secretaries made a representation to the Government that they be put
a:t par with the Section Officers if not on a higher scale.
The Government appointed Pay Commission (1971-72). The
Pay Commission _did not accept the claim of the Bench Secretaries. The
F Bench Secretaries· again moved the Government reiterating their
demand, whereupon an "Anomalies Committee" was constituted. The
Committee rejected the claim of the Bench Secretaries for placing them
at par witli the Section Officers, but suggested ihat ten posts of Bench
Secretaries be upgraded. The Government accepted the recommenda-.
lion and issued orders upgrading ten posts of Bench Secretaries to be
G called Bench Secretaries grade I, giving the nomenclature of Bench
Secretaries grade II to the rest of Secretaries. The Bench Secretaries
grade II moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
challenging the bifurcation of their cadre into grade I & grade II. The
High Court quashed the notification which created Bench Secretaries
grade I. The State of{; .P., aggrieved by the decision of the High Court,
H
appealed to this Court.
288
--------------- - ---- ------- ---------~----~-

STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA .·289

Two questions arose for consideration (I) whether· the Bench
A
Secretaries were entitled to pay-scalu admissible to Section Officers,
and (II) whether the creation of two grades with different pay scales In
the cadre of Dench Secretaries doing the same or similar work was
vlolatlve_of the right to have "equal pay for equal work". ·

Allowing the appeal, the Court, B
HELD: ( 1) It requires evaluation or duties and responsibilities or
the respective posts. Functions of two posts may appear to be the same
or 1lmllar, but there may be a difference In the performance. Quantity
or work may be the same but quality may be different. The equation ·or
posts of equation or pay must be determined by expert bodlu, like pay
commissions. Ir there ls any such determination by a Commission or c
Committee, the Court should normally accept It and not tinker with It
unle:o_, It ls shown to be made with extnureou, consldcratlon. [2?SG-H; 29'.IA·Bl

The Dench Secretaries were. paid more emoluments than the Sec•
tlon Officers,- but II was not known on what basis and how they were D
treated nuperlor to Section Officers. The Successive Pay Commission
and the Pay Rationalisation Committee found no 1upport to their
superior claim. The Court could not go against that opinion. Tho Bench
Secretarlu could not claim as of rl;:ht the pay 1cale admbslblc to the
Section Officen. [299C·D J
E
(2) The second quutlon formulated affected tho dvll nrvlces In
i;eneral. All the Dench Secretaries concerned were Indisputably havln11
the same duties. They had been bifurcated Into two grades with dlffe·
rent pay scales-grade I with higher pay scale and grade II-which wu
sa!d to offend the constitutional principle of "equal pay for equal
work". [299E-G) F

Article 39(d) of the Constitution, which proclaims "equal pay for
equal work" and other like provisions In the Directive Principles, are
rooted In Social Justice, Intended to bring about a socio-economic trans·
formation In society, In m:itters of employment, It mustbe ensured that
there ls' no exploitation of tbe ~oor and Ignorant. It ls the duty or the G
State to see that the under-privileged or weaker section get their dues. ·
Against this background the principle ·or "equal pay for equal work"
has to be construed. This principle has no mechanical application In
every case of similar work. It has to be. read· into Article 14 of the
Constitution, which permits reasonable classification founded on diffe- '•
rent basis. [303C-E] - H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

The classification can be based on some qualities or char-
A
. acteristics of persons grouped together and not in others left out. Those
qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object
to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience contd be the
proper basis for classification to promote efficiency. It cannot be denied
that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is
B Superior to the work of new-comers. Higher pay scale to avoid stagna-
tion or resultant frustration for lack of promotional evenues is common
in career service. Entitlement to higher pay-scales depends upon
seniOrity-cum-merit or merit-cum seniority. The differentiation so
. made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. Classifi-
. cation based on experience is a reasonable classification having a
rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, would be
C detrimental to the interest of the Service itself. [303F-H; 304A-B]
The Bench Secretaries might do the same work, but their quality
of work might differ. The Rule framed by the Chief Justice of the High
Court make a proper classification for the purpose of entitlement to
higher pay scale. The High Court overlooked the criterion provided
D under the Rules. Merit governs the grant of higher pay scale. Classifica-
tion made under the Rules could not be said to be violative of the right
to have equal pay for equal work. ·[30SA-C I
. Randhir Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 298; Ram
Chandra v. Union of India, [1984] 2 SCC 141; P. Savita v. Union of
'.
E India, [198S] Suppl. (1) SCR 101; Dhirendra Chamoli & Anr. v. State
of U.P., [1986] 1 SCC 637; Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief,
CPWD, [1986] 1 SCC 639; R.D. Gupta & Ors. v. Lt. Governor of
Delhi, [1987] 4 SCC SOS; Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of Haryana,
, [1987] 4 SCC 634; National Museum Non-Gazetted Employees
Association & Anr. v. Union of India, (WP No. 1230 of 1987 disposed
· F 'of by the Supreme Court on 10.2.1988); Jaipal & Ors. v. State of
Haryana, (WP No. 4SS and connected petitions of 1987 disposed of by
the Sup_reme Court O!l 2.6.1988); Y.K Mehta v. Union qf India, (WP
· No. 1239 of 1979 and connected petitions disposed of by Supreme Court
on 26.8.1988); Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] 4 SCC
225 at para 712; All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers
G (Recognised) and Others v. Union of India & ,Ors., [1988] (2) Judg-
ments Today SC p. 519, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 56 of
l987.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.11.85 of the Allahabad
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHETTY, J.] 291

High Court in W.P. (C) No. 4211of1983.
A
Gopal Subramanium and Mrs. S. Dikshit for the Appellants.

Vi jay Hansaria and Sunil K. Jain for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B

JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by special leave is
from a judgment of the High Court of AJlahabad dated November 6,
1985 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4211 ofJ983. The appeal
raises a question of considerable importance. The question is whether .it
is permissible to have two pay scales fu the same cadre for persons
having same duties and having same responsibilities. The High Court C
has answered the question in the negative. It is said that it would be
violative of the Constitutional right of "equal pay for equal work".

The facts are not in dispute. They will be found.correctly stated
in the judgment under appeal and may briefly be stated thus: D

, Prior to 1965, in the High Court of Allahabad, Bench Secretaries
were on a higher pay scale than that of Section Officers. They were in
the pay scale of Rs: 160-320 as against the pay scale of Rs.120-300 to
Section Officers. In 1965 the State Government appointed a
Pay
Rationalisation Committee with wide ranging reference. The Commit- E
tee was asked to consider the duties and responsibilities of different
categories of posts. It was required to consider and recommend
changes to reduce the number of then existjng pay scales. It was 1also
asked to recommend as far as possible equal emoluments for identical
duties and responsibilities. The Committee submitted a detailed
report, in which Bench Secretaries became casualties. The Committee F
recommended for them a pay scale slightly lower than that of Section
Officers. Rs.150-350 was recommended/for Bench Secretaries as
against R.s.200-400 for Section Officers. The State Government
accepted the recommendations. Subsequently, these pay scales were
raised to Rs.200-450 and Rs.515-715 respectively.
G
Being dissatisfied with the down grading, the Bench Secretaries
. made representation to the Government. They demanded that they
should at least be put at par with Section Officers if not on higher
scale. The High Court supported their case but half-heartedly. The
High Court suggested "that in view of financial exigencies th.e Govern-
ment may grant for the time being pay scale to 10 Bench Secretaries as H
292 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A admissible to Section Officers." When this matter was pending consi·
ueration, the Government appointed the Pay Commission (1971·72)
headed by Shri Ali Zahir. On February 1, 1973, the Pay Commission
submitted its report. The report did not accept the claim of Bench
Secretaries for giving them pay scale equal to Sectio_n Officers or Pri·
vate Secretaries. The report was in fact very much against them. The
B following remarks of the Pay Commission would be pertinent: ·

"IJ>Bench Secretar.teJ (Sakna Sachlv) -
- -r-

A memorandum from the Dench Secretaries given to
· --· .,. us states that the post which arc at present In the scale of ·
· Rs.200·450 arc: of a great responsibility ·for which
c experience and special qualifications arc required. They
have· claimed that their dut!Cs arc equivalent to Private
Secretaries of Hon'blc Judges and have demanded the
same pay scale which is given to Private Secretaries and the
Section Officers. The' Registrar of the High Court while
D forwarding the memorandum has suggested that they
should also be given the same pay scale which is siven to
Superintendents I.e. · Rs.515·40·715 or to the Section
Officers Le. Rs.350·750. It is not necessary to emphasise
that in comparison to Bench Secretaries, the Section Of·
·ficcrs of the secretariat has to bear more responsibilities in
' their Section and have to control over it1 subordinates.
Section Officers have to prepare a lengthy and original
· notes in complicated and Important matters. Therefore,
-·. : ·the responsibilities of the two posts canno(bc said to be
· cq ual. Keeping in view the present scale of pay, the pay
scale recommended by the Pay Rationalisation Committee,
_, the nature of duties and rcsponsibillties and the fact that
'··every Hon'ble Judge will have one Private Secretary in the
·.. scale of Rs.500· 1,000 we feel that the Bench Secretaries
·,: cannot be given the same scale of pay which rs being given
to Superintendents or the · Section Officers. Since the·
Bench Secretaries are promoted from Upper Division
G Assistants, they should feel satisfied if they arc placed in a
scale of pay a little above the Upper Division Assistants.
Therefore, we have recommended for them a pay scale of
· Rs.400-15-475-20-575-25-750."

·. It will be seen that the Pay Commission refused to equate Bench . •
H Secretaries with Section Officers in view of their differential duties. It
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHETTY, J.] 293

was found that the nature of work of Section Officers was quite diffe· A
rent and more onerous than that of Bench Secretaries. Section Offic·
ers have to bear more responsibilities in their Sections. They have to
exercise control over their subordinate. They have to prepare lengthy
original notes in complicated matters. The Commission, therefore;
recommended Rs.400· 750 for Bench Secretaries and Rs.500· i,000 to
Section Officers. B

The Bench Secretaries again moved the Government reiterating
their demand. The Government ap'i)ears to have received several such
representations against the report (Jf Ali Zahir Commission. To con·
sider all such grievances, a Committee called the "Anomalies Commit·
tee" was constituted. As the name itself suggests, the Committee was
required to examine and remove anomalies in the recommendations of C
tPay Commission. The Committee appears to have made some patch
work. So far as Bench Secretaries are concerne.d, the Committee·
ouggested:

"( 1) For this post the recommendations made by the D
Pay Commission need not have any amendments.

(2) It should be appropriate for the Bench Secre-
taries to accept 10 promotional posts in the pay scale of .
Rs.500-.i,OOO as recommended by the Pay Commission."
E
The Anomalies Committee also thus rejected the claim of Bench
Secretaries for placing them at par with Section Officers. It however,
suggested that ten posts of Bench Secretaries should be upgraded and
placed in the pay scale of Rs.500-1,000. The Government accepted
that recommendation and issued an order dated July 2, l976. The
order inter alia states: F

"Judicial (High Court) Section, Lucknow dated 2nd
July, 1976.

Sub: Implementation of decision and proposals of
Sub Committee of the Cabinet comtituted to consider the G
anomalies pointed out in the pay scales recommended by
the U.P. Pay Commission (1971-73) and its way of removal
and other connected matters

H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A Sir,

In continuation of office memorandum No.P.C. 395-
x-89(M)/74 dated 18th March, 1976 of the Finance (Pay
Commission) Section on the above subject, I have been
directed to say that the Governor has been pleased to sanc-
B tion the pay scales mentioned in Column 3 to 10 post
holders under you mentioned in column 2 in the table given
below w.e.f. lst October, 1975 with this condition that as a
result of sanction of this scale, the number of total posts in
the concerned cadre will not increase:

c
SI. Name Pay No. of No. of No. of Pay '
·l'<o.Of Scale Permanent Temporary Posts Scale
Post Post Posts in higher
scale
D
1.. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

1. Bench Rs.400- i5- 48 3 lO Rs.500-25-
Secre- 475-EB-20- 700-EB-40-
tary 57~-EB-25- 900-EB-50-
;(; 750 lOOO

2. The basic pay in the pay scale mentioned in aforesaid
column 7 of the concerned employee will be fixed accord-
ing to the guiding principles of para 4 under fundamental
F rule 22 of the Financial Handbook Part II Volume 2-4 and
the appointments in the pay scale of Rs.500-1000 will be
made according to seniority subject to unfit.

3. Jn this connection, I have also been directed to say
that the nomenclature of posts of 10 Bench Secretaries
G appearing in column 5 of the said table shall be Bench
Secretaries Grade I and the nomenclature of rest Bench
Secretaries of equal pay scale will be Bench Secretaries
Grade II and the posts of Bench Secretaries Grade I and
Grade II will be of the same duties and responsibilities.

H Sd/- (Ramesh Chandra Deo Sharma)
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHETTY, J.J 295

Joint Secretary"
A
It was then the turn of Bench · Secretaries Grade ,II. They
complained that there was no valid reason to give higher pay scale only
to ten Bench Secretaries and step-motherly treatment to the rest of
their colleagues. The High Court as usual supported their claim, but
the Government did not. B

In order te> give effect to the said Government order the Chief
Justice framed rules called the Allahabad High Court Officers and
Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 ("The Rules").
The Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Article
2~9(:) of the Constitution and brought into force from July 13, 1976.
Thereunder Bench Secretaries Grade I and Grade lI were classified as c
Class II and Class III posts respectively. Rule 8(E) provides procedure
for appointment of Bench Secretaries Grade IL It is by selection
through competitive examination to be conducted by appointing
authority. Permanent Upper Division Assistants and permanent
Lower Division Assistants having not less than ten years· service are D
made eligible for selection. Preference shall however, be given to
candidates possession a Law Degree. Rule 16 provides that the posts
of Bench Secretaries Grade I shall be filled up by promotion from
amongst permanent Bench Secretaries Grade II. Rule 18 .deals with
method of selection for all promotional posts. It shall be made by
selection committee appointed by the Chief Justice. The criterion of E
selection shall be merit with due regard to seniority. The entitlement
to higher pay scale of Grade I Bench Secretary was therefore, not on
the basis of senioritYfilone, but on the basis of selection by merit-cum-
seniority ·---···

In 1979, the State Government appointed another Pay Commis- F
sion. That Pay Commission also did not disturb the categorisation of
Bench Secretaries into Grade l and Grade II. It however, gave mar-
ginal benefits by increasing the number of posts of Grade I from 10 per
cent to 30 per cent of the total cadre strength. Th!' reason given by the
Pay Commission is as follows:
G
"Bench Secretary 26.38

Fifty two posts of Bench Secretaries are in the pay
scale of Rs.400-750 and ten posts in the scale of Rs.500-
1,000. For appointment on these posts a limited competi-
tive examination is held from amongst Upper Division As- ti
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

sistants, Lower Division Assistants with ten years of service
A preferably Law Graduates. We have received a representa-
tion stating that the Bench Secretaries play a very
important role in smooth running of the proceedings-of the
Court. The minimum pay scales of the Bench Secretaries is
comparatively higher than the pay scale of Upper Division
B Assistants though they are appointed through a competi-
tive examination. It is limited to only Upper Division/
Lower Division Assistants of the High Court. Keeping in
view the fact that vacancies in Upper Division/Lower Divi-
sion Assistants are filled up by promotion from Routine
Grade Assistants, it is clear that this is a second promotion
for those who come directly from Lower Division Assis-
c tants and a third promotion for those who are promoted
first to Upper Division Assistant and then a Bench Secre-
tary. Even then we give importance to the fact that only
best from Upper Division/Lower Division Assistants are
preferred for the post. The work of the Bench Secretary is
D of a great importance. We, therefore, recommend:

"{l) 30% of the total posts of Bench Secretaries in
the pay scale of Rs.770-1000; and

(2) Two posts in the scale of Rs. 1420-1900 as is
E admissible to Assistant Secretaries of the Secretariat."

Finally the Bench Secretaries Grade I moved the High Court
on judicial side with an application under Article 226 of the Constitu-
tion. They challenged the validity of bifurcation of one cadre into
Grade I and Grade II. The sheet-anchor of their case was that in the
F same category of posts with similar duties and responsibilities there
cannot be two grades with different pay scales. It would be violative of
prineiples of equal pay for equal work. It was also contended that
Bench Secretaries was a well recognised class that existed over the
years and indeed superior to Section Officers. Rejection of their
demand for equating at least with Section Officers would be ignoring
G that historical fact. The High Court accepted all these contentions and
granted the relief prayed for.

As to the Pay Commission ::ecommendations the High Court
obsen:ed:

H "Rejection of petitioner's demand for equating them
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURAS!A [SHETTY, J.) 297

at least with Section Officers hy comparing them with A
absence of administrative control exercised by Section
Officer in the Secretariat was ignoring history of Bench
Secretaries being a different class both before and after
independence and the nature of duties performed by
them."
B
As to the decision of the Anomalies Committee the High Court
remarked:

"Curiously ·enough when Anomaly Committee
redressed the wrong by granting pay scale equivalent to
Section Officers, it created an artificial division by drawing c
a line between first ten and others. A Bench Secretary or
for that matter any officer who puts in longer years of
service gets more salary than his juniors but if a senior
performing the same duty as his juniors is put in different
higher scale then it results in invidious classification in the
same group. And that violates the concept of equality D
which visualises that whatever condition are guaranteed
and secured by Jaw to one shall be guaranteed to owners
who are of the same group or class. It only denies enact-
ment of a rule or law which attempts to deal differently
with persons situated similarly. The Government order by
which the classification was done itself provided that duty E
and responsibility of Bench Secretary of Grade II be the
same as of Grade I shall be seniority. No other basis or
qualification or test or be it was laid down. The effect of the
order was that those who were senior entered into an
altogether different grade. That is senior Bench Secretary
although doing the same work as his junior became entitled F
to higher grade. An<l that clearly violated the principle of
equal pay for equal work."

. Iµ support of these conclusions the High Court relied upon two
decisions of this Court: (i) Randhir Singh v. Union of India, [1982] 3
SCR 298 and (ii) P. Savita v. Union of lndia, 0985] Suppl. 1SCR101. G

With regard to rules framed by the Chief Justice for the purpose
of promotion to Bench Secretary Grade I, the High Court said:

"Rules were made not because the Court agreed with
the classification of Bench Secretaries in Group I and H
298. SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

Gro~p II but because of the Government order dated July
A
2, 1976. The vice is not in the method of sel~ction but in
creation of two different groups without any intelligible
differentia. If Bench Secretaries of Group I would have
been required to do any work different than Bench Sec-
retaries Grade II, it could be described as promotional
avenue. Promotion from one post to another is associated
with advancing to a higher office, climbing one more ladder
in service career. But the different grade for persons of
· · same even on seniority cum merit with same work and
responsibility cannot amount to promotion."

With these conclusions, the High Court quashed a part of the
C notification dated July 4, 1976 which created Bench Secretaries Grade
I. The High Court did not quash the Rules relating to promotion to
that cadre. The High Court directed that all Bench Secretaries
irrespective of their grades should be given the pay scale admissible to
Bench Secretaries Grade I with effect from October 1, 1975.

The State of U .P. being aggrieved by the decision has appealed
to this Court.

On the submissions made by counsel on both sides, two ques-
tions arise for our consideration:
E
(i) Whether Bench Secretaries in the High Court of
Allahabad are entitled to pay scale admissible to Section Offi-
cers?; and

(ii) Whether the creation of two Grades with different pay
JI: scales in the cadre of Bench Secretaries who are doing the same
or similar work is violative of the right to have "equal pay for
equal work"?

The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale admissi-
ble to Section Officers should not detain us longer. The answer to the
.Q question depends upon several factors. It does not just depend upon
either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secre-
taries. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and
responsibilities of the respective posts. More often functions of two
posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be dif-
feren.ce in degrees in the performance. The quantity of work may be
H the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHETTY, J.] 299

relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. The equa-
A
tion of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Govern-
ment. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission.
They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and
responsibilities of posts. If there is any such determination by a Com-
mission or Committee, the court should normally accept it. The court
should not try to tinker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it B
was made with extraneous consideration·.

In the present case, it is true that at one time, Bench Secretaries
were paid more emoluments than Section Officers. But it is not known
on what basis they were paid in the higher pay scale and treated as a
superior class to Section Officers. The Successive Pay Commissions
- - - - .
and even Pay Rationalisation Committee, however, found no support c
to their superior claim. The Commissions and Committee have
evaluated the respective duties and responsibilities of the two posts. It
was found that the Section Officers perform onerous duties and bear
greater responsibilities than Bench Secretaries. We cannot go against
that opinion and indeed, we must accept that opinion. The Bench D
Secretaries, therefore, cannot claim as of right the pay scale admissible
to Section Officers.

The second question formulated earlier needs careful examina-
tion. The question is not particular to the present case. It is pertinent
to all such cases. It is a matter affecting the civil services in general. E
The question is whether there could be two scales of pay in the same
cadre of persons performing the same or similar work or duties. All
Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad are undisputedly
having same duties. But they have been bifurcated into two grades
with different pay scale. The Bench Secretaries Grade I are in a higher
pay scale than Bench Secretaries Grade II. The entitlement to higher F
pay scale depends upon selection based on merit cum seniority. Can it
be said that it would be violative of the right to equality guaranteed
under the Connstitution?

It was argued for the respondents that it offends the constitu-
tional principle of "equal pay for equal work". Several decisions of G
this Court were relied upon in support of the proposition.

"Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" has been
accepted as a "constitutional goal" capable of being achieved through
constitutional remedies. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India & Others,
[ 1982] 3 SCR 298 Chinnappa Reddy, J. said (at 304): H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

"It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is
A
not expressly declar~d by our Constitution to be a funda-
mental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Art.
39( d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal
work for both men and women' as a Directive Principle of
State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both
B men and women' means equal pay for equal work for every-
one and as beween the sexes. Directive Principles, as has
been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court
have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of
interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State
not to deny any person equality befordhe law or the equal
protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there. shall
c be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relat-
ing to employment or appointments to any office under the
State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must
mean something to every one. To the vast majority of the
people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean
D nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and
the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have
some substance if equal work means equal pay."
The learned Judge however, observed that a differential treat-
ment in appropriate cases can be justified when there are two grades
based on reasonable grounds:
E
"It is well known that there can be and there are
different grades in a service, with varying qualification for
entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a
promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The
higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be
F either academic qualifications or experience based on
length of service reasonably sustain the classification of the
officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The
principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract
doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to
them.''
G
In Randhir Singh, the petitioner was a driver-constable in the
Delhi Police Force ur1der the Delhi Administration. It was found that
the petitioner and the other drivers in the Delhi Police Force per-
formed the same functions and duties as other drivers in the service of
the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. Indeed, by
H reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of
•·-)-

STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA {SHETTY, J.] 301

a police officer', their duties and responsibilities were found to be
A
more arduous. It was also admitted by the Delhi Administration in
that case that the duties of driver constable of the Delhi Police Force
were onerous. Therefore, learned Judge said that there was no reason
for giving them lower scale of pay than other drivers. It was direc!ed
that the driver constables of Delhi Police Force should .be given the
scale of pay at least on par with that of drivers of the Railway Protec- B
tion Force. The principle enunciated in Randhir Singh was followed in
Ramachandra v. Union of India, (1984] 2 SCC 141 and P. Savita v.
Union of India, (1985] Supp. 1 SCR 101. In the former, the arbitrary
differential treatment in the pay scale accorded to some professors was
struck down. The petitioners therein were holding the posts of Pro-
fessors in the Indian Veterinary Re~earch Institute under the Indian
Council of Medical Research. The pay scale of professors underwent c
revision. The new recruits got the benefit of revision of scales, but not
the petitioner. He was allowed to continue in the old scale. He cha!-,
lenged that discrimination in this Court as being violative of the right
to have equal pay for equal work. This Court accepted the contention
and observed (page 163): · D

"The case in hand is a glaring example of discriminat-
tory treatment accorded to old, experienced and highly
qualified hands with an evil eye and unequal hand and the
guarantee of equality in all its pervasive character must
enable this Court to remove discrimination and to restore E
fair play in action. No attempt was made to sustain the
scales of pay for the post of Professor on the doctrine of
classification because the classification of existing incum-
bents as being distinct and separate from newly recruited
hand with flimsy change in essential qualification would be
wholly irrational and arbitrary. The case of the petitioners F
for being put in the revised scale of Rs. 1100" 1600 from the
date on which newly created posts of Professors in sister
disciplines in IVRI and other institutes were created and
filled-up in revised scale is unanswerable and must be
conceded."
G
In P. Savitd v. Union of Indio., the artificial division of senior
draftsmen in the Ministry of Defence Production with unequal scales
of pay for the same work was struck down.

In Dhirendra Chamo!i and Anr. v. State of U.P., (1986] 1 SCC
637, this Court found fault with the Central Government for not giving H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A the casual workers engaged in Nehru Yuvak Kendra the same salary
and conditions of service as enjoyed by class IV employees regularly
appointed against sanctioned posts. It was observed (at 628):

"It must be remembered that in this country where
there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majo-
B rity of people is to starve or to take employment on what-
ever exploitative terms are offered by the employer. The
fact that these employees accepted employment with full
knowledge that they will be paid only daily wages and they
will not get the same salary and conditions of service as
other class IV employees, cannot provide an escape to the
c Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality
enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. This article
declares that there shall be equality before law and equal
protection of the law and implicit in it is the further princi-
ple that there must be equal pay for work of equal value.
These employees ·who are in the service of the different
D Nehru Yuvak Kendras in the country and who are admit-
tedly performing the same duties as Class IV employees,
must therefore get the same salary and conditions of
service as Class IV employees. It makes no difference
whether they are appointed in sanctioned posts or not. So
long as they are performing the same duties, they must
E receive the same salary and conditions of service as class IV
employees."

In- Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, [1986] 1 SCC
639, the case of poor daily wage workers employed for several years by
the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) came up for consi-
F deration before this Court. They demanded parity in their wages,
salary and allowances with those of regular and permanent employees
of the Department on the basis of performing similar work. This Court
while granting relief to the workmen observed (at 642):

'"The Central Government, the State Government
G and likewise, all public sector undertakings are expected to
function like model and enlightened employers and argu-
ments such as those which were advanced before us that the
principle of equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine
which cannot be enforced in a court of law should ill come
from the mouths of the State and State Undertakings."
H
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHE1TY, J.] 303

The right to have equal pay for equal work was also accepted.by ·A
this Court in R.D. Gupta and Others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1987] 4
SCC 505; Bhagwan Dass and Others v. State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC
634; National Museum Non-Gazetted Employees Association and Anr.
v. UOI, WP No. 1230 of 1987 disposed of dt. 10.2.1988; Jaipal and
Ors. v. State of Haryana, WP No. 455 and connected petitions of 1987
of DD 2.6. 1988 and Y.K. Mehta v. UOI, WP No. 1239 of 1979 and B
connected petitions DD 26.8. 1988.

Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal
work''. This article and other like provisions in the Directive Principles
are "conscience of our Constitution." They are rooted in social justice.
They were intended to bring about a socio-economic transformation in
our society. As observed by Hegde and Mukherjee, JJ. in Kesha-
c
vananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973] 4 SCC 225 at para 712: "The
Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic needs of the common man and to
change the structure of society." In the words of Sbelat and Grover, JJ
(at para 596): "The dominent objective in view was to ameliorate and
improve the lot of the common man and to bring about a socio-
economic justice." In matters of employment the Government of a
socialist State must protect the weaker .:;,,ections. It must be ensured
that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the duty of the
State to see that the under-privileged or weaker sections get their
dues. Even if they have voluntarily accepted the employment on
unequal terms, the State should not deny their basic rights of equal E
treatment. It is against this background that tlie principle of "equal
pay for equal work" has to be construed in the first place. Second, this
principle has no mechanical application in every case of similar work.
It has to be read into Art. i4, of the Constitution. Art. 14 permits
reasonable classification founded on different basis. It is now well
established that the classification can be based on some qualities or
characteristics of persons grouped together and not in others who are
left out. Those qualities or charcteristics must; of course, have a
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service
matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classifica-
tion to promote efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by
experience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied that the G
quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is superior
than the work of newcomers. Even in Randhir Singh's case, this princi-
ple has been recognised. 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the
classification of officers into two grades with different scales of pay
based either on academic qualification or experience on length of
service is sustainable. _Apart from that, higher pay scale to avoid stag-
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

A nation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very
common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges.
There is senior tiine scale in Indian Administrative Service. There is
super time scale in other like services. The entitlement to these higher
pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority.
The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to
B discrimination. The classification based on experience is a reasonable
classification. It has a rz.tional nexus with the object thereof. To hold
otherwise, it would be detrimental to the interest oflhe service itself .

. In All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Reco-
gnised) and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1988] 2 Judgments
C Today SC p. 519, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. said:

"There may be qualitative difference as regards relia-
bility and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the
responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that
often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is
an element of value judgment by those who are charged
with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other
conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is
made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criteria which
has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such
differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is
E important to emphasise that equal pay for equal work is a
concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it fol-
lows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a
negation of that right."

And said:
F
"The same amount of physical work may entail diffe-
rent quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring
more tact, some less-it varies from nature and culture of
employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always
be translated into a mathematical formula. If it has a
rational nexus with the object to be sought for, as rei-
terated before a certain amount of.value judgment of the
administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the
pay scales has to be left with them and it cannot be interfer-
ed with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it
is !frational or oased on no basis or arrived ma/a fide either
_H in law or in fact."
fl
;;r
STATE OF U.P. v. J.P. CHAURASIA [SHETTY, J.] 305

In the present case, all Bench Secretaries may do the same work, A
but their quality of work may differ. Under the rules framed by the
Chief Justice of the High Court, Bench Secretaries Grade I are
selected by a Selection Committee. The selection is based on merit
with due regard to seniority. They are selected among the lot of Bench
Secretaries Grade II. When Bench Secretaries Grade II acquire
experience and also display more merit, they are appointed as Bench B
Secretaries Grade I. The rules thus make a proper classification for the
purpose of entitlement to higher pay scale. The High Court bas
completely overlooked the criterion provided under the Rules. The
merit governs the _grant of higher pay scale and that merit will be
evaluated by a competent authority. The classification made uJ><ier the
Rules, therefore, cannot be said to be violative of the right to have c
equal pay for equal work. ·

After the argument was concluded in this appeal, counsel on
both sides brought to our attention that the State Government has
granted uniform pay scale of Rs.1600-2950 to both the grades of Bench
Secretaries with effect from January 1, 1986. We may make it clear D
that this decision of ours shall riot affect the Bench Secretaries to get
· that pay scale accordingly with effect from January 1, 1986.

In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of
the High Court.
E
S.L. Appeal allowed.