STATE OF WEST BENGAL ETC. ETC.versusASHUTOSH LAHIRI AND ORS.

                STATE OF WEST BENGAL ETC. ETC.                            A
                              v.
                  ASHUTOSH LAHIRI AND ORS.

                         NOVEMBER 16, 1994

   [KULDIP SINGH, B. L. HANSARIA AND S.B. MAJMUMDAR, JJ.]                B
    West Bengal Animal Slaughter Control Act, 1950-Section 12-
Exemption of slaughter of healthy cows on Bakri-ldd day-Validity
challenged-Whether such slaughter of cows by members of Muslim
community on Bakri Idd was an essential requirement of Muslim religion- C
Held, No, as such an exemption was outside the scope ofsection 12.

     Respondents filed a tVrit petition challenging the validity of
exemption of slaughter of scheduled animal, namely, cows, from the
operation of the West Bengal Animal Slaughter Control Act, 1950 on
Bakri-Idd day. The writ petitioners contended that the State of West D
Bengal had wrongly invoked section 12 of the Act when it exempted
from the operation of the Act, the slaughter of healthy cows on the
ground that such exemption was required to be given for the religious
purpose of Muslim community. The Division Bench of the High Court
held that such slaughter of cows by members of Muslim community on
Bakri Idd was not an essential requirement of Muslim religion and E
therefore, such exemption was ousted the scope of section 12 of the Act.
A mandamus was issued to State calling upon them to forbear from
giving any such exemption on the occassion of Bakri ldd day
thereinafter.

     These appeals by special leave are filed against the judgment of the F
High Court. It was contended by the State that the view of the High
Court was erroneous and it did not correctly interpret section 12 of the
Act. According to the appellants such exemption can be granted for
fulfilling any religious purpose and such purpose · may not be an
obligatory purpose. That even if it is open to a Muslim to offer sacrifice G
of a goat or a camel or a cow and when such a sacrifice should be of a
healthy animal it was perfectly open to the State to grant exemption
from the operation of the Act so far as the slaughtering of healthy cow
on Bakri Idd day was concerned. So far as section 12 of the Act is
concerned it does not talk of an essential religious purpose but talks of
any religiou; purpose which may include even an optional purpose.          H
                                  515
    516                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [1994) SUPP. 5 S.<;.R

A        The respondent in these appeals contended that the Act is meant
    for controlling the slaughter of animals including the cows and
    buffalloes and this is with the object of increasing the supply of milk
    and avoiding the wastage of animal power necessary for improvement
    of agriculture. Under. the Act so far as healthy animals like cows are
    concerned there is a complete ban on slaughtering them. Section 12
B   seeks to lift the ban in connection with such animals only on the
    fulfilment of the condition precedent, namely, such lifting of ban being
    necessary for any· religious, medicinal or research purpose. As this is an
    exception to the general protection against slaughtering of healthy
    animals, such exemption.or exception should be strictly construed and
    cannot be lightly granted or lightly resorted to for any optional
C   religious purpose which may not be absolutely necessary. It was
    submitted that it is no~ essential for Muslims to earn religious merit by
    insisting on sacrificing only healthy cows on Bakri ldd. Consequently,
    the State will not have any jurisdiction or power to invoke section 12
    for fulfilling such optional religious practice of Muslim community.

D         Dismissing the Appeal, this Court

         HELD: 1.1 The legislative intention of the West Bengal Slaughter
    Control Act, 1950 is that healthy cows which are not fit to be
    slaughtered cannot be slaughtered at all. In other words there is total
    ban against slaughtering of healthy cows and other animals mentioned
E   in the schedule u/s 2 of the Act. This is the very essence of the Act and is
    necessary to subserve the purpose of the Act i.e. to increase the supply
    of milk and avoid the wastage of animal power necessary for
    improvement of agriculture. (520-H, 521-A)

         1.2. Section 12 seeks to lift the ban in connection with slaughter of
F   such animals on certain conditions. For lifting the bap it should be
    shown that it is essential or necessary for a Muslim to sacrifice a
    healthy cow on Bakri ldd day and if such is the requirement of
    religious purpose then it may enable the State in its wisdom to lift the
    ban. If it is not necessary or essential to permit slaughter of a healthy
    cow for any religious purpose it would be equally not open to the state
G   to invoke its exemption power u/s 12 for such a religious purpose.
                                                             (521-G-H, 523-D)

        1.3. Slaughtering__of healthy cows on Bakri ldd is not essential or
    r.equired for religious purpose of Muslims; in other words i,t is not a
    part of religious requirement for a Muslim that a cow must be
H   necessarily saerit'iced for earning religious merit on Bakri-ldd. (523-D) ·
              STATE v. ASHUTOSH LAHIRI [MAJMUDAR, J.]                 517

   MH Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. (1958) SC 731, A
(Constitution Bench), Followed.

    Unionofindiav. Wood Papers Ltd, (1991) 1JTSC151 andNovopal
India Ltd v. C.C.E. and Customs, Hyderabad, (1994) 6 JT SC 80, relied
on.
                                                                            B
    Tilkayat Shri Govindlaiji Maha;·aj v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.,
(1964) 1 SCR 561; Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali
and Ors., (1962) 1 SCR 383 and Hazrat Kair Mohd Shah v. Commissioner
ofIncome Tax, (1967) 63 ITR 490 (SC), distinguished.

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6790of1983              C
Etc. Etc.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 20.8.82 of the Calcutta High Court
in C.R. No. 709-W of 1971.

   Jaideep Gupta, G.S. Chatterjee and Ms. Aruna Banerjee for the D
Appellants.

   V.M. Tarkunde and Harish N. Salve, Isa, Kalimuddin Ali and Shakil
Ahmed Syed for the Applicants.

    D.V. Sehgal, A.M. Singhvi, Bimal Roy Jad, A.S. Pundir, Rajinder E
Singhvi, B.S. Banthia, R.D. Upadhyay and Arun Bansal for the
Respondents.

    Tl)e Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     MAJMUDAR, J. All these appeals by special leave arise out of the
judgment of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. F
709 (W) of 1971 decided on 20th August, 1982. The appellants in these
appeals are the State of West Bengal and the other contesting respondents
who were before the High Court. 27 respondents herein had filed the writ
petition before the Calcutta High Court, challenging the validity of
exemption of slaughter of scheduled animal, namely, cows, from the
operation of the West Bengal Animal Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 G
(hereinafter referred to as the' Act') Bakri-Idd day. The writ petitioners had
obtained leave under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
joined respondents 7 to 21 representing the Muslim community. The writ
petitioners contended before the High Court that the State of West Bengal
respondent No. l before the High Court had wrongly invoked section 12 of H
    518                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   the Act when it exempted from the operation of the Act, the slaughter of
    healthy cows on the occasion of Bakri Idd on the ground that such
    exemption was required to be given for the religious purpose of Muslim
    community. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court after hearing
    the contesting parties took the view that such slaughter of cows by members
    of Muslim community on Bakri ldd day was not a requirement of Muslim
B   religion and, therefore, such exemption was outside the scope of section 12
    of the Act. Consequently, the impugned order was dehors the statute. In
    that view the Division Bench allowed the petition and issued a mandamus
    to the appellants, State of West Bengal respondent No. I and its delegate
    officers respondent Nos. 2 to 16 in the writ petition calling upon them to
    forbear from giving any exemption under section 12 of the Act in respect of
c   slaughter of cows on the occasion of Bakri Idd day thereinafter. The writ
    petitioner's oral application for leave under Article 133 of the Constitution
    was refused as according to the Division Bench it had followed the
    Constitution Bench decision of this Court in MH Quareshi r;znd Ors., v.
    State ofBihar, A.LR (1958) SC 731, in coming to the said conclusion.

D        As noted earlier the State of West Bengal as well as other contesting
    respondents of Muslim community have preferred these appeals by way of
    special leave to appeal from the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench
    of the Calcutta High Court.

         As all these appeals involve common questions of facts and law,
E   learned counsel for contesting parties addressed common arguments in all
    these appeals. Consequently, we are disposing of these appeals by this
    common judgment.

         Learned counsel for the appellants in these appeals vehemently
    contended that the view of the High Court is erroneous and does not
F   correctly interpret section 12 of the Act. It must be held that such
    exemption can be granted for fulfilling any religious purpose and such
    purpose may not be an obligatory purpose. That even if it is open to a
    Muslim to offer sacrifice of a goat or a camel or a cow and w~en such a
    sacrifice should be of a healthy animal then it was perfectly open to the
G   State to grant exemption from the operation of the Act so far as
    slaughtering of healthy cow on Bakri Idd day was concerned. It was also ·
    coi1tended that the High Court had misread the judgment in Quareshi 's case
    as this case had interpreted Article 25 of the Constitution of India and in
    that light it was held that slaughter of cows could not be considered to be a
    p~rt of essential religious requirement. so" far as section 12 of the Act is'
H   concerned it does not talk of an essential religious purpose but talks of any
              STATE v. ASHUTOSH LAHIRI [MAJMUDAR, J.]                     519

religious purpose which may include even an optional purpose. Mr. A
Tarkunde, learned senior counsel, appearing for one of the appellants
vehemently contended that for operation of section 12 it is not necessary
that the religious purpose must be a mandatory purpose but would cover
even an optional purpose as contemplated by the Muslim religion, like
slaughter of healthy cow on Bakri Idd. Hence such a purpose would be
covered by the sweep of section 12 of the Act.                            B
     On the other hand learned counsel for the original writ petitioners,
respondents in these appeals, contended that the Act is meant for
controlling the slaughter of animals including the cows and buffaloes and
this is with the object of increasing the supply of milk and avoiding the
wastage of animal power ~ecessary for improvement of agriculture. Under          C
section 4 of the Act only animals fit for slaughtering can be slaughtered.
For that a certificate is required to be issued by the concerned authorities.
But so far as healthy animals like cows are concerned there is a complete
ban on slaughtering them. Section 12 seeks to lift the ban in connection
with such animals only on the fulfilment of the condition precedent,
namely, such lifting of the ban being necessary for any religious, medicinal     D
or research purpose. As this is an exception to the general protection against
slaughtering of healthy animals as envisaged by the Act, such exemption or
exception should be strictly construed and cannot be liglltly granted or
lightly resorted to for any optional religious purpose which may not be
absolutely necessary. In this connection it was submitted by learned counsel     E
for the respondents that as per the appellants, in order to earn religious
merits a Muslim can offer sacrifice of a goat or alternatively of a healthy
cow if 7 Muslims together decided to do so and spend for it or even a camel
can be sacrificed by them on Bakri Idd. Therefore, it is not essential for
Muslims to earn religious merit by insisting on sacrificing only healthy
cows on Bakri Idd. Consequently, the State will not have any jurisdiction or     F
power to invoke section 12 for fulfilling such optional religious practice of
Muslim community. It was further contended that the Constitution Bench
judgment in Quareshi 's case (supra) had clearly ruled that slaughter of cow
on Bakri Idd day cannot be considered to be a part of essential religous
practice and that is the reason why protection of Article 25 is not available
for enabling slaughtering of cows on Bakri ldd day. If that is so, on that       G
very basis the State's action under section 12 of the Act has to be judged
otherwise what is held to be non-essential religious requireme~t by the
 Constitution Bench of this Court, would be treated as essential religious
 requirement for the purpose of section 12 of the Act. That would run
 counter to the very ratio of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
 Court. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, writ     H
    520                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   petitioners, the Division Bench of the High Court was perfectly in
    following the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
    Quareshi's case (supra).

        We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. In
    our view the decision rendered by the Division Bench of Calcutta High
B   Court under appeal is unexceptionable and calls for no interference. We
    must keep in view the scheme of the Act for deciding the question in
    controversy.

         As the preamble of the Act shows it was enacted to control the
    slaughter of certain animals as it was expedient to do so with a view to
c   increase the supply of milk and to avoid the wastage of animal power
    necessary for improvement of agriculture. Section 2. lays down that the Act
    applies to animals specified in the schedule. The schedule to the Act covers
    bulls, bullocks, cows, calves, male and female buffaloes, buffalo calves and
    castrated buffaloes. Section 4 of the Act deals with prohibition of
    slaughtering of animals without certificate from authorities concerned.
D   Section 4 ( l) provides that notwith~tanding anything in any other law for
    the time being in force or in any usage to the contrary, no person shall
    slaughter any animal unless he has obtair:ed in respect thereof a certificate
    under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) that the animal is fit for slaughter.
    As per sub-section (2) a certificate is required to be issued by the concerned
    authorities that the animal is over 14 years of age and is unfit for work of
E   breeding or that the animal has become permariently incapacitated from
    work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or any incurable disease.
    Sub-section (3) deals with a case where there is a difference of opinion
    between the concerned authorities from which initially a certificate is to be
    obtained. As per section 5 even if there is a certificate enabling a person to
    get concerned animal slaughtered he cannot slaughter it in any place other
F
    than the place prescribed in that behalf. As per section 7 whoever
    contravenes the provision of the Act shall be punishable with imprisonment
    for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend
    to one thousand rupees or with both. Section 8 makes the offences
    cognizable under the Act. Section 9 prescribes punishment for abetment of
G   offences or even attempts to commit any such offence under the Act.

         The aforesaid relevant provisions clearly indicate the legislative
    intention that healthy cows which are not fit to be slaughtered cannot be
    slaughtered at all. That is the thrust of section 4 of the Act. In other words
    there is total ban against slaughtering of healthy cows and other animals
H   mentioned in the schedule under section 2 of the Act. This is the very
              STATE v. ASHUTOSH LAHIRI [MAJMUDAR, J.)                    521

 essence of the Act and is necessary to sub-serve the purpose of the Act i.e. A
 to increase the supply of milk and avoid the wastage of animal power
 necessary for improvement of agriculture. Keeping in view these essential
 features of the Act, we have to construe section 12 which deals with power
to grant exemption from the Act. As we have noted earlier the said section
enables the State Government by general or special order and subject to
 such conditions as it may think fit to impose, to exempt from the operation B
 of this Act slaughter of any animal for any religious, medicinal or research
purpose. Now it becomes clear that when there is a total ban under the Act
 so far as slaughtering of healthy cows which are not fit to be slaughtered as
per section 4 (I) is concerned, ifthat ban is to be lifted even fora day, it has
to be shown that such lifting of ban is necessary for sub-serving any
religious, medicinal or research purpose. The Constitution Bench decision C
of this Court in Mohd Henif Quareshi's case (supra), [1959) SCR 629, at
page 650 of the report speaking through Das C.J. referred to the
observations in Hamiltion' s translation of Hedaya Book XLIII at page 592
that it is the duty of every free Mussulman arrived at the age of maturity, to
offer a sacrifice on the Yd Kirban, or festival of the sacrifice, provided he
be then possessed ofNisab and be not a traveller. The sacrifice established D
for one person is a goat and that for seven a cow or a camel. It is, therefore,
optional for a Muslim to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel
for sl!ven persons. It does not appear to be obligatory that a person must
sacrifice a cow. Once the religious purpose of Muslims consists of making
sacrifice of any animal which should be a healthy animal, on Bakri Idd,
then slaughtering of cow is not the only way of carrying out that sacrifice. It E
is, therefore, obviously not an essential religious purpose but an optional
one. In this connection Mr. Tarkunde for the appellants submitted that even
optional purpose would be covered by the term 'any religious purpose' as
employed by section 12 and should not be an essential religious purpose.
We cannot accept this view for the simple reason that section 12 seeks to F
lift the ban in connection with slaughter of such animals on certain
"conditions. For lifting the ban it should be shown that it is essential or
necessary for a Muslim to sacrifice a healthy cow on Bakri Idd day and if
such is the requirement of religious purpose then it may ·enable the State in
its wisdom to lift the ban at least on Bakri ldd day. But that is not the
position. It is well settled that an exceptional provision which seeks to • G
avoid the operation of main thrust of the Act has to be strictly construed. In
this connection it is profitable to refer to the decisions of this Court in the
cases Union of India v. Wood Paper Ltd, (1991) I J.T. S.C. 151 and
Novopal India Ltd., Hyderbad v. C.C.E. and Customs, Hyderbad, (1994) 6
J.T. S.C. 80. If any optional religious purpose enabling the Muslim to
sacrifice a healthy cow on Bakri Idd is made the subject matter of an H
    522                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R .

A   exemption under section 12 of the Act then such exemption would get
    granted for a purpose which is not an essential one and to that extent the
    exemption would be treated to have been lightly or cursorily granted. Such
    is not the scope and ambit of section 12. We must, therefore, hold that
    before the State can exercise the exemption power under section 12 in
    connection with slaughter of any healthy animal covered by the Act, it must
B   be shown that such exemption is necessary to be granted for sub-serving an
    essential religious, medicinal or research purpose. If granting of such
    exemption is not essential or necessary for effectuating such a purpose no
    such exemption can be granted so as to by-pass the thrust of the main
    provisions of the Act. We, therefore, reject the contention of the learned
    counsel· for the appellants that even for an optional religious purpose
c   exemption can be validly granted under section 12. In this connection it is
    also necessary to consider Quareshi 's case (supra) which was heavily relied
    upon by the High Court. The total ban of slaughter of cows even on Bakri
    ldd day as imposed by Bihar Legislature under Bihar Prevention of
    Animals Act, 1955 was attacked as violative of fundamental right of the
    petitioners under Article 25 of the Constitution. Repelling this contention
D   the Constitution Bench held that even though Article 25 {l) granted to all
    persons the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, as slaughter
    of cows on Bakri ldd was not an essential religious practice for Muslims,
    total ban on cow's slaughter on all days including Bakri ldd day would not
    be violative of Article 25 (I). As we have noted earlier the Constitution
    Bench speaking through Das C.J., held that it was optional to the Muslims
E   to sacrifice a cow on behalf of seven persons on Bakri Idd but it does not
    appear to be obligatory that a person must sacrifice a cow. It was further
    observed by the Constitution Bench that the very fact of an option seemed
    to run counter to the notion of an obligatory duty. One submission was also
    noted that a person with six other members of his family may afford to
    sacrifice a cow but but may not be able to afford to sacrifice seven goats,
F   and it was observed that in such a case there may be an economic
    compulsion although there was no religious compulsion. In this connectio·n,
    Das C.J., referred to the historical background regarding cow slaughtering
    from the times· of Mughal emperors. Mughal Emperor Bahar saw the
    wisdom of prohibiting the slaughter of cows and by way of· religious
    sacrifice and directed his son Humayn to follow this. Similarly, emperors
G
    Akbar, Jahangir and Ahmad Shah, it is said, prohibited cow slaughter. In
    the light of this historical background it was held that total ban on cows
    slaughter did not offend Article 25 (l) of the Constitution.

        In view of this settled legal position it becomes obvious that if there is.
H   no fundamental right of a Muslim to insist on slaughter of healthy cow on
              STATE v. ASHUTOSH LAHIRI [MAJMUDAR, J.]                 523

Bakri Idd day, it cannot be a valid ground for exemption by the State under A
section 12 which would in turn enable slaughtering of such cows on Bakri
Idd. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that Article 25 (1)
of the Constitution deals with essential religious practices while Section 12
of the Act may cover even optional religious practices is not acceptable. No
such meaning can be assigned to such an exemption clause which seeks to
whittle down and dilute the main provision of the Act, namely, section 4 B
which is the very heart of the Act. If the appellants, contention is accepted
then the State can exempt from the operation of the Act, the slaughter of
healthy cows even for non-essential religious, medicinal or research
purpose, as we have to give the same meaning to the three purposes,
namely, religious, medicinal or research purpose, as envisaged by section
12. It becomes obvious that if for fructifying any medicinal or research C
purpose it is not necessary or essential to permit slaughter of healthy cow,
then there would be no occasion for the State to invoke exemption power
under section 12 of the Act for such a purpose. Similarly it has to be held
that if it is not necessary or essential to permit slaughter of a healthy cow
for any religious purpose it would be equally not open to the State to invoke
its exemption power under section 12 for such a religious purpose. We, D
therefore, entirely concur with the view of the High Court that slaughtering
of healthy cows on Bakri Idd" is not essential or required for religious
purpose of Muslims or in other words it is not a part of religious
requirement for a Muslim that a cow must be necessarily sacrificed for
earning ieligious merit on Bakri Idd.
                                                                            E
     We may also mention one submission of Mr. Tarkunde that India is a
secular democratic country and, therefore, that State has to respect the
wishes of minority. In the appeals at hand we are concerned with the short
question whether in the light of clear wording of section 12, the State can
exempt from the operation of the Act slaughtering of healthy cows on Bakri F
Idd. For deciding this, ours being a secular country would not be relevant.
Mr. Tarkunde next submitted that as per Gujarat rules slaughtering of cows
on Bakri Idd is considered a bonafide religious purpose. Even this aspect is
not relevant for deciding the parameters of section 12 of the West Bengal
Act, even if that be the position in Gujarat presently, which is not so
according to the learned counsel for the respondents.                        G
     We may also deal with the effort made by the learned counsel for the
appellants to distinguish Quareshi's case on the ground that for interpreting
the term 'religious' under Articles 25 and 26, a restricted meaning was
given for balancing the secular nature of democracy on the one hand and
the interest of the individual so for as right to practise any religion is H
    524                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   concerned on the other. In this connection, our attention was invited to the
    decisions of this Court in Ti/kayat Shir Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of
    Rajasthan and Others, [1994] 1 S.C.R 561 and The Durgah Committee,
    Ajmer and Anr., v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors., [1962] I S.C.R. 383. These
    decisions are of no avail to the appellants as therein while dealing with the
    question of validity of certain enactments, scope of Articles 25 and 26 of
B   the Constitution was spelt out and nothing has been held in these decisions
    which is contrary to what was decided in Quareshi case, which we have
    noted in detail. The effort made by learned counsel for the appellants to get
    any and every religious practice covered by section 12 also is of no avail
    for the simple reason that in the context of section 12 the religious practice
    must be such which requires the invocation of exemption provision under
c   section 12 so as to by-pass the main thrust of section 4. For such an exercise
    non-essential religious practices cannot be made the basis. Reliance placed
    on the decision of this Court in Hazrat Kair Mohd. Shah v. Commissioner
    ofIncome Tax, Gujarat, (1967) 63 l.T.R. 490 SC, also is of no assistance as
    the same refers to section 11 of the Income Tax Act, the scheme of which is
    entirely different from that of the Act. Even if we agree with learned
D   counsel for the appellants that slaughter of a healthy cow on Bakri Idd is for
    a religious purpose, so long as it is not shown to be an essential religious
    purpose as discussed by us earlier, section 12 of the Act cannot be pressed
    in service for buttressing such a non-essential religious purpose.

         Before parting we may mention that one preliminary objection was
E   raised before the High Court about the petitioners, locus standi to move the
    writ petition. The High Court held that it was a public interest litigation and
    the writ petitioners have sufficient locus standi to move the petition. That
    finding of the High Court was not challenged by any of the appellants. In
    our view rightly so as the writ petitioners representing a Hindu segment of
    society had felt aggrieved by the impugned exemption granted by the State.
F   They had no personal interest but a general cause to project. Consequently,
    they had sufficient locus standi to move the petition. Rule 7 framed under
    the Act, provides that provisions of the West Bengal Animal Slaugftter
    Control Act, 1950, shall not apply to the slaughter of any animal for
    religious, medicinal or research purpose subject to the condition that such
    slaughter does not affect the religious sentiment of the neighbours of the
G
    per~on or persons performing such slaughter and that· the previous
    permission of the State Government or any officer authorised by it is
    obtained before the slaughter. The case of the original writ petitioners
    before the High Court was based on religious sentiments and, therefore,
    they had moved this public interest litigation. In these circumstances, no
H   fault could be found with the decision of the High Court recognising locus
              STATE v. ASHUTOSH LAHJRI [MAJMUDAR, J.]                     525

standi of the original petitioners to move this public interest litigation       A
which we have found to be well justified on merits.

     In the result, we confirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss
these appeals. Interim reliefs granted earlier during the pendency of the
appeals shall stand vacated. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there
will be no order as to costs.                                                    B
A.G.                                                      Appeals dismissed.