Holding

The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was sufficient to convict the police officers for culpable homicide, the High Court’s reversal was erroneous, and the appeal was allowed, affirming the Sessions Court’s conviction under section 304 IPC.

Summary

The Uttar Pradesh State prosecuted four police officers for the death of Brijlal, who was arrested on a spurious charge and died in police custody after being beaten. The prosecution relied heavily on Brijlal's dying declaration to the magistrate, which identified the Station House Officer and constables as his assailants. The High Court set aside the Sessions Court's conviction under section 304 IPC, but the Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was admissible without corroboration and that the evidence clearly showed the officers inflicted the fatal injuries. The Court affirmed the Sessions Court's finding of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, noting that the act also fell within the second clause of section 300 IPC, though it did not pursue a murder conviction because the State did not appeal on that point. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court judgment was reversed.

Issues considered

Whether a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration in a police‑custody homicide case.
Whether the police officers are liable for murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under sections 300, 302 and 304 of the IPC.
Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Sessions Court conviction and sentence.
Whether the appropriate conviction should be under section 302 IPC instead of section 304 IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 220, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304

Subjects

dying declarationpolice custodymurderculpable homicideextortionpolice misconductburden of proofevidencesection 304 IPCsection 300 IPCsection 302 IPCsection 220 IPC

Judgment

, 621
" A
'· ...

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
I';• B
i.
-' · - · - _·1
-... '_._
' '.-

·.. RAM SAGAR. YADAV AND ORS •. ·

. (Y.V. Cl!ANDRACHVo ..' C.I. AND
..
NATI! SEN, J.]. c
. . AMARENDRA
' .... ' ' )

. "'·
lndion Penal Code.,- s.s. 300, 302 and 3H-Mr1rder and C1'1pablt ltomicldt 1
not om,,unling It> murder-Dbti~tlon between. · ' ·· , '
'.-.•
Indian E"'ldem:t Att-Evidence-Apprecfatlon of-Dyjnt deefarot/011-lf
true, whtthtr co1·roboration neces.rary:_DtaJh Caused and/or a1trOci1le1. Perpttra· D
t,dwhllt in police custOdy-Burdtn ofproof-Need for ft~xamina1ton by ltgls•
laturt. ' · ' .· '
_, ...
Criminal Law- Petty detail$ and minor contr0dicli'1n1 in . evldence-Wht·
tlrtr can tilt the scale cf justice.
; .
Respondent 1 was the Station HOuse Officer and Rtspoadents 2 to 4 were
attached as constable.i to the Police Station. The prosecution aliegd that a com• - E
pJaiot Wai filed againSt tt.e deceased for cattle trespas1.. The Respondent pursuant to
the said complaint sought to extort illega1 gratification from the deceased for bush·
i.Dg up the case. Re-;pondent 2 succeeded in obtaining Rs. 100 and made a fu-rthcr
demand or Rs 200. The deceased refused to obJige him and made a complaint to
the Superintendent of Police, who forwarded h to Respondent 1 for jnquiry and .
report. This iuc:cnsed Respondent l .. The. deceased v.as arrest~ and brought to
the Police Station by Respondents 3 and 4 at about 10.00 · A.M; Same day at
about 6.00 P.M. tbe de,eased sucumbed to injuries which were caused to him by, F
Respcndents white he was in their custody. · ·

j The SessiOnscCollrt tried the roui- RespOndents, convicled c:i~h or them
under 'se<:tion' 304. Part 2 of tbC: Penal Code wbi:e Respondeiit l wis" also coilvic..
· tcd under section 220 of,tbe Penal Gode and all were seDtenccd to ditrefcnt termS '
of imprisonment, - · · ' ··'
.. • G
· The Respondents aprealed to the High. Court and a Sin&lc Judgc set
aside their order or conviciions and sentences. , · ~ . , ,, :

Allowing the Appeal of the State, , '·
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 SC.R.
A
HELD: I. It is impossible to sustain the judgment of the High Court
as it has totally overlooked crucial evidence Jed by the prosecution and taken an
unrealistic vLw of unequivocal fact~. It bas not even adverted to the reasons
give-!1 by the trial court for holdin~ the Respondents guilty of the offences of
which they were convicted. [625B-C]

2. It is quite clear that upon the evidence led by the pro::.ecution only one
conclusion is possible, which is, that the Responden s inflicte :I injuries upon
•
B Brijlal while he was in their custody, thereby causing his death. [635F)

3. It is well-settled ·that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be
acted upon without corroboration. There is not even a rule of prudence whkh
has harden d into a rule.of law tjiat a dying declaration c:annot be acted upon
unless it is corroborated. The primary effort or the Court has to be to find out
whether the dyjng decJaration is true. If it is, no question of co;roboration arises.
c Ii is only J the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear
or coov.ncing that the Court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the
dying declaration. [6280-E)

The instant case, is a typical i11ustratioa of that <Jass of cases in which
the Court shoi.Ild not hesitate to act on the basis of an uncorroborated dying
declaration The circumstances leave no doubt that the dying declaration made
by the deceased to the Judicial Magistrate to the effect tha[ he \Vas beaten by
D Darogah and the constables at the Pqlice Station is true in 1.:very r~spect and it is
safe to accept tr.e same. [628F; G; 629A-B]

Khusha/ Rao v. The State of Bombay, [1958] SCR 552, Harba11s Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1962) Supp. ISCR 104 and Gopafsingh v. State of M.P, [1972)
3 sec 268, followed.

E 4. The distinction b~tween murder and culpable born cide not amounting
to murder is often lost.sisht of, resulting in undue lib~rality in favour of undeserv-
ing culprits like tbe respondent-police officers. Except in cases covered by five
exceptions mentioned in section 300 of the P~nal_ Code, culpable homicide is
·murder if the act by which the death is cau~ed is done with the.intention of caus-
ing death, or if-the act falls within any of the three clauses of section 300,
F
namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. [630 F·G] '
1
The instant case, appears to fall under the clause 2ndly' of section 300,
since the act by which the death of was caused, was done with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as the Respondents kn.:w to be likely to cause bis
death. It is regrCttable that the Se -sions Court convicted the Respc;>ndents under
section 304 instead of convicting them under sect:on 302 of the Pen11l Code. This
G Court, would not however pursue the matter further since the State did not filed
an appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Court. [6JOH; 63JA]

5. The record of the case is disproportionately bulky to the narrow point
. b . involved in the case. It is not an uousuJl experience that tbe wood is
Wb IS r the trees when a Ju dgets
. tC d, ' confronte d wit
'h a Jum
. bl ed-up mass of data,
H m1sse io
U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV 623

relevant and irrelevant. It is necessary in such cases to find out the' central point
A
of tl~e ca,e and to concentrate upon evidence which bears upon that point. Petty
de ails which befog the real issue and c2n tradictions in the evidence which are
inevitable when a story is narraied under the stress of a ¥rave crime, ought not
to be p.rmitted to tilt the scales of justice. The more a Judge gets bogged down
in superfluous detai\s', the greater is the likelihood of his-straying away from evi
dcnce wh ch can clinch the issue. [625C-E] B

In the instant case, the-High ~curt rnisstd or mistook the salient features
of the case and embarked upon a hair· splitting exercise while app1 eciat ng the
evidence.

6. Remand orders are oft~n passed mechanical'!y without a proper appli·
c
cation of mind. In this case, the Magistrate was led into passing an order of
remand on the basis of the usual statement that the offence of which the accused
was charged was still und r investigation. What is imprirt·Jnt is that dec~ased had
not committed ar~y offence at all for which ht could be remanded and, far from
being an accused, he was in the position ol a complainant. Respondent' 1 was
the architect of his remand and the motive for obtaining the remand order D
was to keep him in custady so as tO prevent him from disclosing to his people
who beat him and where. (627D-F]

7. It is neces~ary that the Government amends the law appropriately so
that policemen who commit atrocities on persC1ns u..ho are in their custody rire
not allowe1 to e~cape by reason of paticity or absence of evidence. P\)Jice ·omc~rs
E
alone_ and none else. can give evidence as regards the circumstances in which a
person in their custody comes to rec1 ive injuries while in their custody. Bound
6Y-ties of a kin1 of brotherhood, t'ley often pr('fer to remain s.Jent in such situa-
tions and when. they choose to speak they put their own gLiss up.'ln facts
and per·1ert the truth. The result is th3t person_s, on whom atrocities are
perpetrated by t1~e police in the s·anctum sanctorum or the Police StaC:on, are left
without any evidence to prove who the offenders are. The Jaw as to the burden F
of proof in such cases may be re·examined by the l~gislature so that hand-maids
of law and order do not u~e their authority and opportunities· for oppressing the
in.nocent citizens, who look ~o them for protection. [631C·EJ

'·--" CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 69
of 1975.
G

From the Judgment and Order dated 13th May, 1974 of the
Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 269 of 1973,

M.R. Sharma, Dalveer Bhandari, H.M. Singh and Miss Raclma
Joshi, for the Appellant ·

R.K. Garg, VJ. Francis and N.M. Popli for the Respondents.
ff
,,'

624.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANCRACHUD, C.J. This is an appeal by the State of U.P.,
against the judgment of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High
. Court, setting aside the order of conviction and sentence, pas5ed by
B the learned Sessions Judge, Fatehpur against the four respondents.
Respondents I and 2, Ram Sagar Yadav and Shobha Nath alias Ptljari
were convicted by the learned Sessions Judge under section 304. Part
2, of the Penaf Code and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment
for seven years. Respondent 1 was also convicted under section ·220
of the Penal Code for keeping a person in confinement corruptly and
c was sent~nced to rigorous imprisonme.nt for 'five years Re•pondents
. 3 and 4 were convicted under section 304, Part 2 of. the Penal Code
and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.

Respondent I,· Ram Sagar Yadav, was the Station House
Officer of the Hussainganj Police Station, District Faiehpur, while the
D
remaining three respondents were. attached to 'that police station as
constables. On the morning of August 29, 1969 respondents 3 and 4
went to village. Haibatpur, arrested the deceased Brijlal and brought
him to the rolice station at about .10.00 A.M. Brijlal died
the same day at about 6.00 P.M. due to the injuries which were
E caused to him between the time that he was brough(to the police
station and the forenoon of August 29. ·
·.•

The case:of the prosecution is' that the re1pondents wanted . tO
extort illegat;gratification from Brijlal in connection. with a complaint ·
which was filed against him by one Faheeman Faqirin for cattle tres-
pass. ·Respondent 2, Sbobha Nath, had succeeded in obtaining a· sum
F of Rs.100 from Brijlal with an assurance that no steps will be taken
a
against him in that complafot. Respondent 2 demanded further sum
of Rs .. 200 from Brijlal for hushing up the case. which the latter
refused to pay. Instead, ·a11 August 7,'· 1969 he sent a complaint
(Exhibit Ka-2) to the Superientendent of Police, Fatehpur, complain·
ing that a bribe was being demanded from him by respondent 2, a
G . policeman of the Hussainganj Police Station. That complaint was for·
warded by the Superintendent of Police to respondent I for inquiry and
report. Being incensed by the 'audacity' of Brijlal in complaining .
against a policeman under his charge, respondent I sent respondents
·3 and 4 to bring Brijlal to the police station iii· order that he could be
taught a proper lesson. That is the genesis of Brijlars arrest. Apart from
Faheeman Faqirin's complaint that Brijlars bullock had damaged her
H crop, thare was no complaint or charge against him. ' .
u P. STATE v. R.S. YADA\' .(Chandrachud, C.J.) 625
~
~- A
,), We have heard this appeal.at reasonable length and both Shri
., M :R. Sharma, who appears on.behalf of the appellant, l\lld Shti R.K,.

'
"' Garg who appears on behalf of the· respondents, have taken us
through the relevant evidence and the judgments of the High' Court
and the Sessions Court. Upon a:consideration. of that evidence, we
J
find it impossible to sustain the judgment of the High Court; It has B
·\ totally overlooked crucial evidence Jed by the prosecution in; support
i) of- its case and, with respect, taking an unrealistic vie1~"of unequivocal
facts, it has not even adverted to the reasons given by- the trial court
;,- in support of its conclusion that- the respondents are.guitly of the
offences of which-it convicted them.
c
The record of the case is diproportionately bulky to the narrow
point which is involved in the case. It is not an ., unsual:. experience
that the wood is missed for the trees when a Judge is confronted with
a jumbled-up mass of data, relevant and irrelevant. It is necessary in
such cases to find out the central point of the case .and to concentrate J)
upon evidence which bears upon that point. Petty details which befog
the real issue and minor contradictions in the evidence which_ are
inevitable when a story is narrated under the stress of a grave crime,
ought ~ot to be .permitted to tilt the scales of justice. The more a
Judge gets bogged down in superfluous details, the greater is the like-
lihood of his straying away from evidence which can clinch the issue.
In the instant case, the High. Court missed or mistook the salient
features of the case.and, in the result, embacked upon a hair-splitting E
exercise _while apprecia\ing the evidence ..
'L
Werlo not propose to discuss. more than is. strictly necessary
since· it is 11uite clear that upon the evidence led by the. prosecution
only one ceuclusion is possible, which .is,_that the respondents iutlic-
ted injuries· upon Brijla\ while he was in their custody,. thereby F
causing his death.

Brijlal was hale and hearty-on the,anorning of-August 29, 19~9.
He was ploughing his field when respondents 3 and 4 reached.Haibat-
pur in order to arrest him. They took him on foot to the Hussaniganj
· Police Station which is about 3 km away from. Haibatpur. They
G
reached the police station at I0.00 A.M. Two hours later,· Brijlal was
taken,in a police van to the Court of the learned Additional District
Magistrate for. obtaining remand, Shri· RcC, Nigam, thei- Piesiding
_i.. Officer, of.. the Court, had finished the winding.,. list. of the
-r<;mand .. applica\iQns, at the eml oL which, the.. M~harir,-of, the
H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1985] 2 s.c.R,
A
Court informed him that a remand order1 had remained to be
passed against an accused who was brought from the Hussainganj
Police Station and that the accused could not be produced in Court
since be was lying in the verandah in a badly injured condition. Shri
Nigam (P.W. 5) says in his evidence that since the accused could not
be brought to the Court-room, be himself went to the verandah
B
where the accused was lying and be asked him his name. The accu-
sed was unable to respond at first since bis condition was "very
serious" but, on repeated inquiries, the accused told Shri Nigam
that bis name was Brijlal. On being questioned as to how be came
to receive the injuries, Brijlal replied that 'the Darogab of Hussain-
ganj and the. constables had beaten him very badly'. Shri Nigam
c made a note of the statement made by Brijlal on the remand appli-
cation (Exhibit Ka-1). That application bears Shri Nignm's signature
and the thumb impression of Brijlal.

Shri Nigam's evidence is of a crucial character since it establi-
D shes, beyond any doubt, that Brijlal had extensive injuries on his
~

....
person and that, at the earliest opportunity, he involved the police-
men of the Hussainganj Police Station as the authors of those injuries,
It is as transparent, as any fact can be, that the injuries which were "
found on the person of Brijlal were caused to him at the Hussainganj
\
Police Station. The few and simple steps in the logical process leading
to that conclusion are that Brijlal had no injuries on his person when
E f
he was arrested at Haibatpur in the morning or when he was brought
to the police station at about 10.00 A.M., and that, when he was sent
for remand he had a large number of injuries on his person which
. ~

had induced a state of shock. We are unable to see what other expla-
nation can reasonably be given of this chain of facts except that the
F injuries were caused to Brijlal by the policemen attached to the
Hussainganj Police Station. Who, from amongst them, is or are
responsible for causing the injuries has undoubtedly to be considerd.
But, there is no escape from the conclusion that Brijlal was assaulted
while be was in custody of the respondents at the Hussainganj Police
Station.
G '
The evidence of Laxmi Narain, P.W. No. 17, who was one of
the constables attached to the Hussainganj Police Station bas an im-
portant bearing on the guilt of the respondents, an aspect which has
escaped the attention of the High Court. Laxmi Narain says that when
he went to the police station at· about 10.45 a.m. on August 29, 1969,
H respondent !, the Station House Officer, and the other three respon-
U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, c J.) 627
A
dents were present at the police station ; that Brijlal was lying in the
..,,_ lock-up of the police station shrieking in pain ; and that, when Brijlal
was handed over to his custody for being taken to the Magistrate,
there were a number of injuries on his arms and legs. According to
Laxmi Narain, and that is undisputed, respondent I also accompanied
him and Brijlal to the Magistrate's court. It seems to us surprising
that respondent I was nowhere on the scene in the Magistrate's court, B
especially in the light of the fact that Brijlal's was an unsual case in
~ which, the prisoner for whom remand was to be obtained was in a
precarious condition due to the injuries suffered by him. It was res-
pondent I who, being the S.H.O., had the custody and care of Brijlal.
Instead of making himself available to the Magistrate for explaining
how Brijlal came to be injured, he resorted to the expedient of depu-
ting Laxmi Narain to face the Magistrate. Laxmi Narain has also C
stated in his evidence that Brijlal told the Magistrate that the Daro-
gah and the constables of the Hussainganj Police Station had assaul-
--..1 # ' ted him.

It is notorious that remand orders are often passed mechanically
without a proper application of mind. Perhaps, the Magistrates are D
not to blame because, heaps of such applications are required to be
·disposed of by them before the regular work of the day begins. Shri
Nigam has to be complimented for the sense of duty and humanity
which he showed in leaving his seat and going to the verandah to see
an humble villager like Brijlal. It is obvious that he was led into E
passing an order of remand on the basis of the usual statement that
the offence of which the accused was charged was still under
investigation. What is important is that Brijlal had not committed
any offence at a!l for which he could be remanded and, far from

- being an accused, he was in the position of a complainant. Respon-
dent I was the architect of his remand and the motive for obtaining
the remand order was to keep Brijlal in custody so as to prevent
F

him from disclosing to his people who beat him and where.

After obtaining the remand order, Brijlal was sent to the Fateh-
pur District Jail at 3.40 p.m. Shea Shanker Sharma, P. W.8, who G
was the Assistant Jailor of the Fetehpur Jail, says that when he exami-
ned Brijlal at about 3.45 p.m. while admitting him to the Jail, he
..I.. found that there was swelling on his bands, legs and knees. Brijlal
was unable to get up and on being questioned, he told Sharma that
the policemen belonging to the Police Smtiou arrested him H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 2 S.C.R.
A
from his field, took him to the Police Station and committed
"marpit" on him, as a result of which the was unable to stand. Fin-
ding that Brijlal's condition was serious, he called the Jail Doctor.

Dr. S. C. Misra PW. 21, went to the District Jail at about 5.20
p.m. He fonnd that there were 19 injuries on the various parts of
Brijlal 's person. On being questioned, Brijlal told him in a faltering
voice that he had been beaten by the policemen. Dr. Misra says that
Brijlal's condition was precarious but that, he had neither any fever
nor any symptoms of Pneumonie. The evidence of Dr Misra proves
that Brijlal died on account of the injuries received by him and that,
the suggestion made by the defence that he died on account of some
c kind of a fever or on account of the pneumonic condition of his
lungs, is utteiy baseless. The congestion in his lungs was the result
of the beating administered to him.

It is well-settled that, as a matter of law, a dying declaration "' ..,.
can be acted upon without corroboration. (See Khushal Rao v. The
D State of Bombay(l);Harbans Singhv. State of Punj1b,(2) and Gopa/singh
v. State of M.P.)(3 ) There is not even a rule of prudence which has
hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted
upon nnless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the Court has
to be to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no
question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances sur-
E rounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing that the
Court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration to the dying
declaration. The case before us is a typical illus! ation of that class
of cases in which, the Court should not hesitate to act on the basis
of an uncorroborated dying declaration. Brijlal had no reason for

-
involving the policemen falsely for having assaulted him. There was
F no possiblity of anyone tutoring him, for the simple reason that he
was in the exclusive custody of the policemen of Husssainganj Police
Station. It is the respondents who were in a position to exert influ-
ence over him. No one else bad access to him, which not only exclu-
des the possibility of his being tutored, but which also excludes
G the possibility that he was assaulted by any one else. Indeed, the
circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the dying declaration

(1) [19581 SCR 552.
(2) [1962] Supp. I SCR 104. J.
H en 119121 J sec 268.
U.P. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, c J.) 629
A
made by Brijlal to Shri Nigam is true in every respect. We consider
it safe to accept the statement made by Prijlal to Shri Nigam that
be was beaten by the 'Darogab and the constables' of the Hussain-
gauj Police Station.

The only question which remains for consideration is as to the
identity of the persons belonging to the Hussainganj Police Station B
who participated in the assault on Brijlal. Respondent I is directiy
and specifically implicated in the dying declaration. He was the
"Darogah" of that Police Station. Laxmi Narain says in his evidence
that at I 0.45 a.m. when Brijlal was brought to the police station by
respondents 3 and 4 respondent I was present. It is difficult to believe
c
that the police constables would beat an accused so mercilessly in
the police station without the connivance, consent or coollaboration
of the Station House Officer. The Police Station of Hussainganj is
not so large that the Station House Officer would not know what is
happening there during his presence. The possibility of any other
officer being a "Darogah" is removed by the evidence of S.I. Bajrang D
Babadur Singh, P. W. 19, who says that, at the relevant time, there
was no other Second Officer at the Hussainganj Police Station except
him.

Any doubt lurking about the involvement of respondent 1 in
the incident is removed by bis own conduct. Though be was unques- E
'
tionably present at the police station at the material time, be prepared
a false record in order to show that be bad gone for the purpose of
an identification parade to another place. We agree with the learned
Sessions Judge that the record was thus prepared by respondent 1
falsely in order to support the defence of alibi. That, indeed, was bis
F
defence at the trial. He also prepared false record to show that Brij-
lal was involved in a dacoity cas.e and was brought to the police
station for that reason. There was no such charge against Brijlal and
yet, respondent 1, as the S.H.O., authorised or allowed respondents 3
and 4 to go Haibatpur for arresting Brijlal. The true reason for
arresting him was that the respondent were incensed at the complaint
made by Brijlal against respondent 2 for extorting a bribe.
G
In so far as respondent 2 is concerned, be is truly the cause of
the assault on Brijlal. It was be who bad extorted a bribe from Brijlal
and was attempting to get some money from him. Brijlal sent
a complaint on August 7, 1969 to the [Superintendent of Police,
Fatehpur, complaining against respondent 2. That complaint having H
630 SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.
A been referred for inquiry and report to the Hussainganj Police Soltion,
respondents hatched a conspiracy to put Brijlal under arrest, bring
him to the police station and assault him.

In so far as responden\5 3 and 4 are conc~rned, it is they who
arrested Brijlal on a false charge of dacoity and brought him to the
B
police station at 10 a.m., on August 29. Shortly thereafter, constable
Laxmi Narain found that Brijlal was lying in the lock-up in a badly
injured con~ition and was shrieking in agony.

In the light of these findings, it is unnecessary to refer to the
c evidence of P.Ws. 6. 7 and 9 who are respectively the nephew, the
daughter and the wife of Brijlal. We agree with the learned Sessions
Judge that these·persons went to the police station immediately after
Brijlal was taken there under arrest. It is not, however, possible to
say with a reasonable amount of certainty that they saw the respon-
dents assaulting Brijlal. They reached the police station quite some
D time after Brijlal was taken there and it would be too much of a
coincidence to suppose that they arrived at the police station precisely
-
at the time when Brijlal was being beaten. They might have heard
the shrieks of Brijlal who was writhing in pain. But, standing outside
the police station, as they were, it could not have been possible for
them to see who was assaulting Brijlal. The limited relevance of their
E evidence is for showing, apart from the other circumstances stated
above, that Brijlal was lying injured in the police station. f

For these reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment
· of the High Court and affirm that of the Sessions Court. It is to be
F greretted that the learned Sessions Judge convicted the respondents
under section 304 instead of convicting them under section 302 of the
Penal Code. The distinction between murder and culpable homicide
not amounting to murder is often lost sight of, resulting in undue
liberality in favour of undeserving culprits like the respondent-police
officers, Except in cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned in
G
section 300 of the Penal Code, culpable homicide is murder if the act
by· which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death, or if the act falls within any of the three clauses of section
300, namely, 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly. In this case, the injuries suffered
by Brijlal would appear to fall under the clause '2ndly' of section
300, since the act by which his death was caused was done with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as the respondents knew to be
H likely to cause his death. However, we will not pursue that matter
tJ.J>. STATE v. R.S. YADAV (Chandrachud, C.i.) 631
A
any further since the State did not file an appeal against the judgment
of the learned Sessions Judge asking that the respondents should be
convicted under section 302 of the Penal Code and since the prosecu-
tion did not lead sufficient evidence through the Medical Officer in
order to bring out the true nature of the injuries suffered by Brijlal.
B
Before we close, we would like to impress upon the Government
the need to amend the law appropriately so that policemen who com-
mit atrocities on persons who are in their custody are not allowed to
escape by reason of paucity or absence of evidence. Police Officers
•
alone, and none else, can give evidence as regards the circumstances
in which a person in their custody comes to receive injuries while in c
their custody. Bound by ties of a kind of brotherhood, they often
prefer to remain silent in such situations and when they choose to
speak, they put their own gloss upon facts and pervert the truth.
The result is that persons, on whom atrocities are perpetrated by the
police in the sanctum sanctorum of the police station, are left without
D
any evidence to prove who the offenders are. The law as to the
burden of proof in such cases may be re-examined by the legislature
so that hand-maids of law and order do not use their authority and
opportunities for oppressing the innocent citizens who look to them
for protection. It is ironcial that, in the instant case, a person who
complained against a policeman for bribery, was done to death by E
that policeman, his tw > companions and his superior officer, the
Station House Officer. The vigilant Magistrate, Shri R.C. Nigam,
deserves a word of praise for dutifully recording the dying declaration
of the victim, which has come to constitute the sheet anchor of the
case of the prosecution.

- A. P.J . Appeal allowed.

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