Holding

The Supreme Court held that the forged bail order, though unsigned, is a document; the respondent made a false document dishonestly, satisfying Sections 466 and 468 IPC, and therefore his conviction is upheld while the High Court's acquittal and service direction are set aside.

Summary

Ranjit Singh, a stenographer of a High Court judge, forged a bail order that was never signed by the judge to obtain bail for an accused. He was convicted under IPC Sections 466 and 468 for making a false document and for forgery of a court record, while the Sessions Court granted him probation under Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of First Offenders Act, 1958. The Allahabad High Court acquitted him on the ground that the unsigned bail order did not constitute a "document" and that probation was not a punishment, directing that he be treated as continuously in service. The Supreme Court held that a document need not be signed to fall within the meaning of Section 464, and that the respondent dishonestly made a false document with intent to defraud, satisfying the elements of Sections 466 and 468. Consequently, the High Court's acquittal and service direction were set aside, the conviction upheld, and the probation order affirmed. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether an unsigned bail order can be considered a 'document' under Section 464 of the IPC for the purpose of forgery under Section 466.
Whether the elements of Sections 466 and 468 IPC – dishonest making of a false document with intent to defraud – are satisfied in the present facts.
Whether the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of First Offenders Act, 1958 constitutes a punishment affecting the respondent's service continuity.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to direct that the respondent be deemed in continuous service and to award back wages.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 23, s. 24, s. 417, s. 420, s. 464, s. 466, s. 467, s. 468

Subjects

forgeryfalse documentIPC Section 466IPC Section 468probationfirst offenderservice continuityjurisdictionbail order

Judgment

+

A STATE OF U.P.
..
v.
RANJIT SINGH

FEBRUARY 19, 1999

B [G.B. PATTANAIK, M.B. SHAH AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.]

,-
Indian Penal Code 1860-Sections 464, 466 & 468--Respondent forging
a bail ord~r--Not signed-Conviction by trial cowt-Acquittal by High
Court-Both courts finding that document forged by respondent-Held, char-
c ges proved beyond doubt-Conviction upheld.

U.P. Probation of First Offences Act, 1958-Section 4--Respondent
convicted of forgery-No bad antecedents-Lapse of 27 years-Sessions Judge
granting benefit of Probation-Upheld-Respondent directed to execute a
personal bond with one s,urety for 2 years.
D
Service Law :

Conviction of respondent for f orgery--Benefit of probation granted by
Sessions Court-Acquittal by High Court-Whether High Court can direct the
respondent to be treated as in continuour service-Held, no, the order of High
E Court is without jurisdiction.

Respondent was tried for offences under Sections 417, 420, 466, 467
& 468 of Indian Penal Code for fabricating a forged bail order for an
accused. The trial Court convicted the respondent of all charges and
F passed different sentences. On appeal, the Sessions Court acquitted the
respondent of the offences under Sections 417, 420 and 467 IPC but
maintained his conviction and sentence under Sections 466 and 468. But
the Sessions Court gave the respondent, the benefit of Section 4 of Proba-
tion of First Offenders Act, 1958, on production of a personal bond with
one surety.
G
On Revision, the High Court held. t}laf'since the accused has not ~

signed the bail order, the said_bail-oroer cannot be said to constitute a ~

document and therefore;Tt cannot be said that the ingredients of the
offence under Sections 466 & 468 have been satisfied and acquitted the
H respondent under Sections 466 & 468. The High Court also held that the
\ 786
+
STATE v. RANJIT SINGH 787
grant of benefit under U.P. First Offenders Act by Sessions Court cannot A
be treated as a punishment and that the respondent must be deemed to be
in continuous service with all backwages.

On appeal before this Court the State c.ontended that the prosecu-
tion having fully established the fact that the bail order in question was in
the hand-writing of the respondent even though the Hon'ble Judge had not
B
passed any bail order, the charges under Section 466 and 468 must be held
to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the High Court com-
mitted error in coming to the conclusion that the ingredients have not been
satisfied merely because it had not been esta~lished that the signature in
the bail order had not been put by the accused. C
The respondent contended that in order to attract the offence of
forgery of record of court under Section 466 it must be established that a
document has been forged; that since no "wrongful gain" or "wrongful loss"
can be said to have been achieved by the bail order, there was no dishonesty D
in making the document and therefore Sections 464, 466 & 468 IPC will
not be attracted, and that therefore, the High Court was justified in
acquitting the accused of the charges.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
E
HELD : 1. The Order of acquittal, passed by the High Court is set
aside. The respondent is convicted under Section 466 and 468 of IPC but
sinte the incident itself was of the year 1971 and more than 27 years have
elapsed in the meantime and the Sessions Judge himself had granted the
benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. First Offenders Probation Act and there is
F
) no bad antecedents, the order of Sessions Judge is affirmed and respon-
dent is directed to execute a personal bond of Rs. 2,000 with one surety of
the like amount for keeping peactr and good behaviour for a period of two
years. [792-H; 793-A-B]

2. The conclusion of the High Court that the bail order in question G
cannot be said to be a 'document' since the accused did not put the
-. signature under the bail order is erroneous. The Court has lost sight of
the fact that under Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code, a person is said
to make a false document who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs,
seals or executes a document or part of a document. The reasoning of the H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A High Court, therefore, that the bail order without the signature cannot be
said to be a document thereby not attracting the provisions of Section 464
of the Indian Penal Code is wholly unsustainable. [791-A-B]

3. In view of the conclusion of the Courts below that the accused-
respondent did write the bail order in his own hand- writing, even though
B the Judge did not pass any bail order, the conclusion is irresistible that
the accused-respondent made a false document, as a result of which a
person not entitled to be released on bail could make himself free from
custody. [791-E]

C 4. Where, a document is prepared with the intention to deceive and
by means of deceit, an advantage is obtained then there is a fraud and
judged from this stand point, the preparation of a forged bail order by the
utili1;ation of which the person concerned obtained an advantage of being
released deceiving the courts and the society at large cannot but be said
to have made the document fraudulently thereby attracting Section 466 of
D the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, charges under Section 466 and 468
of the Indian Penal Code must be lield to have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. [792-C-G]

Mahesh Chandra Prasad & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR (1943) 30 Patna 393,
E referred to.

5. The direction and observation of the High Court that the accused
must be deemed to have been in continuous service without break and he
should be paid his full pay and D.A. during the period of his suspension
is without jurisdiction and it is quashed. [793-C]
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
772 of 1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.93 of the Allahabad High
G Court in Cr!. R. No. 994 of 1988.

P~aveen Swarup, Prashant Choudhary and AS. Pundir for the Ap-
pellant.

Giridhar G. Upadhyay, Ms. Vinita Upadhyay and R.D. Upadhyay for
H the Respondent.
STATE v. RANJITSINGH [PATTANAIK,J.] 789
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

PATIANAIK, J. The respondent was .a Stenographer of a learned
Judge of Allahabad High Court. He stood the trial for having committed
offences under Sections 417, 420, 466, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal
Code on the allegation that he fabricated a forged bail order for one
B
accused Khelawan. The accused however denied the allegations in the trial.
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate convicted him of all the charges and passed different
-~~

sentences thereunder. On an appeal being carried, the Additional Sessions
Judge, Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 1985 acquitted the accused
of the offence under Sections 417, 420 and 467 IPC but maintained his c
conviction under Sections 466 and 468 and sentenced him to rigorous
imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.500 for each of the offences
under Sections 466 and 468 IPC and in default, to serve out rigorous
imprisonment for three months more, with the further direction that the
sentences will run concurrently. But instead of sending the accused to Jail,
D
he was given the benefit of Section 4 of Probation of First Offenders Act,
1958 and it was ordered that he will file a personal bond of Rs.2000 with
_,.
one reliable local surety of the like amount for keeping peace and good
behaviour for a period of two years. The accused, then filed a revision in
the High Court and the High Court by the impugned Judgment came to
the conclusion that since the accused has not signed the bail order, the said E
bail order cannot be said to constitute a document and, therefore, it cannot
be said that the ingredients of the offence under Sections 466 and 468 have
been satisfied and the High Court accordingly acquitted the accused of the
charges under Sections 466 and 468. The High Court also. peculiarly
enough further came to the conclusion that the grant of benefit of Section F
4 of the U .P. First Offenders Act by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
)o
cannot be treated as a punishment and, therefore, the accused cannot be
treated as suspended from service and on the other hand must be deemed
to have been in continuous service without break. The court, therefore
. ordered that he should be paid his pay and allowances immediately for the
period of his suspension. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge G
of the Allahabad High Court the present appeal has been preferred by the
State.
-.
Mr. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
prosecution having fully established the fact that the bail order in question H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A was m the hand-writing of the accused which was utilised for getting ...
Khelawan on bail, even though in fact the Hon'le Judge had not passed '
any bail order, the charges under Sections 466 and 468 as against the
accused-respondent must be held to have been proved beyond reasonable
doubt and the High Court committed error in coming to the conclusion
B that the ingredients have not been satisfied merely because it had not been
established that the signature in the bail order had not been put by the
accused, even though it was established that the bail order was in the
hand-writing of the accused.

Mr. ·Upadhyay, appearing for the respondent on the other hand
C contended that in order to attract the offence of forgery of record of court
under Section 466, it must be established that a document has been forged.
Forgery as defined in Section 463 means whoever makes any false docu-
ment and making a false document under Section 464 of the Indian Penal
Code means whoever dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or
D executes a document or a part of a document. According to Mr .. Upadhyay,
the expression 'dishonestly' has been defined in Section 24 to mean
whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one
person or wrongful loss to another person and 'wrongful gain' and 'wrong-
ful loss' have been defined under Section 23 to mean a gain by unlawful
E means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled and
loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally
entitled. According to Mr. U padhyay, since by the bail order in question,
no 'wrongful gain' or 'wrongful loss' can be said to have been achieved,
there was no. dishonesty in making the document and, therefore, Section
464 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be attracted and consequently,
F Section· 466 of the Indian Penal Code will also not be attracted. The
learned counsel also submitted that for the same (.easons the offence under
Section 468 cannot be said to have been committed and, therefore, the
High Court was justified in acquitting the accused of the charges. We,
however are not persuaded to agree with the contentions raised by Mr.
G Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondent. There is no dispute and
in-fact on the basis of the evidence of the hand-writing expert as well .as
the evidence of Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.L. Sinha, in whose court the accused
was working as Personal Assistant, it has been proved that the forged bail
order in question has been written by the accused-respondent. The High
H Court, in our view committed gross error in recording the conclusion that
+
STATE v. RANJITSINGH [PATfANAIK,J.] 791

..., the bail order in question cannot be said to be a 'document' since the A
accused-respondent did not put the signature under the bail order. The
Court has lost sight of the fact that under Section 464 of the Indian Penal
Code, a person is said to make a false document who dishonestly or
fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or pmt of a
document. The reasoning of the High Court, therefore, that the bail order B
without the signature cannot be said to be a document thereby not attract-
ing the provisions of Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code is wholly
-:- unsustainable. Coming now to the contention raised by Mr. Upadhyay,
appearing for the accused-respondent, it would be seen from Section 466
of the Indian Penal Code that whoever forges a document, purporting to
be a record or proceeding of or in a Court of Justice commits the offence.
c
The bail order in question undoubtedly purports to be a proceeding in a
court of justice and the question, therefore is whether the accused-respon-
dent can be said to have forged the said document. 'Forgery' has been
defined in Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code to mean whoever makes
any false document or part of a document with intent to cause damage or
D
injury to the public and the expression 'making a false document' is defined
~
in Section 464 of the Indian Penal Code to mean that a person is said to
make a false document who dishonestly or fraudulently makes, signs, seals
or executes a document or part of a document. In view of the conclusion
of the courts below that the accused-respondent did write the bail order E
in his own hand-writing, even though the learned Judge did not pass any
bail order, the conclusion is irresistible that the accused-respondent made
a false document, as a result of which a person not entitled to be released
on bail could make himself free from custody. The question, therefore, is
whether under such circumstances it can be held that the accused-respon- F
dent made a false document either dishonestly or fraudulently. The expres-
sion 'wrongful' in Section 23 of the Act means prejudicially affecting a party
in some legal right. The words 'gaining wrongfully' or 'losing wrongfully'
need not be confined only to the acquisition or to the actual deprivation
~·
of property. In this view of the matter if by virtue of preparing a false G
document purporting it to be a document of a court of justice and by virtue
of such document a person who is not entitled to be released on bail could
be released then, undoubtedly damage or injury has been caused to the
..., public at large and, therefore, there is no reason why under such cir-
cumstances the accused who is the author of such forged document cannot H
,
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A be said to have committed offence under Section 466 of the Indian Penal
Code. Then again under Section 464 whoever dishonestly or fraudulently
makes a document or part of a document can be said to have made a false
document. A person is said to do a thing f'audulently if he does that thirig
with intent to defraud but not otherwise. The expression 'defraud' involves
B two elements, namely deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is
something other than economic loss and it will include any harm whatever
caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. A benefit
or advantage fo the deceiver will a1most always cause loss or detriment to
the deceived. Where, therefore, a document is prepared with the intention
to deceive and by means of deceit, an advantage is obtained then there is
C a fraud and judged from this stand point, the preparation of a forged bail
order by the. utilisation of which the person concerned obtained an ad-
vantage of being released deceiving the courts and the society at large
cannot but be said to have made the document fraudulently, thereby
attracting Section 466 of the Indian Penal Code. In the case of Mahesh
D Chandra Prasad and Another v. Emperor, A.I.R.(30) (1943} Patna 393, a
Bench of Patna High Court observed:

"To tamper with the record of a proceeding in a Court of justice
in order to obtain from that Court a decision or order which it
otherwise would not make, is to my mind, as much a public mischief
E
as to attempt to secure the unauthorised release of a prisoner from
jail or to obtain for an unqualified person credentials entitling him
to practise as a surgeon or to navigate a ship. I can see no reason
why the expression 'with intend to defraud' as it occurs in Section
25 of the Penal Code, should be more narrowly construed by the
F Courts in India than it has been construed by the Courts of
Common Law in England in which, in an indictment for forgery,
an intent to defraud had to be alleged."

Consequently, charges under Sections 466 and 468 of the Indian Penal
G Code must be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In this view of the matter, we unhesitatingly reject the contention
raised by Mr. Upadhyay, appearing for the respondent and hold that the
accused-respondent committed the offence under Sections 466 and 468 of
the Indian Penal Code. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal,
H passed by the High Court of Allahabad and convict the accused-respon-
+
STATE v. RANJITSINGH [PATTANAIK,J.] 793
dent under Sections 466 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code but since the A
incident itself was of the year 1971 and more than 27 years have elapsed
in the meantime and the learned Sessions Judge himself had granted the
''·
benefit of Section 4 of the U .P. First Offenders Probation Act and there
is no bad antecedents, we also affirm the order of learned Additional
Sessions Judge and direct that the respondent should execute a personal
bond of Rs.2000 with one surety of the like amount for keeping peace and B
good behaviour for a period of two years.

We also fail to understand how the High Court, while deciding a
Criminal Revision can direct that the accused must be deemed to have
been in continuous service without break and, therefore, he should be paid
his full pay and D.A. during the period of his suspension. This direction C
and observation is wholly without jurisdiction and we, accordingly quash
the said direction contained in the impugned judgment of the High Court.
This appeal is accordingly allowed.

V.M. Appeal allowed.