STATE OF UTTAR PRADESHversusRUP LAL SHARMA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 1496
- Decided
- 17 December 1996
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- M M PUNCHHI
Holding
A fresh eviction application is not barred by res judicata when the tenancy has not been determined, and a government‑allotted quarter is a public premises, making post‑retirement occupation unauthorised.
Summary
Rup Lal Sharma, a retired government servant, continued to occupy a government‑allotted quarter after retirement. The State of Uttar Pradesh sought eviction under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, but the prescribed authority dismissed the first application on the ground that the house was not a public premises and Sharma was not an unauthorised occupant. After serving a notice determining the lease, the State filed a fresh eviction application, which was again dismissed on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the earlier dismissal did not bar a fresh application because the tenancy had not been determined, and that the building was indeed a public premises, making Sharma’s continued occupation unauthorised. Consequently, the Court allowed the State’s appeal and ordered Sharma to vacate the premises within three months.
Issues considered
- Whether the earlier dismissal of the eviction application bars a subsequent application under the doctrine of res judicata.
- Whether the government‑allotted quarter qualifies as a 'public premises' under Section 2(e) of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972.
- Whether the respondent’s continued occupation after retirement constitutes 'unauthorised occupation' within the meaning of the Act.
Legislation cited
- U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972s. 2(e), s. 4, s. 5, s. 7(g)
Subjects
Judgment
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH A
v.
RUP LAL SHARMA AND OTHERS
DECEMBER 17, 1996
[MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND K. T. THOMAS, JJ.) B
Rent Control Law .'
U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1972-Sections 5, 2(e) and 7(g) 'Public Premises'-So wide as to include all C
such buildings-Whether it actually belongs to Government as such or only
to a government department or even a building belonging to a private in-
dividual if government requisitioned it or some person on behalf of the
government has requisitioned it 'unauthorised occupation' the definition com-
prises within its contours occupation of the public premises by any person
without authority for such occupation-Also the continuance in occupation D
of such premises by any person after the authority under which or the capacity
in which he was allowed to hold or occupy the premises has expired or has
been detennined for any reason whatsoever-Continuance in occupation after
'l-the detennination of such authority would also make the occupation un-
authorised for the purpose of the said Act. E
The respondent was a government servant and he was allotted a
-cl
quarter on payment of rent by the ollicer in charge of government estate.
After the retirement of the respondent the appellant State moved the
prescribed authority under the Act for an order of eviction against the F
respondent. On 22.3.1978 the prescribed authority passed an order dis-
missing the application holding that it was not possible to hold that the
house in question was a public premises nor the respondent was an
authorised occupant.
Appellant issued a notice determining the tenancy of the respondent G
and again approached the prescribed authority by an application for an
order of eviction against the respondent. The prescribed authority dis-
missed the application holding that the order dated 22.3.1978 would
operate as res judicata. An appeal to the District Judge was also dismissed.
A writ petition before the High Court also failed. The appellant filed this H
205
206. SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.
A appeal against the order of the High Court.
' '
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1. the previous application for eviction was dismissed on the
ground that the tenancy was not determined. An application for eviction after
B determining the tenancy will not therefore be bit by res judicata. [207·B·C]
2;1. The house belonging to the Government Estate is a public
premises. [207-H; 208-A]
2.2 Respondent's continuance in occupation of the premises for the
C past 10 years after retirement is unauthorised occupation. [208-E-F]
2.3. It is unfortunate that first respondent was allowed to continue
as an "unauthorised occupant" in government quarters for nearly a decade
now after he ceased to be a government servant, when other government
servants in service are waiting in the queue for accommodation. [208-E]
D
2.4. The application of the appellant for grant of an order of eviction
is allowed. First respondent is directed to vacate the building in question
on or before the expiry of three months. [208-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 16762 of
E 1996.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.84 of the Allahabad High
Court.in C.M.W.P. No. 5404 of 1980.
Ms. Rachna Gupta for Ashok K. Srivastava for the Appellant.
F
Jitendra Sharma Ms. Gunwant Dara and P. Gaur for the Respon-
dents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is by the State of U.P. as they failed to get an order of
eviction against first respondent Rup Lal Shrama - a retired Government
servants from a Goverlll!lent quarter as per the provisions of U.P. Public ,.
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act. 1972 (for short the
H Act.).
STATE v. R.L.SHARMA[1HOMAS,J.] W7
Admitted facts are; Rup Lal Sharma was a Government servant. A
Quarter No. 34 situated at Mohalla Fadirganj, Old Katra, Allahabad was
allotted to the first respondent on payment of rent by the officer incharge
of Government Estates, Allahabad. When first respondent retired from
Government service the State moved the prescribed authority under the
Act for an order of eviction under Section 5 of the Act. On 22.3.1978, the B
prescribed authority passed an order of eviction dismissing the application
by observing that "it is not possible to hold that the house in question is
public premises or that the opposite party is an unauthorised occupant of
it." After the said order, the appellant sent notice to the first respondent
determining the lease, and on the expiry of the period specified in that
notice appellant moved a fresh application under Section 4 of the Act C
before the prescribed authority. Even on this time the application was
dismissed on the principles of res judicata in that the earlier order dated
22.3.1978 would operate as a bar against the appellant from seeking evic-
tion of the first respondent under the provisions of the Act. Appellant
thereupon went in appeal before the District Judge who was the appellate D
authority under the Act, but the appeal was dismissed. A writ petition was
/
filed before the High Court of Allahabad challenging the said orders, but
the said writ petition was also dismissed by the impugned judgment.
Even assuming that the findings made in the earlier order dated
22.3.1978 would preclude the appellant in subsequent proceedings from E
reconvessing against such findings on the principles of res judicata we may
observe that the question raised in the present proceedings has no bearing
on such findings. As per the order of 22.3.1978 the prescribed authority
found that the building belongs to the Government Estate, and there is no
evidence that the tenancy was terminated before filing the application. On p
the above two premises the prescribed authority concluded thus: "Hence
the opposite party cannot be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of
this premises as defined under the Act."
In the present proceedings there is no dispute that notice was sub-
sequently served on the first respondent determining the lease. If so, can G
the respondent be treated as an unauthorised occupant even if it is true
that the building belongs to a Government Estate?
"Public premises" is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act as meaning
any premises "belonging to or taken or lease or requisitioned by or on H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.
A behalf of the State Government; The first respondent never disputed that [_
the building belongs to the Government and all he has said was that it
belongs to the Government estate. It does not matter. The definition of
public premises is so wide as to hedqe in all such buildings whether it
actually belongs to government as such or only to a Governinent depart-
B ment or eve!?- a building belonging to a private individual if Government
have requisitioned .it or some person on behalf of the Government has
requisitioned it. Hence there is no escape from concluding that the building
in question is public premises.
"Unauthorised.occupation" is defined in section 2(e). The definition
C comprises within its contours occupation of the public premises by any
person without authority for such occupation, and also the continuance in
occupation of such premises by any person after the authority under which
or the capacity in which he was allowed to hold or occupy the premises
has expired or has been determined for any reasbn However. Thus con-
tinuance in occupation after the determination of such authority would also
D make the occupation unauthorised for the purpose of the said Act.
In the above view, there is no question of any bar of res judicata on
the strength of the earlier order dated 22.3.1978 particularly because there
is a finding in that order that the building belongs to Government Estate.
E From any view of the matter the building in question is public premises. It
is unfortunate that first respondent was allowed to continue as an "un-
authorised occupant" in Government partners for nearly a decade now
after he ceased to be a Government servant, when lot of other Government
servants in service are waiting in the queue for acco=odation.
p We, therefore, allow this appeal and upset the impugned Judgment
of the High Court. We allow the application of the appellant for grant an
order of eviction. First respondent is directed to vacate the building in
question on or before the expiry of three months from today. However, we
direct.the parties to bear their respective costs: -
G K.S.G. Appeal allowed.
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