Holding

When the prosecution establishes that the victim was abducted with the intent to kill and the body is found dead shortly thereafter, the court may presume murder under Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act, sustaining conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

Summary

The State of West Bengal prosecuted Mir Mohammad Omar and six co‑accused for abducting a 29‑year‑old businessman, Mahesh Kumar Aggarwal, with the intention of killing him, and for his subsequent murder. The trial court convicted them under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC but acquitted them of murder; the Calcutta High Court reduced the sentence and upheld the acquittal. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the abduction was carried out with the purpose of murder, whether the dead body was that of the deceased, and whether the injuries were sufficient to cause death. Relying on the prosecution’s evidence, the forensic report, and the presumption provisions of Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court held that the abduction was intended to kill, the body was correctly identified, and the injuries were fatal. Consequently, the Court affirmed conviction under Section 364/34 IPC and added conviction under Section 302/34 IPC, imposing life imprisonment on each accused.

Issues considered

Whether the abduction was carried out with the intention to murder, attracting Section 364 IPC.
Whether the prosecution proved that the dead body examined was that of the deceased.
Whether the injuries discovered at autopsy were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Whether circumstantial evidence, including the bush shirt and its serological test, could be used despite not being put under Section 313 CrPC.
Whether the presumption of fact under Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act can be invoked to infer murder.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 114, s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34, s. 364

Subjects

abductionmurdercircumstantial evidencepresumption of factIndian Evidence ActIndian Penal CodeSection 364 IPCSection 302 IPCSection 34 IPCforensic evidencelife imprisonment

Judgment

A STATE OF WEST BENGAL
v.
. MIR MOHAMMAD OMAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

AUGUST 29, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 302 and 364 read with Section 34-
Abduction-Murder-Offence of-DeceCf!t!d abducted by the accused pro-
claiming that he would be finished off-Deceased found dead within a couple
c of hours of his abduction-Bush shirt worn by deceased at the time of
abduction recovered at the instance of one of the accused-Aforesaid circum-
stances succes~fully established by the Prosecution-Held, if it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that the deceased was abducted by the accused and,
he was found murdered within a short time thereafter, the permitted reasoning
process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have
D murdered him-{f any deviation from the aforesaid course would have been
factually correct only the abductors would know about it, because such
deviation would have been especially within their knowledge-The abductors
not having given any explanation as to what happened to the deceased after
he was abducted, the inference would stand undisturbed-Indian Evidence
E Act, 1872-Sections 106, 114-Presumption of fact-Rule of.

Evidence Act, 1872 :

Reliance on evidence of a junior doctor who wrongly estimated the age
of the deceased and noted that the penis of the dead body had undergone
F religious circumcision-Tenability of-Held, this circumstance has no bearing
as the Senior Doctor specialist in Forensic Medicine did not find any evidence
of such circumcision on the dead body-Estimation of age by a novice doctor
without conducting any medical tests not enough to offset the age spoken to by
kith and kin of deceased

G Circumstantial evidence :

Injuries-Whether sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death-Not elicited from the doctor-Held, mere omission to put that question
not enough for the Court to reach a conclusion that the accused were not
relponsible for causing the death of the deceased-Nature of injuries itse(f
H
712
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED 713
indicating that they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause A
death.

Circumstance regarding the bush shirt of the deceased having been found
with human blood not put to the accused when questioned by Sessions Judge
uls. 313 of the Cr.P.C.-Consequence of-Held, such circumstance cannot be
used against the accused-Code o.fCriminal Procedure, 1973-Section 313. B

Practice and Procedure :

Castigation o.f investigation by the Trial Courts while acquitting ac-
.. rnsed-Practice o.f-Need for restraint-Emphasised.
c
Deceased was engaged in some small business. A· 7 demanded a sum of
Rs. 50,000 from the deceased for allowing the deceased to deal with his
business unobstructed. The deceased having refused, he was abducted by
the accused persons. His dead body was found a couple of hours later in a
hospital. The Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with D
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to rigorous impris·
onment for 10 years. The case against A· 7 having been spoilt up due to some
reasons, had already been dropped. Appeal filed by the State against the
acquittal for murder was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court
and reduced the sentence to a short term imprisonment restricting it to the
period already undergone. The State has challenged the acquittal for mur·
E
der charge. The accused have preferred appeals challenging their convic·
tion.

On behalf of tl.e accused, it was contended that it was a case of abduc·
tion simplicitor and that such abduction by itself was not punishable by any F
provision of the Penal Code; that it was easy for interested witnesses to put
in the mouth of the accused such words as that the deceased would be fin·
ished in orde~ to aggravate the dimension of the offence; that the prosecu·
tion failed to establish that the dead body on which the autopsy was con·
ducted was that of the deceased.
G
1 On behalf of the State, it was contended that the bush shirt which the

J deceased was wearing at the time of his abduction, was recovered pursuant
to a statement by A· 1 at the time of interrogation by the Investigation Of·
fleer; that the said bush shirt was subjected to serological examination at the
Forensic Sciences Laboratory and it was found stained with human blood. H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A Allowing the appeal filed by the State and dismissing the appeals filed
by the accused, the Court

HELD : 1.1. There is no doubt that all the accused abducted the de-
,.
ceased in order to murder him. The temper which the assailants exhibited in
the house of the deceased's sister, is broadly indicative of the truculence of
B the intruders that they went there with some definite purpose. The deceased
was once caught by them on that night itself and then he was badly handled
by them. If their intention was only to inflict some blows on the victim they
would have stopped with what they did to him at that stage. But when the
deceased struggled and extricated himself from their clutches and escaped
C to another place, these accused did not stop and they persisted in prowling
for their prey and succeeded in tracing him out from that different area and
hauled him out violently. Such repeated chase for the deceased could, in all
probabilities, be for his blood. [720-D-E]

1.2. The deceased was abducted by the abductors proclaiming that he
D would be finished off. The abductors took the deceased out of the sight of the
witnesses. He was then wearing a bush shirt which was recovered at the
instance of A-1. Within a couple of hours the murdered body of the deceased
was found in a Hospital without a shirt. The bush shirt which the deceased
was wearing at the time of abduction was concealed by A-1. When prosecu-
E tion succeeded in establishing the aforesaid circumstances, the court has to
presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of
evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other
proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved
facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclu-
sion as the most probable position. Section 114 of the Evidence Act empow-
F
ers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to
have happened. In that process court shall have regard to the common course
of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. In
the present case, the facts which prosecution proved including the proclaimed
intention of the accused, when considered in the light of the proximity of
G time within which the victim sustained fatal injuries and the proximity of the
place within which the dead body was found are enough to draw an infer-
ence that victim's death was caused by the same abductors. If any deviation
from the aforesaid course would have been factually correct only the abduc-
tors would know about it, because such deviation would have been especially
H within their knowledge. As they refused to state snch facts the inference
/

STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED 715
would stand undisturbed. [724-H; 725-A; 726-D-EJ A
Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, [1956] SCR 199, referred to.
·o
2. The contention that the prosecution failed to establish that the dead
body on which the autopsy was conducted was that of the deceased, deserves
to be rejected. The fact that PW-28 who saw the dead body first estimated B
the age as 40, whereas the deceased was only 29 and that he had noted that
the penis of the dead body had undergone "religious circumcision" has no
bearing on this aspect. The doctor who conducted post-mortem examina-
tion (PW-30) did not find any evidence of such circumcision on the dead
body. That doctor is a specialist in Forensic Medicine and is a senior person.
On the other hand, PW-28 was only a stripling in the profession who had just
c
completed his internship after his graduation. The age estimated by this
novice medical practitioner without conducting any medical tests in that
regard is hardly sufficiept to conclude that the dead body was that of a
person aged 40. There is overwhelming evidence to show that the autopsy
conducted on the dead body by PW-30 was that of the deceased. There is D
little scope even to doubt the possibility of some other dead body being mis·
takenly treated as that of the deceased while conducting the post-mortem
examination. [721-A; C-EJ

3. The Trial Court made a fallacious conclusion regarding the death of
the deceased on the premise that the public prosecutor did not elicit from the
E
doctor as to whether the injurie~ were sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. No doubt it would have been of advantage to the court
if the public prosecutor had put the said question to the doctor when he was
examined. But mere omission to put that question ls not enough for the court
to reach a wrong conclusion. The Sessions Judge himself would have been an F
experienced judicial officer. Looking at the injuries he himself could have
deduced whether those injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. No sensible man with some idea regarding the fea-
tures of homicidal cases would come to a different conclusion from the inju-
ries indicated, the details of which have been stated by the doctor (PW-30) G
in his evidence. [722-B; D-E]
) 4. The recovery of bush shirt worn by the deceased at the time of his
abduction at the instance of A-1 goes a long way in focusing at the first
accused for the murder of the deceased. The said bush shirt was subjected to
serological examination at the Forensic Sciences Laboratory and it was found H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A stained with human blood. However, the aforesaid circumstance was not put
to the accused when they were questioned by the Sessions Judge under Sec·
tion 313 Cr.P.C. Consequently that feature on the shirt cannot be used as a
c
circumstance against the accused. [723-G]

5. Abduction takes place when a person is compelled by force (or such
B person is induced by any deceitful means) to go from any place. Section 364
I.P.C. says, whoever abducts any person "in order that such person may be
murdered or disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered" he com·
mits the offence punishable under the Section. Even if the murder did not
take place, the offence would be complete if the abduction was completed
c with the said objective. Conversely, if there was no such objective when the
abduction was perpetrated but later the abductors murdered the victim,
Section 364 IPC would not be attracted, though in such a case the court may
have to consider wh~ther the offence of culpable homicide amounting to or
not amounting to murder was committed. [719-E; G-H]

D 6. Castigation of investigation unfortunately seems to be a regular
practice when the trial courts acquit accused in criminal cases. The function
of the criminal courts should not be wasted in picking out the lapses in
investigation and by expressing unsavoury criticism against investigating
officers. If offenders are acquitted only on account of flaws or defects in
E investigation, the cause of criminal justice becomes the victim. Effort should
be made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite such defects
in investigation. [726-H; 727-A]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 785
of 1991. '.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.9.90 of the Calcutta High Court
in G.A. No. 8 of 1990.

WITH

G Criminal Appeal Nos. 786, 787, 788, 789/91 and 638-645/2000.

K.T.S. Tulsi, P.S. Misra, Dilip Sinha, T.C. Sharma, Vijay Kumar Shukla,
D. Mohanti, J.R. Das for Mis. Sinha and Das, Rajesh (NP), Farock M. Rajak,
Mrs. Swarupa Reddy, Vishnu Sharma, S. Chandra Shekar, Upendra Misra,
H.K. Puri, Rajesh Srivastava, Ms. Anindita Gupta, Ujjwal Banerjee and S.K.
H Puri for the appearing parties.
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 717
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A

THOMAS, J. A young businessman of Calcutta was abducted and
killed. The kingpin of the abductors and some of his henchmen were later
nabbed and were tried for the offences. The trial court convicted them under
Section 364 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, but not for murder,
and sentenced them each to rigorous imprisonment for IO years. A Division B
Bench of the Calcutta High Court rejected the State appeal against the acquittal
for murder and reduced the sentence to a short term imprisonment restricting
it to the period which the convicted persons had already undergone. The State
of West Bengal as well as the convicted persons filed these appeals against the
said decision of the Calcutta High Court, the former mainly challenging the c
acquittal for murder charge and the latter challenging the very conviction
entered against them.

Narration of material facts of this case, in a brief manner, is necessary
before considering the contentions raised. The victim of the offence was one
Mahesh Kumar Aggarwal ('Mahesh' for short). He was doing some small D
business at Bow Bazar area (Calcutta). He was a bachelor aged 29 and he was
residing with his sister Anushila Devi (PW-9) in an apartment situated on the
Westen Street which was re-christened as Banbuk Gali. First accused Mir
Mohammad @ Omar and 7th accused Sajid Ali were friends and associates in
many activities indulged in at Bow Bazar area and the other accused were all E
the henchmen of Omar.

Sajid Ali (7th accused) wanted Mahesh to part with a sum of Rs. 50,000,
almost as a ransom, for allowing him to deal with his business
unobstructed. But the deceased did not capitulate to the demand and such
refusal led to a dig between the two. It seems Mahesh scored an upper hand F
in the dig. The above episode happened about 10-12 days before the death of
Mahesh.

The night of 4.11.1984 became horrendously eventful for Mahesh.
The events started with the gate-crashing made by some assailants led by
A-7 Sajid Ali, into the apartqient of Anushila Devi (PW-9) in search of G
her brother Mahesh. Having failed to see him there the assailants left the
apartment after hurling threatening words at the housewife. About an hour
later, Mahesh reached the apartment and was told by his sister of what hap-
pened. Mahesh got frightened and left the house lest the assailants might come
back to that place. H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A By about 11.00 P.M. Mahesh reached the residence of his friend Abdul
Aziz (PW-4) and took asylum therein. But hardly an hour passed he heard the
sound of knocking at the door and when it was opened they saw one fruit-seller
(by name Moin) standing at the doorstep for conveying a message that A-1
Omar was waiting outside to see Mahesh. When he stepped outside he saw A-
l Omar who then asked him to accompany him. But Mahesh refused to do so.
B
Then A-1 Omar forcibly took him to a rickshaw to be taken away from that
site, but Mahesh managed to escape therefrom and ran away towards Giri Babu
Lane.

Mahesh reached the place where PW-5 (Mohd. Sayeed) was residing on
c Giri Babu Lane and sought asylum therein. He narrated to PW-5 all what had
happened till then. He was allowed to sleep in that room, and concealed himself
beneath the Chowki of that room.

The time was about 2.30 A.M. when there was knocking at the door of
PW-S's room. He opened the door and found A-I and other accused standing
D just outside. Four of the accused sneaked into the room and made a prowl for
Mahesh and traced him out in that snoop. The victim was dragged out of the
room. A-I yelled at the victim: "You escaped earlier. Now let me see how you
would escape again."

Hearing the commotion some of the neighbours woke up from sleep.
E
PW-6 (Mohd. Idris) went out to see what happened and then saw some of the
assailants (including the 7th a•;cused in this case) forcibly dragging Mahesh
towards the Central Avenue. In the course of such towing A- I was showering
lathi blows on Mahesh saying "I will beat you and kill you like a pig". A-7 r
was heard saying, "As you did not give the money which we asked for we
F would finish you today." They took Mahesh away from the sight and ken of
the residents of that area. Thereafter, Mahesh was not seen alive by his kith and
kin or his friends.

On the same night Mohd. Sayeed (PW5) went to Bow Bazar Police
Station and lodged a complaint regarding the abduction of Mahesh. An FIR
G
was registered on the strength of the said complaint. On the next morning PW-
9 Anushila Devi (sister of Mahesh) told her nephew Pawan Kumar (PW-29)
about the abduction of Mahesh. Sometime later, Pawan Kumar learned that his
uncle Mahesh was admitted in Islamia Hospital. So he rushed to that hospital
and made inquiries and came across the mangled body of his uncle lying in the
H hospital with his head tonsured.
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 719
PW-3 (Dr. Debabrata Chaudhary) a Reader in Forensic Medicine con- A
ducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of Mahesh and expressed
his opinion that Mahesh was murdered. Subsequently, all the accused were
arrested at different times. Some articles were recovered on the strength of the
statements elicited from the accused. After conclusion of the investigation final
report was laid against the seven accused. The case as against the 7th accused
B
Sajid Ali was split up due to some reasons and hence the trial proceeded as
against the remaining accused.

There is abundant evidence for showing that Mahesh was abducted by
the accused on the night in question. It is unnecessary to dwell upon that aspect
in this appeal, particularly since the trial court and the High Court have held c
that issue in unison and since no serious attempt was made before us for
disrupting that finding. Sri P.S. Misra, learner! Senior Counsel contended that
there would only be a case of abduction simplicitor, even assuming that the
above position stands unassailable, but such abduction by itself is not punish-
able by any provision of the Penal Code. We are not inclined to consider the
said contention in an academic perspective now, for, prosecution in this case D
has put forwarg a case of abduction for the purpose of committing murder. It
was that case which was found against the accused by the trial court which
finding remained undisrupted by the High Court.

Abduction takes place when a person is compelled by force (or such E
person is induced by any deceitful means) to go from any place. In this case
Mahesh was dragged away by the accused from two places, first at Chittaranjan
Avenue and when he escaped from the grip of the abductors and perched
himself in a hide out selected by him at Giri Babu Lane, from there also he was
hauled out.
F
Section 364 IPC says, whoever abducts any person "in order that such
person may be murdered or disposed of as to be put in danger of being
murdered" he commits the offence punishable under the Section. So the im-
portant task of the prosecution was to demonstrate that abduction of Mahesh
was for murdering him. Even if the murder did not take place, the offence
G
would be complete if the abduction was completed with the said objective.
Conversely, ifthere was no such objective when the abduction was perpetrated,
but later the abductors murdered the victim, Section 364 IPC would not be
attracted, though in such a case the court may have to consider whether the
offence of culpable homicide (amounting to or not amounting to murder) was
committed. H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A If the words attributed to the abductors can be believed we have no doubt
that the abduction was done for the purpose of finishing him off. Knowing this
position well, Sri P.S. M!sra, learned Senior Counsel made a frontal criticism
on the aforesaid evidence and contended that it is easy for interested witnesses
to put such words in the mouth of the accused in order to aggravate the
dimension of the offence. No doubt, witnesses can do so. But the question here
B
is whether the aforesaid version of those witnesses was a concoction to embroil
the abductors into the cobweb of a serious offence like Section 364 !PC. The
reliability of that part of the evidence can be tested from different angles.

First is, even in the FIR PW-5 had quoted those words as spoken to by .,
c A-1. It must be noted that when FIR was given PW-5 had no reason to believe
that Mahesh was not alive. If Mahesh had come back alive it is doubtful
whether police would have seriously followed up the FIR. Next is, the temper
which the assailants exhibited in the house of the deceased's sister (when she
was the sole inmate present therein), is broadly indicative of the truculence of
the intruders that they went there with some definite purpose. Mahesh was once
D caught by them on that night itself by PW-4 and then he was badly handled
by them. If their intention was only to inflict some blows OI\, the victim they
would have stopped with what they did to him at that stage. f!.ut when Mahesh
struggled and extricated himself from their clutches and escaped to another
place at Giri Babu Lane these accused did not stop and they persisted in
E prowling for their prey and succeeded in tracing him out from that different
area and hauled him out violently. Such repeated chase for Mahesh could, in
all probabilities, be for his blood. Thus, all the broad features of this case
eloquently support the version of the witnesses to conclude that the words
attributed to the accused were really uttered by them. .
,......_,
F For the aforesaid ryasons, we have no difficulty to conclude that all the
accused abducted Mahesh in order to murder him.

Now we have to consider the more serious aspect whether Mahesh was
murdered by the abductors. On this aspect Sri P.S. Misra led his most vocal
contention that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been established in this
G -~
case. In other words, the contentio~ is that the prosecution failed to establish
that the dead body on which PW-30 (Dr. Debabrata Choudhury) conducted the "
autopsy could not have been that of Mit!1esh.

Learned counsel highlighted two seeming inconsistencies in the evi-
H dence to bolster up his contention on the above score. First is that PW-8

r
-II
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 721
(Dr. Adhikari) who saw the dead body first estimated the age as 40, whereas A

- Mahesh was onlx 29 according to his own kith and kin. Second is that Dr.
Adhikari had noted that the penis of the dead body had undergone "religious
circumcision".

The argument advanced by Sri P.S. Misra, learned senior counsel on the
above material appeared, at the first blush, formidable. But on a closer scrutiny B
the said contention turned out to be very feeble. It must be pointed out that the
doctor who conducted post-mortem examination (PW-30 Dr. Debabrata
Choudhury) did not find any evidence of such circumcision on the dead body.
That doctor is a specialist in Forensic Medicine and was a senior person. On
the other hand, PW-28 (Dr. Adhikari) was only a stripling in the profession who C
had just completed his internship after his graduation. He said in his evidence
that when he examined the patient he found "the glands penis exposed; foreskin
was rolled back; thus it appeared to be a case of early circumcision". We do
not think that such a slipshod observation regarding such a vitally important
identification mark can be taken as a seriously observed feature, particularly
wh:•. PW-30, a senior doctor, did not notice any such thing. Similarly, the age D
estimated by this novice medical practitioner without conducting any medical
tests in that regard is hardly sufficient to conclude that the dead body was that
of a person aged 40. Even otherwise the approximation of the age made by
looking at the dead body is not enough to offset the age spoken to by the kith
and kin of the deceased. E
On the other side, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the
autopsy conducted on the dead body by PW-30 was that of Mahesh. We find

.. little scope even to doubt the possibility of some other dead body being
mistakenly treated as that of the deceased while conducting the post- mortem
examination. PW-9 (Anushila Devi) sister of Mahesh, said that she saw the F
dead body of Mahesh before it was cremated and she had absolutely no doubt
that it was her brother's. PW-29 (Paw an Kumar Agarwal) a nephew of Mahesh
went to Islamia Hospital and it was he who first identified the dead body of
his uncle. PW-4 (Abdul Aziz), PW-5 (Mohd. Sayeed), PW.6 (Mohd. Idris) and
PW-11 (Mohd. Afjal) saw the same dead body and they had no doubt at all that G
it was that of Mahesh.

The post-mortem report made by PW-30 (Dr. Debabrata Choudhury)
shows that the victim was murdered. He noticed as many as 45 injuries on the
dead body which included fracture of 5 ribs (2 to 6 ) on the left side towards
sternal end, fracture of some of the fingers and extravasation of blood on the H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A right side of occipital region and also on the situs of the rib fractures. The

--
remaining injuries included a few lacerated wounds, contusions and aberra-
tions. There was just one minor incised wound on the left pinna. The right lung
was congested. The doctor opined that death of that deceased had resulted from
multiple injuries and injuries of vital organs and it was homicidal in nature.

B The trial court made a fallacious conclusion regarding the death of the
deceased on the premise that the public prosecutor did not elicit from the doctor
as to whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. The Sessions Judge concluded thus on the said issue:

"There being no evidence on record to show that the injuries were
c sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it cannot be
said that the injuries noticed by the autopsy surgeon (PW-30) were
responsible for causing the death of the deceased Mahesh."

No doubt it would have been of advantage to the court if the public
D prosecutor had put the said question to the doctor when he was examined. But
mere omission to put that question is not enough for the court to reach a wrong
conclusion. Though nol an expert as PW-30, the Sessions Judge himself would
have been an experienced judicial officer. Looking at the injuries he himself
could have deduced whether those injuries were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. No sensible man with some idea regarding the
E
features of homicidal cases would come to a different conclusion from the
injuries indicated above, the details of which have been stated by the doctor
(PW-30) in his evidence.

F
We have no doubt that homicidal death of Mahesh had happened on the
same night of his abduction. Now we have to deal with another crucial issue.
..
Having found that Mahesh was abducted by the accused in order to murder him
and he was in fact really murdered very soon thereafter can the accused escape
from the penal consequences of such murder. The trial court has stated on the
said crucial issue thus:

G "From the discussions made by me in the earlier part of the judgment
it would appear that the accused persons had forcibly taken away the
deceased Mahesh from the premises at 29/2/2A, Giri Babu Lane,
Calcutta. There is no iota of evidence to show that the deceased
Mahesh was in the custody of the accused persons along from 2.30
A.M. to 5.45 A.M. of 5.11.86 ..................... There is no evidence worth
H
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 723
the name to show that the accused persons had carried the dead body A
of Mahesh to Islamia Hospital and then abandoned it at the Emergency
.... Department."

The High Court unfortunately did not deal with thi> aspect at all. Learned
judges made scathing criticism on the flaws incurred in the investigation and
without any reference to the evidence confirmed the conviction passed by the B
trial court.

Before we consider the said crucial aspect we have to point out another
important circumstance. Sri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned counsel who argued for the
State highlighted the said circumstance that when A-1 Omar was interrogated
by the Investigating Officer (PW-34) on 12.11.1986 he told the officer that "I
c
have kept it (a full sleeve bush shirt) underneath the mattress on the ground
in my club room". Pursuant to the said statement the shirt was recovered
therefrom. It is marked as Ext.XV in this case. It is now in a torn condition.
The statement attributed to A.1 Omar, and extracted above would fall within
the r"-view of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If it is believable, it would show D
that the said shirt was concealed by the said accused. We do not find any reason
to disbelieve the evidence of the investigating officer regarding recovery of
Ext.XV - shirt.

There are two significant features relating to the said shirt. One is that
PW-5 said that he supplied a shirt to Mahesh on the same night when he found
E
his wearing apparels shabby and torn. PW-5 said that when Mahesh was
abducted from his room he was wearing that shirt and PW-5 identified Ext.XV
as the said bush shirt. No explanation whatsoever was offered by A-1 Omar
regarding Ext.XV (bus:1 shirt) except a bare denial regarding it. We have no
'
difficulty to believe the evidence of PW-34 on that score. It goes a long way F
in focussing at the first accused Omar for the murder of Mahesh.

The other feature has been highlighted by Sri K.T.S. Tulsi that the bush
shirt was subjected to serological examination at the Forensic Sciences Labo-
ratory and it was found stained with human blood (vide Ext.40 series). Sri
Harsh Kumar Puri, learned counsel for the appellants in one of the appeals filed G
.. by the convicted persons, pointed out in his written submissions that the
aforesaid circumstance (FSL test result on the shirt) was not put to the accused
when they were questioned by the Sessions Judge under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. When we scrutinised the records we noticed that
no question was put to the accused on that score. Consequently we are disabled H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A from using that feature on the shirt as a circumstance against the accused.

Even barring that, the following circumstances have now been well set
against the accused: ( 1) Mahesh was abducted around 2.30 A.M. by the abduc- "-' -
tors proclaiming that he would be finished off. (2) The abductors took Mahesh
out of the sight of the witnesses. He was then wearing a bush shirt Ext.XV. (3)
B Within a couple of hours the murdered body of Mahesh was found in Islamia
Hospital without a shirt. (4) The bush shirt which Mahesh was wearing at the
time of abduction was concealed by A-1 Omar.

The abductors have not given any explanation as to what happened to
Mahesh after he was abducted by them. But the learned Sessions Judge after
c referring to the law on circumstantial evidence concluded thus:

"On a careful analysis and appreciation of the evidence I think that
there is a missing link in the chain of events after the deceased was last
seen together with the accused persons and the discovery of the
dead body of the deceased at Islamia Hospital. Therefore, the conclu-
D
sion seems irresistible that the prosecution has failed to establish the
charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable
doubt."

The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove
E the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though
it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption
is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule.
On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the
prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage the offenders in
serious offences would be the major beneficiaries, and the society would be the .-
F casualty.

In this case, when prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore nar-
rated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts.
Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in
conditions such as this.
G
Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from 1'
the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is dis-
proved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise
doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the
H existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 725
of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The A
above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114
• .... is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the
existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process
court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct
etc. in relation to the facts of the case.
B
When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that Mahesh was
abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone
knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered
within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would
enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. c
Such inference can be disrupted if accused would tell the court what else
happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.

During arguments we put a question to learned senior counsel for the
respondents based on a hypothetical illustration. If a boy is kidnapped from the
lawful custody of his guardian in the sight of his people and the kidnappers D
disappeared with the prey, what would be the normal inference if the mangled
dead body of the boy is recovered within a couple of hours from elsewhere. ,
The query was made whether upon proof of the above facts an inference could
be drawn that the kidnappers would have killed the boy. Learned senior counsel
finally conceded that in such a case the inference is reasonably certain that the E
boy was killed by the kidnappers unless they explain otherwise.

In this context we may profitably utilise the legal principle embodied in
Section 106 of the Evidence Act whrch reads as follows: "When any fact is
especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact
is upon him." F

The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the Section would
apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain
G
other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding
such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw
a different inference.

Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is
designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the
knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer,
[1956] SCR 199, the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: ., ~

"This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of
proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is certainly not intended
B to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain
exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate
.
disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which
are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused and which he
could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word 'espe-
C cially' stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exception-
ally within his knowledge."

In the present case, the facts which prosecution proved including the
proclaimed intention of the accused, when considered in the light of the
proximity of time within which the victim sustained fatal injuries and the
D proximity of the place within which the dead body was found are enough to
draw an inference that victim's death was caused by the same abductors. If any
deviation from the aforesaid course would have been factually correct only the
abductors would know about it, because such deviation would have been
especially within their knowledge. As they refused to state such facts the
inference would stand undisturbed.
E
The Division Bench of the High Court instead of dealing ~ith the
circumstances of the case and issues involved made only some general com-
ments and after castigating the investigating officers in severe language reached
the final part of its judgment upholding the conviction under Section 364/34
F !PC and reduced the sentence to the period which the convict had already
undergone. The Division Bench used unkind remarks against the investigating
officer saying "investigation of the case was perfunctory and suffered from
serious lacuna and irregularity".

Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not make any reference to any
G particular omission or lacuna in the investigation. Castigation of investigation
unfortunately seems to be a regular practice when the trial courts acquit ac-
cused in criminal cases. In our perception it is almost impossible to come across
a single case wherein the investigation was conducted completely flawless or
'
absolutely foolproof. The function of the criminal courts should not be wasted
H in picking out the lapses in investigation and by expressing unsavoury criticism
STATE v. MIR MOHAMMED [THOMAS, J.] 727
against investigating officers. If offenders are acquitted only on account of A
flaws or defects in investigation, the cause of criminal justice becomes the
-., victim. Effort should be made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged
despite such defects in investigation. Courts should bear in mind the time
constraints of the police officers in the present system, the ill-equipped machin-
ery they have to cope with, and the traditional apathy of respectable persons
B
to come forward for giving evidence in criminal cases which are realities the
police force have to confront with while conducting investigation in almost
every case. Before an investigating officer is imputed with castigating remarks
the courts should not overlook the fact that usually such an officer is not heard
in respect of such remarks made against them. In our view the court need make
' such deprecatory remarks only when it is absolutely necessary in a particular c
case, and that too by keeping in mind the broad realities indicated above.

In the present case we have not come across any such serious flaw in the
investigation which had affected the case or which would have impaired the
core of the prosecution case justifying or warranting the pejorative remarks
made by the Division Bench of the High Court against the investigating D
officers.

In the result, we allow the appeal filed by the State and dismiss the
appeals filed by the convicted persons. While maintaining the conviction of the
offence under Section 364/34 IPC and restoring the sentence passed by the trial
E
court on the accused we also convict the six appellants/accused of the offence
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and impose a sentence of
imprisonment for life on each of them. The sentences under all counts will run
concurrently.

We direct the Sessions Judge, Calcutta City, to take immediate steps for F
putting the convicted persons back in jail for undergoing the remaining por-
tions of the sentences imposed by this judgement.

M.P. Criminal Appeal No. 785/91 allowed.
Criminal Appeal Nos. 786, 787, 788, 789/91
and 638-45/2000 dismissed . G
._,