Holding

The High Court erred in quashing the proceedings; under Section 482 the court may not revisit a case where a prima facie case exists and no material change in facts has occurred, and the validity of the sanction must be examined during trial.

Summary

The respondent, a government surveyor, was charged under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for possessing assets disproportionate to his known income. After the Special Court dismissed his discharge application and the High Court dismissed the subsequent revision, the respondent filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quash of the proceedings. The High Court quashed the case, reasoning that there was no material change in facts and that the sanction to prosecute was delayed and possibly invalid. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied its inherent powers, having revisited a matter where a prima facie case existed and without any new evidence, and that the validity of the sanction is a matter for trial, not for quashing. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the quashing order, restored the charge sheet, and directed the trial to continue, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

The scope and limits of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings after a discharge application and revision have been dismissed.
Whether a delay or alleged irregularity in the grant of sanction to prosecute a public servant can be a ground for quashing the case under Section 482.
Whether the High Court may assess the likelihood of conviction rather than merely the existence of a prima facie case at the stage of quashing.
The interplay between the inherent power under Section 482 and the revisional powers under Sections 397 and 401 of the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 239, s. 397, s. 401, s. 482
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the respondent u/s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources jurisdiction u/s.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Headnotes† Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) – Allegation that appellant was hoarding assets disproportionate to his income – FIR registered u/ss.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the

Subjects

Disproportionate assetsDischarge applicationChange in the facts and circumstances of the caseScope of section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Government’s sanction to prosecute public authorityValidity of sanctionCourse of trial

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1174 : 2025 INSC 397

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Vigilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department
v.
G. Easwaran
(Criminal Appeal No. 1405 of 2019)
26 March 2025
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the
respondent u/s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources
of income while exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Headnotes†
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) –
Allegation that appellant was hoarding assets disproportionate
to his income – FIR registered u/ss.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the
PC Act – State Government granted sanction to prosecute
the respondent – After investigation, charge-sheet was filed –
Discharge application filed by the respondent – Application
dismissed by the Special Court – Revision Petition was also
dismissed by the High Court – However, respondent again
filed a petition u/s.482 CrPC within 7 months before the High
Court virtually on same grounds – This time, the High Court
quashed criminal proceedings u/s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the
PC Act – Correctness:
Held: It is not disputed that in the instant case, the Special Court, as
well as the High Court, while dismissing the petition for discharge,
examined the allegations and arrived at clear findings that there
was a prima facie case against the respondent – The impugned
order revisits the earlier decisions without any statable change in
the facts and circumstances of the case, traverses to the extreme
end of the spectrum – It is clear that the High Court jumped to the

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1175

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

probable conclusion of trial by not appreciating the limited scope
of s.482 CrPC – Apart from being congruent and overlapping, the
respondent could not demonstrate any material change in facts
and circumstances between the dismissal of the revision petition
by the High Court and the filing of the quashing petition u/s.482
CrPC – As far as the validity of sanction is concerned, the validity of
the sanction can always be examined during the course of the trial
and the problems due to the typographical error as alleged by the
State could have been explained by producing the file at the time
of trial – It is settled that a mere delay in the grant of sanction for
prosecuting a public authority is not a ground to quash a criminal
case – Thus, the reasoning adopted by the High Court for interdicting
the criminal proceedings is contrary to the well-established
principles laid down by this Court. [Paras 10, 14, 15]

Case Law Cited
Krishnan v. Krishnaveni [1997] 1 SCR 511 : (1997) 4 SCC 241;
Renu Kumari v. Sanjay Kumar [2008] 3 SCR 1006 : (2008) 12 SCC
346; State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v.
M.R. Hiremath [2019] 8 SCR 713 : (2019) 7 SCC 515; Dinesh
Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India [2011] 13 SCR 260 :
(2012) 1 SCC 532; Director, Central Bureau of Investigation v.
Ashok Kumar Aswal (2015) 16 SCC 163 – relied on.
State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu [2022] 7 SCR 630 : (2023) 6 SCC
768; State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [2014] 1 SCR 135 : (2014)
11 SCC 709; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3 SCR
259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander
[2012] 7 SCR 988 : (2012) 9 SCC 460; CBI v. Pramila Virendra
Kumar Agarwal (2020) 17 SCC 664 – referred to.

List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

List of Keywords
Disproportionate assets; Discharge application; Change in the facts
and circumstances of the case; Scope of section 482 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Government’s sanction to prosecute
public authority; Validity of sanction; Course of trial.
1176 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1405 of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP No. 5835 of 2017

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Sabarish Subramanian, Poornachandiran R, Vishnu Unnikrishnan,
Danish Saifi.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Dama Seshadri Naidu, Nikhil Kumar Singh, Sr. Advs., Abhishek
Gupta, Praful Shukla.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. This appeal arises out of the final judgment of the High Court of
Madras1, by which criminal proceedings against the respondent
under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 19882 for possessing assets disproportionate to
known sources of income were quashed while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733.
2. Facts: The relevant facts are that the respondent joined government
service as a surveyor in 1980 and was working as Assistant
Director with Nagercoil Local Planning Authority at the relevant
time. Upon receipt of a complaint that the respondent is hoarding
assets disproportionate to known sources of income earned during
check period 01.01.2001 to 31.08.2008, an investigation was
conducted, which revealed that he had, in fact, acquired assets worth

1 Crl. O.P. No. 5835 of 2017 dated 21.04.2017, wherein the High Court has quashed the C.C. No. 30 of
2013.
2 Hereinafter “PC Act”.
3 Hereinafter “Cr.P.C”.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1177

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

Rs. 26,88,057/- disproportionate to his income. An FIR bearing
number 11/AC/2009/CC-III was registered under Sections 13(2) read
with 13(1)(e) of the PC Act on 27.07.2009, and the State government
granted sanction to prosecute the respondent on 08.07.2013. After
investigation, the chargesheet was filed on 23.09.2013.
3. The respondent filed a discharge application under Section 239 of
the Cr.P.C. before the Special Court, Chennai, which came to be
dismissed vide order dated 27.01.2016. While deciding the discharge
application, the Special Court considered the matter in detail and
noted that the prosecution has, in fact, accepted the explanation
regarding: (i) the valuation of the house owned by the respondent
at Poona Nagar and revised the amount from Rs.17,19,541/- to
Rs.10,48,861/- after leaving out the value of the first floor constructed
after the check period; and (ii) value of the asset with respect to
the loan of Rs.3,00,000/- obtained by the respondent’s wife for the
purchase of a car from Kotak Mahindra. Ultimately, the total value
of the disproportionate assets was modified from Rs.43,78,383/- to
Rs. 37,07,703/- and thereafter to Rs. 26,88,057. On the other hand,
the explanation with respect to the non-deduction of the claim of:
i) income earned by the wife through real estate business, ii) gift
said to have been received by the respondent’s daughter from
her grandfather, and iii) income said to have been earned by the
respondent’s son were not interfered with on the basis of a prima
facie finding. The relevant portion of the order of the Special Court
is as follows:
“11…The case is in the stage of framing of charge and
the validity of the said documents viz gift deed, source of
income of Chinnasami to make a gift of Rs.7,80,000/- and
the regarding income of the petitioner’s wife which was
not relied upon by the prosecution cannot be decided at
this stage. It is a settled law that at the stage of framing
of charges the court has got a limited jurisdiction only to
see whether a prima facie case has been made out by
the prosecution against the accused to frame charge.
The appreciation of evidence for the purpose of arriving
at the conclusion whether the prosecution has proved the
case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt would
arise only after all the evidence are brought on record
after trial…though the petitioner counsel contends that
1178 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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income of other family members were not considered by
prosecution, but the prosecution had contended that there
is no document to substantiate the income of petitioner’s
wife and the alleged gift of Rs.7,80,000/- to the petitioner’s
daughter by her Grandfather is an afterthought as the gift
deed is not registered and no source of income for the
said Chinnasami. Hence the validity of the same cannot
be decided at this stage so known source of income at this
stage has to be considered only the sources of income
known to the prosecution and the document viz books of
account not produced and relied upon by the prosecution
cannot be considered and analyzed and the court cannot
conduct a mini trial at the stage of framing of charges.”
4. In view of the above, while dismissing the application for discharge,
the Special Court concluded:
“14…At this stage the court has to consider whether the
prima facie case has been made out against the accused
on the basis of evidence produced by the prosecution
and the court cannot make elaborate enquiry by sifting
and weighing the materials to find out the case against
the accused beyond reasonable doubt which has to be
done only at the time of final hearing. From the documents
produced by the prosecution, the prosecution has facie
establishes that Investigation Officer has considered the
explanation offered by the petitioner under Document No.
70 and the contention of the petitioner is that his wife had
earned Rs.18,51,028/-during the relevant period as a Real
Estate Broker and the gift of Rs. 7 lakhs was given to the
petitioner’s daughter by her Grandfather and whether the
petitioner’s daughter’s grandfather had source of income
to gift Rs. 7,80,000 /- are all can be considered only after
full trial after appreciating the validity of the documents and
statements of the petitioner. At this stage, the documents
produced by the prosecution prima facie establishes there
are materials for framing charges against the accused u/s
13(2) r/w 13 (1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. In
view of the above discussions this petition is dismissed.”
5. The respondent assailed the above findings and dismissal of the
discharge application by filing a revision petition before the High
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1179

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

Court. Having considered various grounds raised by the respondent
and having examined the matter in detail, the High Court came to the
conclusion that the findings of the Special Judge were correct and
that the contentions about the income earned by the respondent’s
wife and daughter cannot be considered at the stage of discharge.
While affirming the findings of the Special Court, the High Court
dismissed the revision petition in the following terms:
“22…But, in my considered view, prime facts, the material
available on record show that before filing the charge
sheet, the investigation agency has duly considered all
the relevant materials including the proof of possession of
properties/income beyond the known sources of income,
and hence, the said submission cannot be countenanced.
23. With regard to the revisional powers of this Court under
Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., as relied on by the learned
counsel for the petitioner/ accused, the Supreme Court
in- extensu dealt with the same in the decision reported
in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander,4 and following the
said decision of the Apex Court, in this case, this Court
finds that all the material records were placed by the
prosecution, and therefore, it is incorrect to state that the
since the said letter, dated 05.01.2009 was not placed, the
trial court ought to have allowed the discharge petition.
24. Hence, in my considered opinion the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused
with regard to the merits of the case, as discussed supra,
are all not the grounds for discharge of the petitioner from
the criminal case. Hence, I do not find any valid ground to
interfere with the impugned order of the trial Court, as this
Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the same
and hence, the impugned order is liable to be confirmed.
25. Accordingly, this Crl.R.C. is dismissed, with liberty
to the petitioner/ accused to put-forth all his contentions
during the course of trial. The trial Court shall complete

4 (2012) 9 SCC 460.
1180 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the trial as early as possible, for which, the petitioner/
accused and the prosecution shall co-operate.”
(emphasis supplied)

6. Within seven months, the respondent filed a petition under Section
482 for quashing the criminal proceedings, virtually on the same
grounds as those taken in the discharge application.
7. It is not in dispute that the Special Court, while dismissing the
discharge application, as well as the High Court while dismissing
the revision petition, arrived at clear findings that there was a prima
facie case, and this conclusion was drawn after examining the
allegations as they stand. The impugned order operates against the
established law that while the bar under section 397(3) of the CrPC
does not curtail the remedy under Section 482, it is trite that inherent
powers must be exercised sparingly. This Court, in Krishnan v.
Krishnaveni,5 has held:
“8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind
conferring the revisional power under Section 397, read with
Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous
supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of
justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to
mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the
High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of
the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High
Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously
when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised
revisional power under Section 397(1)….
10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section
397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant —
cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the
High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers
of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it
may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section
397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code…As stated earlier,
it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless

5 (1997) 4 SCC 241.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1181

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and
protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is
to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see
that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory
of the witness fades out…”
(emphasis supplied)

8. In a later decision in Renu Kumari v. Sanjay Kumar,6 where the
High Court had entertained and allowed a petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. in similar circumstances to quash the proceedings after
a petition for discharge was dismissed by the Magistrate and the
subsequent revision petition was dismissed by the Sessions Judge,
this Court set aside the High Court’s quashing order and held as
follows:
“9. (….) In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab7 this Court
summarised some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the
proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869)
In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may
not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not
ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence

6 (2008) 12 SCC 346.
7 AIR 1960 SC 866.
1182 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable
appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That
is the function of the trial Judge…It would not be proper for
the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in
the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether
a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises
arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be
quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material
before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be
proceeded with…”
(emphasis supplied)

9. In the present case, the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
quashing the criminal proceedings was invoked after the dismissal
of the discharge application and the consequent revision petition. In
State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R.
Hiremath,8 this Court examined a similar situation where the High
Court entertained a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed against
the dismissal of a discharge petition. Setting aside the judgement
of the High Court, this Court held:
“25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the
fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for
discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The
parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction
have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It
is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering
an application for discharge the court must proceed on
the assumption that the material which has been brought
on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the
material in order to determine whether the facts emerging
from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the
existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the
offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan,9 adverting to
the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held:

8 (2019) 7 SCC 515; also see the decision of this Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC
768 where this Court set aside the judgement of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings
clearing setting out the limits of interference with an order passed under Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C for
discharge.
9 (2014) 11 SCC 709.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1183

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

29. … At this stage, probative value of the
materials has to be gone into and the court is
not expected to go deep into the matter and hold
that the materials would not warrant a conviction.
In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the
offence has been committed and not whether
a ground for convicting the accused has been
made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks
that the accused might have committed the
offence on the basis of the materials on record
on its probative value, it can frame the charge;
though for conviction, the court has to come to
the conclusion that the accused has committed
the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial
at this stage.
26. For the above reasons we are of the view that
the appeal would have to be allowed. We accordingly
allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order
of the High Court dated 27-4-2017….We accordingly
maintain the order passed by the learned trial Judge on
5-12-2016 dismissing the discharge application filed by
the respondent.”
10. It is not disputed that in the instant case, the Special Court, as
well as the High Court, while dismissing the petition for discharge,
examined the allegations and arrived at clear findings that there
was a prima facie case against the respondent. The impugned
order revisits the earlier decisions without any statable change in
the facts and circumstances of the case, traverses to the extreme
end of the spectrum, and concludes that: i) the wife of the accused
purchased the properties in the name of the daughter having power
of attorney; ii) that there was no satisfactory evidence of Benami;
iii) even if allowed to prosecute, the chances of conviction were bleak;
or iv) the probability of conviction is low; and v) the statements of
witnesses do not warrant prosecution. It is clear that the High Court
jumped to the probable conclusion of trial by not appreciating the
limited scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Instead of determining “whether
or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”
based on the material, it asked the wrong question as to, “whether
1184 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

that would warrant a conviction”10. We are of the clear opinion that
the High Court has exceeded the well-established principles for
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
11. The next issue before us is regarding the validity of the sanction
granted to prosecute the respondent. Dealing with the same, the
impugned order goes into the merits of the sanction, taking into
account the statement of LW-1 Mr. Thanga Kaliyaperumal, who is
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Government of
Tamil Nadu and is the sanctioning authority. Perusing the statement
of LW-1, the High Court makes a finding regarding the sanction being
invalid and belated in the following terms:
“36. From the above circumstances enumerated under
clauses a, b & c, the following crucial questions are arisen
for the consideration of this Court:
(1) The request made by the Director, Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption, seeking order of sanction dated 15.08.2012
was received by the Government on 20.12.2013 i.e., after
one year four months and five days. What is the reason
for the abnormal delay of one year and above to receive
the report from the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
even though it is dated back to 15.08.2012.
(2) It is revealed that the Governor had accorded sanction
for the prosecution. When such being the case how the
petitioner was authorized to speak about the order of
sanction for the prosecution against the petitioner. Where
is the authorization letter from the Government or from
the Governor?
(3) Who had perused the First Information Report,
statement of witnesses and connected documents and
who had subjective to satisfaction after perusal of the
records to launch prosecution against the petitioner. These
questions are remained unanswered by the prosecution.

10 In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, this Court held:
“32.4…the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We
are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and
discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself
cannot be a ground for discharge.”
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1185

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

37. From the statement of LW-1 Mr. Thanga Kaliyaperumal
it revealed that the Governor vide Government Order
in G.O. Ms. No. 178, Housing and Urban Development
(UD2(1)) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu had
accorded sanction for the prosecution on 08.07.2013. The
requisition of the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
in RC306/09/RDP/CC-III was made on 15.08.2012: But the
requisition was received by the Government on 20.12.2013.
When the request of the Director, Vigilance and Anti-
Corruption dated 15.08.2012 was received on 20.12.2013,
how the Governor could have accorded sanction for the
prosecution on 08.07.2013 i.e., with anti-date. This serious
defect or lacuna has not been explained by the prosecution.
***
39. Insofar as this Court is concerned the above narrated
circumstances leave scope to suspect the order of sanction.
This Court also is of view that the order of sanction
might have been passed without application of mind,
mechanically at the behest of higher officials.
***
43. On coming to the given case on hand, as a matter of
fact, at no stage the grievance of the petitioner regarding
delay in granting sanction has been disputed by the
respondent State. Not only that, but no justification has
even been put forward explaining the delay in prosecution.
***
45. It is also to be noted here that the delay in granting
order of sanction itself is fatal to criminal investigation
as well as to the trial. It gets worse if it can be attributed
to lethargic and investigation lackadaisical manner of
investigation.
(emphasis supplied)

12. Learned counsel for the State submits that the conclusions drawn
by the High Court about the impossibility of granting sanction on
08.07.2013 when the government received the request only on
20.12.2013, was not raised at any point of time, neither in the
1186 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

discharge application before the Special Judge nor before the High
Court in revision petition. He further submits that the argument is
not even mentioned in the quashing petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C. filed before the High Court. He also submits that this question
was not put to LW-1, whose statement is the sheet anchor for the
High Court to question the validity of the sanction. The State also
explained the actual position in the Special Leave Petition. It is
explained that the misconception about the dates arose because of
a typographical mistake of mentioning the letter requesting sanction
as 20.12.2013, instead of the correct date being 20.02.2013. This
is typically the problem that would arise when the High Court seeks
to interdict proceedings and quash the criminal case before the
relevant material to support the case of the prosecution is brought
on record.11 Findings regarding the legality, validity, or delay in grant
of sanction were premature. Validity of the sanction is an issue that
must be examined during the course of the trial. In Dinesh Kumar v.
Chairman, Airport Authority of India,12 this principle is reiterated
as follows:
“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction
order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-
availability of material before the sanctioning authority or
bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction
having been passed by an authority not authorised or
competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds
are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds
of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same
category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account
of non-application of mind—a category carved out by this

11 See, generally, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335:
“103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the
court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice”
Further, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, this Court held:
“27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed
for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or
quashing of charge”.
12 (2012) 1 SCC 532; followed in CBI v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal, (2020) 17 SCC 664.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1187

State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and
Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department v. G. Easwaran

Court in Parkash Singh Badal,13 the challenge to which
can always be raised in the course of trial.”
(emphasis supplied)

13. Similar view was taken in Director, Central Bureau of Investigation v.
Ashok Kumar Aswal14, where it was held that:
“15. All the above apart, time and again, this Court has
laid down that the validity of a sanction order, if one exists,
has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice to
the accused which is essentially a question of fact and,
therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of
the trial and not in the exercise of jurisdiction either under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in
a proceeding under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)

14. Thus, there is no doubt that the High Court committed an error in
quashing the prosecution on the ground that the sanction to prosecute
is illegal and invalid. In conclusion, we find that the objections raised
in the revision petition against the Special Court’s order dismissing
the discharge application were identical to the grounds raised in the
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., from which the present appeal
arises. Second, apart from being congruent and overlapping, the
respondent could not demonstrate any material change in facts
and circumstances between the dismissal of the revision petition
by the High Court and the filing of the quashing petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. Third, the validity of the sanction can always
be examined during the course of the trial and the problems due
to the typographical error as alleged by the State could have been
explained by producing the file at the time of trial. Fourth, it is settled
that a mere delay in the grant of sanction for prosecuting a public
authority is not a ground to quash a criminal case.
15. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the reasoning
adopted by the High Court for interdicting the criminal proceedings

13 (2007) 1 SCC 1.
14 (2015) 16 SCC 163.
1188 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

is contrary to the well-established principles laid down by this Court.
We, therefore, set aside the judgment while reiterating the correct
position of law.
16. The appeal is allowed accordingly. In view of the aforesaid, we restore
C.C. No. 30/2013 to the record of the Court of the Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Chennai, for the continuation
of the trial from the stage the trial was interdicted. Since the matter
pertains to the check period 2001-2008, we request the Trial Court
to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan