Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appeals must be remanded for fresh adjudication because the High Court failed to properly determine the nature of the 1947 sale deed and the compliance with the 1924 lease conditions, and ownership cannot be decided without a thorough examination of the original records.

Summary

The dispute concerned a 183‑bigha parcel of land in Haripur, Nainital, originally leased in 1924 under the Government Grants Act of 1895. The lease was allegedly transferred by a 1947 sale deed, but the deed’s nature—whether it conveyed title or merely lease‑hold rights—was contested. The respondents claimed ownership based on the sale deed and on being recognised as "Bhumidhar" and "Sirdar" under various tenancy statutes, while the State argued that the transfer violated the lease’s condition requiring prior written approval from the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had not properly examined the sale deed or the lease conditions, and that crucial records were missing, making a definitive ownership determination impossible. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgments and remanded the matters for fresh adjudication with a full examination of the documents. The Court also directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending the new proceedings.

Issues considered

Did the respondents' predecessor purchase ownership rights or only lease‑hold rights under the 1924 lease deed?
If lease‑hold rights were transferred, were the conditions of the 1924 lease, especially the requirement of prior written approval, complied with?
Was the 1924 lease deemed determined at the expiry of its initial thirty‑year term, and could the lease continue under the doctrine of holding over or acquiescence?
Could the predecessor be recognised as an "Occupancy Tenant" under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, and thereby attain "Sirdar" status under the Zamindari Notification?
Does Section 33 of the 1939 Act preclude the transfer of occupancy‑tenant status to the respondents?
Was the land governed by the 1939 Act or by the Kumaon Tenancy Rules of 1918, and what impact does that have on the respondents' rights?
Do the revenue entries and mutation records create a presumption of correctness in favour of the respondents?
Should the High Court’s findings be set aside due to lack of proper examination of the sale deed and lease conditions?

Legislation cited

Agra Tenancy Acts. 1926
Government Grants Acts. 1895
Land Acquisition Acts. 1894
Transfer of Property Acts. 116, s. 1882
U.P. Tenancy Acts. 1939, s. 33
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Acts. 131, s. 1950, s. 3(26)

Subjects

tenancy lawleasehold rightssale deedownership disputeoccupancy tenantsirdarbhumidhargovernment grants actU.P. tenancy actland revenueremand

Judgment

936 [2023] COURT
SUPREME 10 S.C.R.REPORTS
936 : 2023 INSC 550
[2023] 10 S.C.R.

A STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR.
v.
RAVI KUMAR (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 4983 of 2009)
B MAY 18, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Tenancy laws: Title claim – On facts, land leased out to one
in 1924 for thirty years under the 1895 Act, who sold it to
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents vide sale deed of 1947
C
and thereafter the land was recorded in his name and on his death
his successor, and they are continuously recorded as Bhumidhar of
the said land – Different set of legal proceedings which proceeded
in parallel – Issues pertaining to sale of ownership rights or
leasehold rights to the respondents; status of the respondents under
D the applicable tenancy law and if the status entitled them for
ownership of the suit land; if the leasehold rights validly transferred
under the 1924 lease deed; determination of the 1924 lease deed,
breach of the condition of prior approval and expiry of initial lease
deed period; and was it possible for predecessor of respondents to
be accorded the status of ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 Act,
E
which resulted in them being subsequently accorded the status of
‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification – On appeal, held: High
Court while deciding the issue of ownership in favour of the
respondents on the strength of the Sale Deed, have come to different
conclusions as such to the nature of the instrument – Both these
F parallel findings by the High Court have been without any serious
examination of the nature of the Sale Deed itself – Reasoned finding
on both the nature of Sale Deed as well as whether the same was
violative of conditions of the 1924 Lease Deed very important,
because of which the issue of determination of lease remains
unanswered – High Court made sweeping remarks in respect of the
G
tenancy status without any serious consideration as to whether the
same were legally tenable or not – No reference is made to any
proceedings wherein the status as an occupancy tenant was ever
granted to the predecessor of the respondent and, if so, how and
when the same culminated into the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the
H Zamindari Notification – Thus, there are compelling circumstances
936
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 937
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

which have been left unanswered by the courts below, because of A
which determination of several factual issues have been left in limbo
– In dearth of appropriate records, ownership rights in respect of
an immovable property cannot be decided casually – Thus, the Court
is reluctant to give a final opinion on the matter until the Court is
satisfied on the basis of the entirety of documents – Matters remanded
B
to the High Court for a fresh adjudication on the issues formulated,
even though pending before this Court for more than 15 years –
Government Grants Act of 1895 – U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court while deciding the issue of C
ownership in favour of Respondents on the strength of the Sale
Deed, have come to different conclusions as such to the nature
of the instrument. Respondents in the plaint filed by them in 1983
Injunction Suit, the respondents claim to tenure holders who were
later accorded the status of ‘Bhumidhar’ on the basis of Zamindari
Notification. On the other hand, in the Second Writ Petition, the D
respondents stated that the Sale Deed was actually in respect of
the title per se. The recitals of the Sale Deed highlight that the
relationship between JV and ML seemed more akin to that of a
vendor vendee in a title sale than that of the sale of leasehold
rights. [Paras 37 and 38][965-B-C; 966-E] E
1.2 In respect of the two parallel findings given by the High
Court, the respondents for the first time before this Court have
given up the finding which treated the Sale Deed as a sale of title.
However, it is noted that both these parallel findings by the High
Court have been without any serious examination of the nature F
of the Sale Deed itself. The High Court erred in respect of these
findings and as the same was essential to determine the present
dispute on merit, it is deemed to be a fit case to exercise the
power of remand. Additionally, despite these findings being a
serious lacuna to reach a conclusive decision, the appellants have
raised no serious objection to the modified stand taken by the G
respondents wherein they stated that the Sale Deed was in respect
of leasehold rights only. [Paras 39 and 40][966-F-H]
1.3 It can be safely deduced that the appellants did contend
the issue of prior approval from the initial stage itself. Apart from
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A the said eviction suit, two other proceedings need to be
highlighted, i.e. consolidation proceedings which occurred
between 1959–1960 and acquisition proceedings for a portion of
land initiated by the military authorities in 1963. In respect of the
consolidation proceedings, the stand taken by State cannot be
deduced as no document or order in respect of the same has
B
been produced. However in respect of the acquisition, order dated
22.11.1965 passed by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer,
which granted compensation to the predecessor of respondents
has been brought on record wherein it must be noted that
compensation was granted on the basis of revenue entries and
C without any serious examination of the validity of the same.
Hence, both these proceedings cannot be treated as an admission
of validity of revenue entries or as accepting the waiver of breach
of the condition in respect of prior approval from the Deputy
Commissioner. [Para 42][968-B-D]
D 1.4 The order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the
Commissioner, Kumaon, in the mutation proceedings makes it
apparent that the approval from the appropriate authority as per
the lease deed, i.e. Deputy Commissioner was granted only on
06.12.1948 which is more than a year later than the Sale Deed.
On the contrary, as per the recitals contained in the Sale Deed, it
E is mentioned that due permission was obtained and the
consequent mutation was effected in the office of Superintendent,
Tarai and Bhabar, Nainital before its execution. Hence, this above-
mentioned recital leads to immense confusion as to whether any
approval was ever granted at the first instance. Even if such
F approval was granted, no indication is given as such to actually
who granted the approval and if it is assumed that a subordinate
authority granted the approval, no statutory instrument is
produced to highlight whether this delegation was possible or
not. The subordinate courts as well as the High Court have merely
relied on the order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner,
G Kumaon to come to a sweeping conclusion that a valid approval
existed in favor of the predecessor of the respondents despite
glaring contradictions which were on the face of the record.
Consequently, on this issue of breach of the conditions of the
1924 Lease Deed, this Court fails to arrive at a decisive conclusion
H as neither the original record nor its true copies have been placed
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 939
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

on record of this Court or the High Court as well as the other A
forums. Finally, while the respondents argued that until there
existed an express refusal by the Deputy Commissioner for sale
of leasehold rights, the sale was valid especially in light of post
facto approval granted by the Deputy Commissioner as has been
recorded in order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the
B
Commissioner. [Paras 43-45][968-H; 969-A-F]
1.5 It is settled law that any contractual term or condition
is to be interpreted as per the natural and ordinary meaning
appended to the language used by the parties unless the same
leads to absurdity. In the present case, condition (e) of the 1924
lease deed makes it clear that no rights in the Suit Land are C
allowed to be transferred or created “without the written approval
of the Deputy Commissioner of Nainital” which bears the crystal
clear requirement of the prior assent needed from the Deputy
Commissioner. This interpretation is also supported from the
fact that leases under the Government Grants Act of 1985 are to D
be strictly constructed as per the terms of the grant, regardless
of any other provisions of the law. Even otherwise, the High Court
and other authorities have proceeded on the premise of a valid
approval. They are completely silent on whether the post facto
approval could be granted and if so, who granted such approval.
Again, no records are produced and its not known whether any E
approval was ever actually granted and when or by whom. [Paras
46 and 48][970-F-G; 971-A, E-F]
1.6 A reasoned finding on both the nature of Sale Deed as
well as whether the same was violative of conditions of the 1924
Lease Deed goes to the heart of the present dispute, because of F
which the issue of determination of lease remains unanswered.
Hence, in light of the same, the respondents’ claim on the strength
of doctrine of holding over or through doctrine of acquiescence
as well as the reliance on the conduct of appellants, remains in
doldrums as the same are hinged on the finding in respect of G
determination of lease. It is also highlighted that decades have
passed in litigation, and it would be extremely iniquitous to remand
the case to revenue authorities at such a belated stage. [Para
49][971-G; 972-A-B]

H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 1.7 Even assuming that JV was deemed to have been
granted status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 Act, it
should be noted that his status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ cannot
be transferred to the predecessor of respondents in light of
Section 33 of the 1939 Act. The only exception to the bar on
transfer of status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ in the section 33 is
B
under sub-clause (b) of clause (2) wherein reference is made to
Section 251 which in turns deals with sale of occupancy rights
when the tenant himself is facing the execution of a decree for
arrears of rent. As no factual situation has been indicated stating
that JV had suffered a decree for rent arrears, there is no surety
C as to how any transfer of ‘Occupancy Tenant’ status in favour of
the predecessor of respondents was sustainable. This confusion
further indicates that the predecessor of respondents could not
have been accorded the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari
Notification on the strength of revenue entries which recorded
him as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’. [Para 52][973-B, G-H; 974-A-B]
D
1.8 The High Court again made sweeping remarks in
respect of the tenancy status without any serious consideration
as to whether the same were legally tenable or not. No reference
is made to any proceedings wherein the status as an occupancy
tenant was ever granted to the predecessor of the respondent
E and, if so, how and when the same culminated into the status of
‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification. These proceedings
which ultimately led to the grant of status of ‘Bhumidhar’ in favour
of the predecessor of respondents for the first time, could have
potentially served as the litmus test for the validity of these
F revenue entries. [Para 53][974-B-D]
1.9 The High Court held that predecessor of respondents
was rightly accorded the status of ‘Sirdars’ under the Zamindari
Notification on the ground that they were leaseholders governed
by the Government Grants Act of 1895. However, this finding
G again appears unsustainable because there is no proper factual
analysis as to when the 1924 Lease Deed stood determined or
whether the same subsisted after the initial period of thirty years.
[Para 54][974-D-E]

H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 941
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

1.10 Initially the 1939 Act was not applicable to the Suit A
Land as the concerned area where it is situated was excluded
from the purview of the 1939 Act, as it was specifically included
in the First Schedule. Any future application of the 1939 Act in
respect of the Suit Land was supposed to be through a separate
notification, but the same has again not been produced in these
B
proceedings or before any forum, which further dissuades from
rendering any final opinion at this stage. The same aspect has
been highlighted by the appellants who contend that the area in
which the Suit Land is situated was governed by the Kumaon
Tenancy Rules of 1918. On the other hand, the respondents have
produced on record a G.O. No. 5678/ 1-B-1212~B-19 dated the C
30.04.1948 which indicates the possibility of hereditary rights
being accrued on predecessor of Respondents under the 1939
Act but again, this Court constrained to give any finding on the
same because of the lack of proper documents on record to
ascertain the tenancy status of the Respondents. Hence, on this
D
ground also the instant appeals are liable to be remanded back
so that the relevant statutory notifications, original records can
be placed before the High Court to enable it to determine the
applicable tenancy law and their impact on the alleged rights of
the respondents. [Paras 55 and 56][974-F-H; 975-B-D]
1.11 These appeals have been pending before this Court E
for more than 15 years. In normal circumstances, this Court would
have ventured to decide the issues but in light of the
abovementioned observations and dearth of appropriate records,
ownership rights in respect of an immovable property cannot be
decided casually. The hands are further tied because of the fact F
that the ownership of certain portions of the Suit Land has
apparently changed hands on account of subsequent sale by the
respondents. Furthermore, the value of the Suit Land has
increased exponentially during the entire period of litigation and
the relevant parties have also done certain valuable
developments. Any decision now cannot be based on conjectures G
and surmises or on the basis of mere guesswork. Hence, the
Court is reluctant to give a final opinion on the matter until the
Court is satisfied on the basis of the entirety of documents which

H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A showcase how the ownership or possessory rights were created
on the Suit Land. [Paras 57 and 58][975-D-G]
1.12 There are indeed compelling circumstances which
have been left unanswered by the courts below, because of which
determination of several factual issues have been left in limbo.
B Therefore, in light of the peculiar situation, it is expedient to
remand the appeals back to the High Court for fresh adjudication
on the issues formulated. In light of the long-drawn pendency of
these disputes, the High Court is requested to take up these
matters at the earliest and dispose of the same as early as
possible. The impugned judgments of the High Court are set
C aside, and the matters are remanded to the High Court for a
fresh adjudication. It is made clear that casual findings/
observations made by Revenue Authorities or the Civil Court
shall not be accepted at their face value unless the High Court is
satisfied on a thorough inspection of the original or certified copies
D of the relevant record. The parties are directed to keep status
quo until the matters are decided afresh by the High Court. [Paras
59-61][975-H; 976-A-E]
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop.
Housing Society Ltd. (1995) 3 Supp SCC 456 : [1995]
E 3 SCR 729; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4
SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663; State of Kerala v. M.K.
Kunhikannan Nambir Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (1996)
1 SCC 435 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 139; Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1997)
3 SCC 443 : [1997] 2 SCR 152; State of U.P. v. Zahoor
F Ahmad (1973) 2 SCC 547 : [1974] 1 SCR 344; M.O.H.
Uduman v. M.O.H. Aslum (1991) 1 SCC 412 : [1990] 2
Suppl. SCR 663; Life Insurance Corpn. of India v.
Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR
909; Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Workmen AIR
G 1961 SC 860 : [1961] SCR 204 – referred to.
Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] 1 All
ER 855; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd vs. West
Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 –
referred to.
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 943
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

Shambhu Dayal Singh, The Law of Tenancy in U.P. (3rd A
edn, Empire Press, 1949) 131 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1995] 3 SCR 729 referred to Para 33 (a)
[1991] 3 SCR 663 referred to Para 33 (d) B
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 139 referred to Para 33 (d)
[1997] 2 SCR 152 referred to Para 33 (d)
[1974] 1 SCR 344 referred to Para 33 (f)
[1990] 2 Suppl. SCR 663 referred to Para 46 C
[1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 909 referred to Para 47
[1961] SCR 204 referred to Para 47
CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 4983 of 2009. D
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.08.2006 of the High Court
of Uttaranchal at Nainital in RA No.150 of 2005 in WP No. 920 of 2001,
RA No. 151 of 2005 in WP No. 7176 of 2001 and RA No. 152 of 2005
in WP No. 808 of 2002.
With E
Civil Appeal Nos. 4988, 4984, 4985 Of 2009, Contempt Petition
(Civil) Nos. 165-168 of 2007 in Civil Appeal No. 4983 of 2009 and Civil
Appeal Nos. 4989-4992 of 2009.
Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Atul Sharma, Vikas Negi, A. Venayagam
F
Balan, Krishnam Mishra, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ashiwan Mishra,
Kamlendra Mishra, Prashant Kumar, Aditya Dev Triguna, Saurabh S.
Sinha, Satyajit A Desai, Satya Kam Sharma, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar,
Siddharth Gautam, Gajanan N. Tirthkar, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Manish
Kumar, Amit Kumar, Rahul Prabhakar, Ms. Aparajita Jha, Karan Singh,
Mahesh Tiwari, Rakesh K. Sharma, P. N. Gupta, Advs. for the appearing G
parties.

H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURYA KANT, J.
1. The core question that arises for our consideration in the present
set of connected matters pertains to the ownership of land measuring
183 bigha 8 biswa which is equivalent to 28.56 acres of land, bearing
B Khasra Nos. 2, 3/1, 3/2, 4 to 28/1, 28/2, to 49 and situated in Village
Haripur, Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital (hereinafter, ‘Suit Land’).
2. Since these appeals arise out of a complex factual scenario
and different sets of legal proceedings which proceeded in parallel, it
would be appropriate to discuss the same at length before delving into
C the issue of law, which require adjudication before us.
A. FACTS
A.1 THE COMMON FACTS: 1924 SALE DEED, 1967
EVICTION SUIT AND 1978 MUTATION
D PROCEEDINGS
3. The genesis of these disputes began on 20.06.1924, when one
Mr. John Vaughn, son of Mr. Charles Vaughn obtained a lease of the
Suit Land (hereinafter, ‘1924 Lease Deed’) from the erstwhile colonial
rulers through the Secretary of State for India in Council for thirty years
on payment of rent as agreed between the parties. The lease was also
E
extendable for another thirty years and was subject to certain conditions,
which are reproduced as follows: -
“X-X-X-X
(a) The lessee to pay the first period of thirty years the
F yearly rental of No.183-6-4 clear of all deductions on the
first day of March in each year at the Haldwani Tehsil or at
such other place as the Deputy Commissioner of Nainital
shall form time to time appoint in this behalf and also from
time to time and at all times during the continuance of the
said lease pay and discharge all rates, taxes, charges and
G assessment of every description which are now or may at
any time hereafter during the said lease be assessed,
charged or imposed upon the land hereby demised.
(b) Lessee agree that the said plot of land will be used for
residential purposes, for poultry farming for orchards and
H for vegetable cultivation only.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 945
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

(c) The lessee agrees that he will submit the plan of any A
building which he wish to erect or of any existing building
which he has to modify to the Deputy Commissioner of
Nainital for approval before starting building operations,
that he will complete the sanctioned building within two
years of the receipt of approval and that he will keep every
B
building erected by him and also the Government buildings
standing on the said plot of land and shown on the plan
annexed in good and substantial repair and condition both
externally and internally.
(d) The lessee agrees that he shall not claim the benefits
which agricultural tenant and lessees are given in the Tarai C
and Bhaber estates.
(e) The lessee agrees that he will not transfer or sublet
said plot of land without the written approval of the Deputy
Commissioner of Nainital.
D
(f) The lessee agrees that he shall be responsible for the
observance of Estate rules in force now or at any time
hereafter regarding sanitation, reporting cattle disease etc.
(g) The lessee agrees that he shall have no right to any
minerals in the aid plot of land. E
(h) The lessee further agrees that if he dies heirless before
the expiry of lease as also on the expiry of lease, the land
hereby demised and all buildings standing on the land shall
revert to the lesser without compensation.
(i) The lessee shall have the right to erect masonry wall F
not exceeding 4.5 feet in height or a wire fence along the
boundary of the said land hereby demised.
(j) The lessee shall have the use of a share of the water
when available for irrigation purposes from the tank fixed
approximately at mile 6 furlong 70 feet left of the main G
gailuwar canal, but the lessor reserve on control over this
outlet which the lessor is empowered to decrease or close
whenever such decrease or closure is required on account
of short supplies in or on account of executing repairs,
extensions or improvements canal works etc. and the lessee
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A shall have no right to claim compensation for any damage
done by such reduction or closer of the water supply to the
said plot of land.
(k) The lessee shall have and unrestricted right to dispose
of the produce of the land leased to him in any manner he
B may choose and the lessee shall be allowed to clear and
use for his requirements the trees and bushes standing on
the land hereby demised.
(l) If there be any breach by the lessee of any covenant
herein before contained the Deputy Commissioner of
C Nainital may, not withstanding the waiver of any previous
breach by the lessee giving the Deputy Commissioner of
Nainital the right of re-entry, enter upon any part of whole
of the land hereby demised or of the buildings standing on
the said plot of land and thereupon the said land and buildings
shall remain to the use of and be vested in the Secretary of
D State and the lessee shall not been titled to any
compensation for any building erected by him or for any
improvements made by him upon the land demised and this
demise shall absolutely determine.
(m) The Deputy Commissioner of Nainital agrees to stamp
E the lease at his expense.
X-X-X-X”
(Emphasis Applied)
4. After the execution of the 1924 Lease Deed which was
F registered on 22.08.1925, it appears that revenue entries were made in
favour of one Manohar Lal, who is said to have purchased the Suit Land
through a sale deed dated 17.11.1947 (hereinafter, ‘Sale Deed’). The
same Manohar Lal is also stated to be the paternal uncle of the primary
contesting respondents before us, namely Virendra Kumar and Ravi
Kumar (hereinafter, ‘Respondents’), as the relief sought by all the
G
remaining private parties in connected matters flows from their claim on
the Suit Land. It would be appropriate at this stage to reproduce the
relevant portion of the Sale Deed, which records the factum of prior
permission as required under the 1924 Lease Deed. The same is as
follows –
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 947
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

“……whereas the vendor has full right to sell the aforesaid A
buildings and constructions with the permission of the
Deputy Commissioner, Nainital for which the vendor has
obtained the necessary permit from the proper authorities
and mutation has been duly effected in the name of the
vendee on 25.9.47 in the Government records in the office
B
of the Superintendent, Tarai & Bhabar, Nainital……”
(Emphasis Applied)
5. Thereafter, it is to be noted that revenue records continued to
depict the name of the predecessor of the Respondents as ‘Occupancy
Tenant’ on the strength of the said Sale Deed. Interestingly, at the expiry C
of thirty years in 1954, it is admitted that predecessor of Respondents
applied for renewal and paid enhanced rent as per the 1924 Lease Deed.
After that, consolidation proceedings took place between 1959-1960
wherein revenue entries remained in favour of Manohar Lal and even
compensation was also awarded for a portion of Suit Land which was
acquired by the military authorities in 1963. D

6. It was not until 1967 that the State filed a suit for possession of
the Suit Land along with the damages before the concerned District
Judge. During the pendency of the said suit, UP Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 was promulgated and accordingly,
the said suit stood transferred to the Prescribed Authority under the Act. E
In the interregnum before the final adjudication took place before the
Prescribed Authority, it is pertinent to note that Bhumidhari certificates
were also issued to the predecessor of Respondents under the applicable
tenancy law by depositing the amount which was equal to twenty times
the land revenue for the Suit Land. Eventually, the Prescribed Authority F
dismissed the suit on 25.03.1975 as being non-maintainable in view of
the exclusion clause contained in the UP Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 whereby the lands which were held
by any class of tenure-holder are exempted from the applicability of the
said Act. The State’s appeal against the said order before the District
Judge was also dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred and the G
suit being non-maintainable. The relevant extract of the District Judge’s
order dated 30.07.1976 is as follows –
“There are document on record to show that in 1366 Fasli
the Respondent were recorded as Occupancy tenants.
H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A Similar entries exist on the Khatauni for the year up to 1375
Fasli and in the Khatauni for 1376 Fasli the Respondents
are recorded Sirdar. The learned Counsel for the
respondents has referred me to section 2(b) which defines
the expression “Premises”. There are certain exception
mentioned and sub section (ii) is in respect of land by a
B
tenure holder under the U.P. Tenancy Act. The land in
dispute has to be excluded from the expression “Premises”
and the prescribed authority was justified in holding so.
The appeal must, therefore be dismissed.”
(Emphasis Applied)
C
7. Hence, the suit which was instated in 1967 was never
adjudicated on merits per se in respect of the claim of tenancy by the
Respondents, but on the technical grounds of the bar contained in the
UP Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 as
well as on the ground that the appeal against the Prescribed Authority’s
D order was time barred. However, the District Judge’s order dated
30.07.1976 remained unchallenged and ultimately, after the demise of
Manohar Lal, who died issueless, mutation proceedings were initiated in
1978 by the present Respondents on the basis of a family settlement.
8. While the relevant orders in the said mutation proceedings have
E not been made part of the records produced before us, it is stated that
the Tehsildar, Haldwani passed an order dated 04.07.1978 in favour of
the Respondents. This order was later confirmed by another order dated
30.08.1978 passed by the concerned SDM directing the Tehsildar,
Haldwani to mutate the Suit Land in favour of Respondents in revenue
F records. Against the order of the SDM, the State preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner, Kumaon which was rejected vide order dated
07.08.1980 and even the revision application against the same was
dismissed on 31.12.1980. It is pertinent to note that during the proceedings,
a vernacular copy of the order dated 07.08.1980 was produced before
us, which we will refer to at a later stage.
G
9. In the end, because of the fact that the Respondents were
successful in the mutation proceedings, the Pargana Officer, Haldwani
passed an order dated 30.09.1981 accepting the partition between the
concerned Respondents, i.e. between Virendra Kumar and Ravi Kumar,
on the basis of family settlement. Meanwhile, orders dated 07.08.1980
H and 31.12.1980 were challenged before the Board of Revenue in revision
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 949
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

proceedings, but the same were dismissed via order dated 20.01.1982 A
with the following observation –
“In fact, the challenge which is raised on behalf of the
government, is in respect of ownership of the land and this
matter cannot be decided finally in the mutation proceeding.
Therefore, the matter should be proceeded in other B
competent court.”
Thus, the issue of ownership again remained unadjudicated even
at this stage.
10. For the ease of analysis, the key events in these proceedings
are summarised as follows – C

D

E

F

G

H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A A.2 THE CANCELLATION OF REVENUE ENTRIES AND
RESTRAINT ON SALE OF LAND: CIVIL APPEAL NO 4983
OF 2009 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO 4985 OF 2009
11. The subject matter of these appeals arose from an order dated
31.12.1981 passed by the District Collector, Nainital (hereinafter,
B ‘Expunction Order’) during the pendency of the revision proceedings
before the Board of Revenue in the abovementioned mutation
proceedings. In the said order, the Collector noted that on perusal of the
revenue records, it was found that after the initial lease period of thirty
years had expired, the Respondents had illegally gotten themselves
recorded as ‘Bhumidhar’ of the Suit Land in the revenue records.
C Accordingly, the Collector directed the expunction of the revenue entries
in favour of the Respondents and recommended that eviction proceedings
be initiated against them.
12. Against the Expunction Order, the Respondents preferred a
revision before the Commissioner, Kumaon who passed an interim order
D dated 20.01.1982 directing that no revenue entries should be deleted in
light of the fact that the matter was pending before the Board of Revenue
in mutation proceedings. However, as noted above, the Board of Revenue
dismissed the said pending revision in the mutation proceedings on the
same date. Consequently, it is stated that despite the abovementioned
E interim order dated 20.01.1982 of the Commissioner, the Tehsildar acted
on Expunction Order and proceeded to expunge the revenue entries in
favour of Respondents.
13. Afterwards, on 16.08.1983, the Commissioner, Kumaon
dismissed the revision pending against the Expunction Order noting that
F the same was not maintainable in view of the fact that no provision
provided for revision of an order passed under the Government Grants
Act of 1895 as applicable to the then State of Uttar Pradesh vide
amendment made in 1960. The relevant provisions after the 1960
amendment to the Government Grants Act of 1895 are as follows –

G “2. (1) Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to
government grants.-Nothing contained in the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, shall apply or be deemed ever to have
applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any
interest therein, heretofore made or hereafter to be made,
by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any
H person whomsoever; and every such grant and transfer shall
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 951
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been A
passed.
(2) U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 not
to affect certain leases made by or on behalf of the
Government.-Nothing contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act,
1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, shall affect, or be B
deemed to have ever affected any rights, created, conferred
or granted, whether before or after the date of the passing
of the, Government Grants (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960,
by leases of land by, or on behalf of, the Government in
favour of any person; and every such creation, conferment
or grant shall be construed and take effect notwithstanding C
anything to the contrary contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act,
1939, or the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926.
(3) Certain leases made by or on behalf of the Government to
take effect according to their tenor.-All provisions,
restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any such D
creation, conferment or grant referred to in Section 2, shall
be valid and take effect according to their tenor; any decree
or direction of a court of law or any rule of law, statute or
enactment of the legislature, to the contrary
notwithstanding: E
Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent, or be
deemed ever to have prevented, the effect of any enactment
relating to the acquisition of property, land reforms or the
imposition of ceiling on agricultural lands.”
It must also be highlighted that the Respondents, against the F
aforesaid action of the Tehsildar wherein he expunged the revenue entries
in favor of Respondents, preferred a contempt petition before the
Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed in limine on 16.08.1986
after the concerned officials tendered unqualified apologies.
14. Aggrieved by the said order dated 16.08.1983 of the G
Commissioner, the Respondents filed a revision before the Board of
Revenue, which was heard by a Single Member who vide its order dated
22.01.1993 (hereinafter, ‘Single Member’s Order’) set aside the
Expunction Order. The Single Member’s Order noted that the Expunction
Order was not passed under the Government Grants Act of 1895 but
H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A under the applicable land revenue laws, making it susceptible to revisionary
jurisdiction. It furthermore noted that no enquiry report was ever obtained
nor was any opportunity given to Respondents for being heard while
passing the Expunction Order.
15. Against the Single Member’s Order, the District Magistrate
B of Nainital wrote a letter to the Board of Revenue seeking permission to
challenge the same through a writ petition and during the interregnum,
the State filed a writ petition in 1996 against the Single Member’s Order
(hereinafter, ‘First Writ Petition’). Meanwhile, the Board of Revenue
acted on the abovementioned letter addressed by the District Magistrate
of Nainital and constituted a Three Member Bench to scrutinise the
C Single Member’s Order.
16. The Three Member Bench in turn vide its order dated
20.12.1996 (hereinafter, ‘Three Member Bench’s Order’) held that
Single Member’s Order was without any jurisdiction as no power for
revision existed under the land revenue laws and also noted that the
D Expunction Order was passed under the Government Grants Act of
1895. It furthermore noted that the Collector had rightly issued the
Expunction Order as the Respondents illegally obtained revenue entries
in their favour in collusion with revenue officials after the expiry of the
initial lease period of thirty years. Hence, it observed that the Suit Land
E stood automatically resumed in favour of the State after the expiry of
the lease period, and no notice was required to be given to the
Respondents at the time of passing the Expunction Order. Against this
Three Member Bench’s Order, Respondents filed a writ petition in 1997
(hereinafter, ‘Second Writ Petition’).

F 17. Afterwards, a review petition was filed before the Single
Member of the Board of Revenue in view of the observations in the
Three Member Bench’s Order. Accordingly, the Single Member on
03.03.1997 directed that the review petition be placed before the same
bench that rendered the Three Member Bench’s Order. In turn, the said
bench on 18.12.1997 is said to have passed an order stating that Three
G Member Bench’s Order did not alter the Single Member’s Order and
directed that the review should be filed before the Single Member only.
Though, it is stated by the Respondents that no such review proceedings
took place as none of the parties pursued it any further and instead the
matter was kept pending in the writ proceedings as noted above. However,
H it has come on record that a review was indeed filed by the Appellants,
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 953
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

which was directed to be heard urgently and later on was transferred to A
the revenue court of Additional Chief Revenue Commissioner, Nainital
after the formation of State of Uttarakhand.
18. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ proceedings as
well as the review before the revenue court, the District Magistrate
passed orders dated 02.05.2001 and 21.05.2001 (hereinafter, ‘Restrain B
Orders’) directing the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the
concerned Tehsildar to restraint the Respondents from selling, transferring
or mutating the Suit Land or any part thereof. Aggrieved by the said
orders, the Respondents filed an injunction suit, but the same was
dismissed on 06.06.2002 on account of being non-maintainable. Upon
dismissal of the suit, the Respondents instead filed a revision petition C
before the Additional Chief Revenue Commissioner, who vide his order
dated 22.07.2002, declared Restrain Orders as void and illegal. It also
noted that the Single Member’s Order had attained finality, the State
recognised ownership of the Respondents as they granted them
compensation for the land acquired by military authorities in 1963 and D
that the revenue entries were longstanding in favour of the Respondents.
It must be noted that the Appellants filed a writ petition against the order
dated 22.07.2002 before the High Court (hereinafter, ‘Third Writ
Petition’).
19. Ultimately all three writ petitions were heard together by the E
High Court, which vide the impugned judgement dated 07.10.2005 in
Civil Appeal No 4985 of 2009 decided the matter in favour of
Respondents. The High Court noted that, firstly the predecessor of the
Respondents validly got the approval of the Commissioner as required
under the 1924 Lease Deed, which was reflected in the order dated
07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner in the mutation proceedings. F
Secondly, the revenue entries have long been standing in favour of the
Respondents since 1948 which reflects that they have been accorded
the status of ‘Bhumidhar’. Furthermore, it noted that these entries became
final since the Appellants never initiated any proceedings for their
correction, and these entries could not be deleted through an administrative G
order as done by the Expunction Order. Consequently, the Respondents’
writ, i.e. Second Writ Petition, was allowed while the remaining writ
petitions filed by the Appellants were dismissed.
20. Interestingly after the High Court passed the impugned
judgement dated 07.10.2005, the pending review before the revenue H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A court of Additional Chief Revenue Commissioner, Nainital was decided
in favour of the Appellants vide an order dated 21.10.2005 wherein the
authority set aside the Single Member’s Order and directed that in view
of the Three Member Bench’s Order, the Expunction Order must be
complied with.
B 21. Consequently, the Appellants preferred review applications
against the judgement dated 07.10.2005, which the High Court dismissed
vide the impugned judgement dated 05.08.2006 in Civil Appeal No 4983
of 2009 wherein it was noted that no ground for review was made out
by the Appellants and the observations of the order dated 07.10.2005
were reiterated. It also specifically noted that Expunction Order stood
C set aside in view of the Single Member’s Order and that order dated
21.10.2005 was passed without any jurisdiction by the Additional Chief
Revenue Commissioner as the High Court already decided the matter
vide judgment dated 07.10.2005. We must also hasten to add that during
the hearing of the abovementioned review applications, the Additional
D Chief Revenue Commissioner tendered an apology via an affidavit stating
that he had no knowledge that the High Court had already decided the
pending writ petitions through its judgment dated 07.10.2005.
22. Again for ease of analysis, the key events in these proceedings
are summarised as follows –
E

F

G

H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 955
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

A

B

C

A.3 THE RESPONDENTS’ 1983 INJUNCTION SUIT
PROCEEDINGS: CIVIL APPEAL NO 4988 OF 2009
AND CIVIL APPEAL NO 4984 OF 2009
23. The cause for the inception of these appeals arose when the D
Commissioner dismissed the revision against the Expunction Order as
non-maintainable. Because of the said dismissal, the Respondents
apprehended that the revenue entries in their favour would be struck
off, and accordingly, they filed a suit praying for perpetual injunction
restraining the Appellants from evicting the Respondents from the Suit E
Land as well as a mandatory injunction directing the Appellants to refrain
from deleting or restoring the revenue entries in their favour.
24. The Trial Court decreed the said suit in favour of the
Respondents vide its order dated 20.10.1984. The Trial Court made
extensive reference to 1967 Eviction Suit proceedings and 1978 Mutation
F
Proceedings to hold that Respondents became ‘Sirdar’ and later on
‘Bhumidhar’ legally and that Appellants have no claim of title over the
Suit Land. The Appellants filed an appeal against the order dated
20.10.1984, which was dismissed by the First Appellate Court on
16.06.1986 on identical reasoning as given by the Trial Court. The First
Appellate Court again highlighted the factum of longstanding revenue G
entries in favour of Respondents and the continued possession with them
to uphold the order of the Trial Court. It also observed that the dispute in
respect of the revenue entries should have been adjudicated by the
competent revenue court instead of being decided by the Collector vide
the Expunction Order.
H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 25. The Appellants proceeded to file the second appeal before
the High Court against the First Appellate Court’s order, and the same
was dismissed vide the impugned judgment dated 05.11.2004 passed in
Civil Appeal No 4988 of 2009. While dismissing the second appeal, the
High Court noted that the suit was filed within limitation and that the
courts below have rightly held that Respondents have lawfully acquired
B
the status of ‘Sirdar’ and later on that of ‘Bhumidhar’. Against the said
judgment dated 05.11.2004, the Appellants preferred a review petition,
but the same was dismissed vide the impugned judgement dated
28.07.2005 in Civil Appeal No 4984 of 2009 on identical reasoning.
26. We again proceed to summarise the litigation history in a tabular
C format as follows –

D

E

A.4 THE 1982 LAND ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS:
CIVIL APPEAL(S) NO. 4989-4992 OF 2009
F 27. The commencement point for these appeals began when the
state authorities issued a notification dated 13.04.1982 under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for acquiring land measuring 70
bigha 08 biswa for the construction of Model Industrial Training Institute.
Out of the entire proposed acquisition, land measuring 11 bigha 06 biswa
G was part of the Suit Land. Subsequently, a notification dated 16.09.1982
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was issued, possession
was taken on 23.07.1983 and an award was also passed on 30.09.1985,
but the Respondents were denied compensation on the ground that land
belonged to the government. Aggrieved by the denial of compensation,
the Respondents filed a reference which was decided in their favour on
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 957
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

21.02.2006 on the strength of impugned judgements in the A
abovementioned connected civil appeals which determined Respondents
as lawful owners of the Suit Land.
28. The Appellants filed respective appeals before the High Court
against the Reference Court’s order, and the same was dismissed vide
the impugned judgement dated 24.07.2008 in Civil Appeal(s) No 498- B
4992 of 2009 wherein the High Court again held in favour of the
Respondents on identical grounds and granted compensation at the rate
of Rs. 8 per square feet along with solatium and applicable statutory
benefits.
29. To summarise these proceedings – C

D

E

F

A.5 CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO 165-168 OF
2007 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO 4983 OF 2009
30. Respondents have initiated these contempt proceedings for
violation of order dated 23.02.2007 passed by this Court directing parties G
to maintain the status quo. The Respondents contend that the Appellants
have been interfering with their peaceful possession, especially in concern
with the commercial activities conducted on the Suit Land. However,
since we are disposing off the appeals finally, there is no need to deal
with these contempt petitions.
H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A B. CONTENTIONS
31. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the documents produced on record. We would like to point out that during
the course of arguments which went on for a couple of days, the bench
as well as the counsel for the parties, readily agreed that the core issue
B for adjudication was in respect of the status of the Respondents under
the applicable tenancy law and whether the same entitled them for
ownership of the Suit Land. It is in this context that we propose to consider
the arguments raised by the parties.
32. Mr. Atul Sharma, learned counsel for the Appellants made the
C following contentions –
a) It was submitted that the Suit Land was given on lease to Mr.
John Vaughn for the limited period of thirty years under the Government
Grant Act of 1895 and as per the conditions stipulated in the 1924 Lease
Deed, it was necessary to obtain a prior written approval or approval of
D the Deputy Commissioner, Nainital before the lease rights could be
transferred in favour of the Respondents. Therefore, since no such
approval was ever given nor produced before the courts during the
proceedings below by the Respondents, it must be construed that the
predecessor of Respondents, i.e. Manohar Lal was an illegal occupant
when he was put into possession of the Suit Land on the basis of the
E Sale Deed. He vehemently argued that the Sale Deed was null and void
as the vendor himself had no ownership title which he could lawfully
alienate;
b) It was argued that even otherwise the Respondents’ status
remained that of illegal occupants as the initial lease period ended in
F 1954 and since no renewal was granted by the State. Hence, it was
submitted that the Suit Land stood automatically resumed in favour of
the State after the expiry of the lease period;
c) The 1924 Lease Deed explicitly stated that there would be no
application of tenancy law benefits as applicable to the lessees of the
G Suit Land. Furthermore, it was submitted that after the 1960 State
amendment to the Government Grant Act of 1895, the applicability of
the tenancy laws as well as Transfer of Property Act was retrospectively
barred. Hence in effect, no tenancy rights were ever created in favour
of Respondents, nor could they claim lawful tenancy by evoking the
doctrine of holding over;
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 959
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

d) It was also argued that 1967 Eviction Suit and 1978 Mutation A
Proceedings never decided the issue of ownership or tenancy status.
Therefore, these proceedings cannot be treated to have decided the
principal issues on merits.
e) It was also argued that mere longstanding entries in favour of
Respondents would not be sufficient to establish the claim of ownership B
and that the same were made fraudulently in connivance with revenue
authorities. In other words, mutation entries in no way confer the title.
f)Finally, the Courts or quasi-judicial authorities have merely
followed each other without going into the root question as to how the
Respondents claimed to have become the owner or ‘Bhumidhar’ over C
the Suit Land.
33. On the contrary, Mr. Harin P. Ravel, learned senior counsel
for the Respondents initiated his arguments on the first day of hearing
by submitting that the Respondents claimed ownership on two
independent grounds, firstly through the Sale Deed and secondly, on D
the strength of status accorded under the applicable tenancy laws.
However, on the final day of arguments, Mr. Ravel clarified the
abovementioned stand by stating that the Sale Deed pertained to sale of
leasehold rights and not the sale of title or ownership rights. Therefore
at present, the claim of the Respondents is actually based on the strength
of status accorded under the applicable tenancy laws as we will note E
while reiterating Mr. Ravel’s arguments which are as follows -
a) It has been submitted that there was no mandatory requirement
of prior approval from the Deputy Commissioner at time of the execution
of the Sale Deed. The Respondents have relied upon the decision in
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Coop. Housing Society F
Ltd.1 to contend that there is a distinction between the term ‘approval’
and ‘permission’ wherein when the former term is used, all actions hold
good until they are explicitly disapproved. In other words, they contend
that the Sale Deed must be treated as valid until there is an explicit
refusal to grant consent for transfer of rights by the Deputy G
Commissioner.
b) It was also argued that even otherwise, permission or approval
as required from the Deputy Commissioner was granted on 16.12.1948
1
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd 1995 Supp (3)
SCC 456. H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A as recorded in order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner in
the mutation proceedings. Therefore as the approval was validly granted,
albeit after the Sale Deed was executed, the predecessor of the
Respondents was rightly accorded the status of ‘occupancy tenant’ under
the United Provinces Tenancy Act of 1939 (hereinafter, ‘1939 Act’),
which superseded the conditions in the 1924 Lease Deed as well as
B
provisions of the Government Grant Act of 1895. Furthermore, it was
submitted that after notification dated 30.06.1969 was issued by the State,
which extended the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 to the Suit Land (hereinafter, ‘Zamindari
Notification’), the predecessor of Respondents became ‘Sirdar’ as per
C Section 131 as applicable vide Zamindari Notification. The relevant
portion of the said notification is as follows –
“X-X-X-X
130- Every person belonging to any of the following
classes shall be called a bhumidhar and shall have all
D the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred
or imposed upon bhumidhars by or under this Act, namely
–
(a) every person who on the date immediately preceding
the appointed day held land as-
E

F (b) every person who acquires the rights of a bhumidhar
under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
x-x-x-x
131. Sirdar. - Every person belonging to any of the
G following classes shall be called a sirdars and shall have
all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred
or imposed upon sirdars by or under this Act, namely –
(a) every person who, on the date immediately preceding
the appointed day held kind as-
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 961
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

A

(iii) a grantee at favourable rate of rent B
(iv) a lessee holding a lease under the provisions of the
Government Grants Act, 1895 and having rights of
hereditary tenant under the terms of the lease, but not
possessing the rights to transfer the holding by sale,
(b) every person who is admitted as sirdar of vacant land C
under the provisions of this Act,
(c) a tenant in any of the 42 Buxari villages specified in
the Annexure, appended hereto, who was recorded in
Class X(l) in the Khatauni of the previous agricultural
year, and D
(d) every person who, in any other manner, acquires the
rights of a sirdar under or in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
X-X-X-X”
E
c) Extending the abovementioned argument, it is submitted that
predecessor of Respondents made application for becoming a
‘Bhumidhar’ under the applicable rules which is stated to be
allowed. It is also stated that they paid twenty times the revenue
for the Suit Land and accordingly were granted a ‘Bhumidhari’
F
certificate under Section 137 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950. Therefore to sum up, it was submitted
that the entire chronological sequence as narrated above bears
testimony to the logical progression of rights of the predecessor
of the Respondents culminating into title as ‘Bhumidhar’ as per
the object of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms G
Act, 1950. This argument is further supplemented by stating that
the Appellants have failed to produce anything on record to support
the plea that the concerned revenue entries during this period
have been made fraudulently or through suppression of any fact.
H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A d) It was also submitted that Appellants have deliberately failed
to take any steps to correct the abovementioned revenue entries,
which carry the presumption to be correct in law, despite
suggestions to the contrary by the adjudication authorities in
multiple proceedings, including in the 1978 Mutation Proceedings.
Therefore in effect, it is stated by Respondents by relying on
B
multiple decisions2 that favourable orders passed in the erstwhile
proceedings between parties have become final, especially in light
of the fact that the Appellants never took steps to get them set
aside by competent authorities.
e) It was argued that the Respondents have acquired rights over
C the Suit Land by way of acquiescence and the conduct of the
Appellants wherein it is alleged that in addition to failure to initiate
proper proceedings to evict them, the Appellants accepted the
enhanced rent, raised revenue demands and allowed them
approvals for further development of the Suit Land.
D f)Finally, it has been argued that the lease did not end after the
expiry of the initial thirty year period in June 1954 and instead the
lease got extended on an yearly basis on account of application of
Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882, through which
tenancy has been lawfully continued by holding over on account
E of continuous possession by Respondents. Reliance was placed
on the decision rendered in State of Uttar Pradesh v Zahoor
Ahmad3 to argue that Section 116 of the Transfer of Property
Act of 1882 would be applicable notwithstanding the 1960 State
amendment to the Government Grant Act of 1895 and the fact
that predecessor of Respondents deposited enhanced rent as per
F the 1924 Lease Deed which was never rejected by the Appellants.
C. ANALYSIS
34. Before we analyse the rival contentions raised by the parties,
it would be appropriate to broadly highlight the issues which arise for our
G consideration –

2
Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] 1 All ER 855; State of Punjab v
Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1, para 8-9; State of Kerala v M.K. Kunhikannan Nambir
Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (1996) 1 SCC 435, para 7-8; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v.
Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 443, para 17-18.
3
H State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad (1973) 2 SCC 547.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 963
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

i. Did the Respondents’ predecessor-in-interest purchase A
ownership rights or leasehold rights from Mr. John Vaughan?
ii. In case of the latter, the next question that arises is whether the
leasehold rights stood legally transferred to the predecessor of
Respondents as per the conditions of the 1924 Lease deed, which
was governed under the Government Grants Act of 1885? B
iii. If the leasehold rights cannot be held to be validly transferred
under the 1924 Lease Deed, whether the same stood determined
at the time of execution of Sale Deed because of violation of the
stipulated conditions?
iv. If the abovementioned question is answered negatively, did C
the 1924 Lease Deed stand determined at the expiration of the
initial lease period of thirty years?
v. If the 1924 Lease Deed stood determined after the initial lease
period of thirty years, whether the Respondents are entitled to
seek protection of holding over of the lease under Section 116 of D
the Transfer of Property Act of 1882?
vi. Alternatively, could the lease ever deemed to have been
subsisted because of the doctrine of acquiescence and through
the conduct of Respondents? Furthermore, if the same could
accord them any benefit under the Zamindari Notification? E
vii. Regardless of the fact that the lease deed is deemed to have
subsisted, was it possible for predecessor of Respondents to be
accorded the status of ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 Act,
which resulted in them being subsequently accorded the status of
‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification? F
viii. Furthermore, could the predecessor of Respondents have
been accorded the status of ‘Sirdar’ through any other alternate
method as indicated under the Zamindari Notification? In other
words, did the Respondents’ predecessor obtain status as ‘Sirdar’
on account of being recorded as a ‘hereditary tenant’ or a G
‘government lessee’ as per Section 131 of the Zamindari
Notification?
C.1 SALE OF OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OR LEASEHOLD
RIGHTS
H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A 35. At the outset, it is iterated that during the oral arguments, the
Respondents have taken the stand that the Sale Deed actually pertained
to sale of leasehold rights and not of title per se. However, it is pertinent
to mention that their stand has been inconsistent regarding this issue in
the courts below and even the High Court vide its impugned decisions
have given parallel findings regarding the nature of the Sale Deed.
B
36. In the impugned judgement 07.05.2005, which arose from the
Expunction Order Proceedings, the High Court noted –
“The respondents are the recorded Bhumidhar of the land
in question which is evident from the khatauni of 1401 F-
C 1406 F. The land was leased out to Mr. John Vaughan on
20.6.1924 who sold the land to Sri Manohar Lal vide sale
deed dated 117 .11.194 7 and thereafter the land was
recorded in the name of Sri Manohar Lal and on his death
his successor Sri Ravi Kumar and Virendra Kumar. They
are continuously recorded as Bhumidhar of the land in
D question. The Chief Revenue Commissioner also held in
his judgment that from the order dated 20.9.1999 of
Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Lucknow
and from the G.O.No. 376 dated 16.5.2002 issued by the
Secretary, Uttaranchal Government all land acquisition
E proceedings in respect of the land in question have come
to an end and the Government has ordered that the land be
kept in the ownership and possession of the Bhumidhars
i.e . Sri Ravi Kumar and Virendra Kumar.”
(Emphasis Applied)
F On the contrary, in the impugned judgement 05.11.2004 which
arose from the 1983 Injunction Suit, the High Court noted –
“In view of the amended section 131 of U.P.Z.A. & LR.
Act, a lease holder would become a Sirdar on the date of
enforcement of the Act viz. 1. 7.1969. The plaintiffs’
G predecessor Sri Manohar Lal got transferred the lease
existing in the name of Mr. John Vaughan with the
permission of the Commissioner Kumaon and he was in
possession in July 1969 on the land in suit. Thus from the
evidence on record it is established that the plaintiffs are
the Bhumidhar, and are in possession over the land in
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 965
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

dispute and there is no material error in the finding arrived A
at by both the courts below.”
(Emphasis Applied)
37. Therefore, the High Court while deciding the issue of ownership
in favour of Respondents on the strength of the Sale Deed, have come
to different conclusions as such to the nature of the instrument. In this B
respect, our attention is also drawn towards the contrary stands taken
by the Respondents in their pleadings which have been brought on record.
In the plaint filed by them in 1983 Injunction Suit, the Respondents claim
to tenure holders who were later accorded the status of ‘Bhumidhar’ on
the basis of Zamindari Notification. On the other hand, in the Second C
Writ Petition, Respondents stated that the Sale Deed was actually in
respect of the title per se.
38. Nevertheless, even if the clarification on behalf of Respondents
which is taken for the first time at this stage is allowed, we must note
that the tenor of the Sale Deed completely contradicts the said modified D
stance. The relevant portion of the Sale Deed is as follows –
“…….NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH That in
consideration of the sum of Rupees Fifty Five Thousand
Rs.55000/- paid by the vendee to the vendor in the manner
following i.e., Rs.5000/- five thousand acknowledged and E
Rs.20000/- Twenty Thousand paid in cash before the Sub.
Registrar. Rs.20000 by cheque 16124 on Imperial Bank
Nainital dated the 17 th November 1947 Rs.5000/- five
thousand by cheque No. 16125 on the same Bank dated
the 10th December 1947 which cheques have been handed
over to the vendor before the Sub Registrar to day and the F
balance of Rs.5000/- five thousand to be paid by the vendee
when the garages are vacated by the present tenants whom
the vendor undertakes to vacate by the end of this month
set forth above is acknowledged in full, the vendor for
himself, his executors, administrators and assigns doth G
hereby sell, transfer, convey and assign unto the vendee
the aforesaid plot of land in its entirety containing by
admeasurements 28.165 acres of land more fully described
at the foot of THESE PRESENTS with all residential and
other buildings therein standing and the boundary wall, tank,
H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A garages and out houses together with all trees, plants,
shrubs, crops and all agricultural implements and cattle as
per list handed over to the vendee and all surface rights,
lights, water & other rights easements to have to hold and
to enjoy peaceably and for ever without any let or hindrance
from the vendor or any one claiming through him or
B
independently. It is certified by These Presents that the
possession of the premises has already been made over to
the vendee whose name has already been mutated in the
Government records in place of the vendor aforesaid. It is
further certified that the land and premises hereby sold are
C absolutely free from all liens and charges save and except
the yearly Government lease rent of Rs.183/6/4. The
Vendor covenants with the vendee to compensate and save
from harm the vendee his heirs, executors and assigns
against any loss or damage that he might suffer due to any
defect in the title of the vendor to sell the premises hereby
D
transferred or to any part thereof…….”
(Emphasis Applied)
These recitals of the Sale Deed highlight that the relationship
between Mr. John Vaughn and Mr. Manohar Lal seemed more akin to
E that of a vendor-vendee in a title sale than that of the sale of leasehold
rights.
39. We must again take note that in respect of the two parallel
findings given by the High Court, the Respondents for the first time
before this Court have given up the finding which treated the Sale Deed
F as a sale of title. However, we must note that both these parallel findings
by the High Court have been without any serious examination of the
nature of the Sale Deed itself. In our opinion, High Court erred in respect
of these findings and as the same was essential to determine the present
dispute on merit, we deem it a fit case to exercise our power of remand.

G 40. Additionally, despite these findings being a serious lacuna for
us to reach a conclusive decision, the Appellants have raised no serious
objection to the modified stand taken by the Respondents wherein they
stated that the Sale Deed was in respect of leasehold rights only. However,
we would like to highlight several other aspects of the present disputes
which further warrant the exercise of the power of remand.
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 967
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

C.2 DETERMINATION OF THE 1924 LEASE DEED: A
THE BREACH OF THE CONDITION OF PRIOR
APPROVAL AND EXPIRY OF INITIAL LEASE DEED
PERIOD
41. During the course of hearing, the bench raised a query in
respect of the earliest stand taken by the Appellants on the aspect of B
breach of clause (e) of the 1924 Lease Deed in respect of prior approval.
In response to the same, our attention was towards the plaint filed by the
State in the 1967 Eviction Suit, the relevant part thereof is as follows –
“X-X-X-X
3. That on or about 21-8-1947 the lease, Mr. John Vaughan C
Transferred the property in suit to the defendant no.1 and
put him in possession of the same without the written
approval of the Deputy Commissioner, Nainital, an
application was no doubt made to and approved by the then
superintendent of Tarai and Bhabar Govt. Estates, but the D
orders of the Superintendent T.& B. Govt. Estates,
sanctioning and approving the transfer were without any
right or authority. The name of the defendant no. 1 was
ordered to be entered in the revenue records by the
superintendent Tarai and Bhabar Govt. Estates and entries
were made accordingly. But these entries were not in order E
and according to law or otherwise correct and no
presumption of correctness flows from them.
The breach of the covenant by the lease has given a
right to the plaintiff of re-entry and as also a right to recover
damages. F
4. That on the expiry of the original lease on 20th June 1954
the defendant No. 1 deposited rent at the enhanced rates
and applied for a renewal of the lease to which he was not
entitled.
G
5. That the approval of the superintendent, Tarai and Bhabar
Govt. Estates; The entry in the revenue records on the
payment of the rent do not in any way confer the rights of a
lease on the defendant no. 1 whose possession continues
to be wrongful from its very inception and the plaintiff is
H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A entitled to recover the possession of the premises in suit
and also damages.
X-X-X-X”
42. Hence, it can be safely deduced that the Appellants did contend
the issue of prior approval from the initial stage itself. Apart from the
B said eviction suit, two other proceedings need to be highlighted, i.e.
consolidation proceedings which occurred between 1959-1960 and
acquisition proceedings for a portion of land initiated by the military
authorities in 1963. In respect of the consolidation proceedings, we cannot
deduce the stand taken by State as no document or order in respect of
C the same has been produced before us. However in respect of the
acquisition, order dated 22.11.1965 passed by the concerned Land
Acquisition Officer, which granted compensation to the predecessor of
Respondents has been brought on record wherein it must be noted that
compensation was granted on the basis of revenue entries and without
any serious examination of the validity of the same. Hence, both these
D proceedings cannot be treated as an admission of validity of revenue
entries or as accepting the waiver of breach of the condition in respect
of prior approval from the Deputy Commissioner.
43. Coming back to the aspect of prior approval, the Respondents
drew our attention towards the vernacular copy of the order dated
E 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner, Kumaon, in the mutation
proceedings to support the plea of grant of valid approval. The relevant
part of the said order in the vernacular language is as follows –
“Mool leejdhari shri John Vaughan ko Upayukta ki anumati
2009 se lease hastantaran ke adhikar prapt the jo anumati
F missal 14/23 dinank 6.12.48 dwara unhone prapt kar li thi
aur jiske adhar par malkagjatomein 1948 mein sanshadhan
bhi ho gayatha”4
[Broadly on translation in English, it would read: “The
original lease holder Sri John Vaughan had rights to transfer
G with the permission of Deputy Commissioner which permission
he had received vide File 14/23 dated 6.12.48 and on the
basis of which amendments were made in the Revenue papers
in 1948.”]
The following order makes it apparent that the approval from the
H appropriate authority as per the lease deed, i.e. Deputy Commissioner
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 969
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

was granted only on 06.12.1948 which is more than a year later than the A
Sale Deed.
44. On the contrary, as per the recitals contained in the Sale Deed
as extracted in Para 4 of this judgment, it is mentioned that due permission
was obtained and the consequent mutation was effected in the office of
Superintendent, Tarai and Bhabar, Nainital before its execution. Hence, B
this abovementioned recital leads to immense confusion as to whether
any approval was ever granted at the first instance. Even if such approval
was granted, no indication is given as such to actually who granted the
approval and if it is assumed that a subordinate authority granted the
approval, no statutory instrument is produced before us to highlight
whether this delegation was possible or not. The subordinate courts as C
well as the High Court have merely relied on the order dated 07.08.1980
passed by the Commissioner, Kumaon to come to a sweeping conclusion
that a valid approval existed in favor of the predecessor of the
Respondents despite glaring contradictions which were on the face of
the record. Consequently, on this issue of breach of the conditions of the D
1924 Lease Deed, we again fail to arrive at a decisive conclusion as
neither the original record nor its true copies have been placed on record
of this Court or the High Court as well as the other forums.
45. Finally, while the Respondents have argued that until there
existed an express refusal by the Deputy Commissioner for sale of E
leasehold rights, the sale was valid especially in light of post facto approval
granted by the Deputy Commissioner as has been recorded in order
dated 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner. They have relied on the
following observation in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad5 –
“6. This Court in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts F
Ltd. [(1986) 1 SCC 264], considering the distinction between
“special permission” and “general permission”, “previous
approval” or “prior approval” in para 63 held that: “We
are conscious that the word ‘prior’ or ‘previous’ may be
implied if the contextual situation or the object and design
of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling G
circumstances justifying reading any such implication into
Section 29(1) of the Act.” Ordinarily, the difference between

5
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (n 1). H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A approval and permission is that in the first case the action
holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other case it
does not become effective until permission is obtained. But
permission subsequently granted may validate the previous
Act. As to the word ‘approval’ in Section 33(2)(b) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna
B
Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 860 : (1961) 1
LLJ 211] , that the Management need not obtain the
previous consent before taking any action. The requirement
that the Management must obtain approval was
distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain
C permission, of which mention is made in Section 33(1).
7. It is seen that the approval envisaged under Exception
(iii) of Section 59(1)(a), is to enable the Parishad to proceed
further in implementation of the scheme framed by the
Board. Until approval is given by the Government, the
D Board may not effectively implement the scheme.
Nevertheless, once the approval is given, all the previous
acts done or actions taken in anticipation of the approval
get validated and the publications made under the Act
thereby become valid.”
E (Emphasis Applied)
In this respect, we would like to hold that reliance on the same is
misdirected for the reason that the interpretation of a contractual condition
as contained in the present lease deed stands on a different footing than
the interpretation of statutory provisions which were the subject matter
F in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.6
46. It is now settled law that any contractual term or condition is
to be interpreted as per the natural and ordinary meaning appended to
the language used by the parties unless the same leads to absurdity. 7 In
the present case, condition (e) of the 1924 lease deed makes it clear that
G no rights in the Suit Land are allowed to be transferred or created
“without the written approval of the Deputy Commissioner of
Nainital” which bears the crystal clear requirement of the prior assent
needed from the Deputy Commissioner. This interpretation is also
6
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (n 1).
7
M.O.H. Uduman v. M.O.H. Aslum, (1991) 1 SCC 412, para 14; Investors Compensation
H Scheme Ltd vs. West Bromwich Building Society, [1998] 1 All ER 98.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 971
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

supported from the fact that leases under the Government Grants Act of A
1985 are to be strictly constructed as per the terms of the grant, regardless
of any other provisions of the law as noted in State of Uttar Pradesh v
Zahoor Ahmad8 which states that –
“16. Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares the
unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such B
conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what
the general law of the land be. The meaning of sections 2
and 3 of the Government Grants is that the scope of that
Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered
discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or C
restrictions in its grants, and the right, privileges and
obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to
the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of
any statutory or common law.”
47. Additionally, the bench in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad9 D
furthermore relied on the decisions rendered in Life Insurance Corpn.
of India v. Escorts Ltd. 10 and Lord Krishna Textiles Mills
Ltd. v. Workmen11, wherein the terms ‘permission’ and ‘approval’ were
used within same statute which necessitated the distinction between
these terms. Hence, the present case is distinguishable on this aspect E
also, as no such distinction is warranted in the case at hand.
48. Even otherwise, the High Court and other authorities have
proceeded on the premise of a valid approval. They are completely silent
on whether the post facto approval could be granted and if so, who
granted such approval. Again, no records are produced and its not known F
whether any approval was ever actually granted and when or by whom?
49. In our opinion, a reasoned finding on both the nature of Sale
Deed as well as whether the same was violative of conditions of the
1924 Lease Deed goes to the heart of the present dispute, because of
which the issue of determination of lease remains unanswered. Hence, G
in light of the same we must also note that the Respondents’ claim on

8
State of U.P. (n 3).
9
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (n 1).
10
Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264.
11
Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1961 SC 860. H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A the strength of doctrine of holding over or through doctrine of
acquiescence as well as the reliance on the conduct of Appellants, remains
in doldrums as the same are hinged on the finding in respect of
determination of lease. However, before moving forward, we must
highlight another aspect which requires application of mind by the High
Court. We observe so for the reason that decades have passed in litigation,
B
and it would be extremely iniquitous to remand the case to revenue
authorities at such a belated stage.
C.3 RESPONDENT’S TITLE CLAIM THROUGH
TENANCY LAW: THE CONUNDRUM OF VALIDITY OF
REVENUE ENTRIES
C
50. In the present case, revenue entries starting from 1948 have
recorded the Respondents’ predecessor as ‘Occupancy Tenant’ on the
strength of which they were accorded the status of ‘Sirdars’ vide the
Zamindari Notification. Consequently, this led to predecessor of
Respondents being accorded the status of ‘Bhumidhar’ as per the
D applicable statutory scheme. Since these entries carry the statutory
presumption of correctness in their favour, we must address them.
51. However, before delving into the issue of the tenancy status
of the Respondents, it would be appropriate to highlight the legislative
history of the term ‘Occupancy Tenants’. Under the U.P. Zamindari
E Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 195012, it is assigned the same meaning
as employed in the 1939 Act which is as follows-
28. Occupancy tenants - Every tenant, who is not a fixed
rate tenant or an exproprietary tenant and who, at the
commencement of this Act, has acquired a right of
F occupancy under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, or any
previous enactment relating to Agra, or under the Oudh
Rent Act, 1886, shall be called an occupancy tenant, and
shall have the rights and be subject to the liabilities
conferred and imposed on occupancy tenants by this Act.
G Hence by virtue of this definition, ‘Occupancy Tenants’ are the
ones who have acquired a right of occupancy under the Agra Tenancy
Act of 1926 and its legislative pre-enactment, i.e. Agra Tenancy Act of
1901 or the Oudh Rent Act of 1886. Nevertheless, this provision only

H 12
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, s 3(26).
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 973
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

confirms the occupancy rights which were enjoyed at the commencement A
of the 1939 Act. Therefore, new occupancy tenancies cannot be created
even if it is assumed that all the concerned parties consented to the
same. 13
52. Even assuming arguendo that Mr. John Vaughn was deemed
to have been granted status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 B
Act, it should be noted that his status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ cannot
be transferred to the predecessor of Respondents in light of Section 33
of the 1939 Act which is as follows –
“33. Interest of other tenants. - (1) The interest of a tenant
holding on special terms in Oudh, of an ex-proprietary C
tenant, of an occupancy tenant, of a hereditary tenant, and
of a non-occupancy tenant is heritable, but is not transferable
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
(2) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall D
render illegal:
(a) a sub-lease of a holding as hereinafter provided.
(b) a sale of the interest of a tenant under the
provisions of Section 251.
E
(c) a release or transfer of an interest in favour of a
co-tenant:
Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a co-
tenant notwithstanding that he may have shared in the
cultivation of the holding, unless he was a co-tenant from
F
the commencement of the tenancy, or has become such by
succession or has been specifically recognised as such in
writing by the land-holder.”
The only exception to the bar on transfer of status as an
‘Occupancy Tenant’ in the abovementioned section is under sub-clause
(b) of clause (2) wherein reference is made to Section 251 which in G
turns deals with sale of occupancy rights when the tenant himself is
facing the execution of a decree for arrears of rent. As no factual situation
has been indicated stating that Mr. John Vaughn had suffered a decree

13
Shambhu Dayal Singh, The Law of Tenancy in U.P. (3rd edn, Empire Press, 1949) 131. H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A for rent arrears, we are unsure as to how any transfer of ‘Occupancy
Tenant’ status in favour of the predecessor of Respondents was
sustainable. This confusion further indicates that the predecessor of
Respondents could not have been accorded the status of ‘Sirdar’ under
the Zamindari Notification on the strength of revenue entries which
recorded him as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’.
B
53. Hence, the High Court again made sweeping remarks in
respect of the tenancy status without any serious consideration as to
whether the same were legally tenable or not. We must highlight that no
reference is made to any proceedings wherein the status as an occupancy
tenant was ever granted to the predecessor of the Respondent and, if
C so, how and when the same culminated into the status of ‘Sirdar’ under
the Zamindari Notification. These proceedings which ultimately led to
the grant of status of ‘Bhumidhar’ in favour of the predecessor of
Respondents for the first time, could have potentially served as the litmus
test for the validity of these revenue entries.
D 54. Additionally, we must also take note of the finding of the High
Court via its impugned judgement dated 07.10.2005 wherein it is held
that predecessor of Respondents was rightly accorded the status of
‘Sirdars’ under the Zamindari Notification on the ground that they were
lease-holders governed by the Government Grants Act of 1895. However,
E this finding again appears unsustainable because there is no proper factual
analysis as to when the 1924 Lease Deed stood determined or whether
the same subsisted after the initial period of thirty years.
55. Before parting, we must also point out that initially the 1939
Act was not applicable to the Suit Land as the concerned area where it
F is situated was excluded from the purview of the 1939 Act, as it was
specifically included in the First Schedule. Any future application of the
1939 Act in respect of the Suit Land was supposed to be through a
separate notification, but the same has again not been produced in these
proceedings or before any forum, which further dissuades us from
rendering any final opinion at this stage.
G
56. The same aspect has been highlighted by Appellants who
contend that the area in which the Suit Land is situated was governed by
the Kumaon Tenancy Rules of 1918. On the other hand, Respondents
have produced on record a - G.O. No. 5678/ 1-B-1212~B-19 dated the
30.04.1948 titled ‘Tarai and Babbar Government Estates (Kham norms),
H
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. v. RAVI KUMAR 975
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS [SURYA KANT, J.]

Revised norms’ issued by Revenue (B) Department which notes as A
follows –
“I. Tenants on admission on have hereditary rights as
defined in section 29 on the united provinces Tenancy Act
expect in the 55 Buxeris village mentioned in the first
schedule to the Act.” B
This notification indicates the possibility of hereditary rights being
accrued on predecessor of Respondents under the 1939 Act but again,
we are constrained to give any finding on the same because of the lack
of proper documents on record to ascertain the tenancy status of the
Respondents. Hence, on this ground also the present appeals are liable C
to be remanded back so that the relevant statutory notifications, original
records can be placed before the High Court to enable it to determine
the applicable tenancy law and their impact on the alleged rights of the
Respondents.
D. Conclusion D
57. We are conscious of the fact that these appeals have been
pending before this Court for more than 15 years. In normal
circumstances, we would have ventured to decide the issues ourselves
but in light of the abovementioned observations and dearth of appropriate
records, we are constrained to hold that ownership rights in respect of E
an immovable property cannot be decided casually. We are actually left
with no other option but to remand these appeals back to the High Court
for effective adjudication on merits.
58. Our hands are further tied because of the fact that the
ownership of certain portions of the Suit Land has apparently changed F
hands on account of subsequent sale by the Respondents. Furthermore,
we must also note that the value of the Suit Land has increased
exponentially during the entire period of litigation and the relevant parties
have also done certain valuable developments. Any decision now cannot
be based on conjectures and surmises or on the basis of mere guesswork.
Hence, we are reluctant to give a final opinion on the matter until the G
Court is satisfied on the basis of the entirety of documents which showcase
how the ownership or possessory rights were created on the Suit Land.
59. There are indeed compelling circumstances which have been
left unanswered by the courts below, because of which determination of
several factual issues have been left in limbo. Therefore, in light of the H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.

A peculiar situation, we find it expedient to remand the present appeals
back to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the issues formulated in
Para 34 of this judgement and the observations made above. However,
we hasten to add that these observations may not to be treated as final
determination on the merits of the dispute.
B 60. Furthermore, in light of the long-drawn pendency of these
disputes, we request the High Court to take up these matters at the
earliest and dispose of the same as early as possible, preferably within a
period of upcoming 12 months. However, all the original records, including
revenue entries as well as that of the office of Deputy Commissioner,
Nainital may be requisitioned. In this regard, we direct the Appellant
C State to produce entire records and notifications before the High Court
and render assistance in the early disposal of these matters.
61. Consequently, these appeals are allowed in part; the impugned
judgments of the High Court are set aside, and the matters are remanded
to the High Court for a fresh adjudication. It is made clear that casual
D findings/observations made by Revenue Authorities or the Civil Court
shall not be accepted at their face value unless the High Court is satisfied
on a thorough inspection of the original or certified copies of the relevant
record. The parties are directed to keep status quo until the matters are
decided afresh by the High Court.
E 62. Ordered accordingly. Pending applications, if any, are also
disposed of in above terms.

Nidhi Jain Appeals partly allowed.
(Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)
F

G

H