STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALOREversusB.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR.

                        [2019] 14 S.C.R. 513                             513


     STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE                            A
                                  v.
                  B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1837 of 2019)
                       DECEMBER 05, 2019                                 B
      [UDAY UMESH LALIT, INDU MALHOTRA AND
                    KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: s.19 – Requirement of
sanction – Held: Sanction to prosecute public servant is not required    C
if the public servant has already retired on the date of cognizance
of the court – Thus, protection under s.19 is not available to public
servant after he demitted his office or retired from service – Public
servant.
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.197 – Protection under        D
s.197 is available to the public servants when an offence is said to
have been committed ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge
of their official duty’, but where the acts are performed using the
office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains, such acts are not protected
– Issue whether the alleged act is intricately connected with the
discharge of official functions and whether the matter would come        E
within the expression ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge
of their official duty’, would get crystalized only after evidence is
led and the issue of sanction can be agitated at a later stage as well
– Public servant.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                     F

       HELD: It was held in Labh Singh case that sanction to
prosecute the public servant for the offences under the PC Act is
not required if the public servant had already retired on the date
of cognizance by the court. In view of the said judgment, there
was no occasion or reason to entertain any application seeking           G
discharge in respect of offences punishable under the Act, on the
ground of absence of any sanction under Section 19 of the Act.
The High Court was also not justified in observing
‘that the protection available to a public servant while in service,
should also be available after his retirement’. Again, it has            H
                                 513
514            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     consistently been laid down that the protection under Section
      197 of the Code is available to the public servants when an offence
      is said to have been committed ‘while acting or purporting to act
      in discharge of their official duty’, but where the acts are performed
      using the office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains, such acts are
      not protected. It has also been observed by this Court that, at
B
      times, the issue whether the alleged act is intricately connected
      with the discharge of official functions and whether the matter
      would come within the expression ‘while acting or purporting to
      act in discharge of their official duty’, would get crystalized only
      after evidence is led and the issue of sanction can be agitated at
C     a later stage as well. [Paras 9-12][523-C, F-G; 524-A; 525-E-F]
            State of Punjab v. Labh Singh (2014) 16 SCC 807 :
            [2014] 11 SCR 312; S.A. Venkataraman v. The State
            [1958] SCR 1037; Inspector of Police and another v.
            Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another (2015)13
D           SCC 87 : [2015] 4 SCR 609; P.K. Pradhan v. State of
            Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau of
            Investigation (2001) 6 SCC 704 : [2001] 3 SCR 1119
            – relied on
            Rishipal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another
E           (2014) 7 SCC 215 : [2014] 6 SCR 1012; Anil Kumar
            Bose v. State of Bihar (1974) 4 SCC 616 : [1974] 3
            SCR 902 – distinguished.
            N.K. Ganguly v. CBI, New Delhi (2016) 2 SCC 143 :
            [2015] 10 SCR 192; Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of
F           Orissa AIR 1998 SC 2595 : [1998] 3 SCR 961;
            R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala (1996) 1 SCC
            478 : [1995] 6 Suppl SCR 236 – referred to
                             Case Law Reference
      [1998] 3 SCR 961                referred to             Para 6
G
      [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 236         referred to             Para 6
      [2014] 11 SCR 312               relied on               Para 6
      [2015] 10 SCR 192               referred to             Para 6

H
        STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                       515
                 B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR.

[1958] SCR 1037                        relied on         Para 9           A
[2015] 4 SCR 609                       relied on         Para 11
[2001] 3 SCR 1119                      relied on         Para 12
[2014] 6 SCR 1012                      distinguished     Para 14
[1974] 3 SCR 902                       distinguished     Para 14          B

[1974] 3 SCR 902                       distinguished     Para 14
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1837 of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2018 of the High            C
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Revision Petition No. 834
of 2015.
     Ms. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Vivek Narayan Sharma, Sachin
Sharma, Sushil Dubey, Ms. Divya Nair, Anuj Aggarwal, Puneet Pathak,
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.                             D

     Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rajani K. Prasad,
Ms. N. Annapoorani, Advs. for the Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.                                            E
          1. Leave granted.
      2. This Appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 08.08.2018
passed by the High Court1 allowing Criminal Revision Petition No.834
of 2015 preferred by the Respondent No. 1; and thereby discharging the
                                                                          F
Respondent No.1 of the offences punishable under Sections 419, 420,
467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(‘IPC’, for short) and Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’, for short).
      3. The Respondent No. 1 retired on 31.10.2012 as Assistant
                                                                          G
General Manager, Vijaya Bank. On 28.10.2013, FIR being RC 12(A)/
2013 was registered pursuant to complaint given by the General Manager,
Vijaya Bank, Head Office, Bangalore against the Respondent No.1 in
respect of the offences mentioned hereinabove. After completion of
1
    The High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore                              H
516            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 31.10.2014 against the
      Respondent No.1 and other accused in respect of said offences. It was
      alleged inter alia :-
            “3. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) while working as Assistant
            General Manager (AGM) and Branch Head, Vijaya Bank, Mayo
B           Hall Branch, Bangalore during the period from 11.01.2010 to
            20.10.2012 entered into a criminal conspiracy with Shri
            B.Lakshman (A-3), Smt. Shanta Gowda (A-4) and Shri S.V. Isloor
            (A-5) to cheat and defraud Vijaya Bank, Mayohall Branch,
            Bangalore and to extend undue financial accommodation to
            M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2) on the basis
C           of fake and fabricated documents and in furtherance of the said
            criminal conspiracy, Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) sanctioned and
            disbursed Rs.200 lakhs of Term Loan and Rs.100 lakhs of Cash
            Credit Hypothecation (Working Capital) in favour of M/s. Nikhara
            Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2) without proper due diligence
            and in gross violation of all extant rules and regulations of Vijaya
D
            Bank, and hence, facilitated A-3 and A-4 to divert the loan-funds
            against the terms and conditions, thereby causing wrongful loss to
            Vijaya Bank and corresponding gains to others.
                               …        …       …
E           8. That Shri B. Lakshnian (A-3) and his wife Smt. Shanta Gowda
            (A-4) fraudulently created an agreement dated 10.06.2011 on the
            photocopy of e-stamp paper having franking No.57724 dated
            08.06.2011 and submitted a copy of the same to Vijaya Bank to
            support their dishonest claim of taking over M/s. Nikhara
            Electronics & Allied Technics, proprietary concern by making a
F           payment of Rs.1.00 Crore as goodwill to Shri Venkataramana
            Bhat (A-6). Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) dishonestly accepted the
            photocopy of the agreement intentionally omitting to ascertain its
            genuineness or authenticity. It is revealed that the above agreement
            was fraudulently created on the photocopy of e-stamp paper
            franked vide 57724 dated 08.06.2011 and the original stamp paper
G
            remained blank was seized from the office premises of Shri S.V.
            Isloor (A-5). It is thus established the fraudulent intentions of all
            the accused persons to create forged documents as and when
            required and to misrepresent that the proprietary unit was taken
            over by A-3 and A-4 from A-6.
H                              …        …       …
 STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                              517
B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

  16. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) in furtherance of criminal          A
  conspiracy with the other accused dishonestly, by abusing his
  official position as AGM & Branch Head of Vijaya Bank, Mayohall
  Branch fraudulently considered the loan application, processed
  loan proposals in gross violation of the rules and regulations of
  Vijaya Bank in this regard in order to favour the accused persons.
  He intentionally accepted the inflated financial statements             B
  submitted by A-3 and A-4 even though they were not audited and
  considered them for working out the credit assessment of the
  borrower firm i.e., M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics
  (A-2). He purposely did not exercise due diligence to analyse the
  financial statements submitted by the borrower firm which               C
  contained several inconsistencies. He also did not conduct the
  mandatory pre-sanction verification at the address of the borrower
  firm to ascertain whether any business activities such as
  manufacturing of electric equipment etc., were going on as claimed
  in the loan application. The criminal acts of Shri B.A. Srinivasan
  (A-1) facilitated the accused private persons to misrepresent the       D
  existence of M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2),
  which actually existed only on the forged partnership deed dated
  10.06.2011, created by A-3 and A-4.
  17. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) prepared the Credit Process
  Note himself and obtained the signatures of Shri Jyoti Prakash          E
  Shetty, the then Asst. Manager in the column of appraising official.
  Shri Nabeel Ahmed, the then Probationary Manager was also
  made to put his initials in the process note, merely as a token of
  his training. It is revealed that A-1 prepared the proposals for an
  aggregate amount of Rs.300 lakh (term loan of Rs.200 lakhs and
  cash credit of Rs.100 lakhs) as against the request for Rs.350          F
  lakhs (term Loan of Rs.200 lakhs; working capital of Rs.130 lakhs
  and Bank Guarantee of Rs.20 lakhs) without there being any
  clarification/justification for such reduction in the requirements of
  the applicant.
  18. That Shri B. Lakshman (A-3) fraudulently submitted a forged         G
  Letter No. REFREF: SP: QT: 155: 2011 dated 10.08.2011
  purportedly signed as JAK, Partners, M/s. V-Tech Engineering
  Enterprises along with Quotations/Proforma Invoices for an
  aggregate amount of Rs.2,69,60,496/- which were purportedly
  issued by M/s.V-Tech Engineering Enterprises.
                                                                          H
                     …        …       …
518      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     33. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) was also fully aware that
      property offered as collateral security was in occupation of third
      parties (tenants). However, A-1 dishonestly and fraudulently chose
      to ignore this important fact, in spite of his field inspection and
      also the observations made by the valuer in his Valuation Report.
      Concurrent Auditor of the Bank also pointed out this fact in her
B
      report adding that the tenants in occupation of collateral security
      would adversely affect the interests of the bank, in the event of
      necessity, to enforce sale of the property to recover its dues. It is
      also revealed that tenants were paying rents to Shri Nagesh s/o
      late Krishnappa, who sold the property to Shri Nilakanth Sanikop,
C     from whom A-3 purchased the property. A-1 intentionally omitted
      to make any endeavour to ascertain the nature of rights of the
      tenants, despite the fact that in future it would affect the
      enforceability of the mortgaged property by the bank.
      34. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) also violated the extant rules
D     of the bank by not obtaining the Legal Audit Report, on the
      mortgaged property, prior to processing and sanctioning of loans
      to M/s. Nikhara Electronics and Allied Tekchnics. Shri B.A.
      Srinivasan (A-1) obtained this report only on 19.04.2012, more
      than six months after the loan was sanctioned and disbursed.
E     35. By the above said acts, Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1), the then
      AGM, Vijaya Bank, Mayo Hall Branch, Bangalore; M/s. Nikhara
      Electronics and Allied Technics (A-2); Shri B. Lakshman @
      Lakshman Reddy (A-3); Smt. Shanta Gowda (A-4); Shri S.V.Isloor
      (A-5) and Shri Venkataramana Bhat (A-6) committed the offences
      of cheating and personating as proprietor, M/s. V-Tech
F     Engineering Enterprises, committed forgery of documents such
      as Quotations, Cash/Credit Bills, vouchers etc. for the purpose of
      cheating, using the forged documents as genuine in pursuance of
      the criminal conspiracy among themselves, thereby causing
      wrongful loss to the bank and corresponding gains to themselves
G     and others. Investigation also establishes that Shri B.A. Srinivasan
      (A-1) committed the offence of criminal misconduct by gross abuse
      of his official position as the then AGM of Vijaya Bank, Mayo
      Hall Branch, Bangalore, and caused accrual of pecuniary
      advantage to the accused private persons, attracting the penal
      provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. That, the
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    STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                             519
   B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

      above acts of Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1), M/s. Nikhara Electronics    A
      and Allied Technics (A-2), Shri B. Lakshman (A-3), Smt. Shanta
      Gowda (A-4), Shri Shripad Vishwanath Isloor (A-5) and Shri
      Venkataramana Bhat (A-6) constitute offences punishable u/s 120-
      B r/w 420, 419, 468 & 471 IPC and 13(2) r/2 13(1)(d) of the
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
                                                                            B
      36. That Shri B.A. Srinivasan (A-1) is retired from the services
      of Vijaya Bank on 31.10.2012; hence sanction for prosecution
      u/s 19 of the PC Act, is not required.”
       4. After the cognizance was taken by the concerned court, an
application was moved by the Respondent No.1 seeking discharge in           C
terms of Sections 227 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(‘the Code’, for short). This application was rejected by the Additional
City Civil and Sessions Judge and Principal Special Judge for CBI cases,
Bangalore, vide order dated 13.04.2015. It was observed:-
      “…As can be seen from the charge sheet and statement of               D
      witnesses, accused No.1 has deliberately violated the rules and
      regulations and bank norms of the bank while processing the loan
      application of accused No.2 firm and thereby he had entered into
      criminal conspiracy with accused Nos.3 to 6 and accepted the
      fabricated and forged vouchers, invoices inflated financial
      statements in order to facilitate accused Nos.3 and 4 to avail the    E
      term loan of Rs. Two Crores cash credit and Rs. One Crore.
      The said term loan and cash credit of Rs.Three Crores were
      misutilised for the purpose other than for which the loan was
      sanctioned. Thus, all materials clearly go to show that there was
      dishonest intention on the part of the accused No.1 from the          F
      inception itself. The said circumstances and materials collected
      by the Investigating Officer clearly reveal that accused No.1 had
      entered into criminal conspiracy with accused Nos. 3 to 6 and he
      had accepted the forged, fabricated invoices and inflated financial
      statement knowingly fully well that they were forged. …
                                                                            G
                        …         …      …
      Though accused No.1 was public servant, it is alleged that he has
      retired from the service from Vijaya Bank on 31.10.2013.
      Therefore, sanction as required u/s 19 of PC Act, 1988 to prosecute
      accused No.1 is not required. The discharge application filed by
                                                                            H
520            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A           accused No.1 is devoid of merits and on the contrary, there are
            sufficient materials against accused No.1 for framing charge for
            the offences punishable u/s 120B, 420, 471 IPC and u/s. 13(2)
            r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988….”
             5. The Respondent No.1, being aggrieved, preferred Criminal
B     Revision Petition No. 834 of 2015 in the High Court, which was allowed
      by the judgment and order presently under appeal. The High Court, thus
      set aside the order dated 13.04.2015 as regards the Respondent No.1
      and discharged him of the offences with which he was sought to be
      charged.

C           6. While dealing with the submission that the allegations against
      the Respondent No.1 could, at best, be administrative lapses, the High
      Court observed:-
            “10… …These aspects of administrative lapses, it is to be stated,
            cannot be considered at the time of framing charge. Unless the
            witnesses are subjected to cross-examination, no finding can be
D           given whether the omission in following the procedure amounts to
            administrative lapse or was deliberate. Therefore, this point of
            argument cannot be a ground for discharging accused No.1.
            Therefore, given a conclusion, it can be opined that the materials
            on record are sufficient to frame a charge against accused no.1,
E           the findings of the Special Court in this regard do not indicate
            non-application of mind or, any infirmity or illegality in coming to
            an opinion that accused no.1 cannot be discharged on this ground.
            This finding needs to be sustained.
            On the issue of sanction, the High Court, however, stated:-
F           “11. However, another finding regarding sanction cannot be
            sustained. The special court has held that the sanction is not
            necessary as accused no.1 has retired by the time charge-sheet
            was filed. But the argument of petitioner’s counsel is that sanction
            in accordance with Section 197 CrPC is necessary. Before
            adverting to this point, I think it necessary to opine that the offences
G           triable by Special Judge related to time when an accused was in
            service as a public servant. Sanction under Section 19 of
            Prevention of Corruption Act is necessary to see that a public
            servant is not entangled in a frivolous and false case. Sanction
            insulates a public servant from a false or vexatious or frivolous
H           prosecution. Therefore, a protection available to a public servant
     STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                               521
    B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

       while in service should also be available after his retirement. It      A
       cannot be forgotten that even after retirement, he is prosecuted
       for offences under prevention of Corruption Act. Indeed, the
       retirement removes one from the garb of a public servant; but
       justice requires that same protection should be available even after
       one’s retirement. …”
                                                                               B
                                                        (underlined by us)
       Thereafter, while dealing with submissions based on the decisions
of this Court in Kalicharan Mahapatra vs. State of Orissa2, R.
Balakrishna Pillai vs. State of Kerala3, State of Punjab vs. Labh
Singh 4 and N.K. Ganguly vs. CBI, New Delhi5, thematter was                    C
considered as under:-
       “The learned standing counsel for CBI submitted insofar as
       offences under Indian Penal Code are concerned, they cannot be
       said to have been committed in discharge of official duty; sanction
       therefore is not necessary even under Section 197 CrPC. If the
       allegations levelled against the first accused are seen, and            D
       particularly with reference to conspiracy, it is to be stated at the
       stage of framing charge, it is difficult to discern whether offences
       can be connected to official capacity or not. Thorough trial requires
       to be held. If facts in N.K. Ganguly (supra) are seen, there also
       the accused were sought to be prosecuted for the offences under         E
       Prevention of Corruption Act in addition to some of the offences
       under Indian Penal Code. Thus seen, the first accused should get
       the benefit of discharge for absence of sanction under Section
       197 of CrPC. …”
      Thus, it was concluded that the material on record was sufficient
                                                                               F
to frame a charge against Respondent No.1. The benefit of discharge
was however granted on the issue of absence of sanction under Section
197 of the Code.
      7. In this appeal challenging the view taken by the High Court, we
heard Mrs. Sonia Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, in support of the
appeal and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate for the Respondent          G
No.1.
2
  AIR 1998 SC 2595
3
  (1996) 1 SCC 478
4
  (2014) 16 SCC 807
5
  (2016) 2 SCC 143                                                             H
522               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A            8. Mrs. Sonia Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that
      the protection under Section 19 of the Act is available to a public servant
      only till he is in the employment and no sanction is necessary after the
      public servant has demitted office or has retired from service. As regards
      sanction under Section 197 of the Code, it was submitted that for an
      action to come within the purview of Section 197 of the Code, it must be
B
      integrally connected with the official duties or functions of a public servant
      and that if the office was merely used as a cloak to indulge in activities
      which result in unlawful gain to the beneficiaries, the protection under
      said Section 197 would not be available.
            It was also submitted that the decision of this Court in N.K.
C     Ganguly vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi5 was in the
      context of the peculiar facts involved therein.
              On the other hand, Mrs. V. Mohana, learned Senior Advocate,
      submitted that the Respondent No. 1 retired in the year 2012; that the
      allegations levelled against him would, at best, amount to administrative
D     lapses on his part and there was certainly no criminal intent so as to
      attract the charges under the relevant sections; and that this Court may
      not in its jurisdiction under Article 136(1) of the Constitution interfere in
      the matter.
             9. In S.A. Venkataraman vs. The State6 while dealing with the
E     requirement of sanction under the pari materia provisions of the
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, it was laid down that the protection
      under the concerned provisions would not be available to a public servant
      after he had demitted his office or retired from service. It was stated:-
               “… …if an offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code was
F              committed by a public servant, but, at the time a court was asked
               to take cognizance of the offence, that person had ceased to be a
               public servant one of the two requirements to make s. 6 of the
               Act applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would be
               unnecessary. The words in s. 6(1) of the Act are clear enough
G              and they must be given effect to. There is nothing in the words
               used in s. 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction
               was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the
               offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased
               to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take
      6
H         [1958] SCR 1037
       STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                              523
      B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

         cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time the         A
         offence was committed. … …”
      The law so declared by this Court has consistently been followed.
For example, in Labh Singh4 it was observed:-
         “9. In the present case the public servants in question had retired
         on 13-12-1999 and 30-4-2000. The sanction to prosecute them            B
         was rejected subsequent to their retirement i.e. first on 13-9-2000
         and later on 24-9-2003. The public servants having retired from
         service there was no occasion to consider grant of sanction under
         Section 19 of the PC Act. The law on the point is quite clear that
         sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offences under        C
         the PC Act is not required if the public servant had already retired
         on the date of cognizance by the court. In S.A. Venkataraman v.
         State6 while construing Section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption
         Act, 1947 which provision is in pari materia with Section 19(1) of
         the PC Act, this Court held that no sanction was necessary in the
         case of a person who had ceased to be the public servant at the        D
         time the court was asked to take cognizance. The view taken in
         S.A. Venkataraman6 was adopted by this Court in C.R. Bansi v.
         State of Maharashtra7 and in Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State
         of Orissa 2 and by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
         K. Veeraswami v. Union of India 8. The High Court was not              E
         therefore justified in setting aside the order passed by the Special
         Judge insofar as charge under the PC Act was concerned.”
      10. Consequently, there was no occasion or reason to entertain
any application seeking discharge in respect of offences punishable under
the Act, on the ground of absence of any sanction under Section 19 of           F
the Act. The High Court was also not justified in observing ‘that the
protection available to a public servant while in service, should
also be available after his retirement’. That statement is completely
inconsistent with the law laid down by this Court in connection with
requirement of sanction under Section 19 of the Act.
                                                                                G
      11. Again, it has consistently been laid down that the protection
under Section 197 of the Code is available to the public servants when
an offence is said to have been committed ‘while acting or purporting
7
    (1970) 3 SCC 537
8
    (1991) 3 SCC 655                                                            H
524             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     to act in discharge of their official duty’, butwhere the acts are
      performed using the office as a mere cloak for unlawful gains, such
      acts are not protected. The statements of law in some of the earlier
      decisions were culled out by this Court in Inspector of Police and
      another vs. Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another9 as under:-
B            “7. No doubt, while the respondents indulged in the alleged criminal
             conduct, they had been working as public servants. The question
             is not whether they were in service or on duty or not but whether
             the alleged offences have been committed by them “while acting
             or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty”. That question
             is no more res integra. In Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of
C            U.P.10, at para 5, this Court held that: (SCC p. 328)
             “5. The question is when the public servant is alleged to have
             committed the offence of fabrication of record or misappropriation
             of public fund, etc. can he be said to have acted in discharge of
             his official duties. It is not the official duty of the public servant to
D            fabricate the false records and misappropriate the public funds,
             etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. The
             official capacity only enables him to fabricate the record or
             misappropriate the public fund, etc. It does not mean that it is
             integrally connected or inseparably interlinked with the crime
E            committed in the course of the same transaction, as was believed
             by the learned Judge. Under these circumstances, we are of the
             opinion that the view expressed by the High Court as well as by
             the trial court on the question of sanction is clearly illegal and
             cannot be sustained.”

F           8. In Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab11, at para 20 this
      Court held that: (SCC pp. 22-23)
             “20. The principle of immunity protects all acts which the public
             servant has to perform in the exercise of the functions of the
             Government. The purpose for which they are performed protects
G            these acts from criminal prosecution. However, there is an
             exception. Where a criminal act is performed under the colour of
             authority but which in reality is for the public servant’s own pleasure

      9
        (2015)13 SCC 87
      10
         (1997) 5 SCC 326
H     11
         (2007) 1 SCC 1
        STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                                525
       B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

          or benefit then such acts shall not be protected under the doctrine      A
          of State immunity.”
      and thereafter, at para 38, it was further held that: (Parkash Singh
Badal case11, SCC p. 32)
          “38. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section
          197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the       B
          complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This
          question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question
          whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined
          from stage to stage.”
      9. In a recent decision in Rajib Ranjan v. R. Vijaykumar12 at                C
para 18, this Court has taken the view that: (SCC p. 521)
          “18. … even while discharging his official duties, if a public
          servant enters into a criminal conspiracy or indulges in
          criminal misconduct, such misdemeanour on his part is not to
          be treated as an act in discharge of his official duties and,            D
          therefore, provisions of Section 197 of the Code will not be
          attracted.”
                                                 (emphasis already supplied)
       12. It has also been observed by this Court that, at times, the issue
                                                                                   E
whether the alleged act is intricately connected with the discharge of
official functions and whether the matter would come within the
expression ‘while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their
official duty’, would get crystalized only after evidence is led and the
issue of sanction can be agitated at a later stage as well. In P.K. Pradhan
vs. State of Sikkim represented by the Central Bureau of                           F
Investigation13, this Court stated:-
          “15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it will be
          clear that for claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code,
          it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonable
          connection between the act complained of and the discharge of            G
          official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of
          official duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection
          under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained
12
     (2015) 1 SCC 513
13
     (2001) 6 SCC 704                                                              H
526            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A           of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the
            discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection
            between them and the performance of those duties, the official
            status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then
            no sanction would be required. If the case as put forward by the
            prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported
B
            to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be
            dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section
            197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance;
            maybe immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even
            at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But
C           there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide
            the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence
            to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In
            order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused
            that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his
            duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful,
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            can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity
            to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question
            of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment
            which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.”
                                                             (underlined by us)
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             13. The offences involved in the case of N.K. Ganguly5 were
      under Section 120-B IPC read with Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the
      Act i.e. relating to conspiracy to commit offences punishable under the
      provisions of the Act. Secondly, the conclusion was drawn in the context
      of the facts available therein which is evident from the following: -
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            “35. From a perusal of the case law referred to supra, it becomes
            clear that for the purpose of obtaining previous sanction from the
            appropriate Government under Section 197 CrPC, it is imperative
            that the alleged offence is committed in discharge of official duty
            by the accused. It is also important for the Court to examine the
G           allegations contained in the final report against the appellants, to
            decide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained by
            the respondent from the appropriate Government before taking
            cognizance of the alleged offence by the learned Special Judge
            against the accused. In the instant case, since the allegations made
H           against the appellants in the final report filed by the respondent
        STATION HOUSE OFFICER, CBI/ACB/BANGALORE v.                                  527
       B.A. SRINIVASAN AND ANR. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

          that the alleged offences were committed by them in discharge of           A
          their official duty, therefore, it was essential for the learned Special
          Judge to correctly decide as to whether the previous sanction
          from the Central Government under Section 197 CrPC was
          required to be taken by the respondent, before taking cognizance
          and passing an order issuing summons to the appellants for their
                                                                                     B
          presence.”
                                                             (underlined by us)
      14. We now turn to the cases relied upon by Mrs. V. Mohana,
learned Senior Advocate. In Rishipal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another14 this Court observed:-                                                  C
          “13. What emerges from the above judgments is that when a
          prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to
          be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted
          allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the case.
          The courts have to see whether the continuation of the complaint           D
          amounts to abuse of process of law and whether continuation of
          the criminal proceeding results in miscarriage of justice or when
          the court comes to a conclusion that quashing these proceedings
          would otherwise serve the ends of justice, then the court can
          exercise the power under Section 482 CrPC. While exercising
          the power under the provision, the courts have to only look at the         E
          uncontroverted allegation in the complaint whether prima facie
          discloses an offence or not, but it should not convert itself to that
          of a trial court and dwell into the disputed questions of fact.”
       This decision thus dealt with the parameters which ought to be
considered while entertaining an application under Section 482 of the                F
Code and is not a decision directly on the point. The decision in Anil
Kumar Bose vs. State of Bihar15 pertained to a case which had arisen
after a full fledged trial, where, as regards offence punishable under
Section 420/34 IPC, it was observed that the essential ingredient being
mens rea, mere failure on part of the concerned employees to perform                 G
their duties or to observe the rules/procedure may be administrative lapses
but could not be said to be enough to attract the penal provisions under
Section 420 IPC. The matter was considered after the facts had
14
     (2014) 7 SCC 215
15
     (1974) 4 SCC 616                                                                H
528              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     crystalized in the form of evidence before the court and as such, this
      decision is of no relevance for the present purposes.
             15. Having considered the matter in entirety, in our view, the High
      Court clearly erred in allowing Criminal Revision Petition and accepting
      the challenge raised by the Respondent No.1 on the issue of sanction.
B     We, thus, allow this Appeal, set aside the view taken by the High Court,
      restore the order passed by the Trial Court and dismiss the application
      seeking discharge preferred by the Respondent No.1.
             16. It is made clear that we have adverted to the facts and the
      allegations only for the purpose of considering the basic issue pertaining
C     to issue of sanction and we shall not be taken to have expressed any
      view on merits which shall be considered independently. It has been
      stated by the learned counsel that the matter is listed before the Special
      Court on 11.12.2019. The Respondent No.1 shall appear before the
      Special Court on that day and the matter shall, thereafter, be proceeded
      in accordance with law.
D
             17. This Appeal is allowed in aforestated terms.


      Devika Gujral                                               Appeal allowed.


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