STATE OF U.P.versusUDAI NARAYAN AND ANR.
- Citation
- 1999 INSC 504
- Decided
- 1 November 1999
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- G B PATTANAIK
Holding
The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction; discharge under CrPC Section 239 cannot be based on detailed examination of evidence, and a private individual may be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Summary
The State of Uttar Pradesh prosecuted Udai Narain, an Additional Collector of Customs, and Reshamwala, a private individual, for allegedly receiving Rs.2 lakh in a corrupt transaction at Lucknow airport. They were charged under Sections 8, 10, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 120B of the IPC. The Special Judge rejected their application for discharge under CrPC Section 239, but the Allahabad High Court, on revision, discharged them after scrutinising the prosecution’s evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the evidence in detail at the discharge stage, which is not permissible before a trial. It also affirmed that a private individual can be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, allowed the appeals, and directed the Special Judge to proceed with the trial.
Issues considered
- Whether a court may scrutinise the prosecution’s evidence and form an opinion on guilt at the stage of a discharge application under CrPC Section 239.
- Whether a private individual can be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
- Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in discharging the accused.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 239
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 10, s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 8
Subjects
Judgment
STATE OF U.P. A
v.
UDAI NARAYAN AND ANR.
NOVEMBER l, 1999
[G.B. PATTANAIK AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.] B
Prevention of Corruption Act 1947/Penal Code, 1860/Criminal
Procedure. Code, 1973: Sections 8, JO, 13(2) read with Section 13(I)(d)/
Section 120-B/Section 239-Respondents charged for cprruption and criminal
conspiracy-Application seeking discharge rejectei by the trial court- C
Challenged in revision-Revision allowed and respondents discharged-On
appeal, Held: High Court exceeded its jurisdiction-Evidence and materials
produced by prosecution cannot be scanned at the stage of discharge
application-A private individual could also be prosec.uted under the Act. ·
Respondent No. 1 was the Additional Collector of Customs and D
.. Respondent No. 2 was a private individual On the basis of information received
by the Police that some illegal transaction was going to take place between
R-1 and R-2, a trap was arranged by the police. On the day of occurrence
when R-2 came out of the aircraft and entered the airport lobby, he was received
by R-1. After some conversation between the two, R-2 went in the personal E
car of R-1 which was intercepted by the police authorities and a sum of Rs. 2
lacs was recovered from the briefcase of R-2 .. lt was alleged that R-1 had
earlier teleplioned R-2 and told him to come with necessary papers and a sum
of Rs. 2 lacs, in order to.settle the pending case at Jaipur. Both the respondents
were chargesheeted under Sections 8, 10, 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B of the IPC. Respondents F
application seeking discharge, moved under Section 239 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 was rejected by the Special Judge. The revision
· challenging the said order was allowed. Hence this appeal by the State.
The Appellant contended that the High Court had erroneously examined G
the statements recorded during investigation elaborately and had wrongfully
formed an opinion after scanning and shifting the same as that was not
warranted under law at the stage of considering the application for discharge.
The respondents contended that if the court is fairly certain that on
consideration of the materials produced by the prosecution, the case would
H
255
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A end in non-conviction then the valuable time of the court should not be wasted
for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure
to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. It was also contended that R-2,
not being a public servant, could not have been prosecuted under the provisions
of the Act.
B Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD : 1. The High Court committed serious error in discharging the
accused persons by advancing elaborate arguments on scanning and
scrutinising the evidence and materials produced by the prosecution. A bare
C perusal of the Judgment of the High Court would indicate that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering discharge of the accused persons as if
sitting in appeal against an order of conviction. [258-F, G) ''
Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration & Anr., [1996) 9 SCC 766
referred to.
D
2. R-2, though not a public servant could be prosecuted under the
provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. Thus, there is no force in the
contention that R-2, not being a public servant, could not have been prosecuted
under the provisions of the Act. [258-H; 259-A]
E
P. Nallammal etc. v. State Rep. By Inspector ofPolice, (1996) 6 Supreme
Today 516, relied on.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
1164-1165of1999.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.99 of the Allahabad High Court
in Crl. R.No. 177 and.225of1998.
Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Rekha Pandey and Ms.
G Sushma Suri for the Appellant.
Rakesh Dwivedi and Rao Ranjit for the Respondent.
G. Krishnan, Radha Krishnan and Gopal Singh for the Respondent No. 2.
H The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
r
STATE OF U.P. v. UDAY NARA YAN [PATTANAIK, J.] 257
PATIANAIK, J. Leave granted. A
The State of U.P. is in appeal against the Judgment of the High Court
of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Revision No. 177 of 1998 and
Criminal Revision Ne. 225 of 1998. By the impugned Judgment, the High
Court allowed both the revisions, filed by the accused and discharged the B
accused persons.
Accused Udai Narain is an officer of the Customs Department and
accused Reshamwala is a private individual. It is alleged by the prosecution
that the Customs Authorities at Jaipur seized a sum of Rs. 21,23 ,050 from
said Reshamwala and on that score the matter is pending before the Collector, C
Customs and Central Excise. Accused Udai Narain is the Additional Collector
of Customs at Lucknow. It is further alleged that on 8.11.93 Reshamwala
arrived at Lucknow Airport by Indian Airlines' Flight. The Police had received
an information that some illegal transaction is going to be made between
Reshamwala and Udai Narain and, therefore, the D.S.P. had arranged a trap. D
As soon as, Reshamwala came out of the aircraft and entered the airport
lobby, he was received by Udai Narain and then there was some conversation
between them which was heard by some persons in the vicinity, who have
been examined by the prosecution. It is further alleged that Reshamwala
went in the personal Fiat Car of Udai Narain, whereas the official car of Udai
Narain was occupied by the other officials. The Fiat Car, being driven to by E
Udai Narain and having Reshamwala with him was intercepted by the Police
authorities and when the briefcase of said Rashamwala was opened, a sum
of Rs. two lacs was recovered. It was the prosecution case that Udai Narain
earlier had telephoned Reshamwala and told him to come with necessary
case papers and a sum of Rs. two lacs, so that his pending case at Jaipur
could be settled. On these allegations, after completion of investigation, F
charge ·sheet was filed against both the accused persons under Sections 8,
IO, 13(2) read with Section 13(l)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and
Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The accused persons moved
application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge,
before the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption. The said learned Special G
Judge rejected that petition by order dated 13 May, 1998. Against the said
-· order, the accused persons moved the High Court in revision. The High Court
by the impugned order having allowed both the revisions and having
discharged the accused persons, the State has come up in appeal.
Mr. Altaf Ahmed, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A for the prosecution, contended that at the stage of considering an application
for discharge, it is not open for the Court to shift the evidence and come to·
a conclusion one way or the other about the guilt of the accused persons.
The Court at that stage will not be in a position to decide the trust-worthiness
of the witnesses and discard the same by shifting and scanning, as a Court
B does in trial. This Court has already indicated the parameters of the powers
of the Court to discharge an accused, before framing of charge and the
impugned Judgment runs contrary to the same. According to· the learned
Addi. Solicitor General, an elaborate examination of the statements recorded
during investigation and forming an opinion after scanning and shifting of
the same is not warranted under law.
c Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for accused
Udai Narain and Mr. Krishnan, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the
accused Reshamwala on the other hand contended that if the Court is fairly
certain that' there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction on
consideration of the materials produced by the prosecution, then the valuable
D time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the
purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion
on a future date and adjudged from that stand point, the impugned judgment
cannot be said to be infirm in any manner. In support of this contention,
reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Salish Mehra v. Delhi
E' Administration and Anr., [1996) 9 sec 766. Mr. Krishnan, in addition
contended that Reshamwala not being a public servant, could not have been
prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Having examined the rival submission at the Bar and on scrutinising the
impugned Judgment of the High Court, we have no hesitation to come to the
F conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in discharging the
accused persons by advancing elaborate arguments on scanning and
scrutinising the evidence and materials produced by the prosecution. We
refrain from recording any positive conclusion on the materials as it may
affect the trial. Suffice it to say that a bare perusal of the Judgment of the
G High Court would indicate that the High Court exceed its jurisdiction in
ordering discharge of the accused persons as if sitting in appeal against an ·
order of conviction. So far as the contention of Mr. Krishnan is concerned
as to whether Reshamwala not being a public servant could be prosecuted
under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the said question
has recently been answered by a Bench of this Court in the case of
H p, Nallammal etc. v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, (1996) 6 Supreme
STATE OF U.P. v. UDAYNARAYAN [PATTANAIK, J.] 259
Today 516. We, therefore, do not find any force in the aforesaid contention. A
In the circumstances, the impugned Judgment of the High Court is set aside.
These appeals are allowed. The Special Judge is directed to proceed with the
trial at an early date.
RC.K. Appeals allowed.
B
)
r
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.