STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.versusJAGGU & ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 727
- Decided
- 5 July 2019
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- A M KHANWILKAR
Holding
The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of proof by the contract labourers that they performed the same or similar work as regular employees, they are not entitled to the regular employees' wage rates, and the order of the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act is set aside.
Summary
The case concerned 2,040 contract labourers employed in SAIL's captive limestone mine who, after a 1993 prohibition on contract labour under the CLRA Act, continued to work and claimed parity of wages with regular SAIL employees under the NJCS memorandum. The respondents sought relief under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, asserting that they performed the same or similar work as regular staff. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving the sameness of work rested on the respondents; since they failed to discharge this burden, they could not claim the higher wages of regular employees. The Court further clarified that the Minimum Wages Act is limited to fixing minimum rates and does not enforce equal‑pay claims, and that the CLRA Act and its rules were inapplicable after the prohibition notification. Consequently, the order of the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act and the High Court judgment were set aside. The appeal by SAIL was allowed and the employees' appeal dismissed.
Issues considered
- The contract labourers' entitlement to wages of regular employees under the NJCS memorandum after the CLRA prohibition notification
- Whether the burden of proving same or similar work lies on the contract labour respondents
- Whether Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 can be used to claim equal‑pay for equal work
- The applicability of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and its Rules after the prohibition notification
- The validity of the order of the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948
- The scope of the Minimum Wages Act with respect to enforcement of wage payment versus fixing minimum rates
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 14, s. Article 39(d)
- Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970s. 10(1), s. 12, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9
- Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971s. Rule 25(2)(iv), s. Rule 25(2)(v)
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
- Minimum Wages Act, 1948s. 20(1), s. 2(e), s. 2(i), s. 3, s. 7, s. 8
- Payment of Wages Act, 1936
Subjects
Judgment
[2019] 9 S.C.R. 65 65
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. A
v.
JAGGU & ORS. ETC.
(Civil Appeal No. 8094 of 2011)
JULY 05, 2019 B
[A.M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – ss.2(e), 2(i), 3, 7, 8 and 20(1) –
Scheme of the Act – Tripartite memorandum of settlement signed by
the appellant, contractor (through whom the service of the contract
C
labour was engaged) and the respondents-contract labour, under
which the contract labour was to be paid Rs.11.65/- per day over
and above the minimum wages notified by the appropriate
Government under the 1948 Act – Prohibition notification dated
17th March, 1993 issued by the appropriate Government, however,
contract labour engaged prior to the notification was allowed to D
continue working in the captive mine of the appellant in Distt.
Jabalpur upto April 1996, when their service was terminated after
they proceeded on strike – No fresh agreement in the interregnum
period (17th March, 1993 to April, 1996) was executed – Contract
labour sought parity with the wages payable to the direct/regular
E
employees of the appellant – Allowed by the Prescribed Authority –
Confirmed by the High Court – Held: There are no pleadings on
record and the burden was on the respondents to establish that the
duties discharged by each of the employee was same/similar to that
of regular/direct employee appointed by the appellant – In absence
of the initial burden being discharged by the respondents, the onus F
could not have been shifted on the appellant to counter the nature
of work discharged by each of the workmen – Scheme of the Act
clearly manifests that it is primarily concerned with fixing rates of
minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment of work on a day
of rest and is not intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment
G
of wages for which provision has been made in other laws such as
the 1936 Act and the 1947 Act– Further, after issuance of the
prohibition notification, the provisions of the CLRA Act or 1971
Rules framed thereunder would not be available to either of the
party to strengthen its claim – Minimum wages as prayed by the
H
65
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A respondents could be claimed independently under the 1948 Act,
which indisputedly was Rs. 11.65/- per day over the minimum wages
payable to each of the respondent (2040 employees) and was indeed
complied with by the appellants – Mere assertion of fact that the
contract labour which was allowed to continue after the prohibition
notification was performing same or similar kind of work is not
B
sufficient to endorse their entitlement of claiming wages notified
for direct/regular employees of the establishment applicable
universally to all the steel industries – Order of the prescribed
authority, confirmed by the High Court, set aside – Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – ss.7-9, 10(1), 12– Payment
C of Wages Act,1936 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – CLRA Central
Rules, 1971 – rr.25(2)(iv) & (v), 25(2)(v)(a) – Constitution of India
– Arts. 12,14, 39(d) – Principle of equal pay for equal work.
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – s.3 – Fixation of minimum wages
under – Considerations for – Discussed.
D Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – Enquiry under – Scope of –
Discussed.
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – ss.7-
9, 10(1), 12 – Held: 1970 Act is a complete code in itself and regulate
the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and
E provide for its abolition in certain circumstances and for matters
connected therewith – Act does not provide for total abolition of
the contract labour, but only for its abolition in certain
circumstances, and to regulate the employment of contract labour
in the establishments registered u/s.7 and working through the
F contractors holding licence u/s.12.
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules,
1971 – r.25 – When not applicable – Discussed.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 There are no pleadings on record and primarily
G
the burden was on the respondent applicants to establish that
the duties discharged by each of the employee was same or similar
to that of a regular/direct employee appointed/employed by the
establishment and this can be discerned from the facts pleaded
in the application filed by one Jaggu of which a reference has
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 67
been made. In absence of the initial burden being discharged in A
the first instance by the respondent employees, the onus could
not have been shifted upon the appellant SAIL to counter the
nature of work discharged by each of the workmen as to whether
it was the same or similar to that of a permanent/regular employee
of the establishment and how far the principles of equal pay for
B
equal work claimed as enshrined under Article 14 and 39(d) of
the Constitution of India would be attracted in the facts of the
case. The objects and reasons of the scheme of the Act clearly
manifests that the main object of the Act is to provide minimum
rates of wages for certain scheduled employment and also
provides for fixation and revision of minimum wages of the C
workers, overtime rates, remuneration for the work done on a
day of rest, just to ensure that the employee has enough to
provide to his family and to ensure a decent living standard that
pertains to a social comfort of the employee and the cost of living
index. The procedure for fixing and revising minimum rate of
D
wages, which has to be prescribed, is supported by the
recommendation of Advisory Committees/Advisory Board/
Central Advisory Board being constituted under Sections 7 and
8 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the appropriate
Government on its acceptance notified the minimum wages which
are payable to the category of employees referred to under Section E
2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Indisputedly, in the first
place, the minimum wages which were notified by the appropriate
Government from time to time under tripartite memorandum of
agreement dated 12th November, 1991, signed by the appellant
SAIL and the respondents before the Assistant Labour
F
Commissioner(Central), Jabalpur effective from 1st April, 1991,
it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/-
per day over and above the notified minimum wages with effect
from 1 st April, 1991 which has been indisputedly paid by the
appellant SAIL till the employees were allowed to work in the
establishment i.e. April, 1996 when their services came to be G
terminated by the contractor. [Paras 30-32] [83-A-H]
1.2 The scheme of the Act clearly manifests that the Act is
primarily concerned with fixing rates of minimum wages, overtime
rates, rate for payment of work on a day of rest and is not really
H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for
which provision has been made in other laws such as the Payment
of Wages Act, 1936 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section
20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is primarily enacted to
resolve disputes about the rates of wages, rates of payment of
work done on days of rest and overtime rates and to ensure that
B
the rates of wages which are notified by the appropriate
Government for various categories of employees under the
Minimum Wages Act are to be strictly complied with by the
employer in making payments and if any payment is made at the
rates lower than the minimum rates of wages prescribed by the
C appropriate Government, the remedy has been provided to the
workmen/employee to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act and being
a self-contained Code and a beneficial legislation, it is a social
protection to ensure and secure adequate living wage in the
interest of public and looking to the nature of enquiry postulated
under the scheme of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, there appears
D
no scope of enquiry to examine the principles of equal pay for
equal work which is a dispute to be determined by a adjudicatory
mechanism provided under the law. It was not the case of the
respondent employees(2040 in number) that the minimum rates
of wages which were notified by the appropriate Government from
E time to time or as agreed between the parties under the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 have not been paid. But their claim in the
application under Section 20(1) of the Act, was that, once they
have been allowed to work after the prohibition notification dated
17th March, 1993 has come into force, pursuant to which their
status as contract labour in the establishment ceased
F
to operate as a result of contract of principal employer
with the contractor in regard to the contract labour
having been statutorily extinguished, their relationship stood
automatically converted into the employer (i.e., SAIL in the instant
case) and the employee (i.e. contract labour) making them entitled
G for wages which are notified by the NJCS as per the memorandum
of agreement which is payable to direct/regular employees of
SAIL. [Paras 34-35] [87-G-H; 88-A-F]
1.3 The submission is misplaced for the reason that the
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 is a
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STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 69
complete code in itself and regulate the employment of contract A
labour in certain establishments and provide for its abolition in
certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith. The
title of the Act itself indicates that the Act does not provide for
total abolition of the contract labour, but only for its abolition in
certain circumstances, and to regulate the employment of contract
B
labour in the establishments which are registered under Section
7 and working through the contractors who are holding licence
under Section 12 of the Act. In the instant case, the establishment
was duly registered under Section 7 of the Act and the contractor
through whom the contract labour was engaged was holding its
licence under Section 12 of the Act but in the changed C
circumstances, the appropriate Government took a decision to
put a prohibition in making employment of contract labour in
scheduled employment for various reasons which is not a subject
matter of enquiry in the instant case and in consequence of the
prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 published under
D
Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, the contract labour working in
the establishment ceased to function and the contract between
the principal employer and contractor stands extinguished. To
make it further clear, Rule 25 of the Rules, 1971 of which there
was an emphasis before the High Court, may not come to the
rescue of the respondent employees for the reason that it was an E
obligation upon the contractor who are holding a licence under
Section 12 of the Act and as per the terms and conditions of the
licence granted under sub-rule (1) of Rule 25 or renewed under
Rule 29, to comply with certain conditions enumerated under
sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 of the Rules 1971 which includes clause
F
(iv) and (v) to be complied with by the contractor and, if at all,
there is any breach of the conditions of licence, complaint can be
made to the prescribed authority and its consequences are
imbedded under the Scheme of the CLRA Act, 1970. At the same
time, an obligation to provide amenities conferred by the Act to
the workers has been referred to under Chapter V of the CLRA G
Act and the primary responsibility is of a contractor that each
worker employed by him as contract labour has to be paid his
due wages before the expiry of such period as may be prescribed
with an exception provided under Section 21(4) of the Act, in
H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A case the contractor fails to make payment of wages within the
prescribed period or makes short payment, then the principal
employer shall be liable to make payment of wages in full or the
unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the contract labour
employed by the contractor and recover the amount so paid from
the contractor under any of the methods prescribed by law.
B
[Paras 37-40] [89-F-H; 90-B-H]
1.4 In the instant case, after issuance of the prohibition
notification dated 17th March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act having being published, the provisions of the CLRA
Act or CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder would not
C be available to either of the party to strengthen its claim. Minimum
wages as prayed for in the application filed by respondents before
the prescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 could be claimed independently under the
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which indisputedly in the instant case
D was Rs. 11.65/- per day over the minimum wages to be paid by
the appellant to each of the respondent (2040 employees) in terms
of the agreement executed between the parties and that was
indeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit. For
fixation of Minimum Wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948,
there are number of considerations which are to be kept in mind
E by the committees while prescribing the minimum rate of wages
payable to the workmen of a different category. Under Section 3
of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 the appropriate Government
may fix minimum wages for time work, minimum rate of wages
for piece work, minimum wages in respect of overtime work
F defined under sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Act and the
amendment made in Section 3 of the Act also take note of different
classes/categories of employees in such employment while the
notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 came to be
published by the appropriate Government. In the given
circumstances, a mere assertion of fact that the contract labour
G which was allowed to continue after the prohibition notification
came to be published dated 17th March, 1993 in the establishment
of the appellant SAIL performing same or similar kind of work in
the establishment of the principal employer is not sufficient to
endorse their entitlement of claiming wages notified by the NJCS
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 71
memorandum of agreement for direct/regular employees of the A
establishment applicable universally to all the steel industries.
[Paras 41-43] [91-A-H]
1.5 In addition to it, in terms of reference made by the
appropriate Government dated 27 th January, 2003 read with
Corrigendum dated 9th April, 2003 followed with 22nd February, B
2005, the CGIT framed various issues including issue nos. V &
VI and answered it accordingly. The answer thereto has been
upheld in the independent proceedings. The order of the
prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated
2 nd December, 2003 and confirmed by the High Court are
unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. [Paras 44-48] C
[92-C, G-H; 93-A]
Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presiding
Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, Etc.
(1969) 1 SCC 873 : [1970] 1 SCR 51 ; Hindustan
Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Commissioner of D
Labour and Ors. (1996) 10 SCC 599 : [1996] 5 Suppl.
SCR 447 – relied on.
BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar and Others v.
Union of India and Others (1985) 1 SCC 630 : [1985]
2 SCR 611 – distinguished. E
Air India Statutory Corporation and Others v. United
Labour Union and Others (1997) 9 SCC 377:
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 579 ; Steel Authority of India Ltd.
and Others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and
Others (2001) 7 SCC 1 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 343 F
– referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 579 referred to Para 3
[2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 343 referred to Para 3 G
[1970] 1 SCR 51 relied on Para 17
[1985] 2 SCR 611 distinguished Para 17
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 447 relied on Para 17
H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8094
of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2006 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.A. Nos. 34 and 83 of 2006
With
B
Civil Appeal No. 8334 of 2011.
Ranjit Kumar, Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Advs., Sunil Kumar Jain, Punya
Garg, R. C. Srivastava, Abhishek Jain, Ms. Anusha Agarwal, Ms. Saumya
Jay Karan Singh, Rishi Raj Sharma, Lalltaksh Joshi, T. G. Narayanan
C Nair, Advs. for the Appellants.
Colin Gonsalves, Ms. Indira Nair, C. N. Sreekumar, Sr. Advs.,
T. G. Narayanan Nair, Rajas Pohankar, M. T. George, Ramesh Babu M.
R., Amit Sharma, Ms. Malavika B. Pillai, C. N. Sree Kumar,
M. T. George, Ramesh Babu M. R., Advs. for the Respondents.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RASTOGI, J. 1. The present appeals arise from the proceedings
initiated by the workers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 who had
been in employment after issuance of the prohibition notification dated
17th March 1993 under the Contract Labour(Regulation and Abolition)
E Act, 1970(hereinafter being referred to as “CLRA Act”) upto April,
1996 in the captive mine of the Steel Authority of India(hereinafter called
as “SAIL”) in Kuteshwar Limestone Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt.
Jabalpur.
2. The indisputed facts which has come on record are that after
F issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 by the
appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,1970 no
fresh agreement, in the interregnum period (17th March, 1993 to April,
1996) was executed between the appellant and the contract labour and
the agreement in existence was extended from time to time by the
competent authority and the contract labour was allowed to continue on
G the same terms & conditions till their services were terminated by the
contractor after they had proceeded on strike in the month of April,
1996.
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 73
[RASTOGI, J.]
3. The contract labours (2040 employees) of Kuteshwar limestone A
mines who had worked in the establishment of SAIL after issuance of
the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 filed their claim
applications in the year 1998 on different dates under Section 20(1) of
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
4. Before we advert to the question raised in the instant appeals, B
it may be relevant to take the brief history of the matter for proper
appreciation. The erstwhile contract labourers(respondents herein)
worked at the captive Limestone and Dolomite mines in the establishment
of the appellant SAIL initially filed writ petitions claiming regularisation
with back wages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of
this Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation and Others C
Vs. United Labour Union and Others1 wherein it was held that on
issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA
Act, the logical and legitimate consequences would be that the erstwhile
contract labourer covered by the sweep of such abolition for the activities
concerned would be entitled to be treated as direct employee of the D
employer on whose establishment they were earlier working and they
would be entitled to be treated as regular employees from the day on
which the contract labour system in the establishment for the work which
they were doing gets abolished. The aforesaid judgment of this Court
was subsequently overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others Vs. National Union E
Waterfront Workers and Others2.
5. The Single Judge of the High Court earlier allowed the writ
petitions but the matter was finally remitted back to the High Court to
decide as per the law laid down in the Constitution Bench judgment of
this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others(supra). F
6. It is to be noted that the application filed by Jaggu was considered
to be the lead application which has been placed on record (Annexure
P-1 of the paper book) and the only fact stated by him in the application
was that the applicant was employed in the Captive Mine of the SAIL in
Kuteshwar Limestone Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur on 1st G
September, 1984 and was still in that employment at the time of filing of
an application and worked as a skilled workman and was working as
1
1997(9) SCC 377
2
2001(7) SCC 1
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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A Sikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader and that the employment of Kuteshwar
Limestone Mines is a scheduled employment within the meaning of
Section 2(e ) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and rates of wages of
the workers of SAIL are governed by various settlements/agreements
entered into between the management and the Union which are legally
binding and are the wages to which employees of SAIL are entitled on
B
the basis of contract of service, agreement and/or otherwise.
7. The extract pleadings of his application on the basis of which
he claimed wages and other benefits payable to an employee vis-à-vis
those who are regular employee employed in SAIL are as under:-
C “1.The applicant is employed in the Captive Mine of the Steel
Authority of India (hereinafter called as SAIL’) in Kuteshwar
Limestone Mines (Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur from
01.09.1984 and is still in employment. He is a skilled workman
and is working as Sikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader.
D 6. The rates of wages of workers of Steel Authority of India are
governed by various settlements/Agreements entered into between
the management and the Union which are legally binding and is
the wages to which employees of Steel Authority are entitled on
the basis of contract of services, agreement and or otherwise.
The Applicant is entitled to wages and all other benefits as per
E settlement. The agreement also prohibit employment of contract
labour on job of permanent and perennial nature.
7. The management/opponent has been reusing to make payment
to the employees as per wage agreement which is their minimum
wages Sri Bachchan Nayak and other office bearers of the
F Applicant’s Union repeatedly represented the matter of the
Assistant Labour Commissioner, Chief Labour Commissioner
Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Hon’ble Minister for Steel,
Chairman, Steel Authority of India and even the Prime Minister,
for payment of wages as regular employees. Because of the strong
G and persistent opposition of one of the opponent, Minimum Wages
is denied to the Applicant.
12. The applicant has been reporting for work on all the working
days from 17/3/1993 onwards. However, after May, 1996 he was
refused work even when the reports for duty. The applicant was
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 75
[RASTOGI, J.]
always ready and willing to work. There was no termination of A
services of the applicant. The applicant will be deemed to be in
service and entitled to all the benefits, including wages.
16. The applicant has not been paid the wages as per Minimum
Wages from 17/3/1993. The exact figures of amount due i.e.
difference etc. are available with the management and within their B
special knowledge. The opponents are in possession of all the
records and details of the payment due as per wage agreement
and other details. They are liable to produce the same before this
Hon’ble Authority to make appropriate and proper calculation. In
case they fail to produce the documents an adverse inference is
liable to be taken against them. C
17. The applicant therefore pray that a direction may be issued
under Section 20 [3] of the Act for:
[i] payment of difference of wages payable under the Minimum
Wages Act and the wages actually paid as per details given in D
Annexure-A.
[ii] compensation of 10 times amounting to Rs. 24,86,130-00.
[iii]delay if any, in filing the petition may be condoned.”
8. The complaint of the applicant Jaggu (annexure P-1) in his
E
application under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before
the prescribed authority of which a reference has been made, appears
to be that the rates of wages of SAIL which were governed by various
settlements/agreements entered between the management and the
registered Union of regular employees of SAIL are legally enforceable
and the applicant is also entitled to the wages and such other service F
benefits as per those settlements after a prohibition notification has been
published by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the
CLRA Act.
9. The matter was contested between the parties and the
prescribed authority after holding a summary enquiry as contemplated G
under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 under its Order dated 2nd December,
2003 allowed the claim petitions with five times of compensation in favour
of 2040 contract employees who have been represented by Ispat Khadan
Janta Mazdoor Union, Koteshwar Limestone Mine, Gairtalai, Katni.
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76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A 10. The order of the Payment of Wages Authority dated 2nd
December, 2003 came to be challenged by the appellant SAIL by way
of writ petition before the Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
at Jabalpur which was partly allowed vide Order dated 24th January,
2006 holding that the justice would be met if the respondents(employees)
are allowed 6% interest on the amount payable to each of them as
B
compensation from the date of passing of the impugned order of the
authority till its payment. It was further challenged before the Division
Bench of the High Court that came to be dismissed vide impugned
judgment dated 11th December, 2006 with a modification that instead of
grant of 6% interest as compensation, a consolidated sum of Rs. 5 crore
C be paid towards compensation to the aggrieved employees, which is a
subject matter of challenge in these appeals before us.
11. Learned senior counsel for the appellants Mr. Ranjit Kumar
and Mr. Parag P. Tripathi submit that the parity of wages was one of the
issue nos. 5 & 6 based on the pleadings of the parties framed by CGIT
D pursuant to the reference made by the appropriate Government and
both the issues have been negatively answered under its award dated
16th September, 2009 holding that respondents are not entitled to wages
as per National Joint Committee for the Steel Industries(NJCS) vide
memorandum of agreement dated 30th July, 1975 which is applicable
only to direct/regular employees of SAIL.
E
12. The submission of the learned counsel is that at least the parallel
proceedings which are summary in nature initiated under the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 keeping the reference made for adjudication to the
CGIT at bay were unwarranted and despite their objection being raised,
it was overruled and the applications of the workmen came to be decided
F under Order dated 2nd December, 2003 by the prescribed authority under
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which was without jurisdiction and such
applications filed at the instance of the workmen was not maintainable
under the law.
13. Learned counsel further submits that it is nowhere pleaded by
G the respondents that the principle of equal pay for equal work was
applicable and they were entitled for the wages payable to the regular
employees on the basis of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the CLRA Rules, 1971.
The burden to prove was on the respondents to show that the contract
labour was discharging the same and similar nature of duties and work
H as performed by the regular employees of the establishment but such
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 77
[RASTOGI, J.]
facts were neither pleaded nor established by the respondents either A
before the prescribed authority or before the High Court in writ petition/
letters patent appeal and has not adverted to any finding that the
respondents were performing same or similar nature of work as that of
the regular employees of the appellant SAIL. In the absence thereof,
the contract labour was not entitled for the wages payable to the
B
employees who were directly employed by the SAIL for a work which
is neither same nor similar as being performed by the respondent contract
labourers.
14. Learned counsel further submits that the tripartite agreement
which was entered between the contract labourers, contractor and
appellant SAIL in presence of the labour authorities dated 12th November, C
1991 specifically takes care of the Rule 25(2)(iv) & (v) of the CLRA
Rules, 1971 and indisputedly, each of the worker was paid Rs. 11.65/-
per day over the minimum wages notified by the appropriate Government,
as agreed between the parties. The tripartite agreement was effective
from 1st April 1991 although it was entered on 12th November, 1991 but D
wages were paid to each of the contract worker in terms of the tripartite
agreement.
15. Learned counsel submits that it was never the case of the
respondents that the tripartite agreement dated 12th November, 1991
has not been complied with. In fact, the arrears were paid over the E
minimum wages notified by the appropriate Government in terms of
Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the CLRA Rules, 1971 and appellant became liable
to pay the minimum wages agreed in terms of the agreement after
issuance of the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA
Act, since the contract stood automatically extinct, it became the liability
of the employer to see that every workmen who is working thereafter F
must have been paid his due wages in terms of the agreement which has
been signed in presence of the concerned labour authorities dated 12th
November, 1991 and binding upon the parties.
16. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in sequel
to the notification dated 12th November, 1991, the Ministry of Labour, G
Government of India, vide its notification dated 12th July, 1994 revised
the minimum rate of wages payable to the workers employed in the
mines appended Clause 5 to the explanation that in case the existing
rates of wages of any employee as per agreement are more than the
minimum notified rates shall be protected and be treated as the minimum H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A rates of wages and that according to the appellants have been paid to
each of the workmen who had served the establishment of the appellants
after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 till
their services came to be terminated by the contractor in April 1996.
17. Learned counsel further submits that the State of Madhya
B Pradesh under its Act No. 23 of 1961 has made certain amendments to
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. These amendments as explained in its
object and reasons was enacted as validating legislation. The validation
arose in the context of the High Court of Rajasthan quashing its
notifications pertaining to fixing of minimum rates of wages. The said
amendment Act is merely to validate fixation and has no applicability to
C the dispute having raised by the respondents in the proceedings initiated
under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and in support thereof, learned
counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Town
Municipal Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts,
Hubli and Others, Etc.3; BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar and
D Others Vs. Union of India and Others4 and Hindustan Steel Works
Construction Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Labour and Ors.5.
18. Per contra, Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel for
the respondents in support of the judgment of the High Court submits
that after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993,
E it is an admitted position that the contract labourers had continued to
work in the same capacity in the establishment of SAIL and that would
make them entitled for the wages which are being notified by the SAIL
from time to time payable to its regular employees for the period the
contract labour had worked after the issuance of prohibition notification
dated 17th March, 1993 till April, 1996 and clause(v) of the notification
F prescribing minimum wages dated 6th March, 1990 and 12th July, 1994
clearly stipulates that the existing rate of wages to any employee based
on contract or agreement or otherwise if higher than the rates notified
herein, the higher rate shall be protected and be treated as rate of wages
payable for the purpose of its notification and once this fact has been
G admitted that there was an agreement entered into between union of
regular employees and the management of the establishment, at least
the lowest rate of wages in the establishment of the appellant payable to
3
1969(1) SCC 873
4
1985(1) SCC 630
5
H 1996(10) SCC 599
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 79
[RASTOGI, J.]
a regular and permanent employee became the benchmark of minimum A
wages payable to the contract labour who had worked in the establishment
of the appellant SAIL as an employee after issuance of notification dated
17th March, 1993 until termination of service and this what the prescribed
authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has computed towards
arrears of each of the 2040 employee who have, inter alia, filed
B
applications for legitimate wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
19. Learned counsel further submits that as regards their absorption
and regularisation of service, it was indeed a subject matter of adjudication
in a reference made by the appropriate Government under its notification
dated 27th January, 2003 followed with 22nd February, 2005 but so far as
their minimum wages payable to the employees are concerned, it was C
an independent issue having no relationship to the terms of reference
pending before the CGIT at the relevant point of time and after issuance
of prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 under CLRA Act,
such of the contract workers who had served thereafter in the
establishment of the appellants became their employee and can no longer D
be treated as contract workers.
20. Learned counsel submits that after the contract of service
agreement stands extinguished indisputedly the work discharged by the
employees(earlier contract workers) is same and similar as of the regular
employees and it is not open for the appellant to have two different E
wage structures for the employees of the establishment of SAIL and it
was indeed arbitrary and violative of Article 14 & 39(d) of the Constitution
of India and the wage structure applicable to the employees of SAIL
has rightly been extended by the prescribed authority under the mandate
of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and since the respondents have
demanded lowest rate of wages in terms of settlements dated 6th March, F
1990 and 12th July, 1994, no further finding was required to be recorded
with respect to the same or similar nature of work being discharged and
at least those rates of wages are applicable to the present
employees(earlier casual labourers) and this what has been computed
by the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act and confirmed G
by the High Court under the impugned judgment and in support of
submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar and Others(supra).
H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A 21. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.
22. To appreciate the rival submissions made by the respective
counsels, it is considered appropriate to first take note of the indisputed
facts and the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 & CLRA Act
B emerged from the records are that the appellant SAIL is a Government
of India Undertaking and is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India having its steel plants in different parts of India
and was a registered establishment under Section 7 of the CLRA Act
and the contractor through whom the service of the contract labour was
engaged was holding its licence as envisaged under Section 12 of the
C CLRA Act. The tripartite memorandum of settlement dated 12th
November, 1991 which became effective from 1st April, 1991, was signed
by the appellant, contractor and the respondent through Union before
the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur. Under the said
settlement, it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs.
D 11.65/- per day over and above the minimum wages notified by the
appropriate Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
Indisputedly, each of the member of the union was paid his wages in
terms of the memorandum of settlement dated 12th November, 1991. At
the later stage, the appropriate Government issued a prohibition
notification of employment of contract labour dated 17th March, 1993
E and the fact remains that the contract labour which was engaged prior
to the prohibition notification was allowed to continue in the establishment
of the appellant(SAIL) on the same terms and conditions with no change
in their service conditions under the agreement which was executed
prior to the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993, was extended
F from time to time by the competent authority and the services of the
contract labour came to be terminated by the respective contractor in
the month of April, 1996 after they went on strike.
23. After discontinuance of the service of the contract labour by
the respective contractor in April, 1996, 2040 employees/contract labour
G through their union filed their respective applications in the year 1998
under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before the
prescribed authority to claim parity with the wages payable to the
employees who were direct/regular employees of the establishment of
SAIL under the Minimum Wages Act.
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 81
[RASTOGI, J.]
24. After issuance of a prohibition notification under the CLRA A
Act dated 17th March, 1993, the erstwhile contract labourers/respondents
herein filed writ petitions to claim regularisation of service and backwages
in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court in Air
India Statutory Corporation and Others case(supra) wherein it was
held that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of
B
the CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate consequences were that the
erstwhile regulated contract labourer covered by the sweep of such
abolition for the activities concerned would be entitled to be treated as
direct employee of the employer on the day on which the contract labour
system in the establishment has been abolished. But the theory of
automatic absorption of contract labour by the principal employer in the C
establishment on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Government
under Section 10(1) of the Act was later overruled by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others(supra).
25. It is necessary to point out that Ministry of Labour, Government
of India vide its notification dated 12th July, 1994, while revising minimum D
rate of wages payable to the employees employed in the mines had also
specifically mentioned in clause 5 to the explanation that in case the
existing rate of wages of any employee as per the agreement are higher
than the minimum rates, the higher rates shall be protected and treated
as minimum rates of wages. Relevant para of the said notification is
quoted herein as under:- E
“Where the existing rates of wages of any employee, based on
contract or agreement or otherwise are higher than the rates
notified herein, the higher rates shall be protected and treated as
the minimum rates of wages applicable for the purpose of this
notification to such employees.” F
26. Such rate of wages as agreed in its tripartite agreement dated
th
12 November, 1991 were paid at Rs. 11.65/- per day over and above
the minimum wages with effect from 1st April, 1991 and that was
indisputedly complied with and each of the employee (contract labour)
who had served/worked in the establishment had been paid his due wages G
until their services came to be terminated by the respective contractors
in April, 1996.
27. The claim of the respondents in their application filed under
Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was that as they had
H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A discharged the same or similar nature of work as that of direct employee
of the establishment, it makes them entitled for the wages which are
payable to an employee who is directly/regularly appointed in the
establishment to whom wages are paid in terms of NJCS memorandum
of Agreement dated 30th July, 1975.
B 28. It is to be noted that National Joint Committee for the Steel
Industry (NJCS) started its functioning initially in the name of JWNC(Joint
Wage Negotiating Committee) in October 1969 and was primarily
established in pursuance of the decision taken by the industrial committee
on iron & steel in October, 1969. The Committee has now changed its
name as National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry (NJCS). The
C
scope of the NJCS presently covers :-
i) Negotiations for wage agreement and its implementation.
ii) Matters pertaining to and steps to be taken for increase in
production, productivity, improvement in quality, reduction of cost
D and wastage etc.
iii) Review of welfare amenities and facilities.
iv) Matters on which it is necessary to draw the attention of the
government; and
E
v) Any other matter pertaining to steel industry and its employees
as may be agreed to in the NJCS, from time to time.
29. The membership of NJCS comprises 21 union leaders- three
each from four national centres of trade unions: INTUC, AITUC, CITU
and HMS, one each from recognized unions of the steel plants like Bhilai,
F
Durgapur, Rourkela, Bokaro, TISCO, IISCO, Alloy Steels, Salem and
VISL, and 12 management staff managing directors of the steel plants
of Bhillai, Rourkela, Durgapur, Bokar and IISCO, Bumpur; executive
directors of Alloy Steels Plant, Salem Steel Plant and VISL; Vice-
President(HRM), TISCO; Vice-Chairman and Directors(Finance) of
G SAIL. The Director(Personnel) of SAIL is the Convenor-Member of
the Committee. It is a permanent bipartite committee whose scope
extends beyond wage negotiations to implementation aspects and other
matters of concern to the industries and its employees. It is applicable
to the wage structure across the steel industries in the country.
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 83
[RASTOGI, J.]
30. It may be noticed that there are no pleadings on record and A
primarily the burden was on the respondent applicants to establish that
the duties discharged by each of the employee was same or similar to
that of a regular/direct employee appointed/employed by the establishment
and this can be discerned from the facts pleaded in the application filed
by one Jaggu of which a reference has been made. In absence of the
B
initial burden being discharged in the first instance by the respondent
employees, the onus could not have been shifted upon the appellant SAIL
to counter the nature of work discharged by each of the workmen as to
whether it was the same or similar to that of a permanent/regular
employee of the establishment and how far the principles of equal pay
for equal work claimed as enshrined under Article 14 and 39(d) of the C
Constitution of India would be attracted in the facts of the case.
31. In this backdrop of the matter, it would be apposite to first
take note of the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. If we look
into the objects and reasons of the scheme of the Act, it clearly manifests
that the main object of the Act is to provide minimum rates of wages for D
certain scheduled employment and also provides for fixation and revision
of minimum wages of the workers, overtime rates, remuneration for the
work done on a day of rest, just to ensure that the employee has enough
to provide to his family and to ensure a decent living standard that pertains
to a social comfort of the employee and the cost of living index. The
procedure for fixing and revising minimum rate of wages, which has to E
be prescribed, is supported by the recommendation of Advisory
Committees/Advisory Board/ Central Advisory Board being constituted
under Sections 7 and 8 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the
appropriate Government on its acceptance notified the minimum wages
which are payable to the category of employees referred to under Section F
2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
32. Indisputedly, in the first place, the minimum wages which were
notified by the appropriate Government from time to time under tripartite
memorandum of agreement dated 12th November, 1991, signed by the
appellant SAIL and the respondents before the Assistant Labour
Commissioner(Central), Jabalpur effective from 1st April, 1991, it was G
agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/- per day over
and above the notified minimum wages with effect from 1st April, 1991
which has been indisputedly paid by the appellant SAIL till the employees
were allowed to work in the establishment i.e. April, 1996 when their
services came to be terminated by the contractor. H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A 33. The exposition of scheme of the minimum wages Act, 1948
and its jurisdiction to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act has been examined
by this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. The Presiding
Officer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, Etc.(supra).
“7. The long title and the preamble to the Minimum Wages Act
B show that this Act was passed with the object of making provision
for fixing minimum rates of wages in certain employments. The
word “wages” has been given a wide meaning in its definition in
Section 2(h) of that Act and, quite clearly, includes payment in
respect of overtime and for work done on weekly off-days which
are required to be given by any employer to the workmen under
C the provisions of that Act itself. Section 13(1), which deals with
weekly off-days, and Section 14(1), which deals with overtime,
are as follows:
13. (1) In regard to any scheduled employment minimum rates of
wages in respect of which have been fixed under this Act, the
D appropriate Government may—
(a) fix the number of hours of work which shall constitute a
normal working day, inclusive of one or more specified inter-
vals;
E (b) provide for a day of rest in every period of seven days
which shall be allowed to all employees or to any specified
class of employees and for the payment of remuneration in
respect of such days of rest;
(c) provide for payment for work on a day of rest at a rate not
F less than the overtime rate.
14. (1) Where an employee, whose minimum rate of wages is
fixed under this Act by the hour, by the day or by such a longer
wage-period as may be prescribed, works on any day in excess
of the number of hours constituting a normal working day, the
employer shall pay him for every hour or for part of an hour so
G
worked in excess at the overtime rate fixed under this Act or
under any law of the appropriate Government for the time being
in force, whichever is higher.
In order to provide a remedy against breach of orders made
under Sections 13(1) and 14(1), that Act provides a forum and
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 85
[RASTOGI, J.]
the manner of seeking the remedy in Section 20 which is as A
follows:
20. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen’s
Compensation or any officer of the Central Government
exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, B
or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of
Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as
a Judge of a civil court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the
Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims
arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages
or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest C
or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c)
of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime
rate under Section 14, to employees employed or paid in that
area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred D
to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal
practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised
in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person
acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under
sub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction E
under sub-section (2):
Provided that every such application shall be presented
within six months from the date on which the minimum wages
or other amount became payable:
Provided further that any application may be admitted F
after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies
the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the
application within such period.
(3) ….
G
(4)….
(5)….
(6)….
(7)….
H
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages Act,
because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to the
clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with fixing of
rates — rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment
for work on a day of rest — and is not really intended to be an
Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is
B
made in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act, 4 of
1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947. In Section 20(1)
of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking
remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than
the minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment of
C remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days
under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or
of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14. This language
used in Section 20(1) shows that the Authority appointed
under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for
deciding claims which relate to rates of wages, rates for
D
payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates.
If there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and the
employees, Section 20(1) would not be attracted. The purpose
of Section 20(1) seems to be to ensure that the rates
prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are complied
E with by the employer in making payments and, if any attempt
is made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen are
given the right to invoke the aid of the Authority appointed
under Section 20(1). In cases where there is no dispute as to
rates of wages, and the only question is whether a particular
payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime
F
or work on off-days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate
remedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act. If the payment
is withheld beyond the time permitted by the Payment of Wages
Act even on the ground that the amount claimed by the workman
is not due, or if the amount claimed by the workman is not paid on
G the ground that deductions are to be made by the employer, the
employee can seek his remedy by an application under Section
15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. In cases where Section 15
of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy,
the remedy can be sought either under Section 33-C of the Act or
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 87
[RASTOGI, J.]
by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it decided A
under the various provisions of that Act. In these circumstances,
we are unable to accept the submission made by Mr Sen on behalf
of the appellant that Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act
should be interpreted as intended to cover all claims in respect of
minimum wages or overtime payment or payment for days of rest
B
even though there may be no dispute as to the rates at which
those payments are to be claimed. It is true that, under Section
20(3), power is given to the Authority dealing with an application
under Section 20(1) to direct payment of the actual amount found
due; but this, it appears to us, is only an incidental power granted
to that Authority, so that the directions made by the Authority C
under Section 20(1) may be effectively carried out and there may
not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The power to make
orders for payment of actual amount due to an employee under
Section 20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that
the jurisdiction to the Authority under Section 20(1) has been given
D
for the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not
for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the
various rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation; in our opinion,
also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act with
the provisions of the payment of Wages Act which was already in
existence when the Minimum Wages Act was passed. In the E
present appeals, therefore, we have to see whether the claims
which were made by the workmen in the various applications
under Section 33-C(2) of the Act were of such a nature that they
could have been brought before the Authority under Section 20(1)
of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they raised disputes
F
relating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work done
on weekly off-days.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. The scheme of the Act of which reference has been made by
this Court clearly manifests that the Act is primarily concerned with G
fixing rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment of work
on a day of rest and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement
of payment of wages for which provision has been made in other laws
such as the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and the Industrial Disputes
H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A Act, 1947. Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is primarily
enacted to resolve disputes about the rates of wages, rates of payment
of work done on days of rest and overtime rates and to ensure that the
rates of wages which are notified by the appropriate Government for
various categories of employees under the Minimum Wages Act are to
be strictly complied with by the employer in making payments and if any
B
payment is made at the rates lower than the minimum rates of wages
prescribed by the appropriate Government, the remedy has been provided
to the workmen/employee to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act and being
a self-contained Code and a beneficial legislation, it is a social protection
to ensure and secure adequate living wage in the interest of public and
C looking to the nature of enquiry postulated under the scheme of Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, there appears no scope of enquiry to examine the
principles of equal pay for equal work which is a dispute to be determined
by a adjudicatory mechanism provided under the law.
35. It was not the case of the respondent employees(2040 in
D number) that the minimum rates of wages which were notified by the
appropriate Government from time to time or as agreed between the
parties under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 have not been paid. But
their claim in the application under Section 20(1) of the Act, was that,
once they have been allowed to work after the prohibition notification
dated 17 th March, 1993 has come into force, pursuant to
E which their status as contract labour in the establishment ceased to operate
as a result of contract of principal employer with the
contractor in regard to the contract labour
having been statutorily extinguished, their relationship stood automatically
converted into the employer (i.e., SAIL in the instant case) and the
F employee (i.e. contract labour) making them entitled for wages which
are notified by the NJCS as per the memorandum of agreement which
is payable to direct/regular employees of SAIL.
36. The Division Bench of the High Court has also relied on the
scheme of CLRA Rules, 1971 and Rules 25(iv) and (v) in particular
G while arriving to a conclusion that the workmen since were allowed to
continue to work by the principal employer after the prohibition notification
dated 17th March, 1993 has come into force, and they were discharging
same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the
principal employer in the establishment, makes them entitled for similar
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 89
[RASTOGI, J.]
wages admissible to the regular employees appointed/engaged by SAIL. A
Rules 25(iv) and (v) of Rules, 1971 are extracted hereunder:-
(iv) the rates of wages payable to the workmen by the contractor
shall not be less than the rates prescribed under the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), for such employment where
applicable and where the rates have been fixed by agreement, B
settlement or award, not less than the rates so fixed;
(v) (a) in cases where the workman employed by the contractor
perform the same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly
employed by the principal employer of the establishment, the wage
rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of C
the workmen of the contractor shall be the same as applicable to
the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of the
establishment on the same or similar kind of work:
Provided that in the case of any disagreement with regard to the
type of work the same shall be decided by 1 [the Deputy Chief D
Labour Commissioner (Central)];
(b) in other cases the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and
conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be
such as may be specified in this behalf by 1 [the Deputy Chief
Labour Commissioner (Central)]; E
Explanation. —While determining the wage rates, holidays, hours
of work and other conditions of services under (b) above, the
Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) shall have due
regard to the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and other
conditions of service obtaining in similar employments; F
37. The submission, in our view, is misplaced for the reason that
the CLRA Act is a complete code in itself and regulate the employment
of contract labour in certain establishments and provide for its abolition
in certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith. The title
of the Act itself indicates that the Act does not provide for total abolition
G
of the contract labour, but only for its abolition in certain circumstances,
and to regulate the employment of contract labour in the establishments
which are registered under Section 7 and working through the contractors
who are holding licence under Section 12 of the Act. Section 8 provides
for the revocation of registration in certain cases and Section 9 provides
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90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A the effect of non-registration. Section 10 is one of the back bone of the
Act which provides for prohibition of employment of contract labour in
any establishment and we are fortified in our view supported by the
Judgment of this Court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction
Ltd.(supra).
B 38. In the instant case, the establishment was duly registered under
Section 7 of the Act and the contractor through whom the contract labour
was engaged was holding its licence under Section 12 of the Act but in
the changed circumstances, the appropriate Government took a decision
to put a prohibition in making employment of contract labour in scheduled
employment for various reasons which is not a subject matter of enquiry
C in the instant case and in consequence of the prohibition notification
dated 17th March, 1993 published under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,
the contract labour working in the establishment ceased to function and
the contract between the principal employer and contractor stands
extinguished.
D 39. To make it further clear, Rule 25 of the Rules, 1971 of which
there was an emphasis before the High Court, may not come to the
rescue of the respondent employees for the reason that it was an obligation
upon the contractor who are holding a licence under Section 12 of the
Act and as per the terms and conditions of the licence granted under
E sub-rule (1) of Rule 25 or renewed under Rule 29, to comply with certain
conditions enumerated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 of the Rules 1971
which includes clause (iv) and (v) to be complied with by the contractor
and, if at all, there is any breach of the conditions of licence, complaint
can be made to the prescribed authority and its consequences are
imbedded under the Scheme of the CLRA Act, 1970.
F
40. At the same time, an obligation to provide amenities conferred
by the Act to the workers has been referred to under Chapter V of the
CLRA Act and the primary responsibility is of a contractor that each
worker employed by him as contract labour has to be paid his due wages
before the expiry of such period as may be prescribed with an exception
G provided under Section 21(4) of the Act, in case the contractor fails to
make payment of wages within the prescribed period or makes short
payment, then the principal employer shall be liable to make payment of
wages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the
contract labour employed by the contractor and recover the amount so
H paid from the contractor under any of the methods prescribed by law.
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 91
[RASTOGI, J.]
41. In the instant case, after issuance of the prohibition notification A
dated 17th March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act having
being published, in our considered view, the provisions of the CLRA Act
or CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder would not be available
to either of the party to strengthen its claim. As stated earlier, minimum
wages as prayed for in the application filed by respondents before the
B
prescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 could be claimed independently under the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 which indisputedly in the instant case was Rs. 11.65/- per day over
the minimum wages to be paid by the appellant to each of the respondent
(2040 employees) in terms of the agreement executed between the parties
and that was indeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit. C
42. The submission made by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the respondent workmen were doing the jobs of
perennial in nature and the contract labour was banned under agreements
entered between SAIL and the workers union from 1970 onwards and
their performance of same or similar kind of work as the workmen directly D
employed by the principal employer make them entitled for wages in
terms of NJCS Memorandum of agreement is without substance for the
reason that for fixation of Minimum Wages under the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948, there are number of considerations which are to be kept in
mind by the committees while prescribing the minimum rate of wages
payable to the workmen of a different category. Under Section 3 of the E
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 the appropriate Government may fix minimum
wages for time work, minimum rate of wages for piece work, minimum
wages in respect of overtime work defined under sub-Section 2 of Section
3 of the Act and the amendment made in Section 3 of the Act also take
note of different classes/categories of employees in such employment F
while the notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 came to be
published by the appropriate Government.
43. In the given circumstances, a mere assertion of fact that the
contract labour which was allowed to continue after the prohibition
notification came to be published dated 17th March, 1993 in the G
establishment of the appellant SAIL performing same or similar kind of
work in the establishment of the principal employer is not sufficient to
endorse their entitlement of claiming wages notified by the NJCS
memorandum of agreement for direct/regular employees of the
establishment applicable universally to all the steel industries. The
H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 9 S.C.R.
A Judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in BHEL
Workers Association, Hardwar and Others (supra) may not be of any
assistance in the facts of the instant case for the reason that it was a
writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the
workers union seeking declaration from this Court for abolition of contract
labour and be treated as direct employees of the establishment and entitled
B
to equal pay as workmen of the BHEL but that being a matter of enquiry
by the competent authority, their petition came to be dismissed with the
direction to the Union of India to examine their grievance in accordance
with law.
44. In addition to it, in terms of reference made by the appropriate
C Government dated 27th January, 2003 read with Corrigendum dated 9th
April, 2003 followed with 22nd February, 2005, the CGIT framed various
issues including issue nos. V & VI and answered it accordingly.
Issue nos. V & VI are reproduced as under:-
D “V. Whether lime stone mines violated the provision of Clause-
8 of the memorandum of agreement signed between the SAIL,
New Delhi and their Unions and employing workers through
contractors on jobs of permanent and perennial nature was
justified, legal and fair?
E VI. Whether the workmen/heirs are entitled to the wages to
the post in which they were engaged with parity of wages with
that of regular employees of the management with all consequential
benefits?”
It has been answered as under:-
F “It is evident that it is not established that the alleged contract
labours were the employees of the SAIL, as such they were not
entitled to any wages as per the agreement. Moreover they were
not regular employees of the management and the said agreement
appears to be for the regular employees of the management. Thus
these issues are also decided against the Union and in favour of
G
the management.”
45. The answer thereto has been upheld by us in the independent
proceedings.
H
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS. 93
[RASTOGI, J.]
46. In our considered view, the order of the prescribed authority A
under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated 2nd December, 2003 and
confirmed by the High Court under the impugned judgment dated
11th December, 2006 are unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.
47. Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 8094 of 2011 filed by Steel
Authority of India Ltd. is accordingly allowed and order of the prescribed B
authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1948 and Judgment of the
High Court are hereby set aside.
48. Civil Appeal No. 8334 of 2011 filed by the employees(Jaggu
& Others) is dismissed. No costs.
49. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. C
Divya Pandey Appeals disposed of.
D
E
.
F
G
H
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